DC Awakening

I spent this morning in a very small meeting under the auspices of the Middle East Institute with a visiting delegation of about a dozen tribal leaders from Iraq, including a number of well-known leaders of the Awakening movement.  It was a fascinating meeting, in many ways, if somewhat frustrating.  My long-standing skepticism about the Awakenings is no secret. Nor is my more recent advocacy that at this point they need to get integrated into the Iraqi military.  So I was quite keen to hear what they had to say on this trip to Washington DC - their second, from what I was told, including a visit with President Bush - and to probe their current thinking.   

I wouldn't have written about such a private meeting on the blog, except that I received explicit permission from both organizers and from the delegation to write about the general contents of the discussion (I'll not mention specific names, though who was not here was in a way as interesting as who was).  It's interesting that they are here, and they clearly want interaction with Americans and to get their views heard here.   And as with the visiting Iraqi Parliamentarians who spoke against the US-Iraq security agreement before Congress yesterday (covered so ably by Spencer Ackerman), it's important that Americans are exposed to a wider range than usual of Iraqi voices.

While the discussion was wide-ranging - Iran loomed large, as did the sectarian nature of the state, the absence of genuine political reconciliation, the importance of upcoming elections, their concerns about both a rapid US withdrawal or a permanent military presence, and the desire to have the achievements of the Awakenings recognized - I'm mainly going to focus here on the responses to the opening question from the moderator:   what advice would you offer the next American President?  What follows is a summary, keeping in mind that no one person made all of these suggestions - and the delegation frequently argued among themselves at a number of key points. 

First, start providing massive economic assistance for reconstruction yesterday.  No security or reconciliation will be accomplished without an economic upturn, they argued (one might question the self-interest here, but they are no doubt right about the economic hardships).   This might include American investment or pushing Iraq's Arab neighbors to invest, and has to include dealing with the refugee problem.

Second, redress the sectarian imbalance in the composition of the Iraqi Army and Police, while giving more and better training and equipment.  If that's done, it will make it possible for the US can safely leave.  If it isn't, then it will be a "time bomb", as one of them told me privately, set to go off and explode the Iraqi state at any moment.  The need to establish a genuinely national army and police came up repeatedly, as I expected, and they don't seem happy about progress to date.   

Third, and related, pressure the central government to deliver real national reconciliation, instead of the facade currently being displayed (they, like yesterday's Parliamentarians, were absolutely scathing about the various reconciliation conferences held under official auspices).  This would mean fundamentally reorganizing the Iraqi state, reforming the security sector, normalizing and improving services, and being open to all factions and parts of Iraqi society rather than just the current sectarian-minded ruling coalition.  Specifically, there was mention of ex-Baathists and members of the armed resistance (carefully distinguished, of course, from the "terrorists".)  They seemed somewhat baffled about American impotence in this regard.  They spoke a lot about the need for a national Iraqi identity rather than sectarian parties, questioning the loyalties of the current leadership and of unnamed parties and militias.  This is the second day in a row I've heard unflattering reference to the Kurds.    

Fourth, get the national and provincial elections right.  They were deeply critical of the last national elections, which they believe should not have been held until national reconciliation had been advanced and security achieved.  They urged effective international supervision (the UN seems to be the preference) to ensure honest and transparent elections, effectively barring the ruling parties from using state resources in support of their electoral campaigns, and a system based on open lists rather than closed lists (presumably because individual personalities such as, say, tribal leaders, would do better on open lists).  They warned that those currently in power do not want to give it up, and therefore elections will likely produce conflicts. 

It was a worthwhile meeting, though with few major surprises, and it raised as many questions as it answered.  It didn't really change my view of them, but it was certainly useful to listen to the exchange of views and to hear their own concerns - and to be able to pass some of those on.  They also had questions of their own:  what were American intentions about withdrawal?  What would happen in the US elections?  What was America's regional strategy (meaning, of course, Iran)?  What would the US see as important for national reconciliation?  What did Americans think about Iran's role?  I'd like to say that answers were forthcoming, but.... 

Comments

[Zathras]

If this account is accurate, the visiting delegation truly believes reconciliation is something the government can give them, the way some governments deliver new highways or pension benefits. "You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means."

[aardvark]

interesting.. I actually heard it a bit differently - nothing warm and fuzzy about how they talk about "reconciliation", but a question of power and resources. They want money, not hugs.

[JHM]

First, start providing massive economic assistance for reconstruction yesterday.

... nothing warm and fuzzy about how they talk about "reconciliation", but a question of power and resources. They [the Salvific Awakeners of Sunnidom™] want money, not hugs.

Ah, the mother’s milk of politics! Plus of course the root of all evil.

"The US is holding hostage some $50bn (£25bn) of Iraq's money in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to pressure the Iraqi government into signing an agreement seen by many Iraqis as prolonging the US occupation indefinitely, according to information leaked to the _Independent_. US negotiators ... [have] suggested that if the UN mandate, under which the money is held, lapses and is not replaced by the new agreement, then Iraq's funds would lose this immunity. The cost to Iraq of this happening would be the immediate loss of $20bn."

Happy days.

[Reidar]

Marc, that sounds like a very interesting meeting. I just wondered whether the group had any ideas about what practical steps are needed to arrive at the ideal situation they describe, i.e. less sectarian security forces, more balanced constitution and so on? Did they envisage constitutional revision? International or American pressure? The problem as I see it is that few of the existing mechanisms are likely to produce anything in that direction. The group rightly dismissed the “national reconciliation” antics of the Maliki government, which seem designed to produce minimal change. Also, the constitutional revision process is on the back burner – it seems not to be a Bush administration priority, and progress is at any rate blocked by Kurdish-ISCI dominance on the revision committee. And, as has been pointed out by Greg Gause earlier, even under the rosiest of scenarios, provincial (as opposed to national) elections will not automatically create any changes at the national level. I find it depressing that many Iraqi nationalists have few ideas about how to promote their goals within the existing framework, and some talk more or less openly about a military strongman as the best option. Surely, if the system itself is rotten or on the wrong track, spraying it with American money cannot be a good idea.

[Zathras]

Did these Sunni Arabs give any sense that they thought reconciliation demanded anything of them? Besides not aiding and abetting any more mass-casualty attacks on civilians in Baghdad, I mean.

I'm pretty sure that when Americans hear Bush administration officials talk about reconciliation in Iraq, they are not thinking only in terms of bribes given at gunpoint to tribal leaders. If there is a real difference in how reconciliation is defined by one of the parties we are hoping will reconcile, it would be good to know that.

[nur al-cubicle]

What is the stance of these Iraqis on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)?

[Hamid]

What about the $40 billion dollars that the Iraqi government has in banks and is unable to spend?

Why not make direct welfare distributions to each and every Iraqi based on retina scans (to eliminate cheating completely)?

Every faction including Americans are complaining about destitution and crime and how that begets political and military insecurity. But no one has any idea what to do with the $80 billion (and rising) oil money received every year? Strange.

With direct payment, each Iraqi family will get about $1,000 a month, if 1/3 of the oil money is allocated to direct payments.

Its so strange to hear complaints about destitution when there is so much sitting in the bank and retina scans are so simple even a bank teller could administer that, and there is no real way to cheat.

[Nell]

abu a: I'd like to say that answers were forthcoming, but...

Were you one of the people in a position to provide any answers, or were you there strictly as an observer/interviewer?

If the latter, would you characterize if you can those who were there in a position to provide (or not) answers to the delegation's questions?