Abu Aardvark

USIP: Iraq in the Obama Administration

The United States Institute for Peace has just released a briefing entitled "Iraq in the Obama Administration" drafted by Daniel Serwer and Sam Parker.  The report reflects a series of discussions by USIP's genuinely bipartisan Iraq group, a legacy of the Iraq Study Group (keeping in mind that "those whose names are listed at the end have participated one way or another in the discussions on which the paper is based, but do not necessarily agree with it in its entirety"). 

The report focuses on the need to pay careful attention to Iraq during the transition period and early months of the administration, a time when issues might be expected to fall between the cracks.   I am not going to present the whole report here -- I agree with much but not all of it, and would have preferred some other points be more central, but I recommend that those interested in Iraq policy have a look at it.  Some of its recommendations can't wait for the new team to mull over --  such as the urgent need to quickly fill the key policy positions, including Ambassador, or the need to be prepared for the provincial elections scheduled less than two weeks after the inauguration.   Others will hopefully help prepare decision-makers for some important issues inevitably coming down the pike. 

In the meantime, I would like to say a bit more about one issue, bouncing off of the first recommendation in the report (while saying, FWIW, that no inside information, animal testing, or artificial growth hormones went into the writing of this post):

The President-elect has an opportunity to reconfigure the U.S./Iraq relationship, relying in part on the SOFA.  The Bush Administration gave Prime Minister Maliki largely unconditional support from 2006 onwards, because the future of the political process was in doubt and the overarching priority was for the government to stand up and fill the security and governance void.  Maliki became increasingly confident that there was no alternative for the U.S. but to support him.

The time has come for the U.S. to take a more institutional approach to support for Iraq, one in which Washington communicates clearly that it will implement the SOFA respectfully, effectively and transparently and that its support is not linked personally to the Prime Minister, but is instead intended to help build a stable Iraq that meets reasonable expectations:

• Power sharing and integration of disenfranchised groups into government institutions;
• Respect for basic human rights and the rule of law;
• Resolution of disputed internal boundaries;
• Cooperation with international efforts to fight terrorism.

This approach is not intended to restore U.S. influence, which inevitably will continue to decline, but rather to use the influence that remains most effectively in the pursuit of a future stable Iraq that meets U.S. interests, which are broadly consistent with the political objectives that the Iraqi parliament adopted when calling for a referendum on the SOFA.

....

This meeting [with the Iraqi Presidency Council] should launch an on-going strategic dialogue through the Higher Coordinating Committee created in the Strategic Framework Agreement.  President Obama should tell Iraqis clearly of his intent to withdraw U.S. combat forces faster than the SOFA requires, subject to adequate progress on political and security matters.  As Vice President-elect Biden is strongly associated in Iraqi minds with proposals to partition Iraq, which are vigorously opposed in the Arab population, it will be important to clarify that this is not Obama Administration policy (based on the campaign statements of the president-elect).

Let me put on my public diplomacy hat for a moment.   Right now, in the absence of clear statements from a President-elect wisely determined to adhere to the 'one President at a time' rule, anxious Iraqis and Arabs, the American media, and those hoping to pre-emptively shape the new administration's policy are filling the void with a wild range of theories, projections, and suspicions.   Contradictory comments from Gen. Ray Odierno and Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh have fueled these suspicions.  A whole lot of Iraqis seem to think that the Biden Plan to partition Iraq is coming back or that there are secret riders to the SOFA/WA allowing permanent U.S. bases or that Obama has "abandoned" his commitment to withdraw from Iraq, to mention only three that I hear a lot.   I believe that there is very little basis for most of what's circulating (in the U.S. or in Iraq) but in a sense that's the point -- that's what happens in the absence of good information.   

This is a good example of where public diplomacy and foreign policy come together -- by listening to what Iraqis are saying, and moving quickly and judiciously to respond to those concerns, the administration might be able to pre-empt the emergence of unnecessary problems.  Lord knows there will be enough real problems -- why add on popular fears of, say, the Biden Plan if there's nothing to it?  Most policy types probably wouldn't see the point of denying the partition stories because nobody in the U.S. is really talking about it... but the fact that Iraqis are should be reason enough to take it on.  The new administration could save itself a lot of headaches down the road by addressing these fears and suspicions (and hopes) head on, saying clearly what is and is not the new administration's policy and then living up to it in practice. 

I'm not just talking about words, though.  Words must be matched by deeds to be credible.  Statements should be backed up with clear, strong, "costly signals" that demonstrate the seriousness of the public commitment to withdrawal, to Iraqi territorial unity, to respecting the terms of the SOFA (I expect an early challenge on the immunities question, for instance, probably with an arrest of some kind for which the new administration had best be well-prepared).   Another example:  I continue to argue that Obama should announce early, significant troop withdrawals in spite of the powerful internal pressures to postpone them.  Early withdrawals would take advantage of the transition's unique, single opportunity to reshape the foundations of America's role in Iraq.  They would demonstrate -- to Iraqis, Arabs, Iranians, and Americans alike --  that policy is really changing.  They would force Iraqis to make the painful accommodations avoided for so long (particularly since the Political Reform Agreement passed alongside the SOFA/WA by the Iraqi Parliament lays out a remarkably comprehensive pathway to such political accord).   They would likely help win Iraqi support for the SOFA/WA in the upcoming referendum.    And, though this is less important to me, they would likely be politically popular at home.  But above all, to get back to the original point, such costly, public steps would build credibility and go a long way towards reassuring skeptics and thus have a positive effect across a whole range of other related issues.

Anyway, enough about my own issues.  Let me just again direct attention to Parker and Serwer's USIP report which will likely be only the first of many such reports to drop in the next couple of months.  

hrw: the quality of justice

The story of the day in Iraq is of course the shoe-throwing journalist, whose exploits have dominated the Arab media cycle and will be the enduring image of Bush's final official visit to Iraq.  It would be a pity if that completely crowded out attention to the devastating report on the Central Criminal Court of Iraq released today by Human Rights Watch.  Joseph Logan and Michael Wahid Hanna conclude after a rigorous investigation that the CCCI

is an institution that is seriously failing to meet international standards of due process and fair trials. Defendants often endure long periods of pretrial detention without judicial review, and are not able to pursue a meaningful defense or challenge evidence against them. Abuse in detention, typically with the aim of extracting confessions, appears common, thus tainting court proceedings in those cases.

The report investigates a wide range of failures by the Court to adhere to international law or to its own rules, including dispassionate accounts of coerced confessions and secret witnesses.  The report puts detail and texture on to an overarching sense of institutional dysfunction which should surprise no-one at this point.  

It also notes the corrosive effects of the ongoing confusion over the relationship between MNF and Iraqi institutions:

Other failings reflect the fact that the Iraqi justice system, and hence the CCCI, does not have jurisdiction over individuals taken into custody by the US-led Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF). The MNF refers only a small number of the persons it detains to the CCCI for prosecution, and in those cases has exercised broad influence on proceedings since it provides physical security and plays a dominant advisory role, though that influence is less pronounced than in the court's early days. The refusal in particular of US military officials involved in detention matters to honor hundreds of decisions by the court to release detainees in US military custody has further undermined respect for the Iraqi judicial system. (This report does not address the status of detainees held by the US military as security detainees, except in the context of their transfer to the CCCI for prosecution.)

Presumably, the SOFA/WA is meant to clear up some of these inconsistencies and confusions, but as with everything else in Iraq it remains to be seen whether implementation will follow legislation. 

The report also offers some useful insights into the February 2008 General Amnesty Law, which was meant to be a key reconciliation initiative but instead has foundered at the level of implementation. I've long wondered about the disconnect between the ever-increasing number of cases processed under the amnesty and the miniscule number of people actually released from detention facilities (generating frequent complaints by Tareq al-Hashemi and other Sunni parties).  Human Rights Watch notes that

The amnesty as passed would benefit persons held for more than six months without an investigative hearing, or for more than a year without referral to a court. Implementation, however, has lagged very seriously. The continued high number of persons in detention facilities has put serious strain on the CCCI, where dozens of judges hear thousands of cases a month, and further delayed judicial review of detentions.

Approximately 96,000 cases had been approved for amnesty by July 2008 by the judicial committee that reviews applications, according to the Higher Judicial Council. As of September 2008, an estimated 5,000 to 8,000 detainees in Iraqi facilities had been released under the terms of the amnesty, most of them from facilities run by the Ministry of Justice.  A ministry official in October estimated that approximately 3,200 detainees had been released from Ministry of Justice facilities in Baghdad, Diyala, Basra, Hilla, and elsewhee.  The limited impact on the overall detainee population stems in part from the fact that the vast majority of applicants approved for amnesty are not in custody. As of May, prisoners and detainees accounted for about 25 percent of 68,796 approved applications; by September, that percentage stood at about 19 percent of 120,596 grants of amnesty. (Those at large or on bail make up the other categories of applicants. Grants of amnesty relate to charges, rather than individuals, who may face multiple charges.)

There's a lot more in the report, which should receive more attention than it is likely to get today without throwing a shoe. 

Dabbagh's Dream

Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh spoke at the US Institute for Peace yesterday, and is making the rounds of DC.  He's made some news in his public remarks:  in addition to calling for U.S. dialogue with Iran and pleading for American consultation with Iraqis over the pace and scope of troop withdrawals (see Spencer Ackerman for more), he announced (as far as I know, for the first time) an Iraqi proposal for an EU-style regional economic partnership building off of the existing Iraq and its Neighbors Group (grouping Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and -- possibly -- the other GCC states).  He said that he had already spoken informally to Kuwait, Syria and Turkey about the idea, and -- as several audience members pointed out -- it's hard to imagine that the Iraqi government would propose something that hadn't already circulated through Tehran.  

The proposal is obviously highly unlikely to go anywhere, given regional politics, Iraqi domestic realities, and the implausibility of any Arab government giving up sovereignty in any meaningful sense.  But it's still interesting to think about the reasons for the proposal and its possible implications. The group's main purpose would seem to be to establish Iraq as the core of a new regional structure (Dabbagh said as much in his presentation).  The inclusion of Turkey, for instance, may help Iraq with the Kurdish issue but makes little sense otherwise.   A secondary purpose, however, is likely the search for an acceptable vehicle for reconciling the Iraqi government's relations with Iran and the U.S. while trying to establish itself as some kind of intermediary for, rather than a victim of, Saudi-Iranian competition. 

The group most notably excludes Israel/Palestine and Egypt. To the extent that anyone pays attention to the proposal, I expect Amr Moussa and the Arab League to be extremely hostile, since it would undermine the Arab League (or what remains of it).   Egypt will see this as an Iraqi attempt to undermine its leadership position in the Arab world (or what remains of it).   Palestinians will very likely see the proposal as another step towards their marginalization as world attention inexorably shifts towards the Gulf.   Dabbagh fielded a question about the exclusion of Israel by saying that it was limited to "Iraq's neighbors", but that doesn't stop the GCC states from being considered.   Still, the proposed "region" does reflect a very real shift of power and global interest from the Levant to the Gulf. 

While this particular proposal seems quite unrealistic, I do see merit in trying to somehow build on the Neighbors Group, which has had only limited impact thus far but could hopefully be revitalized by a new administration which actually believes in regional diplomacy.   Including Iran within a regional security architecture should be a major strategic objective for the U.S. in some form or another as an endpoint for the President-elect's proposed tough dialogue and engagement with the Iranians.   Some kind of GCC + 2 (Iraq and Iran) architecture seems like a more realistic objective here.  But if Dabbagh's proposal at least sparks some creative strategic thinking about how Iraq and Iran might be re-integrated into the region then it will have served some purpose. 

Zebari swings at the zombie story trying to eat your brain

Back on September 16, Amir Taheri published a highly disingenous op-ed arguing that during his trip to Baghdad Barack Obama had tried to persuade Iraqi leaders to postpone concluding a security agreement with the United States during the Bush administration.  This led to dark speculation that perhaps Obama had violated the Logan Act prohibiting unauthorized citizens from negotiating with foreign governments, along with a variety of attempts to score political points by the McCain campaign.   

In response, I pointed out that, among other problems, Taheri's only evidence for his assertions was an interview with Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper which clearly did not even refer to the Baghdad meetings but to his June conversation with Obama in Washington DC.   In a follow-up piece, Taheri quoted the entire passage in question... except for the phrase which clearly showed that he had misrepresented the interview.  When several Republican participants in Obama's Baghdad meetings told Jake Tapper of ABC News that nothing of the sort had happened, the story seemed dead. 

But then Barbara Slavin resurrected the issue with a front page, banner headlined Washington Times piece entitled "Obama tried to sway Iraqis on U.S. troop deal."   She at least correctly tied Zebari's al-Sharq al-Awsat interview to the June meeting in DC.  But oddly, for such a prominently placed and unambiguously titled story, she presented no new evidence about what had happened in that meeting, other than a quote from Iraqi Ambassador Samir Sumaidaie - who admitted that he had not been present during the conversation.   She couldn't get Zebari to comment.

But CNN could:

Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama did not urge Iraqi officials to delay a decision on a security agreement with the United States, Iraq's foreign minister told CNN on Sunday. 

The statement by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari refutes a recent published report and a statement by Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin that Obama tried to influence Iraqi politicians negotiating with the United States to score political points. 

Obama "never, ever discouraged us not to sign the agreement," Zebari said. "I think this was misrepresented, and I have clarified this case in a number of interviews back in the United States recently."

That wasn't so hard.   One would think the story is now dead, but we all know that these zombies never stop coming back to try and eat your brains.   

FA: Politics First (1)

In the September/October issue of Foreign Affairs, Stephen Biddle, Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack wrote in an important article entitled "How To Leave a Stable Iraq" that the United States should build on progress in Iraq by refraining from significant troop drawdowns in the short term until progress is consolidated: 

Both to deal with the new problems and to guard against any revival of the old ones, any further troop drawdowns, now that the "surge" is over, should be modest until after Iraq gets through two big rounds of elections -- in late 2008 at the provincial level and in late 2009 at the national level -- which have the potential either to reinforce important gains or to reopen old wounds. But starting in 2010, if current trends continue, the United States may be able to start cutting back its troop presence substantially, possibly even halving the total U.S. commitment by sometime in 2011, without running excessive risks with the stability of Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region.

In the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs (November/December), I have a brief response, entitled "Politics First:  Why Only U.S. Withdrawal Can Spur Iraqi Cooperation" (no link as of yet, sorry:  the issue seems to have reached subscribers, but is not yet online - I will add a link when it's available).   I argue that

Although Biddle, O’Hanlon, and Pollack are right about the tenuous but real security gains in Iraq, they are wrong about the effects this military progress has had on the political realm and about the likely consequences of their recommendation. Their approach would almost certainly mean that troops would remain at high levels for far longer than they suggest, because the kind of political progress they anticipate—and which would, they argue, allow U.S. troops to withdraw from an Iraq that has achieved “sustained stability”—will likely not materialize.

The problem lies in the fundamentally flawed belief that providing more security is the key to achieving political compromise. Restoring basic levels of security from the low point of 2006 was indeed essential. But now, contrary to what the authors argue, improved security is making the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki less likely to make meaningful compromises, since Maliki currently sees little downside to not doing so. The Iraqi government simply does not share American assessments of the negative consequences that would result from failing to achieve reconciliation. And as long as the U.S. military protects Iraqi leaders from the consequences of their choices, they are probably correct.

I make three specific arguments, building on the premise that the moral hazard created by the U.S. military presence creates perverse incentives undermining American efforts to help create a self-sustaining Iraqi polity which can get by without it. 

First, I argue that the provincial and national elections are unlikely to produce a fundamentally new political situation.  Most likely the elections will reshuffle the political deck, producing new lines of grievance and cooperation but not the kind of new political reality which will make American drawdowns suddenly appear more feasible. The elections are extremely important, as I've written many times here, but after the painful experiences of 2005, when much-hyped elections led to sectarian voting, political stalemate, and the sectarian war of 2006, expectations should not be too high for their transformative power.  Thus,

"The United States should of course push for fair, internationally supervised elections and help provide security on election day. But U.S. grand strategy cannot be held hostage to elections that are unlikely to fundamentally change Iraqi politics for the better."

Second, I warn that an incremental approach to promoting political change, absent a fundamental change in the incentives of the political actors, is unlikely to deliver what the U.S. hopes for:   

"the slow and steady approach to Iraqi political accommodation they advocate is a recipe for indefinite delays. In the past, even when Iraqi politicians have reached formal agreements, they have gone on to drag their feet over implementation, stripping the agreements of their intended meaning and generating even greater frustration. This is best exemplified by the failure of the Iraqi government to integrate the tens of thousands of former insurgents in the U.S.- backed Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi security forces, despite constant U.S. pressure and dire warnings of the consequences. Rather than moving the Iraqis toward compromise, [their] approach would create a multitude of perverse incentives for Iraqi politicians to produce just enough progress to keep U.S. forces engaged but never enough to allow them to leave. Political progress would continue to dance just out of reach, with its failures always offering a reason for the United States to delay the drawdown of its military forces."

Third, I argue that the evolution of Iraqi politics (see my article with Brian Katulis for a much more detailed analysis of those dynamics) refutes the claim that providing more security will necessarily give Iraqi leaders the space and confidence to make political compromises: 

"the refrain that the United States has made progress on security but must do better on political progress misses the point. For Iraqi leaders who do not wish to share power, the failure to translate security into political progress is a feature, not a glitch. There will be no significant political progress until the incentives of Iraqi leaders change, which will not happen as long as the United States continues on the current—and Biddle, O’Hanlon, and Pollack’s proposed—course. It is time to acknowledge the limits of the United States’ ability to exert leverage over Iraqi politics. The primary drivers of Iraqi politics are Iraqis, not Americans, and a stable political order must rest on the alignment of their interests and not on the exercise of U.S. power. It is not simply that the United States cannot militarily or financially sustain the commitments required to achieve a perfect solution; it is that the U.S. military presence actively impedes the essential political accommodations needed to create a stable, broadly representative Iraqi political order."

I conclude:

A U.S. commitment to draw down U.S. troops over a defined period, as the Iraqi political leadership itself now demands, would give Iraqi politicians a self-interest in political accommodation—accommodation reached not to meet foreign demands but to ensure their own survival. A clear and credible public declaration of the United States’ intention to withdraw would shift the incentives of all the major political actors. And a responsible exit strategy would then offer plenty of opportunity to shape the transition and guard against the likely dangers. In contrast, a policy built on U.S. troops staying in Iraq, whether to enforce local cease-fires, maintain pressure for political accommodation, or moderate the fears of Iraqi politicians, is a problem masquerading as a solution.

Up next:  Steve Biddle, who is one of the sharpest military analysts I know and a friend for whom I have tremendous respect even when we disagree as we do here, offers up a sharp rebuttal.   Then, I respond as best I can.  As with last summer's online debate between me, Colin Kahl, and Brian Katulis I think this opens up extremely important avenues of debate.  Coming soon.... (probably early next week).

[NOTE:  sorry for all the confusion, for those of you who saw this post appear and then disappear - I just had to check with Foreign Affairs to make sure that the issue had been published and that it was legit to post about it.  The issue did go to subscribers, so even though it's not yet on-line I got the green light - and so the post is back.]   

where strategic communication leads

The Washington Post reports today that the Defense Department "will pay private U.S. contractors in Iraq up to $300 million over the next three years to produce news stories, entertainment programs and public service advertisements for the Iraqi media in an effort to "engage and inspire" the local population to support U.S. objectives and the Iraqi government."   In contrast to earlier efforts, where there was supposedly always a "produced by MNF-I" label, these efforts explicitly will not have such attribution.  As one official explains, "They don't know that the originator of the content is the U.S. government. If they did, they would never run anything."

These sorts of efforts exemplify all of the problems with strategic communications vs public diplomacy at which I hinted on Tuesday.   It's easy to see why eager information warriors think that paying for positive press makes sense in pursuit of tactical advantage in the strategic propaganda war.  It gets the "messaging" out with greater credibility, it "counters" the adversaries efforts, and it might shift some perceptions in the short term.   Even at this level, the strategy is deeply flawed.  When the payments are exposed, as they inevitably are in today's global media environment (for example, with page one stories in the Washington Post), they then discredit not only the specific messages but also every other pro-U.S. message which will quite reasonably then be dismissed as "paid for by the United States."   At our panel this week, Mike Doran and others suggested that the key to success in the "war of ideas"  is building up credible third party messengers.  Nothing could be more devastating to the credibility of third party messengers than this kind of program. 

At a deeper level, these efforts fatally compromise the long-term objective of building free, credible and independent media as the foundation of a democratic system.  I've argued many times that support for free and independent media should be at the center of all efforts to promote reform in the region.  Only a free and independent media can provide the flow of information, the transparency and demands for accountability, and the open contestation of political ideas necessary for real political pluralism and democracy.   Turning the media into a tool for spreading propaganda compromises not only the very media which we should be promoting but also our own credibility in arguing for a free and independent media. 

The other obvious point is that current "war of ideas" and COIN thinking explicity considers U.S. public opinion an important domain of information warfare.  The Post quotes from the contract solicitation this passage which should be deeply disturbing:  one goal is to "communicate effectively with our strategic audiences (i.e. Iraqi, pan-Arabic, International, and U.S. audiences) to gain widespread acceptance of [U.S. and Iraqi government] core themes and messages."  Presenting American audiences as a key target for manipulation through the covert dissemination of propaganda messages should be seen as scandalous, subversive of democracy, and illegal.   Let's hope this story finally gets some attention to trends I've been tracking for years. 

definitely, maybe

Way back on September 16, I succumbed to optimism on the Iraqi provincial elections law based on reports in the Iraqi press that a deal had been reached.   I was particularly pleased about this because of very credible rumors (and a proliferation of statements by UIA and other prominent figures) that a deal had been reached to give up on the Parliamentary track and instead revert to the rules which governed the 2005 provincial elections, which would likely have helped the current ruling elites hold on to power and generate great frustration for the currently excluded groups which hope to gain political power through the elections (especially the Sunni Awakenings groupings).    I argued then, as I have for months, that it was better to get the rules right than to rush to hold the elections by a particular date (in this case the end of December).   And then, of course, the deal in Parliament collapsed and weeks went by without a vote while the rumors of a bad deal escalated. 

Thankfully, today it appears that the impasse has finally been broken as the Parliament overwhelmingly passed a new provincial elections law based on a compromise on Kirkuk engineered by the tireless UN envoy Staffan de Mistura.  (There is some disagreement in the reporting as to whether this was a vote by consensus or by a majority of the 191 members present out of 275, but either way it passed.)  What's more, they have agreed to push back the deadline for voting until January 31, 2009 (in the non-KRG provinces and Tamim province with Kirkuk).  This will allow enough time for the Iraqi High Elections Commission (which will determine the exact date) to adequately prepare and organize and for the various political blocs to mobilize for the campaign.   

The law still needs to pass the Presidency Council, where the last version was vetoed in July.  That remains a possibility, given the interests of some of the members of the Council in avoiding elections under the new rules.  But it seems unlikely given the long, intense crisis.  Last time it was obvious to everyone that Talabani would veto because the entire Kurdish bloc had walked out, but this time they seem to have bought in to the deal so I don't expect him to block this one.

The details of the final law remain unclear also. For example, in this story filed just a few hours before the vote, an Iraqi MP talks about a 25% quota for women candidates - but that's hard to guarantee in an open list election.  So I will be searching today for a text of the new law today to find out its key provisions beyond the headline compromise on Kirkuk which is deservedly getting most of the attention.  More on that when I find it. 

Of course these elections aren't alone going to solve the major problems of power and governance.  There will losers as well as winners, frustrated expectations, and likely complaints about fraud and malfeasance of all varieties.  Refugees and IDPs are still effectively disenfranchised.  But for now, I'm guardedly hopeful that Iraqis might finally have come to agreement on the rules governing these important elections and have avoided the temptation (and pressure from, perhaps, the United States) to rush them on a non-consensus set of rules in order to meet an arbitrary deadline.   

UPDATE:  The Iraqi Parliament has released a detailed report, if not the actual text, of the law.  Among the crucial details, beyond the elaborate compromise on Kirkuk:  the vote will be open list, women's quota but no minorities quota, can use symbols of non-candidates except for religious figures (so no Sistani?  Is Sadr "religious" figure?), and some limitations on use of mosques and other places of worship for campaigning.  All in all looks pretty good - the open list is key, and goes against the preferences of what the ruling coalition, plus a way was found to accomodate the women's quota.   Attention will now turn to trying to guarantee a free and fair vote, but this looks to be a major accomplishment at last - one key to democracy is that outcomes are uncertain but the rules are not.  Staffan de Mistura and the much maligned UN should receive major credit for this outcome, which as he puts it speaks eloquently to the ability of Iraqis to come to agreement despite all the obstacles.   

Taheri's absurd conceit

Amir Taheri is getting some attention today with a remarkable piece in the New York Post alleging that Barack Obama "tried in private to persuade Iraqi leaders to delay an agreement on a draw-down of the American military presence.  According to Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, Obama made his demand for delay a key theme of his discussions with Iraqi leaders in Baghdad in July."  Ordinarily I'd ignore such silliness, but with the McCain campaign recklessly jumping all over it, and the usual suspects hopping on board, it's worth pointing out that how shoddy a piece of work it really is.   

Taheri makes two major claims in the op-ed: first, that Obama tried to persuade Iraqis to delay signing an agreement; second, that this would result in delaying the troop withdrawal Obama advocates. 

Taheri's only source for the first claim is a published interview with Zebari in al-Sharq al-Awsat (to which he also contributes columns), which doesn't quite say what he claims it says.  Looking at the key quote in context makes this clear.  For most of the first half of the interview Zebari described all of the problems with the negotiations and the uncertainties about whether it would be binding on the next administration.  The interviewer then asked him why Iraqi leaders didn't just wait until the next administration - at which point Zebari responded "that is the question which Barack Obama asked me when I was in Washington a while ago."  That's hardly the stuff of concerted pressure or independent diplomacy.   At any rate, the Obama campaign denies the claim forcefully - and they do presumably have transcripts of the conversation on their side. 

Plus, Taheri doesn't even get the time or location of the supposed exchange right.  In the very same sentence which Taheri quoted, Zebari said:  "That is the question which Barack Obama asked me when I was in Washington a while ago, when I met with McCain and Obama."  That's right - Taheri's only piece of evidence that "Obama made his demand for delay a key theme of his discussions with Iraqi leaders in Baghdad in July" is Zebari's account of an exchange which did not take place during Obama's trip to Baghdad in July, but rather during Zebari's trip to Washington in June.   If Taheri can't even get such an obvious and consequential detail right, why should we trust anything else he says? 

Taheri's real focus is on the second claim, that this exposes Obama's hypocrisy because the result of a delay in the agreement would be a delay in an American troop withdrawal.  But this is, frankly, absurd.  The U.S. is not negotiating an "agreement on a draw-down" with Iraq, it is negotiating two related long-term security agreements.  The U.S. does not need to wait until it has negotiated and ratified a long-term security agreement to begin withdrawing troops.  If President Bush wants to withdraw troops, he orders them to leave. The same is true for any future President.  Whether U.S. forces are authorized to be in Iraq by a continuation of the UN mandate or a bilateral deal makes absolutely zero material difference to the next commander-in-chief's ability to redeploy forces at a pace of his own choosing (unless there is an agreement to leave earlier, which isn't at issue at this point).

Taheri is exceedingly disingenuous about what was being negotiated in June 2008 (when the conversation took place). Back then, the Bush administration was still trying to negotiate the McCain position of legalizing the U.S. force presence for the long term and vehemently rejected any talk of time tables, time lines, or time horizons.   It was only in July that Maliki pulled the rug out from under McCain and Bush by insisting on a timetable for U.S. withdrawal in line with Obama's stated position. To describe the agreement being discussed in June as a "draw-down" agreement is misleading to the point of dishonesty.  That might also explain why Taheri dissembles about when exactly the purported conversation took place. 

Third, Taheri implies that Obama's position that the agreement be approved by Congress is part of a secret, nefarious scheme for delay.  Um, no. Obama has consistently argued that any U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement should be approved by Congress because that would give it legal standing and would also be the best way to put the agreement on a firm, bipartisan footing to make it politically sustainable over the long run.  Since the Iraqi parliament will approve whatever agreement is reached, it seems reasonable that Congress should have the same prerogative. In the absence of this approval, Obama has favored a temporary extension of the current UN mandate governing the presence of U.S. forces so an agreement can be reached that has the support of both the American and Iraqi people. This position is not a secret. It is right there on Obama’s website.

Finally, there's the part where Taheri suggests that if Obama were elected it would take him months to get a negotiating team in place [i.e. March or April of 2009], and "by then, Iraq will be in the throes of its own campaign season. Judging by the past two elections, forming a new coalition government may then take three months. So the Iraqi negotiating team might not be in place until next June."  Huh?   Provincial elections will hopefully be held by December 2008 but may be pushed back into the early spring of 2009, but national elections are not due until the fall of 2009 at the earliest.  Does Taheri not know that provincial elections are not the same as Parliamentary elections, or is he just assuming that readers won't know?  Whatever.

Really a fine piece of work from the esteemed columnist.  I'm sure he'll go far.

UPDATE (Friday):  Taheri doubles down on his claims today, but doesn't address any of the main criticisms.  I criticized two significant claims in Taheri's original column: that Obama make delaying a US-Iraqi agreement until the next administration a major priority in Baghdad, and that this means that he was trying to delay a U.S. withdrawal while claiming the opposite.  His new column completely fails to respond to the criticisms. 

On claim #1, that Obama made delaying an agreement a priority in private conversations in Baghdad, he backs up his contention with reference to private conversations with unnamed Iraqi officials and to unspecified reports in the Iraqi media.  His only on-the-record source is Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari's al-Sharq al-Awsat interview.  That interview very clearly refers to the June DC meeting and not to the July Baghdad meetings.  To conceal the fact that his only published source does not support his claim,  Taheri actually quotes the entire sentence in question while omitting the crucial clause "when I was in Washington a while ago."   

On claim #2, he continues to maintain that this alleged attempt to delay the agreement until the next administration means Obama "preferred to have no agreement on US troop withdrawals".  This doesn't stand up to scrutiny, as detailed above, and Taheri doesn't even try to defend it.   There is simply no relationship whatsoever between the US and Iraq reaching agreement on the SOFA/SFA and the U.S. being able to withdraw troops.  There is an important issue of the U.S. presence becoming illegal on December 31 if no agreement is reached and the UN fails to extend its mandate - but that, again, would in no conceivable scenario force U.S. troops to stay in Iraq longer. 

Again, the only reason I waste any time on this is that a number of right wing blogs and magazines are trying to gin this up into another faux scandal, even invoking the Logan Act.   But there's just nothing there.

FINAL UPDATE:  Jake Tapper demolishes what's left of Taheri's story with eyewitness accounts from the meetings:

Attendees of the meeting back Obama's account, including not just Sen. Jack Reed, D-RI, but Hagel, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffers from both parties. Officials of the Bush administration who were briefed on the meeting by the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad also support Obama's account and dispute the Post story and McCain attack.  The Post story is "absolutely not true," Hagel spokesman Mike Buttry told ABC News.

Shocking. 

 

trying again tomorrow

A few days ago I noted with dismay the appearance of a bunch of proposals to revert to the old provincial elections law if the Parliament could not soon come to agreement on a new one.  I said that I had assumed - and hoped - that this was just a bargaining tactic to try and break through the stalemate, but that I had been hearing disturbing rumors that it might be disastrously for real.  Fortunately, today it's looking like my first instinct was right as some relatively good news appears on the horizon.  According to a number of independent reports, the Parliamentary committees on elections and provinces have reached agreement based roughly on United Nations proposals for Kirkuk.   Mahmoud Mashhadani, speaker of the Parliament, reportedly now plans to call a vote tomorrow.  There are several hurdles including the Parliamentary vote (news of which was given to the media but which has not yet been scheduled as far as I know) and approval by the Presidency Council.  But it appears to be very encouraging news - particularly in that their reaching a tough agreement during Ramadan signals a sense of urgency.   Assuming that there are no great surprises in the new draft law (details remain sketchy), I hope this passes and that it paves the way for an election based on widely acceptable rules at the end of December  - with serious, credible independent monitoring and other safeguards to ensure a fair vote.   

UPDATE:  several keen-eyed observers have pointed out that it's not quite right to talk about the "old provincial election law", since none actually seems to exist.  As one friend put it: 

"The only law the COR has ever passed on elections was in late 2005 in advance of the December national elections, and by my reading it doesn't apply to provincial elections.  The only time it mentions them is in Article 1C, but all it says is that there isn't a specific text for them in the law.  Does that mean that you can extrapolate the rules for provincial elections, or does that mean that the law doesn't cover them?  My view is the latter.   The January 2005 provincial elections were developed in consultation with the UN according to the TAL, but I can't find a text of the law or even a description of it.  Would it be whatever this law, if it's even a law, that they would revert to?  I assume this would have the same binding force of the CPA orders, but I could be wrong.

What various politicians were proposing/threatening was to run the elections under the rules of the last round of provincial elections in January 2005.  Most of what I saw was a political, not legal, discussion.  But as my correspondent notes, there doesn't seem to be any legal basis for doing this, in addition to all the political objections I've noted.   All the more reason to hope that the vote reportedly scheduled for tomorrow on a provincial elections law goes ahead...  though it appears that there are still some disagreements between Kurdish MPs and others about the details of the proposed compromise.

meet the new law, same as the old law

Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh told al-Sharq al-Awsat yesterday that provincial elections elections would be held with the old law at the end of December if the new one couldn't be quickly passed.  There have actually been a flurry of such comments in the Iraqi press over the last few days, including comments by Yusif Ahmed, a member of Parliament from the Kurdish bloc, that he expected a reversion to the old law and another MP saying that the parties in the government (which he didn't name) were talking up the legal status of the old law as a way to hold the elections before the end of this year, Ammar al-Hakim suddenly talking up early elections (scan to Visser's Sept 11 post), and more.

I had inititally shrugged off those remarks as bargaining gambits, threats made to try and force an agreement at a time when by most reports the ongoing consultations weren't getting anywhere, tempers were rising, and the "July 22" group was demanding that Talabani and Abd al-Mehdi retract their vetoes and even threatening a boycott of Parliament.   But then I started hearing rumors that a deal was actually in the works to actually do this, to evert to the old closed-list law just in order to get the elections done by the end of the year.  I just don't know how much truth there is to those rumors, although the sudden burst of such commentary suggests that the idea is at least circulating.

If the elections are indeed rushed ahead under the old law because the Parliament and government could not reach agreement on the election law, it would be pretty devastating.  Failure to reach agreement on a provincial election law after all these months would be a highly symbolic indictment of the political status quo and a clear demonstration of the significance of the divisions which Brian Katulis and I laid out in our report yesterday.  It would also be a significant victory for the current ruling elite and another potentially crippling setback to the would-be challengers who expected to be empowered by a new round of elections.  Holding the elections is important, but getting the rules right is more important than meeting an arbitrary deadline.   Let's hope that it doesn't in fact play out this way, that this is just a negotiating tactic, and that Iraqi politicians can come to a basic working agreement on the rules of the coming political struggle.   Because the alternatives, whether a collapsing house of cards or an incipient authoritianism, don't look very attractive... however likely.