that same news that everyone else is writing about

I've been too busy to write much the last week - a couple of big projects with suddenly looming deadlines, and a proliferating number of smaller ones (and of course watching Dr. Horrible and taking the kids to the pool!) are taking up all my time these days. But it's hard not to at least marvel at the rather remarkable changes in the official position of the Iraqi government culminating in Maliki's reported remarks favoring Obama's withdrawal plan and Bush's agreement on a 'time horizon.'   

The best response thus far comes from an unidentified senior adviser to the McCain campaign, via Marc Ambinder:  "voters care about [the] military, not about Iraqi leaders."  That's a bit of 'straight talk' which I'm sure will play well with the Iraqis. 

It's surprising, no doubt. I know that I'm not the only one who has generally assumed that Maliki and most of the ruling elite preferred McCain's vision of endless, unconditional American military support.  Prevailing explanations as to why the change seem to divide into three main groups:  one thinks that he doesn't really mean it and dismisses its significance; the second sees this as an outcome of Maliki's growing strength (real or perceived), after the last few months' military operations / spectacles and the wave of oil revenues;  the third sees it as an outcome of Maliki's real political weakness, forcing him to bend before a rising public storm over the terms of the proposed agreement.

I don't think the first one - that he didn't mean it - holds up, especially after the latest developments. While Maliki may well backtrack after the next round of conversations, and a 'time horizon' leaves a lot of wiggle room, his new stance is well in line with a whole lot of on the record quotes from government officials and senior members of the ruling coalition in the Iraqi and Arab press (scan my tags over the last few weeks for examples, no time to fill in the links now).  It also roughly accords with what most Iraqi political parties and trends have been saying, including Sistani.   In other words, I don't think that transcription errors or whatnot are the story here - the position, for whatever reason, seems like a real one, or at least as real as public rhetoric ever is.  (UPDATE:  here is government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh's version of the 'translation error' argument, helpfully provided by CENTCOM). 

A combination of the latter two may actually be the best explanation:  Maliki feels strong now, but understands that the current high won't last. It's interesting in that regard that Maliki's new position towards the US is unfolding precisely at the same time as a whole raft of major laws are coming before the end of a month-long Parliamentary extraordinary session - provincial elections law (with a push to hold them by October despite all the obstacles), constitutional revisions, the vote on the return of the IAF cabinet members, and more.  That sense of urgency could be read as the behavior of a leadership which feels emboldened temporarily, but knows that its window may soon close and thus wants to lock in favorable agreements now.  Of course, its willingness to go for a short-term memorandum of agreement now and negotiate a long-term one with the next administration cuts the other way... unless the terms on offer now are so bad that they feel able to walk away and take a chance.

At any rate, none of this public bargaining and posturing tells us what kind of relationship with the United States this Iraqi government, or any plausible successor government, really wants.  What would a "favorable deal that they want to lock in" look like to them (as opposed to wider Iraqi political attitudes)?  As pleased as I've been by the Iraqi leadership's new mantra, I remain skeptical.    There's a lot of wiggle room in what's been said thus far, much of it could be for public consumption or for bargaining leverage, and it's not clear that their basic self-interest has changed.   But it's certainly been something to see.. curious to hear how others are interpreting it, beyond the immediate implications for US domestic politics which have thus far dominated the discussions I've read.

UPDATE - there's surprisingly little discussion of Maliki's statement in the Arab or Iraqi press this morning - I found more links to Dabbagh's 'explanation' than to the original statement, and virtually no commentary.  Maybe it's just lag time, maybe something else.  Interesting, though.

Comments

[Zathras]

I interpret Maliki's remarks as an opportunity. The fear had been that withdrawal would mean abandoning everything we'd tried to build in Iraq to the mercy of the terrorists, and the head of the government we've been trying to build says he's sure it can stand without the American army there. So, cover to begin the process of liquidating the American commitment in Iraq has been established.

Of course, this view would have more force if someone other than George Bush were President now. Bush has been placed in a very awkward position, having so often emphasized resolution and steadfastness in a never-ending struggle at home and now being told that his chief Iraqi interlocutor thinks the end is in sight after all. It steps on his message, and of course on Sen. McCain's.

Does Maliki mean what he said? Sure he does. If things head south in a month or so and he denies ever having called for a withdrawal date, he will mean that too. It's only in American politics that flip-flopping is a capital crime; Maliki will want the American army there in force as long as he thinks his government will need it. There is an excellent chance this will be quite a while, regardless of what he is saying now. At some point, we will have to decide if this is the last word on the subject, and whether the Iraqi rather than the American government has the final say on how long this expensive adventure must continue.

[kao_hsien_chih]

However "flip-floppy" Maliki's statement might seem, is that really much of a surprise? Maliki is, after all, the nominal head of a government composed of numerous groups within Iraqi society who don't want US troops around--various Shia organizations. He is also aware that, due to numerous technical, logistic, and organizational problems, US pullout will take years--probably through most of the first term of whoever is succeeding Bush, so he'll have enough time to try to cement a more durable Iraqi ruling coalition (which, btw, could never happen because nobody would really hold hands with Maliki as long as US troops were staying in force indefinitely, make nice with his more longstanding friends in Tehran, and/or stockpile getaway cash elsewhere, if the former doesn't work.

What Maliki will probably do once the US troops are committed to leaving, align Iraq more closely to Iran, will not sit well with many in Washington (or indeed in Tel Aviv or Riyadh), no doubt. Still, it's probably the best outcome we could have gotten since we began the folly in Mesopotamia anyways, given the other guys' goals, interests, and histories (I repeat the point made earlier about Sun Tzu's dictum about knowing about other players in the game being forgotten by modern day US policymakers.). An opportunity it is...although not the ideal one. But then, we can't always dictate our goals.

[Swopa]

The comment above by kao_hsien_chih is right on target. Even under Obama's 16-month timetable (for combat troops only), the U.S. isn't leaving Iraq overnight. So the remaining question is, on whose terms do we stay? Looked at in that light, it's no surprise that (as I wrote nearly two months ago) Maliki & Co. would "prefer to deal with Barack Obama rather than another Republican president reading from the neocon playbook." Obama may pressure the Iraqi government to do the same things the Bushites have sought in terms of political reconciliation, but probably with more genuine respect for Iraqi sovereignty. Why wouldn't Maliki, Hakim et al. prefer that?

[Gregory Gause]

Maybe it is as simple as a position taken in anticipation of the provincial elections (if they ever happen). Let's watch how he does in the elections (if they happen) and what he says after them.