Abu Aardvark

French presence in the Gulf

Speaking of the Gulf,  I'm struggling to understand the significance of the stunning announcement that the UAE had agreed to the establishment of a major French military base in Abu Dhabi.   I think this is the first non-American military base in the Gulf since the British pulled out in 1971 - if not, certainly the most high-profile one in a long, long time.    Early spin has suggested that this will allow France to better cooperate with the US against Iran, but this seems shortsighted.  A long-term French strategic position in the Gulf challenges American exclusivity, and potentially undermines the fundamental architecture of the hegemonic American position in the Gulf.   Perhaps Sarkozy truly is a neo-Gaullist after all....   And another question - how does this relate to the evolving GCC unity and activism, and its changing posture towards Iran?   I invite informed commentary on this fascinating development! 

GCC-Iran Watch

President Bush has come to the Gulf and gone, delivering stern messages in public and, reportedly, in private about the Iranian threat and the need for stiff, manly resolve (* see update below * ).   Did he manage to sway the Gulf leaders who had previously appeared to be more in the mood to engage with and accomodate rising Iranian power?  Today's Arab media offers some suggestive hints:

Iran FM Mataki and Kuwaiti FM Mohammed Sabah al-Salem's joint press conference (Reuters/al-Jazeera)

First, al-Jazeera reports that Iran intends to participate actively and fully in the upcoming 'neighbors conference' on Iraqi security to be hosted by Kuwait in April.  While Iran also participated in the last round in Istanbul, the fact that this time the Iranians will be holding forth in a key American Gulf ally is striking.    In a press conference in Tehran, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Mohammed Sabah al-Salem stressed that Kuwait's excellent relations with Iran did not contradict Bush's position, though they evidently declined to elaborate on this non-contradiction.    

Meanwhile, the Saudi paper al-Sharq al-Awsat turns over part of its op-ed page to Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh, whose call for more Arab-Iranian dialogue is pointedly at odds with the American message.    Dabbagh writes that it is time to think seriously about Arab-Iranian dialogue based on national interests rather than  on ideology or emotion, and tries to reassure Arab audiences that they have nothing to fear from a Shia-dominated Iraq.   It is clear, he concludes, that the American view of the Iranian threat does not match the Arab view.

And in what must surely be a pure coincidence, Ghassan Cherbel - the editor of the other major Saudi-owned Arab paper al-Hayat - today pens a lengthy featured column exploring Iran's legitimate security fears and the reasons for its perception of threat.  This attempt to understand Iranian perceptions and the role of the US in stoking its fears is, again, a bit off the American message.    The Arabs have no interest in a frightened, defensive Iran, writes Cherbel, nor in Iran imposing its hegemony.  The Arab interest is in Iran being a normal state with which the Arabs can do business and cooperate without the shadow of fear. 

In the same issue of al-Hayat we can find a lengthy, approving survey of the Egyptian-Iranian rapprochement as well. Mubarak recently called for a peaceful solution of problems with Iran, and seems keen on exploring that relationship despite American entreaties.

So all told, on Iran issues the GCC and other key Arab states seem to be going right on exploring engagement with Iran despite the American sabre-rattling.   Most analysts see Bush leaving empty-handed, with the savvy Egyptian political scientist Mohamed al-Sayid Said writing in the UAE paper al-Ittihad that Bush's completely fruitless visit to the region will likely go down in history as one of the strangest and most pointless visits to the Middle East of any world leader.  For a more skeptical view of Gulf views on Iran, though, I recommend this piece by Neil Partrick writing from Dubai and, as ever, Greg Gause's views of Saudi calculations.

UPDATE:  okay, okay emailers.. you got the joke.  I admit it, this was indeed the "stiff, manly resolve" in question - can't get anything by you.

source: AFP

CSM: Gulf states no longer want to isolate Iran

Anyone following my tags over the last month will know that I've been keenly interested in the developing stance of the GCC states towards Iran My analysis of what's going on appears in tomorrow's Christian Science Monitor: 

'Everywhere you turn, it is the policy of Iran to foment instability and chaos," Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned Gulf dignitaries in Bahrain last month. But in reality, everywhere you turn, from Qatar to Saudi Arabia to Egypt, you now see Iranian leaders shattering longstanding taboos by meeting cordially with their Arab counterparts      

The Gulf has moved away from American arguments for isolating Iran. American policymakers need to do the same.

The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are accommodating themselves to Iran's growing weight in the region's politics. They remain key parts of America's security architecture in the region, hosting massive US military bases and underwriting the American economy in exchange for protection. But as Saudi analyst Khalid al-Dakheel argues, they are no longer content sitting passively beneath the US security umbrella and want to avoid being a pawn in the US-Iranian struggle for power. Flush with cash, they are not interested in a war that would mess up business.       

That's why America's attempt to shore up containment against Iran increasingly seems to be yesterday's battle.

After reviewing some of the recent developments (including Ahmednejad's appearance at the GCC and at the Hajj, and other officials in Cairo), I argue:

Gulf Arabs have thus visibly discarded the central pillar of the past year of America's Middle East strategy. Saudis and Egyptians had been the prime movers in anti-Iranian and anti-Shiite agitation. When they are inviting Ahmadinejad and Mr. Larijani to their capitals, America's talk of isolating Iran sounds outdated.

One hears little today of the "Shiite crescent" threatening the region, against which Arab officials once gravely warned. The Bush administration's proposed "axis of moderation," joining Sunni Arab states and Israel against Iran, has quietly passed from view.

In the original version, I had a longer discussion of the disappearance of the hysteria over Sunni-Shia conflict last year, arguing that its disappearance of late offers some support for the argument I made at the time (and even more for Greg Gause's argument) that the hysteria was driven more by Arab regimes (especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt) and their media than by genuine popular sectarian sentiments.   Since that got cut in copyediting, I'm glad to have the chance to mention it here.

I then point to some indications of growing GCC self-confidence and assertiveness:

Meanwhile, the GCC seems more unified and confident than it has in years. Earlier this week the six member countries agreed to form a common market. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have mended fences. Pressures for domestic political reforms have been largely defanged, and the oil bonanza has allowed Saudi Arabia to pursue an energetic foreign policy. The Gulf states won't abandon their US protectors anytime soon, but they seem more willing than ever to act on their own initiative.

The emerging signs of a tentative thaw in the Gulf are not due solely to the release of the findings in last month's National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran was no longer pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The NIE helped trigger the thaw by convincing Arabs that a US-led war against Iran had become much less likely. But it has long been clear that most Gulf rulers have no appetite for a war that would disrupt their economic boom and put them at the most risk. The Gulf media today speaks more of avoiding war than of fomenting it.       

On Iraq, I suggest that

fears of a Saudi-Iranian proxy war have given way to hints of an emerging modus vivendi. Gulf regimes remain hostile to the pro-Iranian Iraqi government. But instead of trying to replace its Shiite leader, Nouri al-Maliki, they now seem satisfied that the rise of the Sunni "Awakenings" – US-backed neighborhood councils that have begun fighting Al Qaeda – will check Iranian ambitions. Saudi and Iranian clients in Iraq even seem to be carving out zones of influence, as suggested by recent talks between the Sunni Anbar Salvation Council and the Shiite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council.

Cut due to space constraints (and because a bit off-topic), some comments on the (probable) role of Saudi cash and mediation in promoting those Awakenings.  More on that later. 

Finally, the upshot:

This is not to say that the Gulf states are comfortable with Iranian power. Anti-Shiite and anti-Persian sentiment exists throughout the Gulf. Iran's territorial dispute with the United Arab Emirates generates considerable passion in that country. Few Gulf or Arab leaders publicly welcome an Iranian nuclear program. And Ahmadinejad's proposal of a new Gulf security architecture including Iran was widely seen as an initiative for Iranian hegemony, not a genuine collective security arrangement.

Gulf states see Iran as a challenge that they have been dealing with for decades, not an urgent or existential threat. The shifting Arab approach may leave the US with little choice but to do the same. Just as America's containment of Iraq began to collapse in the late 1990s when its Arab neighbors lost faith in the value of sanctions, the new Gulf attitudes will probably now shape what the US can do with Iran.

Read the whole thing here at the Christian Science Monitor.  My thanks to those who talked to me about the subject - you know who you are.  This seems particularly relevant given that Bush's upcoming visit to the region is reportedly meant to focus on building support for containing Iranian influence.  (By the way, anyone have any thoughts on why he's visiting Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE... but not Qatar?)
 

Second Date

What, no kiss?  On the second date?  Photo:  al-Hayat

Very few media outlets in the US seem to have noticed, but Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmednejad and Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah were back together again the other day on the occasion of the Hajj.  Ahmednejad's surprising appearance at the Gulf Cooperation Council summit in early December had set off something of a frenzy of media discussion about whether it meant a possible reconciliation between Iran and its Arab Gulf neighbors.   A range of commentators (both officials and pundits) had rushed to pour cold water on those hopes/fears, emphasizing lack of agreement on issues over the sheer fact of the public engagement.  Shortly after the Iranian President's visit to Doha, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates led a significant American delegation to an Arab security meeting in Bahrain to rally the Gulf Arabs against the Iranian threat and to re-energize a collective strategy of containment.  This second public meeting - reportedly at the Saudi King's initiative -  suggests that the Gulf Arab approach to Iran really is shifting despite these American efforts.  Whatever the private fears of Iran by Gulf leaders and elites (which by all accounts, including my own conversations, are quite real), this very recent Gulf Arab trend from containment towards engagement of Iran seems real.   Worth paying close attention to, particularly given how such a rapprochement could rebound in places like Iraq and Lebanon - and, of course, Washington.  It's interesting, by the way, that the Ahmednejad-Abdullah meeting was covered prominently by al-Hayat but largely ignored by al-Sharq al-Awsat (both major Arab papers owned by Saudi princes) - suggesting at least the possibility of some internal conflict between members of the royal family on the issue.

Ahmednejad on the Hajj - really, an amazing photo, courtesy of al-Quds al-Arabi

It's also worth noting that this wasn't just an (extraordinary) diplomatic get-together.  Ahmedjnejad's invitation to the religious occasion comes in the context of the deep anti-Shia sentiment which runs through much of the Saudi religious establishment (and the oft-heated Sunni-Shia political issues in Saudi Arabia itself).   That picture above, which ran in al-Quds al-Arabi, is rather eye-catching.   It has recently struck me that this year we're seeing nothing comparable to the Sunni-Shia hysteria which swept through the Arab world around this time last year (after Saddam's execution).  So the changes which seem to be taking place at the level of high politics (i.e. Ahmednejad's visits to the GCC meeting and to Saudi Arabia) are being mirrored at the public cultural level too. 

To be updated later when I have the chance to look over the Arabic press for commentary... and, in other news, I'm still frightfully busy. 

Bahraini elections

While Lebanon remains a potent crisis overshadowing much of the Arab media, it is worth noting that al-Jazeera is devoting its programming right now to a fascinating live forum on the Bahraini Parliamentary elections.   

It's one of the things I've always appreciated about al-Jazeera.  It has always done these kind of features on elections all around the Arab world  - not as a response to American pressure, nor in response to the invasion of Iraq, but because a concern with democracy and reform have always been core to its self-image and agenda.   The event on the air right now is the farthest thing from slick:  four worthies on a platform, including the Bahraini Minister of Information and several prominent Bahraini journalists, along with a studio audience which will get the chance to voice their opinions and pepper the guests with questions.   Bare bones, live and unfiltered - basically an Arab C-Span... but reaching a vast Arab audience in prime time rather than just the political junkies who pay attention to the American version.

As to the elections themselves, I haven't followed things closely enough to offer any serious analysis - but for those interested I'd point back to the excellent overview of the Bahraini scene written last month by Toby Jones for Qahwa Sada (and also this report from Durham University).   The main issues revolve around complaints by the Shia majority that the election is being manipulated to guarantee continued Sunni domination.   There is also widespread disenchantment with the progress of reform in the Kingdom.  Turnout appears to be high, a number of major Shia parties decided to contest the elections (despite a boycott by a few parties and the lingering dismay over the Bandar-Gate scandal about an official report about suppressing Shia votes), and some liberals are expressing tentative confidence.  But enthusiasts for the revolutionary potential of new media technologies like blogs and SMS text messages should note this AP report which points out the use of text messaging by Sunni groups determined to turn out the vote to prevent Shia victories which would (they say) turn Bahrain into Iraq... and the repression faced by Bahraini bloggers and other political activists in the runup to the election. 

There's been a fair amount of commentary on the Bahraini elections in the Arab media over the last few weeks.  It isn't just al-Jazeera, of course - I watched a fairly lengthy report on al-Arabiya yesterday and there have been many essays throughout the Arab press.  Some of the essays view it through the "rising Shia threat" lens, but the real debate seems to be over whether to  view it as Egypt 2005 ("corrupt Arab regime manipulating elections to ensure its preferred outcome") or as Kuwait 2006 ("achieving some progress through the ballot box despite the obstacles").   And then there was an essay in  yesterday's al-Quds al-Arabi, which described the Bahraini elections as "a model of reform in the American style":  gerrymandering elections to a powerless Parliament in order to put on the appropriate show for foreign audiences.  (Today's unsigned al-Quds editorial was more positive, highlighting that despite all its problems the election represented unprecedented democratic participation by Gulf standards.)

If nothing else, the Bahraini elections have proven galvanizing for young Bahraini political activists, who will perhaps build on this year's experiences and continue to push for a greater political role, more transparency and more accountability.  And the elections have sparked another round of region-wide political debate about democracy and the possibilities for change.   Just one more example of how the televised coverage and debate about Arab elections on al-Jazeera and its competitors can matter more than anything the United States does or says in shaping Arab attitudes towards democracy and reform.   

UPDATE:  of course, almost as soon as I posted this al-Jazeera  cut away from the live Bahrain forum to cover a press conference by Lebanon's Minister of Information on the results of a tense Cabinet meeting.   Hard to argue with the editorial decision, every other station I saw covered the press conference too.  Also, the prime time Behind the News show - a good indicator of al-Jazeera's sense of the day's top story - is focusing on the rising violence in Iraq.   Poor Bahrain, even on election day it can't compete with Lebanon or Iraq on the news agenda...

E-voting: not good enough for Bahrain

Last week, al-Arabiya director Abd al-Rahman al-Rashed praised Bahrain for eliminating electronic voting for elections scheduled for November and December of this year.   The  King intervened in the face of opposition complaints that electronic voting machines could be manipulated to corrupt the electoral process (as one put it, "the system has security vulnerabilities that would allow hackers and others users to jeopardise voter privacy and alter votes.")  According to Rashed, the King considered it essential in order to maintain the faith of voters in the political system.   The exploding BandarGate scandal, which alleges regime plans to disenfranchise Shia voters, no doubt has something to do with voters losing faith in the integrity of the political system.  While Rashed sees electronic voting as probably superior in terms of avoiding fraud - compared to traditional Bahraini voting systems - the need to maintain voter confidence in the integrity of the system should legitimately take precedence.

Don't worry about the King - I have no doubt that the Bahraini regime will find other ways to make the vote go its way. I just find it amusing (in the "not amusing at all" sense of the word) by the fact that the United States seems to be less concerned about how easily hacked electronic voting could compromise the confidence of voters in the electoral process than Bahrain.   Do we need to start importing democracy from the Middle East instead of exporting it? 

Yemen: Saleh wins big?

Al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya are both reporting that preliminary returns show that Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh has won big in the Presidential election, with 82% of the votes.   If those results stand, will they be seen as remotely credible?   Makes something of a mockery of the "hotly contested" election, but who knows - maybe the people just love their leader of 24 years that much.  Hey, it was closer than the Egyptian Presidential election last year, where Hosni Mubarak scored 88.6% of the vote in that hotly contested and totally free and fair election.  This year the Arab dictator running for re-election scored almost 7% less of the vote:   Freedom truly is on the march! 

Yemeni elections

Yemen goes to the polls tomorrow for Presidential elections.   These initially looked interesting because long-time President Ali Abdullah Saleh declared that he would not stand for re-election.  He changed his mind, of course. It's a common dilemma for Arab dictators - can he help it if the people love him so?   So now he's running as the candidate of change, another common stance for long-time Arab dictators who seem to see not a whit of irony in their campaigns for urgent reforms of the systems they personally built.   Once Saleh re-entered the race, it looked likely to become boring again. It hasn't really, though. 

This has been an unusually contentious election campaign, far more interesting than most of us expected.   It isn't just the assorted election rally stampedes and occasional violence.   It isn't even the extremely convenient uncovering of an "al-Qaeda plot" which - amazingly! - seems to have allegedly involved one of the bodyguards of the leading opposition candidate Faisal bin Shamlan.   It's that the opposition (including the Islamist party Islah) seems to have united behind a credible candidate, and a combination of Arab media coverage and international election monitors seem to be keeping things relatively straight.  Saleh's government is famously corrupt, and Yemenis - like most Arabs - are sick of the status quo and yearn for political change of whatever kind.   There's even a runaway hit pop song denouncing Saleh.  In response, Saleh has been fighting hard, holding large campaign rallies, reaching out to Islah's Islamist opponents, and even appearing on al-Jazeera for a lengthy grilling by Ahmed Mansour.

Saleh will almost certainly still win, of course - if all else fails, he's still got Diebold (Yemen Branch) to deliver the appropriate results.  He told al-Hayat yesterday that the opposition will experience a great defeat tomorrow, and I reckon he knows exactly what he's talking about.  I hope he loses, on general principles, but don't expect it.  I also wonder what the American response would be to his replacement by a coalition which includes a moderate Islamist party.   So why is the campaign so intense?

Couple of thoughts.  First, I think there's the general al-Jazeera effect which has turned the Arab public spotlight on a sequence of elections in the Arab world, casting them as part of an overall Arab narrative.  The relevant history for this election for the Arab public is not past Yemeni elections, it is the Egyptian elections and the Palestinian elections and the Kuwaiti Parliamentary elections and even the Iraqi elections. 

Second, Yemenis are thinking about the question of hereditary succession which is so important in the Egyptian context right now (in addition to the rarely articulated but I think pervasive sense that the hereditary successions in Syria and Jordan produced rather dim bulbs who are not coming close to filling the large army boots of their fathers;  and the Libyan case, where the jury seems to be out on Sayf al-Islam).   The idea has been circulating that Ali Abdullah's son Ahmed is, just by random chance, emerging as the most talented and brilliant man of his generation and will have to overcome the obstacle of being the long-time President's son to serve his nation.   This idea does not amuse Yemenis as much as it amuses me. 

Third, there's Saleh's withdrawal and re-entry in the race, which I think has energized a lot of people. When he withdrew, quite a few politicians started thinking about a post-Saleh future - and some of them didn't want to back down after he came back in.   His initial declaration raised expectations, and his re-entry just angered a lot of people and energized the opposition.

Finally, Saleh's on-again off-again dealings with the US, especially over the war on terror, aren't particularly popular.  Heck, his accusations that bin Shamlan's bodyguard was working with al-Qaeda (while most likely a cheap election stunt) might even help the opposition in some parts of the country!

At any rate, it's well worth watching - a really intense and hotly contested Arab election is good to see, whatever the limitations.  I'll be watching with interest anyway, and hope to start getting some input from real Yemen experts soon.   Beats talking about the Pope. 

MERO: Kuwait's Annus Mirabilis

Middle East Report Online has just posted a fascinating, lengthy essay on the last turbulent year in Kuwait by Mary Ann Tetrault.   It's all interesting, but I think I'll just excerpt the section on the role played by the new media in the 2006 Parliamentary election:

Like the orange-clad protesters, candidates sent reams of text messages, using lists of cell phone numbers generated from records of attendees asked to sign in at events. Some messages, featuring rumor and gossip, were campaign tricks designed to make another candidate look bad. Most focused on thanking the recipient for his or her support and offered information about the candidate’s next event.

Blogs were a more important innovation. Voters could read some of the more sensational blog postings in daily newspapers. The Orange Movement leadership maintains a blog originating in the United States, managed jointly by overseas Kuwaiti students and one of the Orange organizers. This blog, KuwaitJunior, provided running news and commentary during the emiri transition in January 2006. During the campaign, it brought electoral corruption into the public eye thanks to a posting by a woman who recounted how two men in Rula Dashti’s district had attempted to buy her vote with the promise of a Chanel handbag. Although she did not mention the candidate’s name, it soon became public knowledge that she was speaking of Jamal al-‘Umar. The Orange leadership investigated this allegation by dispatching an undercover member, armed with a small video camera, to negotiate with the vote buyers. The camera failed, but the agent managed to capture pictures and voices on her cell phone. Then four young men who were not Orange organizers decided to challenge al-‘Umar during an event at his tent in Jabriyya southeast of Kuwait City. They asked him to explain why people were buying votes on his behalf if he was innocent of corruption as he claimed. The youths were roughed up and thrown out by the candidate’s assistants and, adding insult to injury, the Jabriyya police refused to accept their assault complaint. The worst part of the story came at the end, when al-‘Umar came in second, thereby winning a seat in the 2006 parliament.

A third media innovation came from broadcasts sent via private satellite stations into Kuwait. These broadcasts consisted primarily of videotapes of candidate forums, speeches and debates. The programs provided by the Alliance, a two-year old opposition umbrella group, featured speakers critical of the government and prominent in the movement for redistricting. The information minister tried to shut these satellite broadcasts down, arguing that they did not cover all the candidates equally and therefore were biased -- the same reason commonly given for why state-owned electronic media do
not cover campaign events. The government put pressure on ArabSat, the broadcaster, to stop carrying the programs. When ArabSat complied, the Alliance shifted its broadcasts to HotBird, a service fewer Kuwaitis subscribe to, but KuwaitJunior and other blogs posted links offering streaming video for those without TV access.

An interesting case where political blogs might actually have mattered in Arab politics.  And overall a piece well worth reading. 

Yemeni nuclear program?

In the opening salvo of his Presidential re-election campaign, one-time non-candidate President Ali Abdullah Saleh announced that his future plans for Yemen will include pursuing a peaceful nuclear program.   Hmm.  Reason for concern?   First Arab response to the Iranian nuclear programme?  Empty campaign promise from a guy who's had 28 years to do whatever he wants and hasn't got much to show for it?   Or just a way to generate electricity in a poor country?    I would see such the dangers of a Yemeni nuclear program as rather similar to Pakistan's, if it came to that - particularly worrisome given the nature of the leadership and the extent of radical Islamism in the country.  Thus far I've seen little reaction to Saleh's announcement outside of the Arab press.