Abu Aardvark

Rumors of Mubarak's death

Source:  al-Araby

Rumors that Hosni Mubarak had died swept through Egyptian discourse over the last ten days.  Unable to squelch the rumors, the Egyptian regime had to resort to releasing (fairly unconvincing) pictures of an alive Mubarak and an interview with Mubarak denying the rumors, and then went on a propaganda offensive accusing the Muslim Brotherhood of spreading the rumors in order to foster instability (it later added Hamas and "Arab media" to the list of conspirators ... and, I kid you not, according to al-Ahram is opening an official investigation into the treatment of the rumors by the opposition press).

The best commentary I've yet seen comes from Egyptian columnist Hassan Nafaa, who argued that the incredibly rapid spread of the rumor and the tenor of private discussions about the possibility that it was true carried extremely important lessons about the current state of Egyptian politics.  The power of the rumor mill testifies to the lack of credibility of the official media and of the government, since Egyptians clearly did not feel that they could trust the information on offer from those sources.   This is not a new story of course, since Egypt's official media have been in a state of free-fall for quite a while.  But as Abdullah al-Sanawi argues this is  something quite extraordinary:  journalists and citizens and politicians trying to find out if their own President was live were resorting to calling foreign ambassadors.  As the official media offered statements devoid of any evidence, which people simply didn't trust, the story quickly spread to the Arab satellite television stations like al-Jazeera and from there to the foreign media - but they couldn't get any reliable information out of the regime either.  All in all, the episode demonstrates the dangers of a regime's lost credibility and of a corroded official public sphere.

The other dimension is more substantively political.  The intensity of concern about Mubarak's fate reflects the current state of political polarization, driven by the regime's confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood,  the frustration of reform efforts after the fiasco of the Constitutional amendments, and the still inncomplete efforts to secure Gamal Mubarak's path to succeeding his father as President.  The ambiguity surrounding the succession creates tremendous uncertainty: there is still no Vice President; according to Nafaa, Gamal has been increasingly behaving like an Acting President rather than a President in Waiting but hasn't yet shored up his support;  nobody has a clue where the military really stands on the succession;  and plenty of people are fanning the fears of a Muslim Brotherhood takeover if Mubarak goes.   

This is precisely the sort of moment which political scientists studying political transitions look for - divided elites, unclear international environment, a powerful opposition movement positioning itself as a moderate alternative, widespread public discontent.   Of course, that doesn't really tell us anything about what it might transition into - the teleology of 'transition to democracy' really doesn't hold up, I don't think.  If Hosni Mubarak really has been incapacitated then we're going to be looking at an extremely tense transitional period, with the 'center' disappearing at the height of multiple political struggles.  Even if he hasn't, the wildfire spread of the rumor and the tenor of the discussions suggest tremendous uncertainty about Egypt's political future.   

UPDATE:  I've just been informed that Ibrahim Eissa, the courageous editor of the independent weekly al-Dustour, has become the first journalist arrested on charges of spreading false rumors of Mubarak's death. 

Memo to the MB

My article "Memo to the MB:  How to talk to America" in the September/October issue of the magazine Foreign Policy is available - to subscribers only - online as of today.   The article is one of Foreign Policy's series of memos to influential policymakers in international affairs (the most recent example available free online is addressed to the Chief Executive of Hong Kong).   The memo, addressed to Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohammed Mehdi Akef, offers advice on what the Brotherhood should do if it really wants to engage with Western audiences.   The article does not advocate on behalf of the Brotherhood. It does begin from the premise that a serious dialogue with the Brotherhood would be valuable, particularly if it can produce common understandings on the value of democracy and the need to combat extremism, but it poses more questions and challenges than answers.  It begins like this:

When you took over the reins as head of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2004, promising to put freedom at the top of your agenda, you probably couldn’t have imagined where your organization would be today. Although still technically banned, the Brotherhood has emerged as the leading opposition group in Egypt, with 88 seats in parliament. Your calls for governmental transparency and accountability represent an entirely new battle in Egyptian politics—and you’ve got the scars to prove it.

Since contesting parliamentary elections, you’ve seen the Egyptian regime aggressively tamper with the ballot box, launch a massive campaign of arrests of Brotherhood members, and alter the Constitution to prevent your participation in the political process. Many in the West are concerned about the way you’ve been treated by the Egyptian government. But your continued ambiguity about the Brotherhood’s core political commitments, your ambivalence toward Hamas’s attacks on Israel, and questions about your connections with Islamic extremism have left even your backers doubting your true intentions.

The memo urges the Brotherhood to engage the "Great Muslim Brotherhood Debate" in US foreign policy circles while it is hot (Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke's Foreign Affairs piece really kicked it off, triggering lots of conservative rebuttals, while Shadi Hamid has more recently carried the torch).  It acknowledges that these are very difficult times for the Brotherhood in Egypt, but that this offers an opportunity as well as a challenge:  "Your Western critics want nothing more than for you to abandon democracy in the face of adversity... How you react to the tough moments tell us more about you than how you behave when things are going well." (a prize if you can identify the Buffy reference).   

It warns against "double talk", pointing out that Americans will likely pay more attention to what is said in Arabic than in English since that is more likely to reflect real view.  This oft-aired critique is vastly overstated, by the way:  in a policy paper that will be published next month, I demonstrate that the Egyptian Brotherhood's rhetoric in Arabic is highly consistent with its rhetoric in English.  Whether this rhetoric reflects their 'real' convictions remains a highly pertinent question, which can not likely be resolved in the absence of an opportunity for them to put the words into action.  But at the level of rhetoric, the forthcoming article documents dozens of recent Brotherhood statements, interviews, speeches and documents (all in Arabic) which attest to consistency rather than double talk.   But at any rate, with a hat tip to Dan Drezner I warn Akef that "all politics is global".  If you can't persuade your fellow citizens (whether Copts or secularists) of your sincerity, I point out, how can you expect to persuade Americans?

I warn Akef against reading too much or too little into the support for the Brotherhood expressed by Western human rights organizations, academics, and political analysts.   On the one hand, their defense of Brotherhood members based on principled commitments to political freedoms and human rights should challenge any undifferentiated view of a uniformly hostile West.   At the same time, such support should not be misunderstood as support for the organization itself.   Most of these voices are simultaneously skeptical of the Brotherhood and deeply worried about its intentions.  It is these pragmatic Westerners, who are open to persuasion but are far from persuaded, that the Brotherhood needs to convince through deeds as well as words. 

I recommend two specific courses of action here:  first, a strong public condemnation of the practice of takfir (declaring a Muslim to be an apostate), both in principle and in practice the next time such a controversy arises in Egypt;  and second, allowing the recent emergence of Muslim Brotherhood bloggers to flourish without censorship as a window into the debates, thoughts, and aspirations of the organization's members.   The third area where I push the Brotherhood is on extremism.  As I've argued elsewhere, the Brotherhood could be either a "firewall" against extremism, holding its members within a moderate doctrine, or a "transmission belt" recruiting people into an Islamist worldview and making them more open to radicalization.  They claim to be the former, most critics see them as the latter. So what are they actually doing to resolve that debate in their favor, and prove that they are really the firewall they claim to be? 

There's a lot more packed in to the short essay; if the full text becomes available I'll add a link.  In between the time I wrote it and its publication, two significant developments have taken place.  The first is the publication of the draft political party platform, followed by reports of internal debates about key aspects of the draft.   Both the move to draft such a political platform and the airing of debates about its contents would have followed the tenor of my recommendations, had the article come out first.   The second is the arrest of Essam el-Erian (head of the political bureau and a key drafter of the platform) and 15 other Brotherhood leaders in what is widely seen as a direct response to the publication of the draft law and Mohamed Habib's al-Jazeera interview about it.  It's not easy to be democrats in an Egypt where the regime seems determined to crush any manifestation of credible political opposition, and which rewards every sign of moderation with greater repression.   One has to wonder how long the younger, less patient members of the Brotherhood will be able to forebear in the face of provocation (as I'm investigating in yet another article due to come out later this fall). No doubt the regime is waiting eagerly for the first sign of a turn to more violent means of expression on their part which can be used to retroactively justify its crackdown.  I hope to see the Brotherhood stick with its public commitments in the face of this adversity (releasing the political party platform, contesting elections where possible, refraining from violence):  paying a high price for its convictions sends a powerful message to those willing to listen that these really are its convictions and not just a convenient facade.

Let the Great Muslim Brotherhood Debate continue!

Muslim Brotherhood Party Platform

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is reportedly about to release the long-awaited platform for its political party.   Drafts have been leaking to various newspapers for a while, along with stories about internal disagreements and debates, but al-Masry al-Youm seems to think that it has acquired a copy of the final version and has published it in two parts.

The contents of the platform won't suprise close observers of the Egyptian scene, since most of its contents have been aired by various MB leaders in interviews and articles over the last few months, and many of its key ideas date back to the Brotherhood's March 2004 position paper on reform.   But others might find it more surprising.  The platform's most notable feature is an explicit, blanket affirmation of the equality of all citizens before the law and rejection of any discrimination between them regardless of religion, race, or ethnic origin.   This, it seems to me, is the farthest they have ever officially gone towards meeting the fears of Coptic Christians.   The platform calls for a civil state, which is the MB's formula for saying that it does not envision rule by the ulema or the direct application of sharia.  It gets around the new Constitution's Article 5 banning the formation of a religious party by declaring its referent to be the affirmation in Article 2 of the Constitution that the sharia would be the primary source of legislation.   Most of its specifically political statements can only be described as liberal and roughly coincide with the demands of most sectors of Egyptian opposition discourse:  insisting on the authority of elections, the freedom to form political parties, civil society, rotation of power, sovereignty of law, judicial independence, and so forth.   In what strikes me as an especially important passage (1.9), it insists on freedom for all based on the premise that God gave every man the freedom to chose between faith and kafir - which could be read as a rejection of 'takfir', even if not as full-throated as I would have liked to see.   It is still Islamist, of course:  it rejects all forms of foreign intervention and interference, works to promote faith and sharia, and offers a vision of a more Islamic society. But it spends a lot more time on politics and economics than it does on religious discourse. 

The MB has made it clear over the last few months that it will not be submitting this platform to the Political Parties Committee, which is cynically and ruthlessly controlled by the ruling NDP and has consistently rejected all applications from possible political contenders. Even the moderate, borderline Islamist Wasat Party was rejected multiple times for offering "nothing new";  it will be interesting to see how the committee deals with the new party of former Islamist radicals, which will reportedly be announced today by Montasir al-Zayat.  But either way, the MB explains that it plans to lay out its platform to public opinion, responding to critics who have accused it of lacking a clear political vision and explaining to the people its real positions and ideas rather than the distortions peddled in the media.   

I suspect that many will have the response articulated by Coptic intellectual Milad Hana in a recent article (can't find the link, sorry):  very attractive words which won't fool Egyptians because they know the MB's true nature.  But others may well be drawn into public debate over the platform being advanced, and could well find common ground with those principles - which could further embarrass the ruling NDP, and could perhaps lay the groundwork for new political alliances in Egypt.  The MB is presenting the platform as a vehicle for such dialogues and public discussions.    Such debates will be interesting to follow - I've been following, for instance, an absolutely fascinating series of articles over the last two weeks by the secularist Sayid Qemni attacking the political ideas of noted MB moderate Abd el-Monem Abou el-Fattouh for cloaking Islamism within deceptively liberal rhetoric.  Those are good debates to have in public, and the way this political party platform is being presented suggests that the MB welcomes them.   I'll be watching closely.

For now, it's just worth noting the significance of the fact that the MB developed this kind of relatively liberal document at a time when it has come under such intense pressure from the regime.  It seems to me that it is trying as hard as it can - whether through this party platform or through its contestation of the Shura Council elections - to signal its moderation to Egyptian and foreign observers. 

(But gosh darn it all, couldn't they have waited a week and a half to release it... you'll see why in a week and a half.)   

MB and elections: Egypt vs Jordan

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood faced an impossible situation in last month's Shura Council elections.  Highly controversial Constitutional revisions designed to prevent its legitimate political participation had come into effect, large numbers of Brothers including some of the most senior leaders were in prison, and the government was fairly explicit in its plans to fix the elections against whatever Brotherhood candidates ran.  Despite all that, the Brotherhood contested the elections, putting out a quite liberal 72 page platform and attempting to run in multiple districts.  When the results were announced, not a single Brotherhood candidate was declared the winner - leading even the fiercely anti-MB former intelligence chief Fouad Allam to pronounce the results highly implausible.   

While the decision to participate in a fixed game was internally controversial, Essam el-Erian argued that participation carried benefits well beyond winning or losing.  The MB's participation forced the judiciary into greater role interpreting the constitution, put the higher council for elections on the spot, and cast a sharp spotlight on regime contradictions and hypocrisies.  What's more, argued Erian, it revived the general sense of importance of participation, forced movement inside the NDP, brought new MB figures from the third and fourth ranks into the public eye and trained them in new forms of outreach, and denied the regime a monopoly on the public sphere.   I would add that the MB's decision to contest the Shura Council elections  spoke volumes about the organization's real commitment to democratic participation - if there were ever a time when a boycott would have been understood, it was now (and indeed other opposition parties called for one). But they didn't.   In the end, I think they were vindicated, as they came out looking like determined democrats while the regime came across as a blundering, anti-democratic behemoth... not that this will evidently cost them any US military aid.

What made me think about last month's Egyptian elections right now was the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood's decision to withdraw its candidates from today's municipal elections.   Fears of an "Islamist victory" in these elections were always exaggerated - the Jordanian MB had put forward only 33 candidates, out of almost 3000 total, so couldn't exactly have swept the board.  But then at the last minute  the MB pulled its candidates from the contest. It claimed that the signs of impending electoral fraud were overwhelming and insurmountable:  blocking of voting booths, stuffing of the electoral rolls, harrassment and arrests of MB candidates and journalists...  the usual.  But all of that is standard procedure and could hardly have come as a surprise.   In a statement explaining its withdrawal, it claimed that the last straw was "secret information" it had received that members of the armed forces had been ordered to vote against the MB's candidates and been bused in to make sure that they voted.  Maybe.   More likely, it anticipated a weak showing and panicked, figuring that pulling out would delegitimize the election (it is calling the municipal elections an insult to Jordanians and damaging to the nation).  But the decision to pull out at the very last minute has allowed the government to seize the high ground, with Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit declaring that such a last-minute boycott is unprecedented and illegal.

Boycott decisions are always a tricky thing.   By not participating, the Jordanian MB cedes any role in the municipalities, and allows its enemies to challenge its commitment to democracy.  On the other hand, participating in a rigged game would legitimize the process, and would allow its enemies to claim that its poor showing proved its declining influence and popular appeal.  The contrast with the Egyptian MB is quite telling, though.   The Egyptian MB scored a real moral victory by participating and losing, demonstrating its democratic credentials and making the regime and the NDP look absurd.  By pulling out at the last minute like this, the Jordanian MB is likely to have hurt itself more than the regime, and will likely feed the public questioning of its real attitudes.  I suppose they will claim credit for the low turnout, which has forced the polls to stay open for several more hours in order to get to the legal threshold of 50.1% (despite the declaration of a national holiday to facilitate voting), but somehow I don't think that you need a Brotherhood boycott to explain low turnout for a municipal election...

Beyond the municipal elections (which are only of limited importance, really, and the MB also boycotted them outside of Amman in 2003), most analysts will be looking at the likely implications for the Parliamentary elections scheduled for November.   Most have doubted that that the MB would boycott the Parliamentary elections (if they are actually held), given the negative experience of their 1997 boycott and the region-wide wave of Islamist electoral victories.   Now the odds of a MB boycott of the Parliamentary elections have probably gone up.  The Jordanian government would probably be thrilled if the MB decided to boycott those elections.  Its greatest fear is Islamist electoral success, which is unlikely under the current electoral law but not impossible, and it would probably prefer to pay the legitimacy costs of an MB boycott than risk the political costs of either an MB victory or having to resort to overly obvious electoral fraud.  Bakhit's government, which admits no wrongdoing, will likely do things the exact same way in November, especially since it now knows which buttons to push.   The Jordanian MB, for its part, may not be up to an electoral test and may prefer to not contest them.  The Brotherhood is by many accounts really struggling with internal divisions over the Hamas takeover of Gaza, and its reputation has taken a beating over the last year or two (the Zarqawi funeral affair, poor Parliamentary performance, and more).  Perhaps it would prefer to sit the election out for fear of exposing its weakness, particularly since it now looks likely that those elections will be held under the much-criticized old electoral law despite all efforts at reform. 

Parliamentary elections without the MB, however tempting this looks to the Jordanian regime or to the US, would not be a good thing for Jordanian democracy or politics. For all its problems, the MB remains Jordan's largest political party, in a system otherwise dominated by tribes, personalities, and regime patronage. While I'm not particularly impressed with the Jordanian MB, given the trends across the region and Jordan's very real political, economic, and social problems I'm skeptical of the many reports of the MB's decline.  Better by far to have the MB engaged in the political realm than losing support to more radical competitors, and better to have a Parliament which at least somewhat approximates the real distribution of opinion in the Kingdom.   In Jordan as in Egypt, you can't have anything meaningfully democratic when the primary political opposition is shut out of the game.  We'll see how this all plays out for November.   As of today, though, the Egyptian MB is looking rather better than the Jordanian MB in terms of sticking to the democratic game despite the obstacles.   

Gamaa going legit? Or not?

Islamist lawyer Montasir al-Zayat recently surprised a conference at the Al-Ahram Center in Cairo by announcing the formation of a new political party.   Zayat is a colorful personality, a one-time confidant of Ayman al-Zawahiri, he broke with him by advocating the Gamaa Islamiya's ceasefire and renunciation of violence.  At the Ahram Center's conference on the Gamaa's ceasefire initiative, Zayat revealed that the new political party Union for Freedom would incorporate a number of Islamist trends but would not be the mouthpiece of any one faction.  It would offer a civil platform within an Islamic reference, would be open to Muslims and Christians, and would symbolize the Islamist movements transition from armed struggle to peaceful political cooperation. He denied that he himself would be one of its leaders, but promised to fight on behalf of its application for a license. 

My first thought on reading this story was that it would be awfully odd if the Gamaa - responsible for many of the worst atrocities in the 1990s - were granted a license to form a political party when licenses were denied to the Muslim Brotherhood (mass popular base, no ties to violence) and the Wasat Party (so liberal as to arguably not even be Islamist anymore).  But maybe it will never come to that.. because a bunch of Gamaa leaders denied any involvement in this alleged new party.  Their colorful denunciations of Zayat filled the Egyptian media.  So now nobody knows what's going on, other than it's all very colorful... and has Zayat's name in all the papers, where he likes it.

Whatever the outcome, the discussions about the Gamaa ceasefire initiative are very interesting.  This has always been fascinating, an initiative which split the Egyptian radicals, helped drive Zawahiri to bin Laden, and has inspired Saad Eddin Ibrahim (for one).  Abd al-Monem Said had some interesting comments as reported, while former Gamaa shura council member Najah Ibrahim didn't show, but his self-evaluation was published in al-Masry al-Youm today.  Also an interesting take from Dia Rashwan. 

The question of why violent Islamist movements might renounce violence is obviously relevant today.  Unfortunately, as important as the prison conversations and theological reflection and better understanding of Egyptian society may have been, it's hard to ignore the role of the ferocious repression by the Egyptian security apparatus. That's certainly the lesson which most Arab governments have learned... and they aren't the only ones.  Unfortunately that often misses the massive collateral damage to the Egyptian political arena, the stultifying propaganda campaigns, the unaccountable military courts, the torture, and all the other ways in which the counter-terrorism campaign morphed into regime maintenance and democracy suppression.   And here we are today.

Gaza: the interests of Egypt (and others)

With Egypt about to host a summit in Sharm al-Shaykh with Israel, Jordan, and Mahmoud Abbas, Mohammed Salah, writing in al-Hayat, takes a closer look at Egypt's interests.  While Egypt no doubt is worried about instability and violence across its border in Gaza - especially if it will find itself responsible for dealing with it - Salah points out that Mubarak's strategy is likely guided as much by domestic considerations.   Since their strong electoral performance in 2005, the government has been waging an unprecedented campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood.   According to a number of Egyptian analysts, Mubarak wants to exploit Gaza to gain support (at home and, more important to him, abroad) for this crackdown.   Placing Hamas under seige in Gaza and placing the Muslim Brotherhood under seige in Gaza are two sides of the same coin, argues Salah.   That's an important bit of context for making sense of Egyptian strategy in the Gaza crisis.

It isn't just Egypt, either.  A number of Jordanian writers have argued that the government is trying to use Gaza to hurt the electoral prospects of the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamic Action Front in the Parliamentary elections now scheduled for November.   Like in Egypt, the Jordanian regime hopes to discredit the domestic opposition by association with Hamas, while deflecting any international criticism of steps taken to limit their electoral success (no matter how repressive or anti-democratic).    Jordan has been harrassing its Islamists too, if not to Egyptian levels, and clearly wants to find ways to limit their electoral success: keeping the old, much disputed electoral law which was designed to limit Islamist gains;  media campaigns against Islamists and Hamas;  leveraging Jordanian-Palestinian ethnic grievances; and more. 

The importance of domestic considerations to both Jordan and Egypt matters quite a lot when looking ahead to the international response to the Palestinian crisis.  Both Arab states have a clear domestic political interest in Hamas doing poorly in Gaza and in making Hamas look bad with Arab audiences.  This domestic interest in mobilizing anti-Islamist sentiment may even outweigh strategic interests pointing in the other direction.  Of course, this attempt to focus attention on Hamas and Gaza could backfire spectacularly if the Arab mood shifts in favor of Hamas - something which many Islamists and other Arab writers expect, and which those regimes no doubt fear.  Something to think about as things develop.

Free Monem?

** be sure to see the update at the bottom of this post **

The blogosphere and mass media alike have rallied impressively to the cause of Abd al-Kareem Sulayman (Kareem Amer), the Egyptian blogger imprisoned for four years for his writings against Islamists.   At the time, I pointed out that while I very much supported focusing on Kareem's plight, "selective outrage, where Westerners care about one anti-Islamist blogger but can't be bothered about equally arbitrary and illiberal repression of hundreds of Islamists, only reinforces general skepticism that this isn't really about freedom, human rights, or democracy."   Some people objected to the comparison between Kareem and Muslim Brotherhood leaders, since the former was only a blogger persecuted for his ideas.  OK, point taken:  the issue is the persecution of youthful bloggers for their free expression of ideas and political activism.    

Early this morning, the blogger Abd al-Monem Mahmoud ("Ana Ikhwan") was arrested by Egyptian security forces.  Monem, a 27 year old journalist, has been one of the driving forces behind the recent turn to blogging by a wide range of Muslim Brothers - including an orchestrated blogging campaign on behalf of the imprisoned Brotherhood members and leaders.  Police raided his house early this morning, but he wasn't there;  he sent out a mass email announcing his situation and then turned himself in.   Alaa Abd el-Fattah, the first benficiary of a high profile "free the Egyptian blogger" campaign, says:  "I believe his arrest is mainly an attempt to silence the campaign agaisnt sending Ikhwan leadership to military tribunal, Monem was coordinating the campaign which used blogs as it’s main tool."  I believe that his arrest may be due to his rising public profile - including my article in the Guardian's Comment is Free, a recent appearance at the Al-Jazeera Forum (where he was featured on al-Jazeera's morning show), and the recent Cairo Anti-War Conference (where he comfortably shared a stage with leftists and human rights activists to spotlight allegations of police brutality).  His "crime" seems to be his growing effectiveness in coordinating an opposition media campaign.   The last I heard, Monem remained in jail and out of contact; I'll update below once I hear more.

Abd al-Monem Mahmoud (left) with leftist blogger Mohammed Sharqawy (source: Arabist.net)

So do those quite appropriately concerned with the fate of Kareem also care are about another blogger arrested for the peaceful expression of his ideas, and his use of blogs to coordinate peaceful political campaigns... even if he is from the Muslim Brotherhood?  Most Egyptian activists understand the common challenge they face, and many are rallying to Monem's cause despite their ideological differences - and Monem distinguished himself with his public support for Kareem despite their own ideological differences.  Will outside observers do the same?  Or are the skeptics right about selective indignation?

UPDATE:  There is now a report on the Ensaa site that Monem is fine and was not arrested - while security forces did raid his house, goes the latest story, and he did send out the message that he was turning himself in, a friend of his now supposedly says that he's not in custody.  Another more recent reports suggests that Monem is not in custody, but is not "fine" -  security forces are searching for him and mistreating his parents.    Is this really a case of state repression against a prominent blogger, or is it really a case of how blogs can quickly spread inaccurate rumors, especially when bloggers are already in a state of near-panic?   The case is developing fast - the Egyptian blogosphere is already festooned with "Solidarity with Abd al-Monem" banners.  I'll update as I hear things.

SUNDAY UPDATE:  Abd al-Monem is now reportedly in police custody.  The Egyptian blogosphere and activists are rallying to his defense in an impressive way - both because Monem is widely respected and liked, and because most Egyptian activists recognize that his arrest is part and parcel of the same regime-led threat to political freedoms regardless of his ideology.   The American media and blogosphere - not so much:  other than myself and Global Voices Online, I can find not a single reference to his case.

Referendum Results

The official results of the Egyptian referendum have been announced:  27.1% participation, 75.9% voting yes.  Al-Ahram, the official mouthpiece of the Egyptian regime (it used to be "semi-official" until a non-entity was appointed as editor in place of Ibrahim Nafie, who was corrupt and imperious but enough of a player to maintain some degree of independence when he felt like it), has announced the resounding success of the Egyptian referendum.   Massive public turnout!  "The boycott fails, the opposition participates", reads another headline!   

Here's 80% of the reported turnout right here (photo: al-Ahram)

Meanwhile, in the real world, turnout was extremely low.  Egypt's leading independent newspaper, al-Masry al-Youm, led with the headline "nothing new":  "nothing happened yesterday.. the referendum ended as it began, with little popular acceptance." It also reported on the "unprecedented" military presence in the city center, the rough treatment of protestors and of would-be electoral observers, and widespread allegations of NDP "vote-buying" and other shenanigans (only 20 pounds for a vote in one district, but you could get 100 for your vote in another).   The claimed 27.1% is obviously absurd;  the only real question is whether the "less than 1%" claimed by al-Mesryoon or the 2-3% claimed by independent observers is too low, and whether a figure of 5-8% would be more realistic.   And that, by the way, would include all of the government employees ordered to vote and the women ordered "to go vote for the President."   Whether this should be seen as a "success" for the opposition which called a boycott, or else just the natural course of events in an apathetic and politically alienated society, will no doubt be a matter of much debate.

Outside of the official Egyptian media, there's no question that the referendum failed to win any popular mandate whatsoever.   Here's my rough scorecard of successes and failures of this process.  First, the regime succeeded at getting its new constitution.  Gamal's succession has become more likely.  NDP single party domination of the political system has been entrenched for the forseeable future. Repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and of all forms of independent political organization got easier.  The security state is now established on constitutional foundations - though, truth be told, the regime was perfectly able to do all of those things before anyway under the cover of Emergency Laws.    And the Egyptian regime succeeded in brushing off any suggestion of American criticism, openly laughing as they rubbed Condi Rice's nose in American impotence. 

On the flip side, the referendum exposed the very low legitimacy of the process.  The low turnout for the referendum and the highly critical international coverage combined to deny the regime any legitimation benefits from the constitutional reforms.  While tempers will cool, a very wide swathe of the country's political elite is infuriated and alienated.  The regime is more fragile now, less legitimate, and will have an ever harder time carrying on with business as usual.   And it was good to see the American media take notice over the last few days, to realize exactly what this says about Bush's foreign policy.  Mubarak was almost certainly hoping that the upcoming Arab summitt meeting and moves on the Palestinian-Israeli front would crowd Egyptian domestic politics out of the international news agenda;  thanks to all of those who focused attention on the issue, that didn't happen.   

Kefaya press conference on al-Jazeera (and lots of other cameras there too)

The verdict on the Kefaya movement is mixed.  On the one hand, activists clearly failed to mobilize mass protests, and suffered under the naked repression of the security forces.  On the other hand, they managed a fairly high public profile, in the international media especially but also in the Egyptian debate.   Today's press conference with Kefaya leaders received equal time on al-Jazeera with Mubarak and Anis al-Faqi's official pronouncements (I'm pretty sure I saw George Ishaq at the press conference, so whatever happened to him the other day he appears to be all right - I'm sure the story will come out soon).   Both are no doubt due to the Muslim Brotherhood's decision to boycott but not protest:  this gave the Kefaya people the chance to be the public face of the protests, such as they were.   Beyond the movement per se, it will be interesting to see if blogs can produce enough video or other documentary evidence of vote fraud to have an impact, as in the exposure of the police abuse videos.   

Will update as the day goes on.

Referendum Day

Source: Al-Jazeera Talk

Al-Jazeera is reporting "very low" turnout in the referendum voting so far, especially in Cairo where voting would usually be expected to be high (Kefaya is also reporting weak turnout across the country - though everyone expects a blatantly forged result to be announced).  It's worth noting that on a pretty busy news day, with the Arab Foreign Ministers meeting to talk about the Israeli-Palestinian initiative and plenty of other things, al-Jazeera is leading its news with the Egyptian referendum. 

 

A very tired looking Hussein Abd al-Ghani had NDP official Ali Shams al-Din in his studio, where they debated the implications of a 30% turnout; Shams al-Din tried to both contest the low turnout claim and to lower the bar for what would count as high turnout.  Expect such arguments to continue. (Al-Arabiya, which I've criticized for not covering the Egyptian events with much enthusiasm, is reporting on it today;  I just saw it interviewing a Muslim Brotherhood Member of Parliament who denounced the referendum.)

Most Arab outlets are reporting that Condoleeza Rice softened her criticisms of the referendum after meeting with Mubarak.  How humiliating, how predictable.  Abou el-Gheit is spooning out the terrorism angle - we must do this to protect ourselves, just as you did with your Patriot Act - and Rice (and at least some of the media) seems to be eating it up whatever the flavor.   Yes, how could Egypt possibly fight its great terror menace  while judges are supervising elections?   

UPDATE:  Elevated from comments, report from the ground by our friend Josh Stacher:

I was out and about this morning and afternoon......

Turnout was very low. I think in Cairo we are talking 3-4%. I saw ballot boxes at 12pm that had 7 votes in them (the high might have been 20). The ballot itself was extremely confusing as all 34 amendments were listed - it was 4 pages (both sides) of text with the green 'muwafiq' or black 'gher muwafiq' on the first page.

There were two types of polling stations today. The ones in NDP-strong constituencies (like Sayida Zainab & Fathi Sorour) where the party activists were busy moving people about and doing their spin about terrorism and increasing freedom. In these places, security/police were very relaxed and letting the party play.

Then there were other polling stations such as in Bab al-Sharaaya (Ayman Nour's old consitutency), which despite being in the government's hands since Nov 05, the party is clearly not comfortable. In these stations, security/police were in charge and the NDP seemed absent (no activists or organizers). Those Ligaan were some of the worst managed polling stations I have ever seen in any Egyptian electoral process - in terms of protocol, who was in charge, spin, following the rules, and basic communication.

Also, last night's repression had an effect on Kifaya. They are lucky if there were 40 activists on the steps of the journalist syndicate (hemmed in by CSF). Al-Maseeri (the new head of Kifaya) is a sweet older gentleman but after speaking with him for ten minutes - it is clear neither he nor the movement has a vision or way forward. That was fine two years ago but now it just gives the whole movement of being stale.

The Brothers basic argument today was that they were not protesting because if they did, the government would bring tanks on the street. Perhaps....but I suspect their calculation is that the regime is doing more harm to itself than if group comes out on the streets. Because If they did, it gives the government an excuse to distract attention away from how the whole amendment ordeal has been so blatently rigged.  By doing nothing, the MB helps keep the pressure/focus on the state.

Perhaps, I am overanalyzing what was in many many respects a completely average day in Cairo during March. Not that I can prove this but well over 90% of Egyptians seemed to think the Amendment/Referendum process was a joke and it did not matter if they participated or not.

Good stuff from an astute analyst of Egyptian politics.  Thanks, Josh. 

UPDATE 1:00:  With the polls now closed, Al-Jazeera's Hussein Abd al-Ghani has assembled another, very impressive, panel to talk about the referendum - if yesterday's panel had strong NDP representation, this one is tilted more towards critical and independent voices (Abdullah Senawi, Salama Ahmed Salama, Abd al-Monim Said).  Al-Jazeera has really done an excellent job with this, turning itself into an Egyptian domestic outlet for large stretches of the referendum and featuring a wide range of voices.  But it's not the only media outlet that matters, of course.  The liberal columnist Magdi Mohanna, who hosts one of the most influential Egyptian talk shows, had Kefaya's coordinator Abd al-Wahab el-Messiri on yesterday.   At least those voices are being heard, despite the official Egyptian media's best efforts.

4:00 .... Everybody is reporting "very low" or "very weak" turnout... right now al-Jazeera reports turnout of 5-7%.   According to Al-Arabiya,  the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights claims that turnout was about 2-3%, while the NDP is claiming 24-27%.  Al-Jazeera just now interviewed various "civil society monitors" and voting station workers saying that nobody came to vote for hours;  Hussein Abd al-Ghani presented estimates of turnout ranging from a semi-official 20% to an independent estimate of under 5%.   Continuing his outstanding presentation of a wide range of Egyptian views over the last couple of days, Abd al-Ghani currently has in the studio an NDP deputy and the head of the opposition Karama party Hamdin Sabahi, and just took a phone call from a prominent member of the Judges association (which did not oversee the referendum).  No word on results (which according to al-Jazeera are due within hours), but reports of fabrications and cheating are already circulating freely.   

Final update:  the Egyptian government now plans to announce the results tomorrow.  It is still claiming the  24-27% turnout I mentioned above, while independent observers are still estimating much lower figures; the claim of 55-60% in some of the more remote districts seems fishy - since those are the ones most likely to be free of pesky independent observers.  Al-Jazeera reports observers being driven away from the polling stations by security forces, as well as rumours of ballot boxes being switched... you know, the usual forgery stuff.   

Here's a question which I may try to explore more fully tomorrow:  what kind of Constitution can be changed by a party line Parliamentary vote followed by a referendum with even a 25% turnout (as per the government's exaggerated claim), much less the more credible 5-10% turnout?   Does something changed so easily at the whim of the ruling party even deserve the name "Constitution", at least as conventionally understood by political scientists?

Referendum: the night before

With the Egyptian referendum scheduled for tomorrow and a major demonstration scheduled for today, and international criticism mounting, all kinds of chaotic information is swirling about.  Here's some of what I've heard, though I emphasize that little is really certain right now. Rumours swirled that Kefaya's former coordinator George Ishaq had been abducted by security forces;  he later turned up unharmed in Port Said, but has since dropped out of contact - don't know where things now stand.  It does seem to be the case that security forces confiscated the full  run of the opposition paper al-Karama before distribution, probably because of its front page headline "overthrow Mubarak in Tahrir Square" (the site of a planned demonstration). 

The major demonstration in Cairo's Tahrir Square called by a wide range of Egyptian political forces was supposed to start not long ago and continue through tomorrow, despite being banned by the authorities.   According to this irregularly updated Kefaya page, several people have already been arrested and beaten, including well-known bloggers including Hossam el-Hamlawy (none of these reports are confirmed), while a number of Western reporters have had their cameras confiscated; al-Jazeera is currently reporting 15 people arrested on their way to the demonstrations.  I'm not having much luck getting info about any of this right now, presumably because most of the people who would be providing it are currently out there.  Will have more later, I hope.

On the other side, Shaykh Tantawi of al-Azhar earned his paycheck another day by declaring it a sin to not vote in the referendum - just the kind of useful fatwa in service of the state which one expects from official ulema in Arab dictatorships.  Going a step further, perhaps, al-Jazeera Talk produced an image of a document which purports to be an official letter ordering state employees to "vote yes" in the referendum tomorrow:  I'll reproduce it here so that amateur sleuths can start looking for typescript irregularities!

Source: al-Jazeera Talk

 

Al-Jazeera is currently airing an interesting roundtable discussion, featuring two senior constitutional law specialists who are harsh critics of the constitutional changes and two leading representatives of the National Democratic Party defending it.   A range of other prominent figures are participating via the phone, including Essam el-Erian of the Muslim Brotherhood (on the line right now, to the visible consternation of the NDP reps). 

Host Hussein Abd al-Ghani is thus far keeping things civil, allowing for a real debate to develop over the issue.   The advantage of this approach is that the constitutional changes are getting a full, calm airing between legal experts;  the disadvantage is that al-Jazeera's cameras aren't currently capturing live coverage from Tahrir Square (though there will presumably be many chances to do so over the next day).  The merits of offering a "public sphere" for the issues to be debated versus lending its cameras to the protestors will no doubt long be debated by those of us who argue over the political effects of the Arab media.

Meanwhile, Rice apparently has toned down her criticisms after meeting with Mubarak.   Why?  Well, as I put it the other day "the bottom line is that Mubarak knows that Bush needs him right now and that the US isn't going to cut off his billions in aid.  So he is free to go medieval on the Egyptian Constitution, and the US has to grit its teeth and smile through it."

Have to head out now for a while;   I will update information when I can.
UPDATE - here's the best running tally.  It all appears to be Kefaya people - I had seen an announcement of the protest on several Muslim Brother blogs, but now there's no information about any protests on the Ikhwan website, nor any indication that the MB put people into the streets.  Anyone who knows about the MB's stance on the Tahrir Square protest, drop me a line or post a comment?