Last week, Greg Gause of the University of Vermont testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about Iraq and regional trends in the Gulf. After that, we needed to drink several adult beverages. As a happy result of those conversations, I'm delighted to give Gause the floor at Abu Aardvark. Ritual disclaimers, given recent silliness. Gause speaks only for himself: just because he's listed as a Clinton adviser, this amazingly enough does not mean that this is what Hillary "really thinks." Funny, that. Nor does he speak for me - I'll weigh in later with my own thoughts. Finally, I had thought of running his piece under a hip-hop lyric, but I figured that would do considerable violence to Gause's person.
Iraq: National Elections Sooner Rather than Later
F. Gregory Gause III, University of Vermont
Unlike many observers of Iraq, I think that the country needs more elections, not just on the provincial level but also on the national level, and the sooner the better.
This is an unusual place for me to be. I am on record as being very skeptical about the Bush Administration’s earlier policy of pushing democracy in the Arab world. (A policy that, as far as I can tell, has now been abandoned by everyone in the Administration except the President, if we believe his rhetoric. But in an administration where the President publicly asserted that disbanding the Iraq army was not his policy and he did not know how it happened, it might be wise not to pay too much attention to what he says.) Given the strength of Islamist groups in the Arab world and their opposition to a number of American foreign policy goals, it just did not make sense to me. I also recognize that elections can make matters much worse on the ground. Just look at Iraq after the December 2005 parliamentary elections, or Kenya after its elections last year.
Still, I think that this is the time for more elections in Iraq, for three reasons:
1. The Maliki government is a disaster, but there is no getting rid of it short of national elections. The Bush Administration has made clear that it will not support efforts by its opponents to form an alternative parliamentary majority (which Iyad Allawi tried to do a couple of times in 2007). So we are stuck with Maliki until the scheduled parliamentary elections of December 2009, unless something changes. Can we (or Iraq) afford nearly two more years of a guy who can’t even fill his cabinet positions, can’t move to take advantage of the relative security improvements brought about by the rise of the Sahwa movements, the Sadr cease fire and (distinctly in third place) the Kagan-Petraeus surge, and bungled the recent Basra operation? I say no.
2. Elections are the only way to integrate the Sahwa movements into national politics, and national elections would do this better than provincial elections. The current Sunni Arab representation at the national level is either inept, in that it cannot bring its purported constituency along with any deals it makes (Tariq al-Hashemi and the Iraqi Islamic Party), or pro-insurgency (Adnan al-Dulaimi and his ilk). These guys cannot make any deals that will stick. On the government side, Maliki is obviously not going to move to integrate any substantial number of the Sahwa militias (tribal and former insurgent, and I know there is a big overlap in those two categories). His talk about bringing Sahwa leaders into his cabinet has led to nothing. So let’s have a test of political strength in Sunni Arab areas. Who are the real leaders? I am hoping that new leadership will emerge from the elections that will be both more representative of Sunni Arab opinion and more willing to make deals at the national level that could get Iraq to a better place. I might be wrong, but I see very little harm in trying.
3. Elections could also ratify politically what we see on the ground: the dissolution of the Unified Iraqi Alliance, the Shi’a amalgam put together by Ayatallah al-Sistani which contested the January and December 2005 elections. The group has broken apart in fact, with the withdrawal of the Sadrists from the Maliki government, with the fighting between ISCI and Sadrist militias and with Maliki’s campaign against the Sadrists in Basra recently. But we need a test of strength among its component parts (other than fights among their militias). Such a test of strength would force Iraqi Shi’a voters to consider the very different approaches that elements of the UIA have on essential questions like the nature of federalism. Having the Sadrists run on their own list could also break the ethnic/sectarian logjam in Iraqi politics, encouraging cross-sectarian alliances. The Sadrists are not that far from most Sunni Arab groups in their views of what federalism should mean in Iraq, for example.
I am arguing for early national parliamentary elections, but can’t these good results come from the provincial elections scheduled for October 2008? Some of them might, but not enough. Unlike some surge protagonists, who have changed their tune from “the surge will provide space for Iraq’s national leaders to reconcile” to “the surge is promoting grass-roots accommodation on the ground at the provincial level, and that is enough,” I still think that a national level political deal is the best way for us to exit Iraq in short order and good order. New provincial leadership is not a bad thing. Provincial elections can give us some indication of where real political strength lies in both Sunni Arab and Shi’a communities. But the real deals, about federalism and oil and some kind of understanding of how Iraqi politics will work in the future, need to be made in Baghdad. To get at least the possibility of those kinds of deals, we have to have new leadership in Baghdad, not just in the provinces.
Let me take on some of the objections to early national elections telegraphically, so as not to bore readers who have gotten this far:
1. Don’t you realize that elections will lead to more violence: Well, maybe. One can argue that Maliki’s ill-conceived Basra operation was an early part of the October election campaign. But there has been plenty of violence without elections, within the Sunni Arab community, within the Shi’a community and between those communities. There might be violence with new national elections, but there might be plenty of violence even without them.
2. What Iraq needs is to build governing capacity, not go through a divisive election campaign: I am sympathetic to that argument, in principle. The problem is that I do not see any of that building of capacity happening. Just the opposite, with important cabinet ministries going months without ministers and security forces becoming more, not less, sectarian.
3. The new forces in Sunni politics need more time to get their act together: This is an argument made by Noah Feldman in this Sunday’s New York Times. I disagree. The UIA did not need much time to get its act together to dominate the elections of 2005. If does not take that long to put together a list of candidates, if people really want to cooperate politically. If they cannot get their act together, we should know that and I’ll give up this idea. Anyway, we Americans should be moving away from the micro-management of Iraqi politics, deciding when the Sahwa-ists are “ready” to compete politically. We (including Prof. Feldman, an adviser to the CPA) have done an awful job of it.
3. OK, Mr. “Let the Iraqis Do It,” why should the U.S. be pushing for new national elections if you think it is up to Iraqis, not Americans, to decide these things: Actually, it is PROFESSOR “Let the Iraqis Do It.” I really do think that Americans should leave the Iraqis to work out their own politics (and I thought that in 2002, also). We should be backing off on all fronts, political as well as military. But part of the reason that Maliki is still prime minister is that the Bush Administration stood against earlier efforts to put together an alternative parliamentary majority. Maliki has basically lost, or nearly lost, his parliamentary majority. In any normal parliamentary system, his government would have already fallen. It is basically being propped up by our support. The Bush Administration just needs to make it clear that it is adopting a real “hands-off” position and then let events take their course.
4. You are painting too rosy a picture of the consequences of these elections, the same way that the Bush Administration painted a rosy picture of post-war Iraq: I admit that I have painted the rosiest picture possible of the consequences of early national elections in Iraq. Things might not work out so well. But is the status-quo so great that it is worth preserving? If you think so, God bless you. I think that the status-quo, which requires the maintenance of large numbers of American troops to sustain, with absolutely no plan to get them out and no “strategy for victory” (unless you think that maintaining the status-quo in Iraq is some kind of American “victory”), is a disaster for America – for the American military, which is stretched to the breaking point, for American foreign policy in the Middle East and for America’s economic and political position in the world. Time to get out, and elections can help us get out.
Could I be wrong? Sure. But one of the things that give me hope that I am not wrong is the fact that people who have been pretty consistently wrong on Iraq are on the other side of this issue. Exhibit A: big-time war supporter and Middle East democracy-monger Noah Feldman says in this Sunday’s New York Times that maybe new elections in Iraq are not such a good idea. I’m feeling better about my argument already.
You make it sound like a Hail Mary pass...
But in all likelihood, Obama is going to win in November, on the back of Iraqi violence in connection with the local elections, and start moving in direction of a pull-out. So why not, indeed.
Posted by: Klaus | April 07, 2008 at 12:14 PM
Based on extensive experience of looking at the usefulness of some elections in helping reduce levels of political violence, and the disutility of others-- I would say that what strikes me about this proposal is its apolitical and therefore in the circumstances necessarily anti-political nature. "Elections" do not simply drop from the sky fully organized. They need considerable planning, and an administrative as well as political framework within which they are held. You say nothing about these things!
For starters, who would you propose CALL these elections? No trivial matter. Would you have it be Maliki? (But then, why would he?) Or would you have it be the occupying power. (Oops! busted! It's not supposed to be act8ing as an occupying power any more, is it?)
And then, what would they be ABOUT, and on what basis would voting be organized? Would it be the same old dysfunctional list system? Would the victors in the election end up having any more real ability to GOVERN the country than Maliki has, anyway? Wouldn't the same twin constraints of (a) the reality of the occupying power's overwhelming and overweening presence, and (b)the non-existence, since 2003, of any working levers of national administration, both still be in place?
An election is only going to be helpful if it is ABOUT something that the majority of the relevant constituencies want to see happen, and if it is called and supervised by a body with political legitimacy. Hence, the only even possibly worthwhile national Iraqi elections that I see on the road ahead are ones that are called and conducted under the auspices of a robust, UN-led national reconciliation project.
We also all need to recognize that the very concept of "elections" has gotten a deservedly bad rap in Iraq, in light of the truly horrendous sequelae from the three rushed rounds of elections that were organized by the occupation.
I am, in general, a great fan of the "Institutionalization before Liberalization" approach to post-conflict peacebuilding that is articulated by Roland Paris. It is certainly very relevant in Iraq.
Posted by: Helena Cobban | April 07, 2008 at 02:57 PM
... the non-existence, since 2003, of any working levers of national administration ...
Well, well, somebody else has noticed the obvious at last! And a surpising somebody it is, not a qualified tertiary educationalist only a ... blogmonger.
The next step would be to wonder WHY there are no effective levers in sight in the former Iraq, or alternatively, HOW it was ingeniously arranged that there shouldn't be any.
Such reflections would lead straight to
But no, there is little point in talking about Step Four when most of the caravan has not reached Step Two.
___
Obviously President Elect Gause was expecting objections from the opposite quarter. He engages in massive polemical preëmption against mainstream invasionites and occupation fans, thinking -- probably quite rightly -- that only they matter enough to argue with.
But he leaves me dissatisfied vicariously on that front, because "some of the objections to early national elections" would almost certainly include "But what about Palestine and Hamás, O President Let-The-Natives-Do-It?"
Happy days.
Posted by: JHM | April 07, 2008 at 03:46 PM
JHM, I think perhaps you should look up that "blogmonger's" CV.
Other than that of course we're in agreeance.
Posted by: Anomalous | April 07, 2008 at 08:50 PM
Guardian UK
Posted by: Anomalous | April 07, 2008 at 11:00 PM
"The Maliki government is a disaster, but there is no getting rid of it short of national elections."
What evidence is there to suggest that the Maliki government would be defeated in the next elections? In the recent ABC/BBC poll 67% of both Shiites and Kurds expressed confidence in the Iraqi govt and together they represent more nearly 70 per cent of the vote? A majority of Shiites and 68% of Kurds also "approved" of the way Mr Maliki is doing his job?
"The current Sunni Arab representation at the national level is either inept, in that it cannot bring its purported constituency along with any deals it makes (Tariq al-Hashemi and the Iraqi Islamic Party), or pro-insurgency (Adnan al-Dulaimi and his ilk). These guys cannot make any deals that will stick."
If it turns out, as is being reported, that the Sunni parties will support ISCI and the Kurds in passing legislation banning political parties from contesting elections unless they disband their militias, will this be accepted as evidence that national reconciliation has taken place at the top?
"Elections could also ratify politically what we see on the ground: the dissolution of the Unified Iraqi Alliance, the Shi’a amalgam put together by Ayatallah al-Sistani which contested the January and December 2005 elections"
What evidence is there that the UIA will be dissolved before the next elections? What evidence is there that the Sadrists won't be part of the List as they were in 2005? When ever has al Sadr broken with the Shiite establishment? In November 2004 when he quit Najaf? In Jan 2007 when he accepted the Baghdad Security Plan and declared a unilateral ceasefire? In August 2007 when he extended the ceasefire? Less than two weeks ago when he declared another unilateral ceasefire and accepted Iraqi government forces operating in Basrah and Sadr City?
"But part of the reason that Maliki is still prime minister is that the Bush Administration stood against earlier efforts to put together an alternative parliamentary majority. Maliki has basically lost, or nearly lost, his parliamentary majority. In any normal parliamentary system, his government would have already fallen."
How so? At what point did the government's opponents have the numbers - ie an absolute majority of the 275 member parliament - to topple the government? Isn't it the case that that the Maliki coalition can only be toppled if either Kurdish bloc or the ISCI -even without the Sadrists - join the opposition and all the opposition parties are united?
Was it ever a serious proposition that the Sadrists and the Sunni parties would have made common cause in 2006 at a time when the Mahdi army was rounding up thousands of military aged Sunnis in Baghdad and executing them?
"The Bush Administration just needs to make it clear that it is adopting a real “hands-off” position and then let events take their course."
Indeed and about time?! Would it help if the Democrats did the same?
Helena Cobban:
"Elections" do not simply drop from the sky fully organized. They need considerable planning, and an administrative as well as political framework within which they are held. You say nothing about these things!"
Perhaps Professor Gause recalls the two elections and the constitutional referendum the Iraqis organised perfectly competently in 2005 despite a raging insurgency trying to stop them?
“For starters, who would you propose CALL these elections? “
Is there any reason why the elections wouldn’t be called according to Iraqi law?
"And then, what would they be ABOUT,and on what basis would voting be organized?"
Would they be about electing a new government and might the basis of voting be decided by the Iraqi parliament according to Iraqi law?
"An election is only going to be helpful if it is ABOUT something that the majority of the relevant constituencies want to see happen, and if it is called and supervised by a body with political legitimacy. Hence, the only even possibly worthwhile national Iraqi elections that I see on the road ahead are ones that are called and conducted under the auspices of a robust, UN-led national reconciliation project."
Is it proposed that the UN over-ride the Iraqi constitution voted in by a majority of 80% in a 10,000,000 turn out in a referendum supervised by the UN? If so, how would the UN impose this against the wishes of a sovereign member state?
"(b)the non-existence, since 2003, of any working levers of national administration, both still be in place?"
Has Iraq been in a state of anarchy since 2003?
"We also all need to recognize that the very concept of "elections" has gotten a deservedly bad rap in Iraq, in light of the truly horrendous sequelae from the three rushed rounds of elections that were organized by the occupation."
Was the horrendous sequelae the result of a raging insurgency, led by a small demographic minority, bent on retaking power from the democratically elected majority government? Is the situation different now that the insurgency is no longer raging and the Sunnis are seeking to join the political process instead of trying to overthrow the government?
"I am, in general, a great fan of the "Institutionalization before Liberalization" approach to post-conflict peacebuilding that is articulated by Roland Paris. It is certainly very relevant in Iraq."
Is it proposed to remove the democratic Iraqi constitution and the democratically elected government of Iraq and establish new/different institutions before "liberalisation" takes place? If so, what institutions? The Iraqi legal system? The free media?
"The Maliki government is a disaster, but there is no getting rid of it short of national elections."
What evidence is there to suggest that the Maliki government would be defeated in the next elections? In the recent ABC/BBC poll 67% of both Shiites and Kurds expressed confidence in the Iraqi govt and together they represent more nearly 70 per cent of the vote? A majority of Shiites and 68% of Kurds also "approved" of the way Mr Maliki is doing his job?
"The current Sunni Arab representation at the national level is either inept, in that it cannot bring its purported constituency along with any deals it makes (Tariq al-Hashemi and the Iraqi Islamic Party), or pro-insurgency (Adnan al-Dulaimi and his ilk). These guys cannot make any deals that will stick."
If it turns out, as is being reported, that the Sunni parties will support ISCI and the Kurds in passing legislation banning political parties from contesting elections unless they disband the militias, will this be accepted as evidence that national reconciliation has taken place at the top?
"Elections could also ratify politically what we see on the ground: the dissolution of the Unified Iraqi Alliance, the Shi’a amalgam put together by Ayatallah al-Sistani which contested the January and December 2005 elections"
What evidence is there that the UIA will be dissolved before the next elections? What evidence is there that the Sadrists won't be part of the List as they were in 2005? When ever has al Sadr broken with the Shiite establishment?
"But part of the reason that Maliki is still prime minister is that the Bush Administration stood against earlier efforts to put together an alternative parliamentary majority. Maliki has basically lost, or nearly lost, his parliamentary majority. In any normal parliamentary system, his government would have already fallen."
How so? At what point did the government's opponents have the numbers - ie an absolute majority of the 275 member parliament - to topple the government? Isn't it the case that that the Maliki coalition can only be toppled if either Kurdish bloc or the ISCI - even without the Sadrists - join the opposition and all the opposition parties are united?
And was it ever a serious proposition that the Sadrists and the Sunni parties would have made common cause at a time when the Mahdi army was rounding up thousands of military aged Sunnis in Baghdad and executing them?
"The Bush Administration just needs to make it clear that it is adopting a real “hands-off” position and then let events take their course."
Indeed and about time?!
Helena Cobban:
"Elections" do not simply drop from the sky fully organized. They need considerable planning, and an administrative as well as political framework within which they are held. You say nothing about these things!"
Perhaps Professor Gause recalls the two elections and the constitutional referendum the Iraqis organised perfectly competently in 2005 despite a raging insurgency trying to stop them?
“For starters, who would you propose CALL these elections? “
Is there any reason why the elections wouldn’t be called according to Iraqi law?
"And then, what would they be ABOUT,and on what basis would voting be organized?"
Would they be about electing a new government and might the basis of voting be decided by the Iraqi parliament according to Iraqi law?
"An election is only going to be helpful if it is ABOUT something that the majority of the relevant constituencies want to see happen, and if it is called and supervised by a body with political legitimacy. Hence, the only even possibly worthwhile national Iraqi elections that I see on the road ahead are ones that are called and conducted under the auspices of a robust, UN-led national reconciliation project."
Is the suggestion that the UN over-ride the Iraqi constitution voted in by a majority of 80% in a 10,000,000 turn out? How would the UN impose this against the wishes of a sovereign member state?
"(b)the non-existence, since 2003, of any working levers of national administration, both still be in place?"
Has Iraq been in a state of anarchy since 2003?
"We also all need to recognize that the very concept of "elections" has gotten a deservedly bad rap in Iraq, in light of the truly horrendous sequelae from the three rushed rounds of elections that were organized by the occupation."
Was the horrendous sequelae the result of a raging insurgency, led by a small demographic minority , bent on taking power from the democratically elected majority government? Does it change the situation for the better now that the insurgency is no longer raging and the Sunnis are seeking to join the political process instead of trying to overthrow the government?
Posted by: bb | April 08, 2008 at 01:10 AM
Bb:
How would the UN impose this against the wishes of a sovereign member state?
I believe your view of "sovereignty" must be very different from mine... But I did fail to specify in my earlier comment that I would envisage these UN-sponsored elections taking place within the context of a broader UN-convened negotiation among all relevant countries over the modalities of a rapid withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country.
In that context it is possible that the Iraqi political movements could all come to an internal governance agreement on their own, though they might ask for some outside help. And the UN might (or might not) be the most appropriate body to provide that. I was simply describing one possible way these thorny remaining issues of internal governance might be decided.
The broader (international) negotiation is the key to righting the currently extremely corrupted sovereignty status of the country. It is very urgent indeed. As a US citizen, I have every right and interest to speak up on this matter and to bring to an end my country's harmful prolongation of its occupation of Iraq. As longtime readers of my blog and my other writings will know, I have always held it is up to the Iraqis how they choose to govern themselves. Hence my suggestion that they might want to have some help from the UN in convening the necessary negotiation is only that-- a suggestion.
Whether Iraqis would want to continue to be governed by a Constitution drafted by foreigners and put into force under the rule of foreign occupiers is up to them.
Gause shows his blindness to these sovereignty-related issues throughout his presentation, which simply assumes it is the right of the US to determine when and how Iraqis have elections. How's that again?
Posted by: Helena Cobban | April 08, 2008 at 07:13 AM
Helena:
I understand why you don't regard the present Iraqi government as legitimate. But, however unpalatable to you and others, it was lawfully elected according to a constitution drafted and negotiated by Iraqis, and approved by an 80 per cent majority in a 10 million vote? This acceptance of the constitution was, perhaps not surprisingly, ratified in the subsequent general election when 70% of the eligible voters turned out.
Even if you were correct in saying the constitution was drafted by foreigners and put into force by foreign occupiers, the endorsement of the referenda and election are on the record for all to see.
The powers of the Iraqi government and the executive are notably circumscribed by the constitution in order to ensure power sharing. There has been example upon example in recent months of cabinet decisions having to be negotiated through the Iraqi Parliament in a manner that must be almost beyond the comprehension of the citizens of the neighbouring Arab countries?
For this, the Iraqis only seem to earn derision or dismissal from western commentators. The implication they would be incapable of organising elections was really quite astonishing. Would that the Egyptians, for instance, had such a constitution, such a voting system and such elections? And such a free media!
Posted by: bb | April 08, 2008 at 09:23 PM
"Gause shows his blindness to these sovereignty-related issues throughout his presentation, which simply assumes it is the right of the US to determine when and how Iraqis have elections. How's that again?"
At least this is an improvement on prominent Democrats demanding that Iraq be divided into three regardless of the views of its citizens!
Posted by: bb | April 08, 2008 at 11:14 PM