Abu Aardvark

about that "freedom agenda"....

Jackson Diehl argues today that the Obama administration should back Arab democracy activists and not abandon the 'freedom agenda'.  I fully agree with Diehl's sentiments.  Twice in September, at a Congressional panel discussion and at a GWU event with Saad Eddin Ibrahim, I argued that Democrats should not abandon their long-standing commitment to democracy and human rights just because that agenda had become associated with the Bush administration.   I think that support for Arab popular democratic aspirations is key both to restoring America's image in the region and to pursuing America's long-term interests in the region. 

But Diehl errs by reducing the Egyptian democracy struggle to Ayman Nour, who supposedly challenged Hosni Mubarak for the Presidency because of Bush's inspiration and has since languished in prison on trumped up charges.   Narrowing his lens to Ayman Nour and a handful of "pro-American" activists misses the complex, turbulent nature of Egyptian democracy activism and protest.  Neither the Kefaya movement nor the Muslim Brotherhood - the most vibrant political movements in Egyptian politics over the last five years -  were inspired or created by the Bush administration.  They did allow themselves to hope - mistakenly - that the United States was serious about promoting democracy, especially after Condoleeza Rice's stirring speech at the American University of Cairo.  But they have long since realized their mistake. 

The Egyptian regime has been systematically repressing and crushing the life out of political opposition for the last three years:  the independent press, the judiciary, the Muslim Brotherhood, bloggers, political activists of all stripes.   That is why Diehl's claim that "with Bush now on his way out, Mubarak is losing his remaining inhibitions" is frankly ludicrous.   Mubarak lost his inhibitions long ago, when it became clear that Bush would do nothing. 

I don't know how the Obama administration will approach these issues, especially since none of the key foreign policy positions have yet been filled.  But for what it's worth, here's what I'd like to see:

I would argue for a more realistic approach than could be found in the Bush administration’s evangelism, of bold words with little follow-through,  but one which makes serious demands on our friends, allies, and aid recipients.  The focus should be not primarily on elections but on ‘Bill of Rights freedoms’:  our friends must respect freedom of speech, of assembly, of the press;  free and fair elections; judicial independence and the rule of law;   human rights. Hosni Mubarak will never allow himself to be voted out of office.  But  we can and must demand that our friends live up to minimal standards and norms.   This, I believe, is in their interests as well as ours, and we do the Egyptian government no favors by turning a blind eye to their own self-destructive policies.

Diehl concludes that "Mubarak and other "pro-Western" autocrats seem to have drawn from Obama's election: that the threat of U.S. pressure for political liberalization has passed."    I'm not sure what he's basing that on.  Those autocrats have long since concluded that they faced no such threat from the Bush administration.  What's more, Diehl seems unimpressed by the widespread (if uncertain) popular enthusiasm for Obama expressed by actual Arab democracy activists, and unaware of the ferment on the Arab op-ed pages and talk shows about Obama's election (more on this soon).   You know who else disagrees with Diehl?  Ayman Nour.  In mid-August, the imprisoned Nour published an open letter to Barack Obama which concluded with his "hopes that January 20, 2009, will be the birthday of a genuine move towards democracy and freedom around the world." 

Reminder: Sept 22 with Saad Eddin Ibrahim

Just a reminder:  on Monday, September 22, the Institute for Middle East Studies at GWU and the Project on Middle East Democracy are hosting a discussion between myself and the leading Egyptian democracy activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim on the "U.S. impact on reform in a changing Middle East."   My remarks about  democracy in Egypt at the Cannon House Office Building last week began with this reflection:

I would like to begin on December 6, 2003, when I watched a remarkable debate on al-Jazeera between two of the intellectual heavyweights of the Arab world about the American role in promoting democracy.   Fahmy Howeydi, an influential moderate Islamist, argued that the United States could not play a role in helping Arab democracy activists because real Arab democracy would always contradict its interests. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the leading Arab democracy activist, responded that Arabs had no choice but to try, because only the United States had the power to make a difference.   Today, Howeydi continues to sit in Cairo writing acerbic essays criticizing American foreign policy and the failures of Arab governments.  Saad Eddin Ibrahim is a dissident in exile, hounded from his home country after being convicted in absentia of “harming Egypt’s reputation”.   The great Arab debate about America’s promotion of democracy, such as it was, has seemingly been resolved in  favor of the skeptics.

In that setting, I primarly focused on Egypt's domestic political developments and only spoke briefly about American policy options.  I plan to say more about the latter on Monday.  But the real attraction will be Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who has dedicated his life to these struggles and knows more than anyone the costs and the opportunities of American attempts to promote reform in the Arab world. I am excited about the chance to have a public dialogue with him on these issues, and hope to see many DC-based readers there.   

Please RSVP by contacting: [email protected].  Relevant details:

Monday, September 22, 2008
2:00-4:00 p.m.
Elliott Room 310, The Cloyd Heck Marvin Center
George Washington University
800 21st Street NW

GP Wittes: Marching to Freedom Unsteadily

I am deep in grading week, and not likely to see sunlight any time soon.   In the meantime, here's a guest post from Tamara Wittes, author of the new book Freedom’s Unsteady March: America’s Role in Building Arab Democracy.  I might throw in some thoughts of my own later, but for now I turn it over to Tamara:

Guest Post:  Freedom's Unsteady March
Tamara Wittes, Brookings

 

Marc’s kindly offered me some space to flog my new book, Freedom’s Unsteady March: America’s Role in Building Arab Democracy. The book is a two-part argument – why I think that, despite the failures of recent years, it remains in America’s interest to advance democratic reform in the Arab world, and how the United States can pursue that goal while protecting its other interests in the region. In this post, I’ll focus on the first part. I’ll begin, though, with the premise that the United States continues to have crucial national interests at stake in the Middle East, and will continue to engage in the region militarily, politically, and economically to advance those interests.

In brief, the argument is that global and regional trends have eroded the resiliency of Arab authoritarianism while presenting challenges that Arab governments are ill-equipped to solve. The analysis centers around three main tools that Arab regimes traditionally used to sustain their social contracts and sustain their rule: rents (from oil and strategic assistance), political ideology, and coercion.  I argue that these three tools are all beginning to fail – they are either less available, less effective, or both.

The most important trend affecting Arab states, with far-reaching effects, is the so-called “youth bulge.” Hobbled by the legacies of a half-century of corporatist governance and state-dominance, Arab economies cannot grow fast enough to create enough jobs to absorb new entrants to the labor market – much less the already-unemployed. Oil rents may be high, but they are out of balance with the region’s demography, and they are not being well-used; new income is inefficiently and incompletely distributed through a network of ruling elites and regime supporters. At the macro-level, most of the region’s economies are growing – but income inequality is growing much faster. This is not China, where a rising tide is lifting all boats and bringing desperately poor people out of poverty – in the more populous states of the region, and the non-oil states, the tide hasn’t even lapped at most people’s hulls yet.

Governments know they need to restructure economies in line with the relentless demands of global investors, trade partners and lenders. They know that, given the demographics, they need to reform economically in order to stabilize politically, but – as today’s Egypt abundantly demonstrates – the political costs of these reforms are themselves too high and too destabilizing. So some governments are stuck, while others engage in half-hearted, start-stop cycles of reform that don’t achieve sustained growth. The state’s capacity to provide benefits to society, and to penetrate society in ways that suppress dissent and bind citizens to the state, is maxed out and beginning to decline.

If rents are no longer doing their job, neither is ideology binding Arab citizens to their governments. Arab nationalism’s decline is obvious; Palestine remains a highly salient issue for Arab citizens, but not one that motivates patriotic loyalty to the state – rather, allegiance to the Islamist opposition. With the decline of ideological legitimacy, government performance becomes a more important source of legitimacy and consent.

Coercion, of course, is still available to Arab states – but at a higher cost today, in an era of satellite TV, cell-phone cameras documenting police abuses and twittering bloggers reporting on their own arrest. The quick transfer of information exacerbates the impact of media and of international human rights monitors, putting more and faster pressure on Western governments to respond to abuses with protests and public criticism – a twenty-first century CNN effect.

The youth factor is also crucial in another way: young people define their aspirations in social and economic, as well as political terms – the ability to buy an apartment, to marry and have kids, all the other markers of normal adulthood. But there is a widening gap between young people’s aspirations for themselves and their real prospects. Arab youth are well aware of what opportunities their colleagues, even in other developing countries, have access to, and they know they are missing out. Plus, as some Brookings colleagues have pointed out, high marriage costs and high unemployment combine to raise the age at which young men can afford to marry and become full adults – Morocco’s average marriage age for young men has risen from 25 a generation ago to 32 today. This crop of unemployed, unmarried young men is an additional source of pressure on governments, and potentially a source of greater instability.

I don’t predict social revolutions in Arab states – their coercive resources are still significant, and many still have residual legitimacy. But I don’t believe that governments can formulate a coherent and lasting response to these pressures that does not involve either a wholesale revision of their power relations, or much-increased repression (perhaps ala Pinochet’s Chile – economic growth at a high societal cost). I think ramped-up repression is by far the likeliest outcome, and one that should be troubling to an American government concerned with the rise of regional extremism. Already, in the two years since the Lebanon War, Hassan Nasrallah has built up his lead as the most popular world leader in Egypt, according to my colleague Shibley Telhami’s polls. His narrative about the bankruptcy of Arab regimes – their humiliating deals with the United States and Israel and their deafness to their own citizens’ suffering – these are the tropes that America and its Arab allies must confront and seek to contain. We cannot do that without making liberalizing, democratizing reform a part of our agenda for US-Arab cooperation.

I recognize that this policy is easy to argue for, yet hard to do. The second half of the book discusses how Bush screwed it up; how the United States can try to make the case for democratic reform to recalcitrant Arab allies; how to prioritize; how to resolve conflicts between democracy promotion and other interests; and how to confront and resolve American worries about the prospect that Arab democracies necessarily mean Islamist victories. I hope you’ll give the book a look, and welcome your feedback at FreedomsUnsteadyMarch  ... at .... gmail dotta com.

Heydemann: Upgrading Arab Authoritarianism

Steve Heydemann, an outstanding political scientist and Middle East specialist who is currently Associate Vice President of the Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program and Special Advisor to the Muslim World Initiative at the US Institute for Peace, recently published an extremely interesting Brookings working paper on the evolution of Arab authoritarianism.  I asked him to adapt its main points for an Abu Aardvark audience, and he graciously agreed.   You can read the whole thing here.   

UPGRADING AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE ARAB WORLD

STEVEN HEYDEMANN

In recent years, a new model of authoritarian governance has emerged in a number of key Arab states. A product more of trial and error more than intentional design, Arab regimes have adapted to pressures for political change by developing strategies to contain and manage demands to democratize. They have expanded political spaces—electoral arenas in particular—where controlled forms of political contestation can occur. They have also tempered their opposition to Islamist political participation. In some instances, notably Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, Islamist representatives have secured meaningful representation in parliament.

Regimes have also adapted selectively to demands for economic liberalization and the integration of Arab economies into global markets, and expanded opportunities for social and economic élites. They have developed techniques for managing and easing public access to the internet and new communications technologies that until recently were resisted as potential carriers of democratic ideas. They have also recognized that authoritarian governance is not inconsistent with, and that its persistence may actually depend upon, the strengthening of state capacity and public services through programs such as civil service reform, education reform, and labor market reform.

In addition, upgrading has involved shifts in the foreign policies of Arab regimes. They increasingly seek out trade, investment, and political ties with states that either share or are broadly sympathetic to the political concerns of Arab autocrats in the Levant and North Africa, such as the Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf. They have built relations with states such as China that are largely indifferent to issues of human rights and democracy. This not a “zero sum game” for these Arab regimes. They continue to enhance their commercial relationships with European Union countries and the United States. Yet the diversification of their economic and political relationships generates new sources of leverage for Arab regimes in an international system dominated by the United States, even while diminishing the West’s economic and diplomatic influence.

Authoritarian upgrading consists in other words not in shutting down and closing off Arab societies from globalization and other forces of political, economic, and social change. Nor is it based simply on the willingness of Arab governments to repress their opponents. Instead, authoritarian upgrading involves reconfiguring authoritarian governance to accommodate and manage changing political, economic, and social conditions. It originated in no small part as a defensive response to challenges confronting Arab autocrats during the past two decades. In recent years, however, authoritarian upgrading has accelerated. It has benefited from U.S. failures in Iraq, and the association of democracy promotion with regime change, social violence and political chaos. Yet the core features of authoritarian upgrading have been shaped more by concerns about how to sustain authoritarian governance in an era of global democratization than in response to U.S. experiences in Iraq.

Authoritarian upgrading takes a variety of forms, each influenced by the particular tensions facing individual regimes. Consequently, it would be a mistake to exaggerate its coherence. There is no single model or template of authoritarian upgrading that Arab regimes have followed. Nor should we overstate the capacity of Arab regimes to absorb and implement policy innovations.

What is clear, however, is that authoritarian upgrading is shaped by what might be called “authoritarian learning.” Lessons and strategies that originate within, and outside the Middle East, are diffused across the region, traveling from regime to regime and being modified in the process. Regimes learn from one another, often through explicit sharing of experiences. However, they also learn by observing experiences elsewhere. Most recently, China has emerged as a model of particular interest for Arab governments exploring ways to improve economic performance without conceding political control. Yet learning goes well beyond fascination with the Chinese model.

While attention was focused in the 1990s on prospects for global democratization, what transpired in much of the developing world was instead the globalization of new hybrid forms of authoritarian governance, including electoral-authoritarian, competitive authoritarian, and other hybrid regime types that exploit elements of openness and contestation to reinforce systems of authoritarian rule. The Arab world is often treated as exceptional in its resistance to democratization—a global outlier that avoided the so-called Third Wave of democratization. Yet its experience of authoritarian upgrading and the rise of new hybrid styles of authoritarian governance across the region place the Arab world squarely within leading global trends over the past decade or more. As a result, authoritarian upgrading in different countries exhibits shared features and reflects common perceptions among Arab autocrats and their counterparts outside the Middle East about how best to position their regimes to survive.

These emerging strategies of governance have undermined gains achieved by democracy promotion programs, and will continue to blunt their impact in the future. Has democracy promotion in its current form run its course? Has it outlived its usefulness? The possibility should be on the table. If democracy promotion has, even if unintentionally, provided Arab regimes with new tools for securing authoritarian forms of governance, should it be continued? If so, in what form?

At a minimum, authoritarian upgrading underscores the need to rethink how the U.S. pursues democracy promotion and to recognize, in particular, that Arab regimes are converging around policies that are explicitly designed to stabilize and preserve authoritarian rule in the context of ongoing demands for political change. At the same time, authoritarian upgrading holds out clues to the kinds of democratic changes it is reasonable to expect in the Arab world, and how these are likely to differ from the Latin American and Eastern European experiences that have been a principal inspiration for U.S. democracy promotion policies worldwide. To be effective in this context, democracy promotion efforts must also adapt.

After twenty years, Arab regimes have become proficient at containing and disarming democracy promotion—if not exploiting it for their own purposes. Strategies that take advantage of the openings offered by authoritarian upgrading are more likely to advance democratic change in the Middle East than the continuation of policies that do not take into account how governance in the Arab world is being transformed. Two openings hold out particular promise:

•    First, adapting U.S. democracy promotion policies to exploit more effectively the openings that upgrading itself produces;

•    Second, taking steps to weaken the coalitions on which upgrading depends.

Both will require substantial adjustments in U.S. democracy promotion policies.

(Editorial note:  to find out what such adjustments might be, read the paper.)   

Our Sunni Moderate Coalition

Let's review what the American government knows about its exciting new coalition of "Sunni moderates": 

Saudi Arabia: 

The Basic Law does not provide for freedom of speech or the press, and the government generally did not respect these rights in practice. According to the Basic Law, the media's role is to educate the masses and promote national unity. Media outlets can be banned if they promote mischief and discord, compromise the security of the state and its public image, or offend man's dignity and rights. The government continued to restrict freedom of speech and press and censored articles critical of the royal family or Islam. The authorities routinely censored foreign print sources....

The print media were censored and privately owned; some had close ties to members of the royal family. Journalists practiced self-censorship by refraining from direct criticism of government officials. A media policy statement and a national security law prohibit the dissemination of criticism of the royal family and the government. The government media policy statement urged journalists to uphold Islam, oppose atheism, promote Arab interests, and preserve cultural heritage. The Ministry of Information must approve the appointment of, and may remove, all senior editors. The government also provided guidelines to newspapers regarding controversial issues. The government-owned Saudi Press Agency expressed official government views. All newspapers in the country must be licensed by the government. With a license, newspapers are allowed to carry government advertisements which accounted for the largest sources of revenue for the newspapers... Authorities continued to ban government employees from criticizing the government. The government enforced existing laws based on Article 12 of the Basic Law that provides the state with the authority to "prevent anything that may lead to disunity, sedition, and separation." Accordingly, all public employees are enjoined from "participating, directly or indirectly, in the preparation of any document, speech or petition, engaging in dialogue with local and foreign media, or participating in any meetings intended to oppose the state's policies."...   The government owned and operated most domestic television and radio companies. Government censors removed any reference in foreign programs and songs to politics, religions other than Islam, pork or pigs, alcohol, and sex.

On August 4, award-winning writer and women's rights activist, Wajiha Al-Howaider, was arrested on the causeway to Bahrain because she was holding a sign that read, "Give women their rights." She was released with a warning. On September 20, she was summoned and interrogated for six hours by the secret police for planning a peaceful protest on September 23, national day, by women demanding their rights. The secret police threatened her with the loss of her job at Saudi Aramco. Al-Howaider was released only after she signed a written pledge to cease human rights activities in the kingdom, including writing articles, organizing protests, and talking to the media. She was not allowed to leave the country for her home in Bahrain until September 28.

On September 27, the Court of Grievances dismissed the charges against the author of the popular novel, "Girls of Riyadh." A group of citizens filed charges against the author because she allegedly slandered society by writing a novel about socially unacceptable behavior by female citizens.

... The government continued to restrict academic freedom. The government prohibited the study of evolution, Freud, Marx, Western music, and Western philosophy. Some professors believed informants monitored their classroom comments and reported to government and religious authorities.

The government continued to restrict cultural events. Citing a 2003 royal decree that stated the King Abdul Aziz Center for National Dialogue obviates the need for individual cultural forums, the government closed Shi'a and Sunni cultural forums in the area of al-Ahsa in the Eastern Province. Cultural forums, particularly in Qatif, continue to operate. The government does not allow movie theaters and restricted the public showing of films.

... The government prohibited the establishment of political parties or any group that the government considered opposing the regime, or possibly overstepping the bounds of criticism by challenging the king's authority (see section 3). Any associations must be licensed by the MOI and comply with its rules and regulations.

... There is no legal recognition or protection of religious freedom, and it is severely restricted in practice.

A valuable partner in the battle to spread liberal values through the Middle East, no doubt. 

Next, Egypt:

The government's respect for human rights remained poor, and serious abuses continued in many areas. These included limitations on the right of citizens to change their government; a state of emergency, in place almost continuously since 1967; torture and abuse of prisoners and detainees; poor conditions in prisons and detention centers; impunity; arbitrary arrest and detention, including prolonged pretrial detention; executive branch limits on an independent judiciary; denial of fair public trial and lack of due process; political prisoners and detainees; restrictions on civil liberties--freedoms of speech and press, including internet freedom; assembly and association; some restrictions on religious freedom; corruption and lack of transparency; some restrictions on NGOs; and discrimination and violence against women, including female genital mutilation. 
...

On September 7, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) reported that 81 detainees were tortured to death inside police stations between 2000 and 2004 and that 21 detainees were reportedly tortured to death in police stations between April 2004 and July 2005. EOHR further reported that detainees were kicked, burned with cigarettes, shackled, forcibly stripped, beaten with water hoses, and dragged on the floor.
...

According to HRW in a December 23 statement, "Torture is pervasive in Egyptian detention centers." There were numerous, credible reports that security forces tortured and mistreated prisoners and detainees. Domestic and international human rights groups reported that the State Security Investigations Service (SSIS), police, and other government entities continued to employ torture to extract information or force confessions. In prominent cases, defendants alleged that police tortured them during questioning (see sections 1.e. and 2.c.). Although the government investigated torture complaints in some criminal cases and punished some offending police officers, punishments generally have not conformed to the seriousness of the offenses.
...

Principal methods of torture reportedly employed by the police and the SSIS included stripping and blindfolding victims; suspending victims from a ceiling or doorframe with feet just touching the floor; beating victims with fists, whips, metal rods, or other objects; using electrical shocks; and dousing victims with cold water. Victims frequently reported being subjected to threats and forced to sign blank papers for use against themselves or their families should they in the future lodge complaints about the torture. Some victims, including male and female detainees and children, reported sexual assaults or threats of rape against themselves or family members. While the law requires security authorities to keep written records of detentions, human rights groups reported that the lack of such records often effectively blocked investigations.

The Emergency Law--applied almost continuously since 1967 under a declared state of emergency--authorizes incommunicado detention for prolonged periods. Detentions under this law frequently were accompanied by allegations of torture. On April 30, the government extended the State of Emergency until May 2008. Following terrorist attacks in October 2004 and April and July 2005, the authorities conducted mass arrests of hundreds of persons allegedly linked to the lead suspects and reportedly tortured some of them in custody (see section 1.d.).

....

Authorities used force to disperse peaceful, unauthorized demonstrations. On May 25, opposition activists demonstrated at the Journalists' Syndicate in Cairo to mark the one year anniversary of "Black Wednesday." (During the May 25, 2005 national referendum, pro-government thugs, allegedly including undercover security personnel, attacked several groups of opposition protesters and journalists, and sexually assaulted several women journalists and protesters.) In late 2005, the public prosecutor closed the investigation into these assaults, claiming that that it was not possible to identify the perpetrators, many of whom were documented on video as they assaulted opposition demonstrators and journalists. No police officers were prosecuted for the abuses.

On May 26, according to EOHR and other widely circulated reports, police tortured Kifaya activists Muhamed al-Sharkawy and Karim al-Shaeer, who had been detained in the aftermath of the May 25 demonstration, at the Kasr al-Nil police station. (The Kifaya, or "Enough," Movement staged multiple demonstrations throughout the 2005 calling for political reform.) According to Sharkawy's own account, police severely beat him at a building on Abdel Khalek Tharwat Street and then took him to Kasr al-Nil police station, where they tortured, and reportedly sodomized him. Police also beat Shaeer, detained him at the Kasr al-Nil police station, and transferred him to the custody of SSIS. A dozen Tora Prison detainees, all opposition and pro-democracy activists, launched a hunger strike on May 29 to protest Sharkawy's treatment, and other protests took place in front of the Doctors' syndicate on May 30 and outside the Kasr al-Nil police station on June 1. Sharkawy and Shaeer remained in detention without charge until their release in July.
In late November, the security forces detained a group of students in Cairo and Alexandria (including 11 Western citizens and an unknown number of Tunisians, Syrians, and Egyptians), apparently on suspicion of having connections to networks recruiting Islamist extremists to fight in Iraq. Some of the Western detainees claimed that the SSIS tortured them at the SSIS office in Nasr City (north Cairo) with beatings and electric shocks, administered while the detainees were blindfolded and handcuffed. The detainees also reported that the SSIS deprived them of sleep, and forced to watch as other detainees were tortured. In December, the Western students were deported. According to AI, the Tunisians remained in detention at year's end. There was no information available at year's end about the status of the Egyptian and Syrian students.

....

The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, during the year, police and security forces conducted large-scale arrests and detained hundreds of individuals without charge under the Emergency Law. Continuing a trend begun in 2005, thegovernment arrested and detained hundreds of activists affiliated with the banned-but-tolerated Muslim Brotherhood, generally for periods lasting several weeks (see section 1.e. and 2.b.). The government continued to use the Emergency Law under the official state of emergency to try non-security cases in the emergency courts and to restrict many other basic rights. Police also arbitrarily arrested and detained hundreds of persons involved with unlicensed demonstrations.

A beacon unto the nations!

And what of Jordan?

While the government respected human rights in some areas, its overall record continued to reflect problems. The following human rights problems were reported: Restrictions on the right of citizens to change their government; torture, arbitrary arrest, and prolonged detention; impunity; denial of due process of law; limited judicial independence; infringement on citizen's privacy rights; harassment of members of opposition political parties; restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, movement, and on some religious practices; legal and societal discrimination against women, discrimination against persons of Palestinian origin; restrictions on labor rights; and abuse of foreign workers.
..

Following his July visit Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, described police and security forces practices using torture as "widespread." He stated there were many "consistent and credible" allegations of torture, which Nowak claimed were substantiated by forensic medical evidence. He noted that a number were difficult to verify because of incommunicado detention (see section 1.d.) by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Public Security Directorate (PSD) and the General Intelligence Directorate (GID).

Additionally, the Special Rapporteur reported that detainees at the Al Jafr Correctional and Rehabilitation Center were routinely subjected to corporal punishment. The Special Rapporteur also received many allegations of torture at various local police stations.

In a July 24 report, Amnesty International (AI), an international nongovernmental organization (NGO), alleged the systematic torture of political suspects. The most frequently alleged methods of torture included severe and prolonged beating with sticks, plastic pipes, ropes or whips, on the soles of the feet and elsewhere, sleep deprivation, extended solitary confinement, forced standing in painful positions for prolonged periods, threats of extreme violence or sexual or physical abuse of family members, and physical suspension. In the AI publication, Your Confessions are Ready for You to Sign, defendants charged with security-related offenses before the State Security Court claimed that they were tortured to obtain confessions and subjected to physical and psychological abuse while in detention.  According to AI, suspected Islamists and Palestinian-origin citizens were more likely to be tortured.

And the beat goes on, da da dum da da dum. 

It is good to see these human rights reports appear.  Local press in Egypt (at least) has leaped upon the reports and featured them prominently. On releasing the reports, a tired-sounding Condoleeza Rice said: 

"With the release of this year's reports we are recommitting ourselves to help new democracies deliver on their people's aspirations for a better life. We are recommitting ourselves to stand with those courageous men and women who struggle for their freedom and their rights. And we are recommitting ourselves to call every government to account that still treats the basic rights of its citizens as options rather than, in President Bush's words, the non-negotiable demands of human dignity."   

Yes, but.  These hard-hitting human rights reports were Congressionally mandated.  American diplomacy over the last year has ostentatiously abandoned any pretence of caring about democratic reforms among its "Sunni moderate allies", at least.   But perhaps this can be a fresh start, and the US can in fact "recommit" to caring about human rights and democratic reforms.   So the question:  will this "recommitting ourselves" mean anything in practice for our relations with these beacons of "moderation"?   How exactly will we be calling these "moderate" torturing, demonstration-crushing, arbitrarily arresting, free speech-repressing governments to account?   Just wondering. 

 

Haass: The New Middle East

Richard Haas, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, has a provocative article in the next issue of Foreign Affairs (preview now available online) entitled "The New Middle East."   It makes for grim reading in some ways.  Here's the setup:

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union brought about a fourth era in the region's history, during which the United States enjoyed unprecedented influence and freedom to act. Dominant features of this American era were the U.S.-led liberation of Kuwait, the long-term stationing of U.S. ground and air forces on the Arabian Peninsula, and an active diplomatic interest in trying to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict once and for all (which culminated in the Clinton administration's intense but ultimately unsuccessful effort at Camp David). More than any other, this period exemplified what is now thought of as the "old Middle East." The region was defined by an aggressive but frustrated Iraq, a radical but divided and relatively weak Iran, Israel as the region's most powerful state and sole nuclear power, fluctuating oil prices, top-heavy Arab regimes that repressed their peoples, uneasy coexistence between Israel and both the Palestinians and the Arabs, and, more generally, American primacy.

What has brought this era to an end after less than two decades is a number of factors, some structural, some self-created. The most significant has been the Bush administration's decision to attack Iraq in 2003 and its conduct of the operation and resulting occupation. One casualty of the war has been a Sunni-dominated Iraq, which was strong enough and motivated enough to balance Shiite Iran. Sunni-Shiite tensions, dormant for a while, have come to the surface in Iraq and throughout the region. Terrorists have gained a base in Iraq and developed there a new set of techniques to export. Throughout much of the region, democracy has become associated with the loss of public order and the end of Sunni primacy. Anti-American sentiment, already considerable, has been reinforced. And by tying down a huge portion of the U.S. military, the war has reduced U.S. leverage worldwide. It is one of history's ironies that the first war in Iraq, a war of necessity, marked the beginning of the American era in the Middle East and the second Iraq war, a war of choice, has precipitated its end.

Haass also cites the end of the Israeli-Palestinian process, the failure of Arab regimes to construct an attractive alternative to Islamism, and the general effects of globalization as reasons for the demise of the 'old Middle East.' 

In this new Middle East, Haass predicts that the US will remain the strongest player but will be much less powerful than before, and that it will face growing challenges from other great powers pursuing their interests and values (Europeans, China, Russia).   Iran and Israel will be the two most powerful states in the region, with or without Iran being nuclear armed, and Iran will likely behave like a classic would-be regional hegemon, remaking the region in its own interests and image.  No recognizable peace processes between Israel and its neighbors should be expected.    Iraq will remain a mess, oil prices will remain high, terrorism will continue, and private armies will increasingly challenge central state authority (often with help from outside actors).   Islam's appeal will continue to grow, as will Sunni-Shi'ite tensions.   Arab regimes will remain authoritarian, but will likely become more anti-American as well.

A grim scenario.  Haass suggests that the US should focus on making this ugly era as brief as possible, and keep an eye on what kind of region might emerge in its wake.    To do that, it should stop relying overly on military force, and should not assume that democratization itself will do the trick.    Instead, the US should intervene more with nonmilitary tools - economic pacts, educational reform, encouraging Muslim leaders to denounce terrorism, and the like.  He suggests creating a regional forum for Iraq's neighbors, which would have the happy side-benefit of bringing Syria and Iran in from the cold, and restarting the peace process. 

I think that Haass is largely right in much of his analysis.  It does make sense to assume rising Iranian power, an unresolved Iraqi mess no matter what the US does, little by way of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, and continued Arab authoritarianism.  American power will likely decline, as he suggests, and accomodating to that reality makes sense.   But I'm struck by the gap between the pessimistic scenario and the policy proposals which follow.  If Haass is right that Iran is emerging as a regional hegemon, that the peace process is dead, that authoritarian governments will survive and turn against the US, then it isn't clear that his major recommendations are either plausible (why restart the peace process if it can't work?  why would Iran want in to our talking shop if we have no options against it?) or would make much of a difference.  Small wonder that his last recommendation is essentially to retrench, reduce American dependence on the region, and lower expectations.

While I could address a lot of different areas, I want to focus attention on the much-abused "war of ideas".   Haass seems ready to write off the Arab world as lost to the Islamists.  But this seems premature: just because authoritarian, corrupt Arab regimes, and a Bush administration allergic to any serious engagement with a war of ideas, have failed to promote an attractive alternative doesn't mean that it can't be done.   

To begin with, Haass is manifestly wrong that Iraq has delegitimized democracy in the eyes of Arabs. It is true that many Arab leaders promote that interpretation in order to justify their own perpetuation.   But there is very little empirical support for that belief.  Public opinion surveys continue to show remarkably high levels of support for the idea of democracy in Arab and Muslim publics, independent of Iraq or American policies.   Looking at Arab political debate today (especially on al-Jazeera and the more independent newspapers), denunciations of democracy are far less common than a comprehensive critique of the Arab order  in which Arab failures are directly linked to the failures of the corrupt, authoritarian Arab dictators. 

Haass is probably right that democratizing the Middle East would neither guarantee peace in the short term nor stop terrorism, but that doesn't mean that it should be abandoned as a goal.  The globalization trends that he briefly notes, combined with Arab demographics and a palpably deep disgust with the status quo, make this a poor time for the US to retrench.  Contentious politics are on the rise across the region, and not just from Islamists, and defaulting back to support for the Arab dictators (as the administration seems to currently be doing, with its Axis of Pro-American Dictators Moderates) would be foolish if the goal is really to minimize the duration and intensity of this 'bad period.'

Haass is right that American influence will likely decline, but given how toxic America is in these debates that might not be such a terrible thing.   Forget about trying to force through an alternative labeled 'made in America' so that we can declare victory.  A more prudent approach would be to try and strengthen the opportunities for Arabs and Muslims themselves to promote and discuss alternatives.  In that regard, I would put far more emphasis on an energetic defense of freedom of speech and free media, two areas where the Bush administration has been downright anemic.  It may be convenient in the short term to look the other way when these dictators crack down on the public sphere in the name of 'fighting terrorism,' but it is deeply destructive in the longer-term.   Arab autocrats have no interest in allowing alternatives to themselves to emerge, but we do... and so do vast majorities of their populations.   The US should energetically and consistently insist on a protected space for free political expression in these areas, even when anti-American rhetoric initially fills it.   Luckily, given diminished American power, such a defense of public freedoms is a lot easier and cheaper than some more activist goals might be. 

Haass is also wrong to lump together all Islamist movements, as he seems to do. There are real differences between mainstream Islamist movements willing to participate in elections and commit to constitutional guarantees for minorities, and radical movements which express contempt for such compromises.  There are a lot of internal disagreements in these movements, and those whould be recognized (the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood alone is traditionally divided into hawks, doves, moderates, and now Hamasis - that's four different trends in one tiny movement, and others could probably be identified).  The only distinction Haass really recognizes here is Sunni-Shia... but as the massive Sunni support for Hezbollah against Israel suggests, that might not really be the most relevant cleavage.  The fact is that Islamist movements are going to be a, if not the more, powerful political force in all Arab countries for the forseeable future.  But dealing with that reality doesn't have to mean a counsel of despair.   

Haass argues that the US should try to make this bad stretch pass as quickly as possible.  But his recommendations don't really push in that direction:  they seem more aimed at insulating the US from the consequences of this new Middle East than about hurrying its demise.  In general, I'm suggesting that not all of the elements of this new Middle East are as grim as he suggests, even if they fly in the face of traditional American foreign policy preferences. 

Egypt's press and the end of Arab reform

Egypt's journalists are going on strike Sunday in protest over the upcoming draft press and publications law, and the Kefaya movement is calling for a boycott of those papers which do publish.   Even though it formally bans the imprisonment of journalists under some conditions, it fails to deliver on the broader range of reforms Mubarak promised, and fails to abolish imprisonment for "libel".  The latter is particularly relevant after the sentencing of al-Dustour editor Ibrahim Eissa to a year in prison for publishing a story about a lawsuit alleging corruption by the Mubarak family - on the grounds that this insulted the President and harmed the nation - has sent chills through the press corps and the activist community. (update - the story was featured on July 3's al-Jazeera episode of Behind the News, giving it even wider regional play)

Egyptian political society has every reason to worry that the letter and the spirit of the new law will be draconian, anti-liberal, anti-democratic, and repressive.  The Press Syndicate says that it was not allowed to read the bill in advance or offer amendments (though given the fate of the hotly contentious judicial bill, in which none of the reformists' amendments were adopted, that might not actually matter).  One Islamist newspaper describes the bill as "defending corrupt people and punishing instead journalists" - which could lead to jail for members of the Kefaya movement who just released a potentially explosive report on corruption which named names.  Whatever the case, it's part and parcel of an institutionalized retrenchment by an authoritarian Egyptian regime which clearly feels that it has taken the opposition's best shot, and doesn't need to worry about its American flank.   

Americans who don't much mind fierce crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood should recognize that, as in Jordan and most other Arab countries, the problems of popular Islamist movements and democratic reform are indivisible.  Authoritarian Arab regimes will use their brutal methods against Islamist and liberal foes alike, and it's foolish to think that the United States can tolerate the one and not expect the other.  Huwayda Taha, in al-Quds al-Arabi, describes a Cairo which away from the press conferences and television screens is sinking into despair and political apathy.  This matches what I've been hearing privately from those involved in Egyptian political activist circles.   

I guess it's not a secret that America under the Bush administration has effectively given up on democracy promotion and reform in the region.  Arab leaders and activists know it, at least.  Tunisia is currently escalating its already extremely harsh repression of its media.  Jordan is sinking deeper into a dangerous confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood, triggered by its arrest of four MPs for publicly expressing their opinions.  The elected Hamas government has been shattered by the ongoing crisis, with a sizable portion of its ministers and Parliamentarians now in Israeli jails.   Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh has recanted on his pledge to not stand for re-election.  Algeria's President Abd al-Aziz Bouteflika is seeking a referendum to amend the Constitution to allow him to stand for a third term (Faisal al-Qassem's popular al-Jazeera talk show the other day was dedicated to the question "will Arab leaders ever step down?"  The answer seems to be no, but at least he's asking the question.)  And so on, across the board. Kuwait's election is at least one small positive sign, a victory for the reformists in that country - though it was Islamists who scored the strongest in those elections as well. 

Two recent Arab talk shows capture the new Arab mood well.   On al-Arabiya last week, Hisham Milhem led a discussion on "Bush and democracy in the Arab world."  While the show included Joshua Moravcik, Mark Tushnet, Nagib al-Ghadiban, and Salameh Nimaat, I was most struck by a remark by   Amr Hamzawy.  He pointed that the fact that most of the Arab media and political class were now discussing the "retreat" of American commitment to democracy demonstrates that at least at one point they were prepared to entertain the thought that there had been some credibility to that campaign.   No longer, Hamzawy argued - America's turn away from democracy and reform had badly hurt its image and its credibility with this Arab political class (by which I think he means something very similar to my "new Arab public").   This seemed to be a well-received notion. 

Meanwhile, on al-Jazeera Ghassan bin Jidu hosted a fascinating discussion on the margins of the Sanaa Conference on Democracy and Reform.  Bin Jidu invited former Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, former Bahraini minister Ali Fakhru, Abd al-Malik Khalafi of the Arab Nationalist Conference, and Scott Carpenter from the State Department (along with an impressive audience of conference participants) to talk about "Reform and freedom of expression in the Arab world."   Once again, the discussion revolved around lost American credibility, and the harm to America's image in the Arab world by its claims to support democracy and subsequent failures to do so.   As is typical, virtually nobody in this hour long program questioned the value of democracy or the need for reform - their complaints were about its failures.   Carpenter tried his best, and it's good that an American voice took part in the discussion, but the overall sense of an America which had lost all credibility in its talk of promoting democracy in the region was clear. 

This is a hidden cost of public diplomacy.  Raising expectation with popular talk about promoting democracy and reform and then disappointing them has immeasurable costs.  Credibility, once lost, is hard to regain.   In an eloquent statement, Fakhru warned the American officials in the room that "their words are not heard" and their efforts at public diplomacy are wasted because they are contradicted by the practices in Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and so forth.  There's still a very strong current in Arab political debate today which demands democratic reform and change - indeed, Fakhro denounced the idea that democratic change in the region had anything to do with American efforts as "empty talk".  But the moment for America to be able to benefit from that impulse may well be past, at least for this administration. 

Kuwait's elections and the Arab agenda

I had been really excited about today's Kuwaiti elections.  These elections really are unusual in today's Arab world, in that the outcome is actually not pre-ordained.   Women are allowed to vote and to run for the first time, which is very exciting - and both liberals and Islamists are claiming that their participation will strengthen their position.   The elections followed the dissolution of the Parliament in the face of determined resistance to a plan to change the number of electoral districts, resistance which extended to a campaign of contentious public politics shaped by blogs and new media politics (the "Orange Youth").  Corruption has been a big issue in the public debates.  Finally, interest in the elections in the Arab media has been high. With democracy and public freedoms on a steady retreat around the region, this election is an exciting exception. 

But alas, it's hard to keep any kind of focus on Kuwait today.  Oh, the elections are going ahead.  They are very interesting, turnout appears to be high, and I'm looking forward to analyzing the results (the Kuwaiti paper al-Watan is promising detailed results here).  But in terms of the Arab public agenda, the elections have been swamped by the Israeli re-invasion of Gaza and arrest of a number of Hamas government officials (more on this later today, I hope).   I've just been watching the 10:00 AM al-Jazeera newscast.  Gaza and Kuwait were indeed the top two stories.  But Gaza took up the first 16 minutes.  Only then did the newscast turned to Kuwait - for two minutes, before turning to Somalia. 

UPDATE:  Behind the News, the major prime time talk show on al-Jazeera, focused on the Palestinian crisis rather than on Kuwait.   The guests included Mustafa Barghouti (the peace activist and Presidential candidate, not Marwan, the imprisoned popular Fatah leader) and an Israeli whose name I missed, from Tel Aviv University.  The al-Jazeera 3:00 EST news brief which followed Behind the News also focused on Gaza, along with the Syrian reaction, and the Hamdan (Guantanamo) decision  - but then it goes to the horrifying Haykal show, which I just can't leave on my screen.    Al-Arabiya's 3:00 EST news is focusing more on the Kuwaiti election, though, and also reports Hamdan... but then goes to Giselle Khoury's interview show, which is almost as bad as Haykal (but at least she has two Kuwaiti women on).  No more TV for me today, thanks. 

UPDATE 2:  Nathan Brown gets a jump on commentary on the elections.  Me, I'm waiting for some results!

.... Kuwaiti TV says that turnout was over 80%.   Results are trickling in - here's a link where you can find a live feed for Kuwaiti TV to watch as they come in!

What can you get for $5 million these days?

So the Bush administration has announced $5 million in support for Syria's opposition forces.  What an odd number.  Seems to me that while $5 million would go a long way towards fixing the damage to my basement caused by a cracked sewer pipe, it is a miniscule amount to actually have any impact on Syrian politics.  (Remember Clinton's $97 million for the Iraqi opposition, widely ridiculed as evidence of his fecklessness and lack of seriousness? And that was in 1998 dollars!)   Wouldn't the main effect of publicly announcing aid of such a small amount be to publicly stigmatize the Syrian opposition and help Bashar al-Asad tar them as American agents, without giving them any concrete material benefit? 

Josh Landis is in favor of the program, but I'm skeptical.  Sounds to me like a policy designed for Washington consumption without given much thought to how it would actually play in the region.  Wasn't that the sort of thing that Karen Hughes was supposed to weigh in on?   

Tunisian hunger strike for freedom

Al-Jazeera reports that eight Tunisian opposition members have gone on a hunger strike demanding political freedoms and the release of political prisoners.  One source reports that observers from the American and British embassies were there, but no reports yet of any follow up. 

Al-Arabiya leads with President Bin Ali's nasty, but all too typical, response that the hunger strikers, and the opposition more widely, lacked patriotism, as evidenced by their actions insulting the country and tarnishing its reputation.  He also rejected the report of a special UN human rights rapporteur about the problems of the Tunisian media. 

The protests are tied to the UN's World Summit on the Information Society, due to be held in Tunis next month.  A bigger travesty could hardly be imagined - Tunisia remains one of the worst places in the world for journalists and political opposition (it would be as if the United States put the regional office of the Middle East Partnership Initiative in Tunis... oh, wait...).  The only good that might come of it would be if the opposition and media can seize the chance to put a global spotlight on Bin Ali and the repressive Tunisian government.  Judging by this Google News search, that is not exactly happening:  no stories from a major Western English language news source... you need al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya for that.  But the real test will be in November, when the summit approaches.