Abu Aardvark

Jordan's Christian IAF member

Many years ago, a frustrated Jordanian leftist and Christian political activist told me that he was ready to join the Islamic Action Front.   The Muslim Brotherhood's political party, he said, was the only one in the country able to get its act together enough to actually make a political difference, and he agreed with most of their political stances on political reform and foreign policy.  He sobered up in the morning and sheepishly admitted that there might be a few kinks in his plan, most notably the whole "beer" issue.  Personally, I think that he would have missed miniskirts too, but that's another story. 

I remembered that evening when I read last week that Aziz Musa'ida had become the first Christian  elected to a leadership position in the Islamic Action Front (its Administrative Council out of the Third District). The Muslim Brotherhood featured the news prominently on its website, and it set off something of a political and media frenzy.  But a week after his election he quit, reportedly after coming under intense personal pressure.  Musa'ida complained about a "whispering campaign" against his personal reputation, while the IAF's Ruhayl Ghurayba blamed his resignation on "religious pressure" from other Christians and from "politicians who did not want to see the appearance of a tolerant Islamist movement which did not discriminate between Muslims and Christians."    At this point, it is still not clear whether the pressure on him was coming from his tribe, Christians, or the government;  some reports claimed that he had been pressured to convert to Islam;  the IAF denied those allegations.

Was it a fascinating instance of potential cross-religious political activism, with potentially region-wide implications, or was it just a publicity stunt by the IAF?  Opinions differ.  Critics grumbled that he was simply window-dressing, to hide the Brotherhood's anti-Christian agenda;  supporters said that it showed that the Brotherhood had evolved far beyond its exclusivist roots and could be trusted to not discriminate against Christians.  Jamil al-Nimri, a liberal al-Ghad columnist not known for sympathy with the IAF, described it as a positive step which would only mean something if it were followed by further developments in the party's ideology and practices towards acceptance of citizenship and a civil state.   Nimri pointed out that there had actually been 30 Christian applicants to join the IAF, but only 3 had been accepted, and that it was perfectly natural for Christian Jordanians to want to join the Kingdom's only large and effective political party.    

The emerging consensus, though, seems to be that the real purpose behind the IAF's Christian "stunt" was sprucing up its image in advance of Parliamentary elections which might or might not be held this year.  The IAF Secretary-General Zaki Beni Rashid recently said that Jordanian government circles are anxiously discussing whether to postpone the elections because it knows that the IAF will do extremely well (he offered the number of 35 seats, without specifying how he arrived at the number).  The IAF has called on the government to set a date for the elections, and Bani Rashid said that he thinks they will go ahead on schedule.  There have been rumours that the IAF has decided to limit its contestation of the elections in order to avoid winning too big and provoking a harsh official response (something the Egyptian MB did, to no avail). If they do, it will be another important test for the whole democracy in the Middle East thing, keeping in mind that even if the IAF got 35 seats - heck, even if it got 55 seats - it wouldn't matter all that much in the realities of the Jordanian political system.

Stunt or not, it still seems very notable that the IAF put a Christian in a leadership position without generating much Islamist dissent that I could find - the global Muslim Brotherhood site featured the news prominently and seemed not the least bit put out by it.  It may also be worth noting that Christian participation in an "Islamist party" is not entirely unique:  Egypt's Wasat Party, which split off from the Muslim Brotherhood, prominently featured Christians in its leadership and in its party manifesto.  The Egyptian government has rejected its application for a license six times now I believe, on the grounds that it contributed nothing new to the political spectrum.  The highly respected Egyptian judge Tareq al-Bishri has written quite a lot on the subject.  Back in Jordan, columnist Ibrahim Ghurayba claims that the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood actually had considerable Christian membership in the 1950s, naming Sulayman al-Mashini and Abdu al-Sha'ir and Abd al-Halim Badran - the real question, for him, is why the Brotherhood is now so closed to Christians;  another pseudonymous columnist suggested that all the foreign media attention was because of Christian-Islamist tensions elsewhere, like Egypt, which never really existed in Jordan.   

Christian-Islamist tensions are growing, with Christians in Arab countries having well-grounded fears of the rise of Islamist movements (some important pieces about the devastation of the Iraqi Christian community should be appearing soon).  Moves like this, even if small and cynical, deserve attention and thought.   I've got to run now though... 

Jordan: new public opinion survey

The Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan has just released the latest round of surveys on the state of democracy in Jordan.  The report isn't yet available on the CSS site, and is only sketchily reported in various newspapers, but here's what I've been able to piece together of the major findings:

• on the 10 point scale (10 the highest) consistently used by the CSS since the early 1990s, the state of 'democracy in Jordan' is currently 5.8, no real difference from most other surveys, a little bit down from 2005 (when it was 6.2)
• just under 50% felt that freedom to join political parties or participate in demonstrations is guaranteed in Jordan
• around 40% said that democracy is the best system to improve economic conditions - an odd way to phrase the question, I think.  Similarly, only 10% said that rule by religious figures would improve economic conditions, again a bizarre way of framing the question - presumably those who want religious government do so because of their religious beliefs, not because of venal material expectations.  I don't know if this very poor framing represents sloppy construction of the survey or an intentional way of not asking other more direct questions. 
• around 60% described the last Parliamentary election as 'fair and just.'  That is rather low.   Less than 50% think that the current Parliament is doing its job well.
• 58.8% see the public media as credible.  Also very low. 

One result which I found especially interesting given my current concerns about the rising sectarian tension:   the survey found near consensus that religious minorities - including the Shia - should be seen as full citizens and be able to practice their beliefs in full freedom, and that a different sect should not be grounds for doubting their loyalty or citizenship.  That seems like one more piece of evidence in support of the general thesis that the current wave of anti-Shi'ism in the region is coming from the top down (the governments) and not from the bottom up.

New Jordan reports

While I'm working through the Iraq Study Group report, it's worth noting a sudden mini-deluge of reports on Jordan in which people might be interested:

• Julia Chochair, Illusive Reform:  Jordan's Stubborn Stability (PDF), from Carnegie:   "the United States and Europe, for short- to medium-term reasons, have shied away from urging Jordan to undertake further reform, which would be in everyone’s long-term interest. Choucair recommends the U.S. and Europe press the Jordanian regime -- in both public and private statements and by leveraging economic aid -- to deepen formal and informal channels of communication and representation; and to acknowledge the demands of Jordanian activists by, for example, expanding legislative powers, adopting new press legislation, decreasing regulations on NGOs, and undertaking electoral reform."
• Scott Lasensky, Jordan and Iraq: Between Cooperation and Crisis, USIP. "The kingdom, for years a linchpin in the U.S. strategy to promote peace and stability in the region, is now less secure in the wake of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. Jordanian leaders worry that Iraq is becoming a haven for terrorist groups, a fear dramatically heightened by the November 2005 suicide bombings in Amman. Jordan also has an interest in the development of an Iraq that does not inspire radical Islamist politics in Jordan. Moreover, the kingdom is anxious about growing Iranian involvement in Iraqi politics, and—more broadly—increasing Iranian and Shiite influence in the region."

Also, the short piece I wrote about Jordan for the Brandeis/MIT conference a few weeks ago will be released at some point as part of the conference report;  anybody who just can't wait for it can find a draft version here at my homepage (PDF).

Now, back to Iraq.   

The Jordan Summit: where's the king?

One of the predictably annoying things about Jordanian newspapers is that the King's picture is almost always on the front page.  Which makes this cover photo from the relatively liberal newspaper al-Ghad particularly striking:

Source: al-Ghad.  This is Jordan - where's the King?

Sure, the picture is from the press conference, and the King wasn't in it - but Jordanian papers usually find a way to get his picture out there.  It isn't surprising that the King wouldn't want to advertise his place in this summit.  President Bush's visit to Jordan was wildly unpopular, met with protests organized by the opposition parties and a cascade of editorial scorn.   The lead editorials in the Jordanian dailies made the best of things, expressing hopes that the visit would open the door on a new page for the region.  Amidst the predictable anger and complaining, some more interesting comments:  Urib Rentawi wrote that Bush always comes to the region barking orders and issuing threats, but this time he came with nothing to say and nothing to offer.  Yasir Abu Hilala sharply notes that contrary to the popular Jordanian demand that Bush go away, he would actually prefer that Bush stay a while:  Americans don't understand us or want to understand us, he writes, so better that he stay and actually learn something.   In al-Ghad, Basim al-Twisi pointed out that Jordanian public opinion is as hostile to Bush and to American foreign policy as ever, even as Jordan and America become ever closer strategic allies - at the least, he suggests, Jordan should be better compensated financially for its efforts.  That reminds me of the old joke, the one which ends "now we're just haggling over the price"...

With that much hostility to the meeting, it very much behooved the King to come out with something to show for it.   Too bad about that.   How did King Abdullah feel about it?  Just check out this picture from the front of today's al-Sharq al-Awsat:

Source: al-Sharq al-Awsat. 

That is one grumpy King.

Abu Odeh before a state security court

Adnan Abu Odeh, former head of Jordan's Royal Court and former Minister of Information, has been brought before a state security court over an al-Jazeera interview recorded earlier this year but only broadcast on October 21 and October 28.  In the interview, Abu Odeh talked at length about the myriad ways in which Jordanians of Palestinian origin face systematic discrimination.  What Abu Odeh said isn't at all new, even it violated taboos. Way back in 1995, the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan carried out a widely discussed public opinion survey which found widespread awareness of these issues.   Abu Odeh made many of the same charges in a book published by the United States Institute for Peace back in 1999 (which was discussed on the program).   Besides the general political context, what's different now can be summed up in one word:  al-Jazeera.  Airing these ideas on al-Jazeera poses a threat very different from an academic study debated in the elite press or an English language book.   

Jordan's press has been going berserk for weeks over this- Abu Odeh has called it an orchestrated attack, but frankly Jordanian-Palestinian relations are so explosive a topic in Jordan that I doubt most of these columnists needed a green light to unload on him.  But denunciations in the media are one thing, prosecution by a state security court are something very different.  And Abu Odeh is indeed being prosecuted for threatening national security and the ubiquitous 'insulting the king.'  I don't have any time to get into the substance of the controversy - the Jordanian blogger Khalaf and Helena Cobban give some details - but just want to highlight the core fact that a senior ex-regime figure is being prosecuted by a Jordanian state security court for an interview he gave on al-Jazeera. 

This is exactly why I was so worried about the long-term implications of the prosecution of some Islamist Members of Parliament before a state security court for their praise of Abu Musab Zarqawi:  once a country like Jordan starts prosecuting politically inconvenient individuals before state security courts, the habit becomes hard to break.  Whatever one thinks of Abu Odeh or about Jordanian-Palestinian identity politics, nobody interested in liberal reform in Jordan (or in the Arab world) should be happy to see someone like Abu Odeh being prosecuted for simply stating political opinions in public.  And at some point, perhaps the US government should start wondering whether Jordan's illiberal trend is getting problematic.

UPDATE:   according to al-Quds al-Arabi, a number of prominent Jordanian commentators and members of Parliament have been calling for Abu Odeh to be stripped of his Jordanian citizenship for his offensive claims that Jordan discriminates against Jordanians of Palestinian origin.  Because nothing says "tolerance for Jordanians of Palestinian origin" like threatening to strip a prominent Jordanian of Palestinian origin of his Jordanian citizenship.

UPDATE 2:  the public prosecutor has reportedly decided not to pursue charges.   Excellent news, and a relief to all those concerned about public freedoms issues.  (Thanks to Khalaf for the link)

Qahwa Sada: postponing Jordan's elections?

I've posted my own piece on Jordan over at Qahwa Sada. While I won't be doing this routinely, since that is more about other scholars than about me, I wanted to lead by example by contributing something substantial.  And to fill in for two promised pieces which failed to materialize on time.   Here's the opening paragraphs:

Postponing Jordan's elections?
Marc Lynch

At a roundtable with Arab journalists last Wednesday, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs David Welch was asked about reports that Jordan would postpone next year's scheduled Parliamentary elections out of concern for an Islamist victory.   Welch ducked the question in favor of generalities about democracy.  Both the question and Welch's non-answer were telling.  Over the last two weeks, a controversy has indeed erupted in Jordan over the question of whether next year's scheduled Parliamentary elections will be held. 

The controversy began when a highly respected independent columnist, Samih al-Mayateh, penned a short piece arguing against a postponement. This relatively innocuous intervention might have been passed over had not speculation in fact been raging in private political salons.  A series of columns followed, and then a taciturn semi-denial from a government spokesman.  Some observers have dismissed this as a non-issue, a straw man cooked up by Parliamentarians who enjoy their cushy jobs or by bored columnists looking to stir up trouble.  While anything is possible in King Abdullah's Jordan, I would agree that such a postponement is actually quite unlikely.  But the controversy is fascinating for what it reveals about the current state of affairs in the Hashemite Kingdom.

Read the rest at Qahwa Sada!

Jordan is making really great strides

Condoleeza Rice, pressed by reporters about the absence of democracy in the 'moderate' states she was flying out to meet, responded that "We have with the Saudis these discussions. We have with the Egyptians these discussions. Look, it's not -- Jordan is making really great strides in its political evolution."  Nice to hear that she is "having these discussions" with the Saudis and the Egyptians - at least she isn't claiming that they are listening to her discussions, or that they are "making great strides in [their] political evolution."  The only place she claims is actually "making really great strides" is Jordan.

Jordan.

Hm.  Let's see what has happened in Jordan's political evolution over the last year (not even counting the sudden alleged discovery of a Shia menace):

• The passage of a draconian anti-terrorism law which dramatically expands the power of the secret police and intelligence. One report describes it like this:  "The law considers any direct or indirect relations with terrorist organizations inside or outside the country as an act of terror. It gives the security services a carte blanche to take measures against those the authorities believe support terror ideas, incite attacks or express sympathy for suicide bombings. These suspects may be detained without charge or trial for long periods of time without access to lawyers, which international rights groups says is already practiced in the kingdom."
• The arrest and conviction of two Islamist Members of Parliament for issuing public statements praising Abu Musab Zarqawi - not material assistance, not incitement to terrorism, just positive statements about him.   They were subsequently pardoned by the King, in traditional Jordanian fashion, leading some observers to wonder why Jordan bothers to have a legal system at all.
• Parliament just approved a law demanding that only government-approved ulema could issue fatwas or preach in mosques, aimed at curbing the power of the Islamist movement. 
• Human Rights Watch has issued a series of reports detailing torture in Jordan's prisons and the rising power of an unchecked GID (General Intelligence Directorate) in all areas of Jordanian life.
• Press freedom has continued to suffer.   Even before the powerful speaker of the Parliament gave an angry press conference vowing to introduce legislation clamping down on the freedom of the press, there were reports of official moves to expand state control over the media, and liberals trying to reform Jordan TV were forced out in favor of more pliant conservatives. Last year the editor of an Islamist weekly newspaper was arrested for posting articles critical of Jordan on a website, and charged with insulting the dignity of the state before a state security (not civilian) court.  Two journalists went to jail for reprinting the Danish cartoons.
• The National Agenda, billed as the framework for liberal political reform, was dead on arrival.  It isn't just that its recommendations haven't been implemented, but it is rarely even mentioned any more.
• As Samih al-Mayateh writes today, rumors continue to circulate among the Jordanian public about the possibility that the Parliamentary elections scheduled for June of next year won't be held (the last time a Jordanian Parliament lasted a full four year session, in 2001, the elections were canceled and the country went without a Parliament for two years).  If they are going to be held, it would be nice if there were a new electoral law in place some time before then so that people could decide whether and how to run. 
• In the most recent public opinion survey I could find which asked the question (December 2005), only 48% of Jordanians said that they felt they could safely criticize the government.

This is what Rice sees as "great strides in its political evolution"?   

Reasonable people can disagree about the merits of each Jordanian policy:  perhaps the anti-terror law wasn't as bad as it could have been or was justified by the Amman hotel bombings;  perhaps the fatwa law was needed to battle extremist preaching in the mosques; perhaps torture was justified because it helped out the Americans.. um, I mean, because, um - I mean, what torture, you biased human rights organizations you!  Certainly a lot of Jordanians (including some bloggers who are likely going to be very annoyed by this post!) see at least some of the moves as warranted by the security situation - terror attacks are real, and so forth.   But whether or not it is justified by Jordan's political situation, the overall trend towards a more repressive, less liberal political system is pretty clear.   

Now, perhaps this is just another definitional issue.  Perhaps from the Bush administration's perspective, passing draconian anti-terrorism laws, using torture, threatening the press and so forth does constitute great progress towards democracy.  Or maybe it isn't just a slip of the tongue when Rice responds to a question about Jordan's political development by talking about its relations with Israel or support for American foreign policy objectives.   But for people who consider progress towards democracy to include things like a more free press, more civil liberties, more respect for human rights, or - god forbid! - actual elections of the country's ruler... not so much.   

Jordan's Shia threat

All morning, I've been mulling over Jordanian columnist Mohammed Abu Roman's article in today's al-Ghad about the appearance for the first time in Jordan's history of the "Shia question" as a security issue.   The appearance of a "Shia question" in Jordan is bizzare, given that (according to generally accepted statistics quoted by Abu Roman) there aren't more than a few hundred Shia among Jordan's citizenry. But, according to Abu Roman, official government circles are increasingly concerned about "political Shi'ism" due to the influx of Iraqi Shia refugees, the alleged relations between Iran and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (via Hamas), and the worrisome popularity of Hezbollah during its war with Israel.  Abu Roman hints at the irony of the fact that the main anti-Shia forces in Jordan are the salafi and jihadist movements against which the regime has been cracking down hard since last November's terrorist attacks, noting that these unnamed officials had no plans to enlist the salafi trend against the Shia threat.   What's the deal?   Any connection with the reports that "the focus of Rice's trip is to talk with moderate Arab governments -- Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states -- about how to form a united front against Iranian-backed extremism"? 

Jordan's Friday protest

A firsthand account of yesterday's protest in Amman from a colleague who happened to be there:

I went to Friday's protest in Amman. Salah Armouti, head of the Bar Association, publicly called for Friday prayers to be held in front of the Association building in Shmesani. Jordan Times quotes him saying no laws prohibit it (actually, the Interior Minister issued something in 1991 or 1992 banning Friday prayers in open fields). Friday afternoon, the police blocked almost all roads into the central shopping district of  Shmesani to motor traffic (including Culture St. and the road lined with coffee shops). Additionally, streets within two blocks of the Association building were closed to EVERYONE, even pedestrians. I tried to talk my way up to C-Town, but they said no one is allowed in that area until 2:00. It was a clever move by the MB and Associations. They knew they wouldn't be allowed to run an independent protest and always planned on joining the gov-approved march downtown. By calling for it, though, they forced the regime to disrupt happenings in Shmesani and Rabia. Gulfies walked past riot police to get to Sultan Coffee Shop.

So, I went downtown to the routinized and controlled march that starts at Jami' Hussein and follows the same route and program. There was one Hashd flag and one other small party, but otherwise it was a Muslim Brother affair (ie, no other visible members of the Higher Committee). Even the head of the IAF wore a MB hat as he spoke. Typical fare - support for Hamas, HizbAllah, bi-ruh bi-dim nafdiki ya Beirut, condemnation of Zionist aggression and colonialism. The Association carried a large banner reading 'kulna al-muqawama', and other banners condemend Arab silence in the face of Zionist crimes. Quite a few HizbAllah flags, but dozens of Muslim Brother flags. Chanters called on Hamas to launch operations and Nasrallah to fire missiles at Tel Aviv (!). Nasrallah's name was mentioned more than any other. The speech was typical as well, although he threw in a bit about electoral reform and the release of the three detained IAF MPs. The MB coordinated encouraged the crowd to chant for Ali Sukkar and Abu Faris. I got the sense that the leadership of the Brothers/IAF were using the gov-approved solidarity march to show support for the detained IAF deputees, whose trial begins this Monday. There were more MB flags than usual. The crowd wanted to yell support for Hamas and HizbAllah and burn an Israeli flag. The coordinators wanted pictures of Jordanians waving MB flags and supporting their MPs.

Interestingly, (and I looked diligently), I did not see a single picture of the king in the march. The other 8 protests I've seen in the same spot by the same groups were always led by a nominal picture of the king. Yesterday, I didn't see a single one. An al-Manar TV crew led this protest. I also only counted three Jordanian flags in the crowd, and one was attached to Lebanese and Palestinian flags. Typical mukhabarat and police presence, although the police had more riot gear than they usually do for these things.

I went to protests in Cairo a few weeks ago. The atmosphere between the two countries is completely different. This is obvious, but I was nevertheless struck how controlled and tame the MB is in Jordan. In Cairo, the police surround and intimidate protestors with overwhelming force. Literally, security outnumber civilians. The Egyptian gov also systematically hires thugs (even called baltagiyyah). I took some pictures of gov-hired thugs standing in a tight square across from protestors, holding police-issued batons (!). The Egyptian authorities make little attempt to hide what they do.

Thanks for the write-up - others on the scene (and not just in Amman) should feel free to send in their own observations!
UPDATE:   Bahraini protests, courtesy of Chan'ad (moved up from comments):

Here in Bahrain there have been lots of demonstrations -- at least 6 in the past week I think. Lots of Hezbollah flags and Bahrain flags... a few Palestinian flags, but hardly any Lebanese flags. Lots of photos of Hasan Nasrallah, and a few of the late Shaikh Ahmed Yassin. Lots of chants of "labbaik ya nasrallah" and "labbaik ya muqawama".

Obviously the dynamics here are a bit different from the rest of the Arab world due to the large Shia population. Nonetheless, the demonstrations in Bahrain are similar to those elsewhere in that they are being used a vehicle to express anger against the ruling regimes. Angry participants at the demonstrations and on online forums frequently refer to the Al Khalifa ruling family as "Zionists" (al khalifa, ya sahyon); though this insult has been commonly used prior to the Lebanese conflict also.

The Leftists and Baathists (and even a few Sunni Islamists) have tried to also show their support and co-sponsored one of the first demonstrations, and other activities supporting Lebanon. But the Shia Islamists, by virtue of the sheer numbers of their supporters have totally dominated the scene.

So the first 4 or 5 demonstrations went ahead without much govt interference. There was a huge one on Wednesday with several thousand people participating. Some photos here.

But yesterday a few hundred protestors wanted to march to the US Embassy, but the govt wouldn't allow it, so it got nasty, as tear gas and rubber bullets were fired resulting in several injuries. Some photos here.

Jordanian protest

Jordanian blogger Issam writes that a protest in downtown Amman began as a demonstration in support of Lebanon and the Palestinians, but then - to the surprise of the regime's people in attendance - it turned to condemning the absence of political freedoms and the martial law mentality pervading the country.   Security types (mukhabaratis) stirred up some trouble, but - according to the blogger - the rally succeeded in voicing both support for Lebanese and Palestinians and opposition to domestic repression.

Source:  al-Mowatan blog (Issam)

That's the sort of thing I was talking about in yesterday's post. One of the commenters complained that Jordan TV distorted its coverage of the rally, presenting it as the crowd thanking the government for his adept diplomacy - insulting the intelligence of the people yet again - while another bitterly pointed out Jordan's scheduled joint military exercises with the US next week.  Bold stuff (and, as a firsthand account of an evidently misreported protest, an illustration of what bloggers can bring to the table - see Haitham Sabbah's roundup at GVO for other Arab blogger perspectives).  Anyone else at the protest, or heard about it or any follow up?   

Meanwhile, over in Cairo....

Source: al-Wa'i al-Masry / Misrdigital