Abu Aardvark

Iran in crisis for real this time?

A while ago I posted a couple of comments about the situation in Iran, speculating that this crisis between the reformists and the Council of Guardians might be different. That the reformists might finally grow a backbone, that the Council might be forced to back down, and that it might be - as Gandalf so majestically put it in the Two Towers - "the turning of the tide."

Jonathan Edelstein responded that he found it more likely that the Khamenei would negotiate a compromise calibrated to take the wind out of the reformist sails while preserving the core of the conservative assault. And for a while, that seemed to be exactly what was happening.

But now, things look like they might be taking the turn that I had originally suggested. If a third of the Parliament really resigns, and the Parliamentary elections are really cancelled - and this is probably still just manuevering and brinksmanship - then my "real crisis" scenario suddenly looks more plausible. Nothing much more to add here... just a fascinating situation continuing to develop.

Iran Again

In Iran's great squabble over Parliamentary candidates, Ali Khamenei has finally intervened:

"Iran's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, broke his silence Wednesday on the barring of reformist candidates from parliamentary races, saying the incumbents among them should be allowed to run. Ayatollah Khamenei, meeting with members of the anti-reformist Guardian Council on Wednesday evening, also said nonincumbent candidates should be considered on their merits rather than rejected out of hand."

Jonathan Edelstein got it right in the comments on my last Iran post (and go see his blog, too): a typical Khamenei maneuver - aimed at giving enough concessions to stop the reformists from storming the barricades, but not enough to really give the reformists victory. If some 80 incumbents are allowed to run, that still leaves about 3,000 candidates to be judged "on their merits." And we have a pretty good idea how the current Council of Guardians might view their "merits," in the absence of firm and direct orders from above.

If events follow their usual course, Khatami and the reformist mainstream will now back down and call for calm, while the frustrated and angry opposition will continue to fume but be impotent without support from Khatami. Early reports suggest that the governors and other officials threatening to resign are, in fact, backing down. And the steady, creeping delegitimization of the system will continue.

Of course, it's still possible that Khatami and his allies will instead see a moment to press their advantage, and push Khamenei to take a clear position in their favor. Some reformist MPs - including Khatami's brother - are saying that they will continue their sit-in, for example. Khamenei's ruling could still be an opening bid rather than the last word. But past experience would suggest that the wind will be taken out of the reformist sails yet again.

Khamenei blinks?

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is reportedly hesitating about backing the Guardian Council's decision to ban reformist candidates for Parliament. The Times reports that governers around the country had threatened to resign en masse in protest, while a number of MPs are staging a sit in and have threatened to resign, and an ally of Mohammed Khatami has hinted that he may resign - all told, a rather unusual show of resolve from reformists who had long since seem to have lost the stomach for fights. All of this must have given pause.

If Khamenei does blink, and decides to allow the banned candidates to run, this could be a pivotal moment in reversing the political trend. Yesterday I noted that the long political stalemate, and especially the impotence of the reformists, was driving alienation from the political system. If some combination of external pressure (from the EU, since the US has long since abandoned any leverage it might have in Iran) and internal mobilization, it could inspire the moribund reformist movement by giving it hope. Things have been going the way of the conservatives for so long that any victory for the reformists could have disproportionate impact.

Of course, this all depends on the unlikely prospect that Khamenei really does overrule the ban, which I wouldn't put much money on at this point.

Iran's Candidates

The relentless saga of the frustration of the reformists in Iran continues with the Council of Guardians' decision to ban nearly half the candidates for Parliamentary elections. Conservatives have been using their control over these unaccountable institutions to frustrate reform efforts for years. This decision, in all its brazen disregard for the rule of law, comes as the culmination of the conservative counter-reformation (so to speak).

On the one hand, it's a sign of strength for the conservatives - demonstrating that there is nothing that the reformists can do about it. Khatami long ago made it clear that he would not go outside the existing institutional structures to press his case, a decision which has crippled the reformists and emboldened the conservatives. This move has all the earmarks of a direct, frontal challenge to the reformists, aimed at forcing them to admit their defeat and to capitulate.

But it also shows the weakness of the conservatives, and their fear of free elections. Having to resort openly to such manipulations demonstrates clearly their recognition that they could not win a fair democratic competition. They can control the existing institutions, but only by stripping those institutions of their legitimacy.

This doesn't mean that Iran is on the brink of a revolution, as Michael Ledeen and the neocons would have it. Encouraging dissidents to rise up isn't going to help the situation - indeed, such exhortations strengthen the hand of the conservatives by giving substance to their constant accusations that the reformists are American pawns or foreign-backed traitors. The forces which are attempting to challenge the regime - student movements, especially - aren't really the liberal democrats which they are sometimes portrayed to be. And the forces backed by the neocons - the son of the Shah and remnants of the old regime - have virtually no support or influence in Iran, and are mainly important (like the INC) as purveyors of inaccurate but politically useful (to the neocons) propaganda.

One quick note on the earthquake. Earthquakes have played decisive roles in the rise of Islamist movements in several Arab countries - both the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the FIS in Algeria dramatically increased their popularity by responding effectively to an earthquake while states stood by helplessly or indifferently. Thus far the Iranian official response seems equally inept - but no alternative civil society trend seems to be stepping up to take advantage. If one does - and I haven't followed this closely enough to know - it could be a leading indicator of the rise of a social movement able to capitalize on the lost legitimacy of the existing Islamist republic.

Iran, Egypt and the US

The recent thaw in relations between Egypt and Iran - according to the Arabic press, they have agreed on full normal diplomatic relations - is one of the more interesting developments in recent Middle East diplomacy. The picture of a smiling Mohammed Khatami shaking hands with Hosni Mubarak in Geneva last month was a real show stopper - the kind of picture that makes you do an honest double take.

The containment of Iran has been a bipartisan feature of American foreign policy since the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis. During the second Clinton administration, after the surprising election of Khatami, there were some tentative moves towards a possible rapprochment - remember Christiane Amanpour's CNN interview with Khatami, or the lifting of the ban on Iranian pistachios and carpets. But it didn't come to much due to fierce opposition among hardliners in both Iran and the United States.

Those American hardliners - the same neocon hawks who brought you the Iraq war - savaged Clinton for even considering talks with the Iranian devil. They blasted the status quo of containment as insufficiently tough, calling instead for real attempts to promote regime change and an overthrow of the Islamic Republic. Their attacks, combined with the conservative assault on Khatami and the hostility of Ali Khameini (the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic), ensured that the nascent dialogue would be stillborn.

Flash forward to now. Iran has been in the firing line of the neocon hawks as part of the Axis of Evil, with the same cast of characters demanding a serious commitment to regime change. At a minimum, the Bush administration's ideologues insist on a tough containment policy, if regime change isn't possible.

So how to evaluate a resumption of normal ties between Egypt and Iran? There is no serious question that this is a blow against the neocon/hawkish policy. It breaks one more strand of Iran's isolation, and gives Egypt's imprimatur to dealings with the Islamic Republic. This comes at a time when Khatami and the moderates are reeling, on the defensive and in danger of losing their control of Parliament. It might, as some commentators have hoped, allow Egypt to exercise a moderating influence on Iran. But it might also strengthen the Iranian - and Egyptian - hand against American pressure.

Bottom line: the Egyptian-Iranian rapprochement is a blow to Bush's Middle East policy, but a potential positive for the region and for American interests in the long run. Engaging Iran can pay off, as the Europeans showed by securing the Iranian cooperation with the IAEA on the nuclear weapons file. Bringing Iran into closer dialogue with regional allies is a good thing, even if (or rather, precisely because) it undercuts the 'axis of evil' policy.