Abu Aardvark

US bases in Gulf not especially popular, except with Americans [with update]

The Project on International Policy Attitudes just released an intriguing result from its multi-national surveys of international public opinion:  outside of the United States, there isn't a lot of support for U.S. bases in the Gulf. 

As the above chart shows, 70% of Americans think that bases in the Gulf are a fine idea.  The UK and France are roughly evenly split (43-39 and 41-43, respectively), but 52% of Germans are opposed.   Only 4% of Russians and 8% of Chinese approve -- ah, the smell of great power politics in the air.   And then you get to the Arab and Muslim world:  11% of Jordanians approve, 6% of Turks, 4% of Palestinians, 5% of Indonesians, and a statistically insignificant number of Egyptians.    A pity they didn't (couldn't?) ask the question in the Gulf itself... would be interesting to hear what the Kuwaitis, Qataris, Bahrainis -- or Iraqis -- in question have said about their "protectors".  

Even allowing for the problems with such opinion surveys, these numbers should be sobering -- especially as they track with lots of other surveys about regional views of American foreign policy.   Americans generally believe that their military presence in the Gulf represents an "international public good", protecting energy supplies and global stability, and consider their military hegemony to be cushioned by "soft power" through which American leadership is perceived as benevolent and desirable.   Most of the world's publics, especially Arab and Muslim publics, don't seem to agree.  Public diplomacy -- and grand strategy -- need to take such findings a bit more seriously. 

UPDATE:  Spencer Ackerman asks WorldPublicOpinion.org why they didn't survey the Gulf - check out the answer.  Regarding his question about who else will guard the shipping lanes, well, India and Qatar did just sign that big security cooperation deal. Not that I think the changing of the guard will (or should) happen any time soon, but a lot of those Gulf countries do seem to be looking East towards the big energy markets lately... and historically speaking, great powers do seem to have a way of seeing the need to protect their interests abroad. 

TWO MORE UPDATES:  Right on cue, "A vice foreign minister and a leading naval strategist were quoted in Chinese state media on Wednesday as saying that Beijing was close to mounting a naval mission in the gulf."   Great powers, state interests, and all that.  

Meanwhile, Jon Alterman reads the NIC's Global Trends 2025 report and concludes (no idea how to find a direct link, sorry, but will add when one appears) that Gulf leaders reading the tea leaves are likely to conclude that "the United States sees their region become far less central to global security than it is now... [which] indicates a far weaker U.S. security commitment to the Gulf come 2025.  Put bluntly, the report suggests that over the next two decades, the U.S. security commitment to the Gulf will shift from being a constant to a variable."   He therefore expects Gulf leaders to rationally start looking around, "diversifying their strategic relationships" -- most likely with France, Russia, China, and India -- and seeking an accommodation with Iran. 

Dabbagh's Dream

Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh spoke at the US Institute for Peace yesterday, and is making the rounds of DC.  He's made some news in his public remarks:  in addition to calling for U.S. dialogue with Iran and pleading for American consultation with Iraqis over the pace and scope of troop withdrawals (see Spencer Ackerman for more), he announced (as far as I know, for the first time) an Iraqi proposal for an EU-style regional economic partnership building off of the existing Iraq and its Neighbors Group (grouping Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and -- possibly -- the other GCC states).  He said that he had already spoken informally to Kuwait, Syria and Turkey about the idea, and -- as several audience members pointed out -- it's hard to imagine that the Iraqi government would propose something that hadn't already circulated through Tehran.  

The proposal is obviously highly unlikely to go anywhere, given regional politics, Iraqi domestic realities, and the implausibility of any Arab government giving up sovereignty in any meaningful sense.  But it's still interesting to think about the reasons for the proposal and its possible implications. The group's main purpose would seem to be to establish Iraq as the core of a new regional structure (Dabbagh said as much in his presentation).  The inclusion of Turkey, for instance, may help Iraq with the Kurdish issue but makes little sense otherwise.   A secondary purpose, however, is likely the search for an acceptable vehicle for reconciling the Iraqi government's relations with Iran and the U.S. while trying to establish itself as some kind of intermediary for, rather than a victim of, Saudi-Iranian competition. 

The group most notably excludes Israel/Palestine and Egypt. To the extent that anyone pays attention to the proposal, I expect Amr Moussa and the Arab League to be extremely hostile, since it would undermine the Arab League (or what remains of it).   Egypt will see this as an Iraqi attempt to undermine its leadership position in the Arab world (or what remains of it).   Palestinians will very likely see the proposal as another step towards their marginalization as world attention inexorably shifts towards the Gulf.   Dabbagh fielded a question about the exclusion of Israel by saying that it was limited to "Iraq's neighbors", but that doesn't stop the GCC states from being considered.   Still, the proposed "region" does reflect a very real shift of power and global interest from the Levant to the Gulf. 

While this particular proposal seems quite unrealistic, I do see merit in trying to somehow build on the Neighbors Group, which has had only limited impact thus far but could hopefully be revitalized by a new administration which actually believes in regional diplomacy.   Including Iran within a regional security architecture should be a major strategic objective for the U.S. in some form or another as an endpoint for the President-elect's proposed tough dialogue and engagement with the Iranians.   Some kind of GCC + 2 (Iraq and Iran) architecture seems like a more realistic objective here.  But if Dabbagh's proposal at least sparks some creative strategic thinking about how Iraq and Iran might be re-integrated into the region then it will have served some purpose. 

Arabs stepping up in Iraq... because they expect US drawdown?

For weeks, Arab editorialists have been arguing for - or, if you like, signaling - the need for an Arab opening towards Iraq.  The seeds of this could be seen in the Neighbors Conference held in Kuwait at the end of April, where appeals were made if little actual progress. (*)  Since a June 12 article in al-Sharq al-Awsat by former Jordanian Information Minister Salleh al-Qullab calling for an Arab "third way" between Iranian and American visions for Iraq, I've been noticing a dramatic increase in such articles in the Gulf press, usually asking some variation, as in in the UAE's al-Khaleej, of the theme  "where is the Arab role in shaping the future of Iraq?"  Many of these have been published in al-Sharq al-Awsat, a paper which is often considered to be an outlet for the views of the Saudi leadership.   

Over the last few days, events have begun to catch up.  In conjunction with Nuri al-Maliki's trip to Abu Dhabi, the UAE announced that it had appointed an ambassador to Baghdad and would forgive Iraqi debt ($7 billion according to the Arab media, $4 billion according to English reports - not sure why the discrepancy).  Jordan appointed an ambassador, and the King reportedly plans to be the first Arab head of state to visit Baghdad.   Iraq is now reportedly beginning talks with Kuwait over outstanding issues, including debt, oil fields, compensation claims, and the border. This is capped with an editorial by al-Sharq al-Awsat's editor calling on Maliki to respond to the Arab opening with real national reconciliation, and a guest editorial in the same paper by Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh.

There are still important limits to this Arab opening.   Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the two key players with regard to Iraqi debt, seem to be biding their time (and, might I add, I've been saying for years that it's scandalous that these Arab countries continue to hold on to their claims on that vast Saddam-era debt).   Qatar's al-Jazeera just apologized to the Iraqi government after the latter complained about an inaccurate report showing some sensational violence.  Despite recent changes, most Arab governments, media, and public opinion still seem to view Maliki's government as sectarian and pro-Iranian.  But enough has now happened in the public discourse and in concrete action to think that there's a real Arab (or at least Gulf) policy shift going on here.   

While many critics argue (for good reason) that American pressure is driving these changes, something else seems to be going on as well.  It's interesting that Maliki chose the venue of a meeting with Arab ambassadors to broach publicly for the first time the idea that Iraq might demand a timetable for withdrawal of American forces in its negotiations over the long-term relationship.  Not only would such a withdrawal please most Arabs, depending on how it is handled, but  it would also increase their perceived need to do something.   Virtually all of the public debate leading up to these new developments highlighted the fact that the US would soon begin to draw down its forces and that Arabs needed to step up now if they did not want Iran to dominate this new Iraq.  That's exactly the sort of "stepping up" which those arguing for a responsible withdrawal have expected - that the expectation of an American drawdown would shift the incentives of all the actors and lead them to change their behavior in a productive fashion.   Something to be encouraged, and closely watched.

(*) sentence added after I came back from my mid-day meeting. 

GP: The MB in Saudi Arabia

Last week I wrote about an interesting piece by Mohanna Hubayl on the state of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf.  I was curious about the accuracy of his descriptions, and asked some colleagues for their take.  I got some informal thoughts on the subject from Thomas Hegghammer, one of the best young(ish) scholars working on Saudi Islamism.  Recall that I summarized Hubayl's brief comments on Saudi Arabia like this:  "the MB peacefully and voluntarily liquidated itself, he claims. The main pillars of MB thought remain but many of its former members have moved to the conservative salafi trend. "

Hegghammer:  The MB in Saudi Arabia is a mysterious entity that is extremely difficult to pin down, because they do not have a formal organizational presence. Nevertheless, some people and communities are known to have more or less of a MB orientation. As such, the MB blends into the Sahwa and the two are often lumped together, especially by liberals (and by Prince Nayif). It is useful to think of the Sahwa as a spectrum with pure MB ideology on the one hand and pure wahhabism on the other. Muhammad Qutb would be far out on the left, Musa al-Qarni three-quarters to the left and Salman al-Awda somewhere in the middle. Two implications follow: first, it is extremely difficult to assess the state of the MB, and second, you never know what people mean when they speak of the MB in Saudi.

If by the MB al-Hubayl means the Sahwa, which I suspect, then I would agree with the assessment. The Sahwa, already out of steam in the late 1990s, has been further weakened by Hawali's hospitalisation and al-Awda's near-total cooptation. They still remain relatively popular and there is a new generation of Sahwists coming up, but their politics are not very contentious any more. I am not sure exactly who al-Hubayl has in mind when he says MB figures have moved to the salafi trend. I should say I don't follow the Sahwa very closely; I am sure Stephane has a lot more to say about this. [editorial note:  Stephane, consider this a call to action!   Please phone home.]

Me:  That sounds about right to me - what I can't figure out is what it means to have the MB without an organization?  Is it still the MB if it's just a bunch of like-minded individuals?

Hegghammer:  Your questions are spot on. Apart from ideological leanings, the most operational way to identify MB-oriented people would be to look at their international contact network. Some Saudis are more closely in touch with Muslim Brothers abroad than others. Hence the international Islamic organizations such as the Muslim World League are said to be bastions of Ikhwanism in the Kingdom. But I am not sure whether this means much for domestic politics.

Carry on.

UPDATE:  ask and ye shall receive:  Stephane Lacroix, elevated from comments (thanks!):

The MB has traditionally existed as an independent network within the Saudi Sahwa - and I have met several persons claiming to be affiliates of the Saudi MB while in the kingdom.

During the last few decades, however, many consider that the Saudi MB have lost their ideological specificity, and have drawn much closer to the mainstream salafi trend found in the Sahwa - to the extent that they have become pretty indistinguishable. This is, I suppose, what al-Hubayyil means when he writes that the "the MB peacefully and voluntarily liquidated itself".

The criticism formulated here by al-Hubayyil is quite common among the young generation of Saudi MB sympathizers, who consider the current context (post-9/11 widespread criticism of salafism/wahhabism, etc...) as favorable to the emergence of the MB as a religious alternative in Saudi Arabia. However, these calls for an "MB renewal" haven't yet led to any significant change in the Saudi political-religious sphere.   

MB in the Gulf

A few weeks back I wrote about the shifting balance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the salafi trend in Kuwait, and tied it to a broader set of questions about how this might affect al-Qaeda and other forms of radicalization.  So I was very interested by an article last week (June 3) on Islam Online written by the Saudi Islamist Mohanna al-Hubayl about the state of the Ikhwan throughout the Gulf. 

Hubayl writes that the Kuwaiti election results should come as a major shock and wake up call to the MB, demonstrating that the general rise in Islamic sentiment in the Gulf will not necessarily translate into support for their organization.   The decline in the MB's popularity is not limited to Kuwait, he argues.  It extends across the entire Gulf, and is tied to the rise of the interlinked threats of America's military presence, the rise of Iranian power, and the ascension of competing salafi movements. 

He looks at each country in turn:

• Saudi Arabia:  the MB peacefully and voluntarily liquidated itself, he claims. The main pillars of MB thought remain but many of its former members have moved to the conservative salafi trend.  (Is that true?  I wish he had said more than that - he gives only a very perfunctory note on the Saudi case.)
  
• Oman:  the MB lives in an ongoing transitional period, ever since a confrontation with the Sultan over a visit by Shimon Peres.  After that, the MB faced a harsh security crackdown.  But in what he calls a historic decision, the MB refused to be dragged into a sectarian conflict with the Ibadis and Shia despite efforts to push them in that direction. 
• UAE:  despite some interesting developments among the cadres and youth of the MB, intense security obstacles prevented them from doing much by way of renewing their thought or engaging in popular actions. 
• Bahrain:  the salafi trend rose up and overwhelmed the MB - to the point of hegemony over the Sunni Islamist field. 
  
• Qatar:  despite being formally dissolved (cf Abdullah Nefissi) the Qatari MB retains a powerful presence intellectually and in the media.  But he sees the 'nahda' efforts of Dr Jassem Sultan as effective only beneath a clear ceiling, lacking a wider reform vision. 

He therefore sees the Kuwaiti Islamist movement as better positioned than its Gulf counterparts because of the democratic elections and political parties there, so uncommon throughout the Gulf region, which makes its evident decline all the more shocking.   He claims to see some encouraging signs of a critical spirit emerging among the MB youth in Kuwait (and to some extent further in the Gulf, though nowhere as developed as the reformist youth in Egypt, who clearly impress him).  But he fears they will be stifled by the organizations and by their lack of either a well-developed concept of internal reform or of a political strategy.

He notes that despiting playing no formal role in the Gulf organizations, the Egyptian (international) MB has nevertheless had a negative impact because of its controversial stances on Iraq (the Iraqi Islamic Party under Tareq al-Hashemi taking part in the political process but remained part of the MB, the performance of the MB-linked insurgency factions); Palestine (many in the Gulf saw the MB's efforts on behalf of Hamas and the blockade of Gaza as inadequate); and Hezbollah (its support for Hezbollah shocked a lot of people in the Gulf, who are less favorably inclined to Shia).    

He concludes that the MB in the Gulf lacks a strategic vision and is losing its ties to the people.  By imposing doctrinal and organizational conformity, and refusing alliances with other reformist trends, the Gulf MB was losing its appeal to the youth and failing to renew itself.   He therefore calls for internal reforms and a renewal of the movement's thought and political discourse - but doesn't seem particularly sure as to where such new energy might come from. 

In short, a pretty grim diagnosis of the state of the MB in the Gulf from this "friendly critic". It would be interesting if he performed the same exercise on the salafi competition and other political trends.  I would be very curious to hear from people studying the MB in any of these countries.  Does Hubayl get it right?  What does he miss?  And if he's right, what are the implications for Islamism more broadly in the Gulf?  Thomas H? Stephane L? Bernie H?  I'm looking at you!   (But not only at you... anyone out there, drop me a note.)

 

Nathan Brown: do the salafis really want to party?

After I stole his best line this morning, my suitemate Nathan Brown volunteered this comment on the performance of the Salafi movement in the Kuwaiti elections, which he spent last week observing: 

Do the Salafis Really Want to Party?
Nathan Brown, GWU

As Marc noted today, one of the most interesting developments in last Saturday’s Kuwaiti elections was the success of the salafis and the decline (probably temporary but still striking) of the Islamic Constitutional Movement (known as Hadas the acronym for the movement in Arabic, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood).  I’ll be posting an analysis of what happened to Hadas on the Carnegie website next week.

Let me note for now what is so interesting about the Kuwaiti salafis. Not only do they participate in elections, unlike most of their counterparts in other Arab politics that disdain such political activity, but some of them are actually forming a political party.  Quintan Wiktorowicz’s book on salafis and the Ikhwan in Jordan shows how salafis there eschew formal and organized politics, and that’s the normal pattern elsewhere in the region.

The new Kuwaiti electoral law was supposed to favor parties and ideological movements, but for the most part it was sectarian and especially tribal identities that proved the real winners.  The exception was a salafi party that ran five candidates, four of whom won seats (some media reports gave the number of their deputies as ten, but that is based on counting their allies and like-minded independents).  They are far less of an impressive organization than Hadas in many ways. They have thought less about their agenda and they remain dominated by specific personalities (especially their leader, Khalid Sultan). 

But salafi movements have generally regarded the Ikhwan as more of a political than a religious organization, and the Kuwaiti salafis are no different. There remain strong ideological and personal differences between Hadas and the salafis—deep enough to have prevented the two from going into an electoral alliance despite long and tortured negotiations.  But the Kuwaiti salafis, as much as they look down upon Hadas as dedicated to what they might term “Islamism light,” now seem to be taking a page out of their book.  Those interested in the party can view its website at http://www.al-islami.org/  

The salafi party will now have to wrestle with the same issues that Hadas has since it was formed in 1991: how and when to cooperate with liberals and Shi‘a, whether to accept ministerial portfolios (if offered), when to make compromises, and how to prioritize among various elements of its program.  I met on Monday with Salim Al-Nashi, their media spokesperson (and the older brother of Hadas secretary-general Badr Al-Nashi) and pressed him on these issues. He insisted that unlike the Brotherhood, the salafis remain concerned with far more than politics and that they would not compromise but only pursue the Islamic way.  But since the Islamic shari‘a gives little guidance on parliamentary maneuvering, we’ll have to see what happens to them in practice.

long beards vs short beards

I haven't had time to follow the Kuwaiti elections as closely as I would have liked, but the results are interesting.  Most of the English-language coverage has emphasized that Islamists did well, increasing their share of Parliament to 21 out of 50 seats, women again failed to win any seats, and liberals roughly held steady.  Shia, who make up about a third of the population, increased their share from 3 seats to 5 (10% is better than 6%, but still far from equitable);  all of their winning candidates were reportedly Islamists, including several who sparked sectarian anger over their praise for Hezbollah a while back, and some of the Saudi media in particular seem to eagerly anticipate increased Sunni-Shia tension. 

But as my colleague Nathan Brown, just back from observing the election, put it, the real story is  "long beards good, short beards bad." 

Salafi Khaled Sultan and friend work the phones:  "long beards", photo courtesy of al-Jazeera

Dr. Badr al-Nashi, Islamic Constitutional Movement ("short beards"), photo via Ikhwanweb

What does that mean?  The key change seems to be in intra-Islamist competition: the decline of the Islamic Constitutional Movement - the Muslim Brotherhood style party, i.e. "short beards" - and the rise of the salafi movement, i.e. the "long beards".   The ICM (which formally split with the MB back in 1991 over the organization's attitude to the Iraqi invasion, but which remains an MB-style party and is routinely identified as such) won only 3 seats, down from 6.  The Islamic Salafi Alliance - which reportedly is thinking about forming a political party, but hasn't yet done so, which would really blur one of the long-standing distinctions with the MB across the region - won 10 seats, with another 8 seats going to independent Islamists (many from tribal areas).

This might have less to do with changes in actual underlying preferences than with the effects of the new electoral law, as some reports suggest that the ICM simply bungled the tribal vote and lost several seats it should have won.   Islam Online quotes both salafi and Muslim Brotherhood figures arguing that the results had more to do with electoral politics than with any real change in support for either salafism or the Ikwhan - but also cites Hamed al-Ali, a former leader in the salafi movement and an influential frequent contributor to jihadist forums, claiming that the results demonstrated the widespread public acceptance of Islamist discourse among Kuwaitis.  I suspect this will be debated intensely in the coming months. 

In general, though, I'd suggest that a decline in the MB-style Islamic Constitutional Movement and a rise in the power of the salafis and independents is certainly relevant in the context of the questions I posed last week about the "Muslim Brotherhood firewall":  such salafis would have both a different ideological stance and less of an organizational component.  Local context matters, and I doubt that it is fair to just describe all of the salafis as "radical" as some of the news coverage has, but there are clear doctrinal and organizational and political differences between them and the ICM.   Look forward to hearing from Kuwait specialists on the topic - comments or emails!

UDPATE:  for more, see Nathan Brown's guest post "Do the salafis really want to party?"

Gnehm Kuwait lecture today

Kuwaiti politics have been really interesting lately, ever since the Emir dissolved Parliament and called for early elections now slated for May 17.  With a new electoral system and some inflamed Sunni-Shia tensions and a vocal opposition, nobody really knows how these will go - a rarity in Arab elections, which are usually gerrymandered and fixed to death (see Asher Susser's latest brief on Jordan for Brandeis, by the way, for an entertainingly depressing explanation of how the Jordanians usually do this).   I haven't written anything about it, though, because I've been waiting for today's lecture by Ambassador Edward Gnehm at the Elliott School (12:30, 6th floor, 1957 E Street).  Gnehm, who probably knows more about high-level politics in Kuwait than anybody else in the United States, is just back from a visit and should have a lot to say.  Anyone interested in Gulf politics, please come by - with apologies for the short notice (it was postponed from last week).

nuclear showers there's nothing spookier you now about to witness the power

Yesterday the UAE announced that it would begin exploring the prospects for a civilian nuclear program, after signing a deal with French President Sarkozy on nuclear cooperation in January.  Today, the United States announced an agreement with Bahrain to support a civilian nuclear program.  Qatar has been talking up nuclear power  for years, and the GCC collectively has been talking of late of the need for a joint nuclear energy agenda.  This all makes great sense.   These large, energy-poor countries clearly need nuclear energy programs to meet the power needs of their vast populations and energy-dependent manufacturing economies.  Where else could they find reliable supplies of energy?  And from a security perspective, there really doesn't seem to be any better place to locate nuclear power plants than in small, weak states in the Persian Gulf, where would-be nuclear terrorists would have no chance of getting close and the plants themselves couldn't possibly become military targets. 

Of course, what Gulf watchers really want to know is whether Dubai's peaceful nuclear energy program will be taller, shinier and more expensive than Qatar's.   

Seriously, does anyone else find the GCC's rush to acquire "peaceful nuclear energy programs" and the West's seeming enthusiasm for the prospect a bit odd?

UPDATE:  it isn't just the GCC, of course.  Gamal Mubarak made some waves  during the NDP's 2006 conference by declaring Egypt's intentions to pursue "peaceful nuclear energy program,"  and as Judah Grunstein points out, Hosni Mubarak just signed some ink in Moscow towards that goal.  So has Jordan and even Yemen (Yemen!).  I'm sure there are more that I missed.  Commenters here and over email have offered various theories, beyond the face value economic explanation.  But both the "status" and the "poking Iran" explanations are odd, though, in that as far as I know it isn't "peaceful nuclear energy programs" which generally produce such status or pokes...  it's the kind that goes boom.  Or is that just so 2006 of me?

GCC-Iran and Al-Jazeera Watch, continued

The GCC-Iran rapprochement appears to proceed apace, despite US efforts to tighten sanctions.  Yesterday Mahmoud Ahmedenejad had a well-publicized phone chat with Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah about regional developments, and also found the time for his first-ever phone conversation with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.   UK based Palestinian scholar Khaled al-Hroub wrote an interesting piece the other day in the UAE's al-Ittihad outlying the good strategic rationale for the emergence of a "Gulf-Iranian security order."  In a piece which ran in both al-Ittihad and the Saudi al-Sharq al-Awsat, the Kuwaiti Saad bin Tufla al-Ajami wrote proudly a few days ago about his country's decision to send its Foreign Minister to Tehran after Bush's visit, to demonstrate that Kuwait and the Gulf will pursue their interests, which might not be American interests.  Just some more data points in support of the argument that the Gulf and other Arabs do not seem to be where the US is, or would like them to be, on the Iran question these days.   

Meanwhile, al-Jazeera's coverage over the last couple of weeks lends little support to the thesis that it has been neutered into a pro-American station.  During Bush's visit to Iran the Gulf [typo corrected; though wouldn't a trip to Iran have been something?], it sent a team to Tehran and aired an interview with Iran's Foreign Minister and a somewhat spectacular interview with Ahmedenejad.  That accords well with the "new GCC line on Iran" thesis, not so much with the "pro-Americanization" thesis.  And while I haven't been able to watch much Arab TV the last couple of days, at least some Arab media watchers are saying that its coverage of the current Gaza crisis has been the most thorough and effective, covering it heavily even as most Arab TV stations acted as if nothing unusual were happening.  That's what one would expect from al-Jazeera, but not from the alleged "new al-Jazeera."   Neither of these is decisive proof of anything, but they are suggestive.