Hamid: The Revolution that Never Came

The Revolution that Never Came
Shadi Hamid

The failure of democracy in the Arab world may be vexing but it’s really not all that mysterious

The long-awaited “Arab spring” had arrived. Or so it appeared. On January 20, 2005, President George W. Bush declared in his inaugural address that “all who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for your liberty, we will stand with you.” Less than two weeks later, the world stood in collective awe, as Iraqis braved terrorist threats to cast their ballots for the first time in their lives. For those who had been waiting decades to see something as simple as a free election, the moment was moving and emotional. Not long after, in March, former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri was killed. A nation grieved as it witnessed, yet again, a visionary figure cut down by the scourge of terror. Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as close to one million Lebanese demanded self-determination on the streets of their war-torn capital. Then, in April, 50,000 Bahrainis – one-eighth of the total population – rallied for constitutional reform.

For a short while, it seemed that the Middle East was witnessing “a democratic moment,” one that would, in due time, render the region’s haunting past (and present) of tyranny a distant memory. However, it was not to be. The anticipated break with autocracy failed to materialize. Today, Arab dictators are as emboldened as ever. The heady democratic openings of last year have been replaced by sudden bouts of authoritarian retrenchment.

Ahead of his time, perhaps, but also behind it, USC economist Timur Kuran wrote in a provocative 1998 essay that “Arab regimes are highly vulnerable to a shock that would stimulate mass dissent. Indeed, even an ostensibly minor rise in open opposition within one Arab country might trigger a revolutionary cascade that then sets off similar cascades in others. Just such a domino process occurred in Eastern Europe less than a decade ago, when people within and outside the region marveled at the collapse of one communist regime after another. The scenario could be repeated in the Arab world”. 

The “ostensibly minor rise in open opposition” happened not only in one Arab country, but in many. After 9/11, the Arab state system, long immune to change, experienced several of the “shocks” that Kuran believed would open up new possibilities. For a time, they did. Although we might not like to admit it, the unseating of the region’s most egregious dictator did, in fact, have a profound, if varied, effect on millions of Arabs.

Kuran also noted that “as conditions became more favorable to the expression of opposition, individuals would jump on the bandwagon for change, encouraging additional people to join in” (120). But the democratic openings of 2005, while real, proved unsustainable and easily reversible. Something, in other words, went wrong.  In a recent post on the Abu Aardvark blog, Marc Lynch posed the stickiness of Arab autocracy a “puzzle.” But is it really that puzzling?

The problem with explanations of the Arab world’s “democratic deficit” – and Kuran’s thesis is no exception – is that they often fail to adequately account for external factors, namely the Unites States and its towering role in the region. Amazingly, over the course of thirteen pages, Kuran does not mention the US even once. It is almost as if the Arab world exists in a vacuum and, of course, it does not. For strategic reasons, the US has always been intimately involved in the question of Arab democracy and more than ever after September 11. Contrary to what the Bush administration would have us believe, however, it has not reconciled itself to the eventuality or even the desirability of Arab democracy. The fear of that Islamists will come to power through free elections – and they most certainly would – continues to animate America’s calculations, and, more often than not, at great consequence to democratic reform. The “Islamist dilemma” has been highlighted, in stark fashion, by recent Islamist electoral gains throughout the region. Hamas’s unlikely election victory in January 2006 marked the final, crushing defeat of America’s purported democratization drive.   

Not surprisingly, then, the Bush administration continues to lend economic, military, and moral support to the region’s most stalwart dictators, including in Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. After all, the devil you know is better than the devil you don’t, or so we are told.

If domestic factors were the only ones that mattered, then Kuran’s predictions may have borne themselves out. But US democracy promotion policy is a crucial variable and one that has a profound effect on regime actors who show a ready willingness to resort to repression knowing that America will say and do nothing to stop them. Moreover, the perception – whether real or imagined – that the US has veto power over Arab political fortunes leads to a sense of powerlessness among the population at-large, providing yet another disincentive for collective action. In short, external factors drastically alter the available opportunity structures for all involved, making successful transitions to democracy more or less likely – and certainly, in the case of the Arab world, the latter.

To truly understand the stubborn insistence of Arab autocracy, we must also delve into domestic factors, for while America matters, it would be foolish to think that the success or failure of Arab democracy is entirely dependent on political calculations made in Washington, DC. Such a notion, in addition to being false, denies 300 million Arabs the moral and political agency that is theirs and theirs alone.

Which leads us to problem # 2: Internally, the political dynamics of Arab countries are “exceptional.” Compared to other regions, the Arab world is paralyzed by a unique set of ideological cleavages that have made achieving substantive democratic reform a much more challenging task than it would otherwise be. In Eastern Europe and Latin America, the primary cleavage between regime and opposition was economic. In the Middle East, the primary cleavage is religious (i.e. Islamism vs. secularism) and this tends to complicate the situation. In such a context, divisions between government and opposition are not a matter of differing public policies, but rather one of the raison d’etre of the state itself. Politics, thus, becomes an existential concern and, in extreme examples, a matter of life and death, as it was during the fated Algerian elections of 1991, where a secular military regime chose civil war over a democratically-elected Islamist parliament. Such ideological polarization makes compromise between regime and opposition forces nearly impossible. “On matters of economic policy and social expenditures you can always split the difference,” the esteemed political scientist Dankwart Rustow once pointed out.  But how do you split the difference on religion, ideology, and identity?

There is also the issue of ideological cleavages within the opposition itself. Successful democratic transitions in Latin America and Eastern Europe were facilitated by broad-based opposition coalitions which were able to unite behind inclusive pro-democracy platforms. A culture of compromise prevailed as key players were able to agree on the how, when, and why of democratization. In the Arab world, however, there is a lack of opposition consensus regarding the most foundational aspects of political life – namely the boundaries, limits and purpose of the nation-state. As a result, the opposition simply can’t get its act together. So Islamists and non-Islamists all too often fight each other instead of unifying their efforts against the regime.

It is this unfortunate confluence of internal and external factors which has made the Arab world the most undemocratic region in the world, even after a set of post 9-11 “shocks” that, in other circumstances, might have provided the impetus for the democratic revolution that Kuran envisioned.

The failure of Arab democracy, while vexing, should not strike us as particularly mysterious or surprising. Certainly, US policymakers should not pretend to be shocked at the way things turned out. While it is not entirely their fault, they have no doubt done their part to ensure the continued vitality of Arab autocracy. As Americans, it may be difficult for us to convince Islamists and secularists to stop hating each other. This is something that Arabs themselves must work to resolve (and, fortunately, there have been encouraging signs of Islamist-secularist reconciliation in recent years). It, however, is well within our purview to begin moving our country toward a democracy-centric foreign policy that actively promotes democratization in the Arab world not only in rhetoric but in practice. Such a policy is long overdue. Until then, let’s stop acting surprised. Arab democracy has failed, and it has failed for a reason, but that doesn’t mean it still can’t succeed if the appropriate course of action is taken. 

Shadi Hamid is founding member and associate at The Project on Middle East Democracy and a PhD candidate in politics at Oxford University. He is also a contributor to Democracy Arsenal, the Security and Peace Initiative’s foreign affairs blog. He recently outlined his vision for a “democracy-centric foreign policy” in a two-part essay (and part 2) for The American Prospect.

Comments

[penny]

If Arab democracy fails, it's cheap and easy to blame the US. The US liberated two Muslim countries, putting the beginnings of a civil society in the place of thuggery, allowing their populace a chance to take responsibility for their futures. Democratic elections were held. Secular governments established. If Iraq and Afghanistan backslide into tribalism and anarchy, then, ultimately that's their decision. There are limits to what outside forces can do.

The failure of Arab democracy, in my opinion, has a direct correlation to the failure of Islam to reform into a modern secular and democracy approving entity. As long as half of the population in the ME, females, are excluded from meaningful equal social, educational and political participation there will never be democracy. You can't enslave half of a population and pretend you are a democracy.

How is any realistic foreign policy going to reform a religion?

[aardvark]

Me, I don't think you can answer the Arab democracy failure question without a hard look at the Arab regimes themselves: repression, highly sophisticated internal security services, patronage networks, and the ability to sell their enemies (Islamists, used to be Communists) to the US. Can't blame it all on the failures of the opposition, or on Islam.

[penny]

Geez,..."repression, highly sophisticated internal security services, patronage networks, and the ability to sell their enemies (Islamists, used to be Communists) to the US".... the characteristics sounds pretty interchangeable with the Saudis' second biggest export, after oil, Whabbism.

Maybe the ME regimes in many ways are simply the secular reflection of a religion and culture that has no permissions or inherent ability to behave in a democratic manner. You can't separate Islam the religion from Islam the politics, it's a complete package.

Arabs haven't produced much in the past thousand years. Have they ever really examined why instead of perpetually playing victim? Memorizing the Koran in madrasses isn't an education. Polygamy is archaic and economically inefficient. Illiterate women encourages a macho male culture. When poll after poll in EU countries demonstrate that a significant Muslim minority denounce western culture and prefer sharia to secular laws, then, it's no wonder that thugs stay in power in the ME. You've got to love and want democracy to obtain it. The majority of Muslims simply aren't there

I'm really tired of the it's not all America's fault attitude, BUT.......

[alle]

Messieurs Cent & Penny:

Well, now we're all waiting for Nickle and Dime to show up with another set of farcial misrepresentations of reality.

First, whoever would claim that the US smash-and-abandon strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq have installed "secular" regimes there (meaning the tribal-Islamist-warlord coalition of Karzai, and the Islamist-militia setup of Maliki) is obviously too far off in his/her own dream world, to be engaged in discussion. As is anyone who for a second thought that the simple installation ex machina of secular Western-style democracy was the a realistic outcome of the invasions.

Second, whoever claims that Arabs haven't given anything to civilization the last 1000 (sic) years, ought to take a class in either maths or history. Or just about any science would do, really.

And if you think Arab or Muslim (you conveniently confuse the two) education normally comes in the form of Quran classes, and that polygamy is a widespread social problem in the ME/NA, you are also strongly advised to visit just about any country in the region to check that against reality.

And about the significant minority who would like religious law in the West, well, you think that's telling about the whole Arabo-Muslim culture. So what then, one asks, does it say about Western culture that Fascist or pseudo-Fascist parties such as Front National, and others with similar aims, are supported by about the same number of non-Muslims in these countries? Is that an indictment of Western culture? Christianity?

Or could it possibly be a reflection of real social issues and political problems, that should be dealt with as such, not as fuel for one's private cultural and religious bigotry?

[penny]

...."whoever claims that Arabs haven't given anything to civilization the last 1000 (sic) years, ought to take a class in either maths or history"...

Wrong. That contribution was a THOUSAND YEARS ago. So, what's been new in the past 1000 years in terms of innventions, copyrights, patents, science, literature, medicine, technology, civil society, commerce, anything that Arabs can take credit for that is modern and relevant? I'll narrow it down, the past 200 years?

"smash-and-abandon strategies"...hey, they've had their best shot at democracy given to them, no less by outsiders, it's time for Muslims to take the ball and run with it.

"Religious bigotry"? That's rich, given the intolerances of fatwas, dhimmitude, jihad, sharia law as dogma in Islam. Look no further than Darfur for religious genocide.

Trying to smear me as a religious bigot is disingenuous. If you don't like the facts, shooting the messenger is stupid.

Western culture is very tolerant. It takes us awhile historically to galvanize our collective resolve to repel fascism, but, when we do, I can assure you it will happen. Is Islam prepared for another thousand years of rot? Or will the truly brave in that dysfunctional religion/culture have the insight and humility to change?

[penny]

Oh and, "now we're all waiting for Nickle and Dime to show up" is a real cheap shot that makes a joke of "a blog journal by Middle experts" a joke.

[model_1066]

alle,

The muslims have certainly given the world much in terms of hatred, misogyny, illiteracy and violence. But whatever useful or original aspects of the culture was strangled hundreds of years ago.
And since you attempted to bolster your weak argument with a reference to some barely known 'pseudo-Fascist' group called Front National, I looked them up:

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia:

Front National can mean:

* Front National, a French political party
* Front National (French Resistance), a World War Two French Resistance group
* Front National, a Belgian political party
* Frente Nacional, a Spanish political party

Hardly relevant, but nice try.

BTW, I have worked in muslim countries, and can reasonably conclude that most of what they have that is worth anything these days comes directly from the French, British, Germans and Americans. For example, there would be little cultural heritage left in Egypt if it wasn't for western archaeologists.

[Antonio Manetti]

Since I don't understand the polities in the middle east, I find it very hard to understand what a democracy ought to look like in that region.

While President Bush says that everyone wants to be free, in the middle east it seems that what everyone wants is freedom at the expense of the other guy.

Antonio

[Shadi Hamid]

Someone said: "Maybe the ME regimes in many ways are simply the secular reflection of a religion and culture that has no permissions or inherent ability to behave in a democratic manner. You can't separate Islam the religion from Islam the politics, it's a complete package."

A question that we would have to examine here is whether religious/cultural stagnation is a symptom or a cause. I would argue that political reform leads to religious reform, not the other way around. Islamic thought and practice has been stifled by an undemocratic atmosphere in which Muslims are not exposed to the full diversity of opinions on issues of importance. In other words, it's unfair to expect Arabs to be engaging in the kind of free-flowing, expansive debates that you allude to when there is no room for freedom of expression and where any form of critical thought is suppressed by the regimes.

Moreover, the notion that Arabs do not desire freedom has no basis in fact. Every poll that's been done on the issue (Pew, Zogby, CSS) suggests that Arabs register some of the highest levels of support for democracy as the best available form of government.

[alle]

Penny:

You've turned out even dumber than I thought, so no reason to continue this. But:

1. I was not involved in creating this blog, and whatever cheap shots I may take at you and your peers in the commentary field should not reflect on those who are.

2. You would be strongly advised to read something, anything, on the Darfur question before ever mentioning it again. (And if reading and studying perchance catches on with you as a habit, why not also try something on the Ottoman Empire.)

Model:

Front National is one of France's (and thus Europe's) most politically important political parties, and it's leader (Jean Marie Le Pen), whom I'm sure you would be quite comfortable voting for, finished second in the last presidential elections. Also see Germany, Poland, Italy, Denmark, etc, for more examples.

"Barely known" to you, perhaps, but you shouldn't assume that's an argument in your favour.

[penny]

The "Darfur question", there is nothing in question, but, the genocidal murder of Christians there by Muslims. You refute those facts? Or, you are unaware of the religious identities of the perpetrators and the victims?

But, I'm pleased that you identified yourself..."and whatever cheap shots I may take at you"... as a cheap shot artist. It's the default position of idiots that can't participate in dialogues using facts and reason.

[alle]

They're all Muslims in Darfur, you sad little cretin.

It's a tribal (mainly Fur, Zaghawa, Mesalit vs. abbala Rizeigat and some minor "Arab" tribes; and intratribal leadership/generational struggles), political (centralism vs. regionalism; and over who gets to sit at the table in Khartum, who gets the most government jobs after Abuja, and who gets the bigger slice of the reconstructio budget) and economic war (nomad-agriculturalist, historically and presently, over hawakir grazing lands; now there's the added question of oil exploitation in southern Darfur, whether real or imagined, and the foreign interest that brings, eg. China's backing of the regime; plus the stresses of desertification; plus the khartumi elite's econmic links to some nomad groups). And, it has also been ideologized, rationalized and much publicized as a racial (Arab/African) war, which, even if it lacks much historical foundation, has indeed started to become a real and significant line of conflict since the 80s, in large part thanks to the Arab nationalist propagandizing and support of the dear brother leader in Tripoli. And it is also interlinked (tribally, politically, militarily, etc -- you name it) with the proxy cold war between Sudan and Tchad.

But it is not in any way a religious war, except for some minor intra-Muslim conflicts that have latched on to the tribal warfare (b/w various Sufi orders and b/w rival local leaders dressing up as religious scholars; and since this is Sudan, the influence of Mahdism and the religio-political ramifications of the rise and fall of the Umma Party). If anything, the Islamic/-ist factor is stronger with the rebels (JEM/Ibrahim, close to Hasan Turabi) than with the government, which has mobilized its auxiliaries virtually only through tribal networks (among the historically landless tribes). The gov only uses the religious factor to whip up national and pan-Islamic resentment towards foreign intervention, not to mobilize groups in Darfur.

Yeah, that's about it. Now you can go look up all those strange foreign names on Wikipedia.

[JR786]

It's sad but typical that this promising site has already been discovered and co-opted by the usual anti-Muslim bigots. It is a lesson for the Muslims that there can never be genuine dialogue with the Christians.

[Sitting in an English garden]

You'd imagine that before the author had begun he'd have thought this through just for a second: if the lack of democracy is America's fault how is it that the two countries under US occupation - Iraq and Afghanistan - are also among the most democratic?

Likewise, if a lack of democracy is the Americans' responsibility then you'd expect those regimes that aren't backed by Uncle Sam to be the most democratic: instead you've got forty years of Baath party rule in Syria, genocidal Islamists in Khartoum and Khomeinists running the show in Iran.

The failure of democracy to take root in the region is the result of much more profound problems than America’s influence, and is one facet of the region’s failure to come to terms with Modernity. Democracy is the product of particular social values, most specifically the relationship between the individual and the state – and these aren’t necessarily the same in the Middle East as they are in the West.

Trying to explain the region’s problems in terms of geopolitics might be good for grandstanding, but until academics come to terms with the reality of Middle Eastern societies they’ll continue to miss the point.

[Masla7ji]

Indeed, Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi was already talking about the malign consequences of political tyranny on all aspects of civilization a hundred years ago. In horribly purple prose, admittedly, but you can't have everything.

[Antiquated Tory]

If I can be forgiven for echoing Fareed Zakaria, isn't the stress on Democracy per se putting the cart rather before the horse?
Western Europe did not suddenly wake up one morning and say "Hey, let's have Democracy!" It came about in various ways in different countries but in all cases was a process that came about over many years and was linked to the rise of a large, monied middle class with political interests.
There was also a very long tradition of limited and divided power in Europe beneath the rule of law. This has not been the case in Arab lands, where rulers just or injust have been absolute. This contrast dates back to Europe's feudal period; Amin Maloof in The Crusades Through Arab Eyes mentions it in an epilogue. (I don't have space here to mention the post-feudal development of absolute monarchy in Europe except to note that it was not successful in the long term.)
Another problem with societies like that in the Middle East is that the mass of the people are poor and little educated, have no stake in the system and no interest in abstractions like "rule of law." Given a vote, they will most likely vote for a populist tyranny that will deliver material benefits and suppress the other classes. The elite, corrupt to varying degrees, are frightened of the populist rule, Islamist or otherwise, that would come about if "the People" ever were empowered, and rightly so. The middle classes are comparatively small and non-expanding, defensive of their status and possibly even more frightened of the masses than are the elites. To all classes though the economy is thought of as Statist, where patronage and the good jobs flow down from the central authority.
This is not unique to the Middle East--much of Latin America runs on similar principles and I've heard it described as a 'Mediterranean' model--but it combines with a traditional/Islamist vs modernist/secular dynamic, often trading off in waves, which as another post here mentioned, makes compromise bloody difficult if not impossible, since the very nature of the society is a bone of dispute.
I think the United States has a great deal of effect but conversely little influence on the situation. That is to say, though the US can do quite a lot, what it cannot do is get the outcome it desires. The most extreme example of what I am talking about is Iraq; clearly the US has had a trememdous impact on Iraqi politics but just as clearly, unless you are some sort of nut, its massive intervention has not resulted in what it wanted. You can also consider the Iraq invasion to have been the culmination of years of frustration over none of its Iraq policies producing anything that the US would truly like to have in the region.
Please forgive me for the gross generalizations I have presented above and in an area where I have no specialist knowlege. I just wanted to argue that "democratization" as a foreign policy goal is simplistic and a pipe dream. No outside agency or combination of agencies has the influence, regardless of raw power, to bring this about. The best that can be done is constant pressure to encourage the rule of law and the broadening of economic opportunity.