how juggernaut is the AQ online juggernaut?

It seems that the internet's role in al-Qaeda's agenda is coming back up as a theme, with Matt Duss quoting Counterterrorism Office Coordinator Dell Dailey saying that al-Qaeda "has made the Internet a virtual safe haven."  I agree with much of the thrust of the importance of the internet and information operations more broadly to today's al-Qaeda, but in the spirit of contrarianism let me sketch out some bullet points of an argument that I made recently in a relevant forum against the conventional wisdom:

• It's true that al-Qaeda Central has dramatically increased and improved its internet distribution and production capabilities.  Al-Sahab, al-Fajr, et al have churned out a remarkable number of vides, audiotapes, and other media productions over 2007-2008 (I've heard the figure of 97 tapes in 2007, which is a lot, and the number will likely be higher this year;  and that doesn't even count the vast number of non-AQC productions - see Dan Kimmage's new report for more details).
  
• The forums do allow the direct distribution of their messages, cutting out the middleman of the al-Jazeera producer or the courier:  they can be directly uploaded and immediately accessed by all international media outlets (usually with convenient English subtitles, these days).  This virtually guarantees coverage, and helps them get around attempts by media outlets to distort or shape the message - as in AQ's furious response to al-Jazeera's presentation of the bin Laden tape on Iraq, which they were able to show was misrepresented because al-Jazeera didn't have the only copy.
• Finally, the forums are an extremely important virtual space for jihadists and interested observers to exchange information, have tactical arguments and doctrinal disputes, disseminate practical information (the much-discussed online training manuals) and key texts (i.e. the al-Tawhed virtual library), communicate broad strategic arguments from the center or from milieu strategists, and generally to build virtual community. 

But these forums and information operations have some underappreciated limitations:

• saturation effect:  more videos is not necessarily better.  One Bin Laden tape in four months has a tremendous impact, a dozen Zawahiri tapes in two months has considerably less.  In Zawahiri's Q+A, he repeatedly answered questions with an irritated "I already answered that in last month's speech" or "bin Laden already answered that in his speech."  That suggests that too many messages dilutes the impact. It also reduces the likelihood of massive media coverage, since the messages become routine.  The same applies for the Iraqi insurgency videos:  the first exploding hummer might be thrilling, but the 76th not so much.  The volume of tapes may be an important signal from AQ Central that it still matters, but it might come at a cost.
• accessibility:  internet sites require some effort to access, unlike the television set which might just be running in the background.  Jihadi forums are like internet porn, I suppose:  not that hard to find, but you actually have to look - it doesn't just pop up onto an innocent computer screen, usually.   As some of the most prominent open-access forums have been shut down (al-Qala'a) or hidden behind proxy servers (al-Tawhed), they become less accessible to the casually interested Muslim.  Requesting a password to the closed sites may be a daunting obstacle to those worried that this will get them put directly onto a Guantanamo list, or lead a terrorist to their doorstep.  Some of the videos make their way to YouTube or other more easily accessible sites, but most don't and AQ can not control their fate there.
  
• polarization effects:  Bin Laden and Zawahiri set out to reach the mainstream Muslim with their political arguments, to spread widely and deeply the sense of the reality of a clash of civilizations and the need to embrace the global jihad.  The discourse within online communities, it seems to me, often empower the most doctrinaire and ideological voices, which can leave the average, mainstream person either cold or with no point of entry.   They also tend to create a self-referential universe of terms, authors, and shared histories which can both raise the barriers to entry and distance them from the wider community (household names among jihadists may be nearly completely unknown in the wider Muslim world). Although I haven't seen this tested in any serious way, the impact of the rising importance of forums to al-Qaeda may be to strengthen the ideological purists (the salafi-jihadist hard core) over the generally angry but not ideologically pure fellow-traveler.   This may empower the base, but reduce the movement's broader appeal - and thus undermine the strategic goals of AQ Central.  We saw this most dramatically with Zarqawi, but even without his unique brand of sensationalism and brutality the general effect may hold.
  
• credibility:  the gap between rhetoric on the forums and actual behavior cuts both ways.  On the one hand, it hurts the credibility of some of the Iraqi forums when they present their group as engaged in ongoing war against the US occupation while everyone knows that they are actually cooperating with the US (check out the Hamas Iraq forum, if you want to be bored).   That doesn't mean that the rhetoric is meaningless:  it is significant that these groups feel the need to present themselves in this way to their members, their backers, and potential recruits.  But I suspect that it does undermine confidence in their claims among some of their intended audience.  Similarly, repeated intimations that major attacks are coming in Egypt or Israel or the West which don't happen can undermine confidence.  If the intended audience comes to think that the forums aren't where the real action is, they might well lose interest leaving behind only an echo-chamber or a shell.
  
• open dissent:  when figures respected by many within the jihadist milieu disagree with al-Qaeda strategy, their dissents instantly reach a very wide audience by jihadist standards through immediate and multiple repostings across multiple forums.   There has been a lot of attention in the West to 'recantations' and critiques of al-Qaeda by old jihadists such as Dr Fadl (from an Egyptian prison).  But from an internal al-Qaeda perspective, the greater challenge may come from challenges such as Hamed al-Ali's denunciation of the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq or Abu Mohammed al-Maqdessi's critique of 'excessive takfir'.  What would once have been internal arguments are now public (or at least semi-public), which could be a healthy or unhealthy development depending on one's point of view.
• the blogosphere effect:  the, shall we say, quality of the contributions to these forums is not always the highest.  I come across quite a bit of posturing and bravado in these forums, hating on 'enemies' and back-patting of 'allies'.  The recent initiation of an 'al-Jazeera watch' feature on one of the forums tracking perceived slights and misrepresentation by the now maligned station reminds me of nothing so much as the partisan media criticism found on so many political blogs).  There's a lot of posting of articles or news reports clipped from the media, with long comment threads of cheering or jeering.  I remember seeing a bitter post on one of the main forums a few weeks ago (al-Boraq?  I forget) complaining that the "internet jihad" had failed since the forum had degenerated into personal attacks and what we would call flame-wars. This isn't to say that nothing on the forums should be taken seriously - far from it.    Some of the postings and discussions are very important, especially the writings and analysis of well-known and trusted figures, and "authenticated" posts with the official seal of approval. Even the "junk DNA" probably contributes to community building and to the 'warming' of online networks. But still....
  
• innovation:  there's a general perception that al-Qaeda is extremely cutting-edge in its use of internet technology, but I think this is overstated.  In fact, they seem to be a bit behind the curve.  Their successes lie in well-established technologies and media forms:  forums, video and audiotapes, online archives of manuals and such.   But whereas many Islamist groups have been innovative with newer internet technologies,  al-Qaeda really doesn't seem to be one of them:  releasing videos to forums is one thing, but Facebook-style social networking, virtual worlds, twittering and podcasting, and other stuff which I'm probably already too old to know about?  Zawahiri's Q+A was actually rather rudimentary - Iraqi groups and others had done this sort of thing before, and his offered little interactivity.  While various sources have suggested that jihadists are using Second Life or other virtual worlds for training (though the evidence on this seems to be mixed) and it's extremely possible that there are things going on that I haven't come across, in general I haven't really seen AQ pushing the envelope with these new internet or media technologies.  They seem kind of stuck in 2005, even if they are doing 2005 better and better. 

Again, none of this is to dispute the basic argument for the importance of the internet in shaping the realm of possibility for all forms of globalized movements, whether jihadist or otherwise.  But it's worthwhile considering some competing hypotheses about their use by al-Qaeda and their possible effects, and even to think about ways that they might be tested.

Comments

[Ken]

Great post. Very difficult to test, of course - whether you're trying to measure the reach, audience profile, or the effect.

Regardless of measuring problems, AQ clearly thinks cyberspace IO is critical, and that the net gets round mainstream media control: Zawahiri wrote early on that we 'must get our message across to the masses of the ummah and break the media siege imposed on the jihad movement. This is an independent battle that we must launch side by side with the military battle.'

They've done okay on that front -- the As Shahab stuff is fairly technically proficient, the combat camera teams are clearly a regular part of operations. Granted, new technology makes this a relatively low cost effort (though they should think about spending more on translation and editorial skills).

But I wonder how effective the net is at 1. winning recruits, and 2. at intimidating undecideds, versus 3. reinforcing existing radicalism. Other communication channels, I intuitively suspect, have more impact on the first two - whether personal contacts, or mainstream media.

[Corrections]

Correct your link:

""Abu Abed confirms Sahwa intent to contest provincial elections
.. as does secularist bloc; meanwhile, questions swirl about whether battle with Sadrists will postpone them. Al-Hayat""

The person quoted is Abu Azzam al-Tamimi, not Abu Abed.

[aardvark]

C - thanks for the early morning eyes

Ken - it's an even more interesting questions than that bc gets to which audience they are trying to reach: to radicalize the non-radical or to mobilize the already radical. Both are important steps in AQ information strategy but they require different things. Question becomes whether those different things are compatible/reinforcing or at odds. I could see arguments in each direction...

[MoXmas]

Speaking as a digital marketer, it's almost impossible to judge how well those approaches are doing from an outside heuristic analysis. And in many ways, usinng existing tech is better, because it allows them to hit the widest digital audience, and probably on the widest variety of platforms to be passed along (web, mobile, email, thumb drive, etc.).

And having one bin Laden vid a quarter, with one or more Zawahiri vida a week, is actually a good saturation effect, which reinforces the message. The fact that Zawahiri produces crap content, and refers to other previous answers, is not an indictment of the approach, but the execution.