Abu Aardvark

Where's Qaradawi?

Hey, you know where Yusuf al Qaradawi, the so-called "shaykh of terror", is right now (or at least was yesterday)? In the Sudan, trying to find a solution to the crisis in Darfur - which, frankly, is a heck of a lot more than Bush is doing.

According to al Hayat, Qaradawi's mission is calling for a meeting to "achieve national reconciliation", and warned that "the humanitarian conditions in the region demanded an immediate and urgent intervention by Arab and Muslim organizations to deal with the suffering and to assign responsibility for the tragedy." While he did not discuss ethnic cleansing or mass rapes, he did pointedly discuss the burning of villages and the collective humanitarian disaster. Above all, he insisted that Muslims must deal with the issue - both because it was wrong for Muslims to do such things, and to avoid Western intervention. The Qatari paper al Sharq quotes him as calling for all parties to "be governed by the voice of reason." Some Sudanese parties are accusing him of taking the side of the government, pointing to the fact that official state television broadcast his Friday sermon live; but he has also met with Turabi, and has explicitly challenged government claims about the magnitude and cause of the problem.

Didn't know that? Maybe that's because, according to Google News, the only place that it's been mentioned is the Sudan Tribune, which quoted him as follows: "The fanning of this sedition serves the enemies of Islam because they want to check the expansion of Islam, through the Sudan gate, to the African countries," he said. "The conflict should not have occurred among people "of one faith and one language," said Qaradawi, adding that the solution "lies in unification of ranks and in making concessions by all parties -- both rulers and ruled -- for addressing the issue so that foreign hands will not have a chance for interference.".

The Washington Times reported his accusation that NGOs were proselytizing for Christianity, but barely mentioned his peace mission.

Other than that, not a story shows up. Maybe that's because Qaradawi leading an Islamic delegation to the Sudan to mediate the conflict doesn't fit the dominant storylines: Arabs and Muslims are ignoring Darfur, Qaradawi is a radical apologist for terrorism.

To be honest, I frankly am not able to judge whether this is a positive intervention or a negative one, whether it really is pro-government or whether it is really an attempt at honest mediation... but what is undeniable is that Qaradawi is there, treating Darfur as a major issue for Muslims, and trying to find a solution. And given that it seems to have been totally ignored in the West, it can hardly be dismissed as double-talk, as one commenter below suggested.

On that front, for what it's worth, here are some of the most recent headlines on Qaradawi's own home page (in Arabic, not English): "Reform is an Islamic obligation"; "Qaradawi calls for the release of journalists"; "Freedoms before implementing sharia."

In some ways, I'm an unlikely defender of Qaradawi - I actually don't support large parts of his political agenda, nor do I like his socially conservative views. I wish that he were far more forthright and expansive in his condemnations of terrorism. But the reason I find myself defending him repeatedly is that Qaradawi - along with his main platform, al Jazeera - has been the target of a concerted campaign of defamation which has established a conventional wisdom which just isn't true. When Swift Boat liars appear in the US, we all (or at least, most of us) understand the smear for what it is; when a smear happens in Arab politics, a lot of people think that someone like Abd al Rahman al Rashed or Mamoun Fandy is some kind of neutral truth teller rather than an active participant in the political operation. There's a million blogs to fact-check the Swift Boat Liars, but not many to correct the record on al Qaradawi or al Jazeera. So criticize Qaradawi for his views, by all means - lord knows there's plenty to criticize - but just try to recognize the political hatchet jobs for what they are....

UPDATE: I'm moving this bit up from comments into the main post, because Eugene's sharply phrased comment helped to focus my mind a bit:

[Why am I even a reluctant defender of Qaradawi?] Because Rashed has roughly zero credibility with the vast majority of Arabs and Muslims and Qaradawi has an enormous amount. When Rashed says such things, it makes Americans very happy, but has very little impact on Arab or Muslim attitudes. When Qaradawi says something which isn't quite what we'd like to hear, but which is - in the context of Arab and Muslim politics - an important stand against radicalism, it has a very real impact on those attitudes. That's why I think that it's important to encourage voices like Qaradawi's, and don't much care about statements like Rashed's.

Plus, Rashed's piece was blatantly dishonest. He repeated the bit about American civilians - okay, maybe he thought it was true, lots of people got taken in, including al Sharq al Awsat. But he also insinuated that Qaradawi ignored issues like the Sudan... at a time when Qaradawi was actually *in* the Sudan trying to mediate.

Ramadan

Muslim WakeUp! reports that Tariq Ramadan has been denied a visa by Homeland Security, and will not take up his teaching post at Notre Dame.

I don't have time to comment on this beyond pointing to what I've written on Ramadan previously... and to just register that this a shameful, terrible decision, which will have wide ranging implications in American (alleged) attempts to reach Muslim moderates. When the United States attacks Islamist moderates like this, it does Osama bin Laden's work for him. Well done.

UPDATE: Scott Martens does what I don't have time to do - and very well!

Reading Pleasure

For your reading pleasure:

The July issue of the Arab Reform Bulletin is out, with a special focus on women's issues.

An interesting pair of essays in Policy Review: Tamara Wittes (Brookings), The Promise of Arab Liberalism, and Jon Alterman (CSIS), The False Promise of Arab Liberals.

An interview with Tariq Ramadan in Open Democracy.

Don't miss the "Charlie Brown, Lucy, and The Football Show", as the warbloggers get all hot and bothered about the Iraqi nuclear missiles that were really found this time, really, really, really.

And John Holbo on "Superbeing and Time" and "Crisis on Infantile Earths" - for something completely different.

Egypt in September

Praktike in comments asks: I'm going to Cairo in September - what should I expect?

Well, let's see. Cairo in September? Oh, no doubt about it - expect to find a thriving pro-American democracy, with a booming economy liberated by the new reformist prime minister. Perhaps you can meet up with Gamal Mubarak, who - I can tell you now - will defy expectations by declining the NDP's pleas that he stand for election to replace his father as President and instead devote himself to strengthening civil society, human rights, and the rule of law. All because Bush said that Egypt should lead the way towards Arab democracy... man, what a speech that was! Who knew that all it took was a few strong words?

Michael Rubin and the Middle East Quarterly

In my previous post, I attacked Daniel Pipes a bit, and suggested that his article being published in the Middle East Quarterly did not augur well for the future reputation of that journal. But then this bit of deliciousness dropped into my lap. Martin Kramer tells us that his replacement as the editor of the Middle East Quarterly has been named. And it is none other than Michael Rubin. Yes, that Michael Rubin - the person most frequently cited as most likely to be the guy who leaked classified information to Ahmed Chalabi, and hence to the Iranians. I, of course, do not know if this is true (Laura Rozen says no, because he didn't have access to that information... but certainly his friends might have, right?), but I find it deliciously ironic that the editorship of a journal explicitly devoted to promoting American interests in the Middle East has passed into the hands of a man who is - at the least- closely associated with the guy who betrayed American secrets to Iran. Kind of like Iran-Contra conspirator Michael Ledeen holding court at the National Review, only more current and hence more pure and pristine. Ah, sweet delicious irony - may you never abandon us.

UPDATE: it makes Pipes' attack on Abou el Fadl for bad predictions looks even sillier now that he's hired Michael "Hugs and Puppies" Rubin to run his journal.. could there be any single person who said more false things about the Iraqi reaction to the American occupation than Michael Rubin?

"Why They Hate Us"

David Warren (who I suspect, but do not know for certain, isthis David Warren) has an article in the new issue of Commentary (not available on line yet, sorry), purporting to explain "why our enemies hate us." It's called "Through the Eyes of Our Enemies," and the blurb begins portentiously: "Our Islamist adversaries hate us for a reason."

All of this suggests a set of very important and interesting questions, which suggest numerous avenues of research. For example, you might want to ascertain that "our enemies" (define your terms, please) do in fact "hate" "us." What is the nature of the "hatred" - is it cultural or political? Has it persisted over a long period of time, or is it a recent phenomenon - since persistence and change would naturally point to different lines of research. All of this would, one again might think, ask the writer to immerse himself in Islamist deas and arguments in order to find some answers. And at the end of the day, we would hope to emerge with some new insights into why Islamists "hate" "us."

Alas. David Warren has a different, altogether more cunning strategy for answering his question. And his strategy reveals a sad, but telling, problem besetting many conservative musings on the subject. How so? Let's go to the tape.

A full one third of his essay is taken up with an account and evaluation of Edward Said (hint: he was bad). Another full third is taken up with the writing of Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit - interesting authors, to be sure, but not exactly the "they" whose "hatred" of "us" would seem to demand explanation. And sandwiched around this meaty filling of Said, Buruma, and Margalit are two pieces of white bread: a recounting of the outburst of instant experts after 9/11, whose work is not evaulated in any real way despite suggestions that such an evaluation might be useful; and a conclusion praising a couple of sensitive and timeless Muslim writers (Fazlur Rahman and Ibn Khaldun, safe picks).

And the argument and evidence about why Islamists "hate" "us"? Craftily left out of the article. No actual living breathing Muslims to be quoted here. No Islamists at all. No glances at public opinion survey data, no trips to the region to at least query the taxi drivers and hotel workers about how they feel about America, no quotations from the English language press... or even MEMRI (which is about as far as a lot of supposed research goes, I'm afraid).

From all of this, the hidden meaning of the essay - and the demon bedeviling all too many essays on the subject - becomes manifest. The "enemies" who "hate" "us" can not be, as the article begins, Islamists, given their complete absence from the essay. No, the true enemy on the evidence of this essay can only be the academic left, corrupted and twisted by Edward Said and now clouding the minds of the impressionable from their all powerful perch at the New York Review of Books. Ah, the new post-September 11 seriousness, as we leave behind our petty concerns with, say, the actually existing Islamic world and focus instead on what's important, like Edward Said.

The narcissism of it all: but enough about me... let's talk about how you feel about me.

Syria Lessons

The power of narratives is often underestimated. When you are looking for a particular story, it's easy to look right at something and see something else. Point in case: the much blogged New York Times story about Syria which argues that the Iraq war has inspired Syrian reformers. Other than one quote from a reformer who says exactly what the Bush administration's supporters want to hear - which we should just hope wasn't Jack Kelleyed - there is nothing in the story to suggest a causal relationship. The rest of the story's evidence is either tangential (a disgruntled filmmaker) or else represents something different than the journalist seems to think. But the narrative that American journalists want to see - Iraq war sends message to Arab dictators - is just so powerful that it can blind even veteran journalists.

What has happened in Syria? Rioting with an ethnic character has captured the attention of the Arab media, but in the US what really has gotten people's attention seems to be the reformists "pushing the bounds," supposedly for the first time in a long time if ever. The thing is, though, that these reformists have been doing exactly the same thing for years. The New York Times - and everyone enthusiastically citing the story - commit what I've come to call the Tom Friedman fallacy, making it appear that nothing like this has every happened before because that's what the Bush narrative requires. In the case of Syria, they seem to have forgotten all about the Damascus spring a few years ago. After Bashar came into office, a whole bunch of reformists began testing the bounds, encouraged by signals that the son's regime might be a bit more tolerant than the father's. Salons sprung up to host excited political debate, the press became a little less boring, expectations began to rise. And then Bashar's regime clamped down, the reformists shut up, and the brief moment of a little enthusiasm passed away. The events which have gotten people so excited thus far seem like a rather tamer version of those earlier events, and I've yet to see any reason to think that the outcome will be any different.

The Bush narrative insists that Arab reform efforts essentially begin with the Iraq war, and for people whose interest in the Middle East began on September 11 this might sound plausible. But a more realistic narrative goes like this: towards the end of the 1990s, pressures for reform began to build up across the Arab world, driven partly by the growing pressures for economic opening and even more by the revolutionary impact of the new Arab media like al Jazeera. After September 11, virtually every Arab government clamped down hard, often using the excuse of fighting terrorism to reclaim their more authoritarian powers. With the runup to the Iraq war, these leaders were terrified of their mobilized publics and kept a really tight leash out of fear. Now that the war is over, these regimes are loosening up a little bit after a period of unusually high repression - keeping in mind that they still face all of the economic, political, and media pressures which drove the demand for reform in the late 1990s.

I would like it to be different. Contrary to what some folks seem to think, I'm not a gloomsayer about the hopes for Arab reform. There's nothing I would rather see than genuine democratic openings in the Arab states. Do I want to deny Bush credit for movements towards Arab reform? Well, yeah - because he doesn't deserve it. I only wish that the Bush administration were doing things that would actually help with that - which is certainly within the power of an American administration that genuinely cares about such things. Invading Iraq was at best an indirect, and more likely a counterproductive, way to spark such reform. Journalists who misread history in order to fit that narrative aren't doing anyone any favors.

The Economist and the Aardvark

Showing once again how the Economist takes its cues from the aardvark (except on the Iraq war, alas), the March 6 issue had paired stories directly addressing the two Islamists who have been the subject of some discussion here the last few weeks. Yes, I know that the March 6 issue isn't the current one, but give me a break... I've had a nasty flu, and I'm catching up.

First, in its story on European Islam, the Economist dwells at some length on Yusuf al Qaradawi. Like me, they take him very seriously indeed; their evaluation is more measured than mine, but more forthcoming than Martin Kramer's. Here's the Economist's take on the Shaykh: "The Muslim Brotherhood.. is a grass-roots movement to build an Islamic society from the bottom upwards that was spawned in Egypt in the early 20th century and spread, in the teeth of repression, across the Islamic world. The Brotherhood's principal ideologue is Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, a 77-year-old religious teacher, based in Qatar, who enjoys great moral standing in the Islamic diaspora, via his writings, broadcasts and websites. He also wields influence through a more formal channel: the Dublin-based European Council for Fatwa and Research, of which he is president. This council comprises 32 leading scholars, from Europe and the Middle East, whose self-appointed task is to ponder the dilemmas—moral, personal and political—faced by European Muslims. The issues they consider range from the religious (the posture and frequency of prayer) and the professional (can Muslims be full-time sportsmen?) to the realm of politics (can Muslims take part in local elections?). But they also touch on world affairs. For example the council has said that Jerusalem is Islamic land, and that its occupation by non-Muslims should be resisted by "all means"—and also that suicide bombings in Israel are not subject to the usual Muslim strictures against taking one's own life, or that of non-combatants. In 2001 European governments rejoiced when Sheikh Qaradawi roundly condemned the terrorist attacks of September 11th. But the scholar makes clear that he feels differently about suicide bombings in the "war zones" of the Middle East. He encourages keen but qualified participation in the western system, with the interests of Islam always in mind."

Second, the Economist discusses Tariq Ramadan. Summary judgement: "Compared with many rivals, the Swiss theologian's reading of Islam is more devout, and also more insistent on the need for Muslims to integrate in the West. A grandson of the Muslim Brotherhood's founder, he combines orthodoxy with enthusiasm for such causes as the green movement and opposition to global capitalism." Noting the various controversies in which he has so frequently been involved, the Economist expects his tenure at Notre Dame to be a lively one. I agree.

Islamists and Democracy

Lee Smith, who some of you may recall from what I found to be a very interesting exchange about Tariq Ramadan, has a piece in Slate today about Islamists and democracy. As in his hardline rejection of Ramadan's moderate credentials, Smith sees little evidence of Islamist understanding of or enthusiasm for democracy. He admits that many Islamists have favored elections, but judges this to be motivated solely by their pragmatic calculation that they would win such elections. Beyond that pragmatism, "However, it's not at all clear that the Islamists have any interest in the broad array of liberties—like freedom of speech and equal rights—that most people, certainly most citizens of liberal democracies, associate with democracy."

Oddly, however, Smith does not actually address the arguments of any moderate Islamists. One would think that to explore the question of how Islamists think about democracy, it would be necessary to engage with those influential Islamist thinkers who have written and spoken about the subject. And Azzam Tamimi does not count, sorry (nor does an anonymous guy he met in Dubai, who said something about an anonymous Iranian intellectual. That's not evidence, it's hearsay). What have Islamists such as Yusuf al Qaradawi, Mohammed al Awa, Tariq al Bishri, Fahmi Huwaydi, Kamal Abd al Magd, Tariq Ramadan, Abdelkarim Soroush, and so on said about it? We've already rehearsed our disagreements about Tariq Ramadan. Let's look at Yusuf al Qaradawi.

Qaradawi is probably the single most influential Islamist thinker today. Many Americans just dismiss him out of hand because he has expressed support for the Palestinians. This is beyond silly, a bit intellectually embarrassing.. but all too common in an American discourse which defines moderation in terms of political positions (specifically, whether or not the person supports particular American foreign policy goals) rather than in terms of approaches to politics (do they endorse violence, do they respect the views of others, do they accept the rights of minorities). Qaradawi - an al Jazeera regular who recently turned down the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood because he felt he could be more influential as an independent thinker - has spent the last thirty years presenting a sustained and coherent argument for a moderate approach to Islamism. He has routinely and consistently denounced terrorism and intellectual extremism. He declared it permissible for American Muslims to participate in the Afghan campaign, and he routinely denounces terrorist attacks. And he argues very clearly that Islam not only is compatible with democracy, it requires it.

In his book "Islam Without Fear," (which Smith referenced in our last exchange, so he presumably has read) Raymond Baker discusses a 1993 series of fatwas issued by Qaradawi on the question of democracy (p.173, for those keeping score). In those fatwas, Qaradawi "unambiguously embraced political pluralism, including the competition of political parties.... Qaradawi explained that Islam has no trouble tolerating diversity in sharia, recognizing four major schools as authoritative despite important differences among them. ... Qaradawi took as a starting point the idea that the Islamic notion of shura [consultation] with the ruler provided a secure conceptual anchor for contemporary efforts to build democracy... Qaradawi unequivocally pronounced that shura was obligatory and not voluntary."

Qaradawi is not obscure. He has written dozens of books, given hundreds of lectures, on this topic. He is the most prominent Islamist intellectual today. If one reads Arabic, one could review this record on Qaradawi's home page. If one does not read Arabic, perhaps one should refrain from blanket judgements about what Islamists think.

What about Fahmi Huwaydi, another very prominent Islamist moderate who writes regular columns for al Ahram and al Sharq al Awsat? Again, I'll quote Baker, since it's in English and easily referenced. Huwaydi's conception of democracy "specified the seven critical characteristics that New Islamist theorists agree a political system must have to meet the exacting Islamic standards of justice achieved through democracy. The first specifies that legitimate authority rests with the people, who choose the ruler and have the right to remove him from power. The second notes that society has responsibilities and duties that it exercises independently of any call by the authorities or permission by the government. The third, fourth, and fifth provide, respectively, for freedom as a right for all, equality fo all citizens, and the explicit recognition of the rightful place of the 'other', that is, the non-Muslim, as a full partner with Muslims in the just Islamic state. The sixth... makes any injustice haram [religiously forbidden]... the seventh recognizes sharia as the source of legislation to which rulers as well as people must yield." Elaborating on the last point, both Huwaydi and Qaradawi defend a highly pluralistic and contestable approach to sharia.

The point of all this is not to prove that these Islamists are "liberals." They aren't, in the American sense of the word. They take religion seriously, and want to expand its place in public life. But they are democrats, and they are a powerful force in contemporary Islamic politics, even if critics like Smith choose to ignore them because they do not fit their thesis.

Friedman's Silliness - some evidence

Last week, I took Tom Friedman to task for his silly claim that the Iraq war had sparked a political debate in the Arab world about democracy after long decades of silence on the matter. I challenged him last week by pointing to his own early enthusiasm for al Jazeera. This morning, I spent a few minutes on the al Jazeera website, and now I can put a little meat on the bones of my criticism.

Remember, Friedman wants you to believe that " the U.S. ouster of Saddam Hussein has triggered the first real "conversation" about political reform in the Arab world in a long, long time. It's still mostly in private, but more is now erupting in public." How, then, to explain the following al Jazeera talk show topics?

March 5, 1999: "Arab democracy between two generations." - More Than One Opinion
March 29, 1999: "Democracy in the Arab world." - More Than One Opinion
June 27, 1999: "The Relationship Between the Rulers and the Ruled." - Sharia and Life
September 21, 1999: "Imperialism and the Arab Regimes." - The Opposite Direction
October 17, 1999: "Islam and the Question of Freedom of Expression." - Sharia and Life
November 2, 1999: "Military Regimes and their Impact on Society." - The Opposite Direction

This isn't every show dedicated to internal critique, just a small sample. The debates on these shows - transcripts are free and easily available if you can read Arabic (unlike Tom Friedman, apparently, who relies on MEMRI for his Arabic sources... more's the pity) - tend towards fierce criticism of dictatorial Arab regimes, and many guests (and most of the hosts) are passionate in their demands for more democracy. Unless Friedman wants to claim that Bush's war is so powerful that it went back in time to alter Arab political discourse, then the most simple and basic evidence shows how very wrong he is.