reports of a truce, some reflections

Everyone's been weighing in on what's happening in Iraq these days... sorry to be late to the party, but I'm guessing that most readers don't need me to recount what's happened while I've been away.  Y'all read the papers.   I've been following the twists and turns as reported in the Arab and Iraqi press over the weekend, but frankly the Arab and Iraqi press are just as confused as the American media about why this all happened and what's transpiring on the ground.   All the theories we've been running through are circulating there, too - from the Iran-centric to the US-centric, from the Maliki-centric to the ISCI-centric - as are the conflicting reports from different parts of Basra and Baghdad and beyond.  This confusion strikes me as itself politically significant. 

The most plausible reading of all this, to me, is that Maliki's circle really believed that they could strike a quick, decisive blow against the Sadrists, which would improve the chances of ISCI and pro-government candidates in the provincial elections expected in October and make the government look strong and competent. Evidently they misjudged the real balance of power, got bogged down militarily, and were forced to backpedal.  While Maliki's first instinct (and Sadr's) was to up the ante and heat up the rhetoric, cooler heads now seem to have prevailed and both sides reportedly agreeing to the the nine point truce terms issued by Moqtada al-Sadr. It does seem rather significant that Iran became the preferred intermediary for talks involving Sadr himself and a delegation from ISCI and Dawa (whatever the Iranian role in the actual mediation). 

Here are some preliminary thoughts, then, about where this might be going - keeping in mind how quickly things have been developing and how easily trends could change.   If the fighting peters out and the deal outlined in Sadr's nine points is upheld, then the outcome looks like a serious political defeat for Maliki, given his own stated goals.   After promising a decisive victory over the Jaysh al-Mahdi, and ruling out negotiations with those he declared "worse than al-Qaeda", he appears to be settling for a deal in which JAM does not surrender its weapons and the government promises to end the arrests and raids which had been infuriating the Sadrists for months.  That sounds like status quo ante, with some possibility of long-standing Sadrist complaints being addressed.

But before declaring victory for one side or the other, everyone should keep in mind that in these situations the fight only begins with the military encounter (think about Hezbollah during and after the 2006 war with Israel - update:  I hadn't seen James Joyner's argument here when I wrote this, but it's appropriate).   What matters is not whether it looks to me, or to you, that Maliki lost - it's what Iraqis, Arabs and Iranians, and the other players end up thinking.   Before issuing any verdict, we'll have to assess the coming propaganda battle to frame the events, and the implementation of any agreement.

First, there's the propaganda battle to interpret the results of the campaign, which is well underway and will likely intensify.   Both sides took some serious military and political losses, innocents took fire from all sides, nerves are raw, and much will depend on how Iraqis perceive the outcome.  It's safe to guess that both sides will declare victory.  The Sadrists will likely argue that they withstood the full force of the Iraqi Army with some American support, demonstrated their ability to wreak havoc if provoked, and defied the demand to turn in their weapons.  Maliki and his supporters will argue that the offensive succeeded in forcing Sadr to disown "criminal militias", and that the truce acknowledged the legitimacy of a crackdown, while defending the performance of the Iraqi Army and highlighting any sign of Iraqi public support it can find.   In other words, the political battle to convince Iraqi (and American) public opinion about what happened and who's to blame is yet to come, and could go either way.

Second, and related, there's the implementation of any deal.  A lot of Iraqi voices are already warning that any truce may prove fragile.  Both sides might fail to live up to their end, either out of bad faith or out of an inability to impose control over their own people.   If Iraqi forces continue to harrass and arrest Sadrists despite the agreement, or if the Sadrists decide to hand in their guns after all or do not honor Sadr's call to stand down, then the truce will look different.  Early signs are mixed;  despite Sadr's order, the Green Zone continues to be bombarded, and an odd article on the Sadrist website Nahrainnet [corrected:  link was to Nahrain, not Nahrainnet - which explains the oddity of the article] claims that Sadr has lost control of his movement in Basra, while Maliki's office continues to talk of finishing the campaign.  In other words, while it's clear that Maliki failed to achieve the decisive victory he needed, on both the battle for public opinion and the actual resolution of the fighting, it's really too early to tell who will emerge the victor. 

Let me be somewhat contrarian here and take a somewhat longer view.  I actually agree in part with CIA director Michael Hayden, who argued the other day that the campaign could be positive if it restored the sovereignty of the Iraqi state over Basra. I've been arguing for many months for the urgency of establishing some semblance of effective Iraqi sovereignty, defined in Weberian terms as a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence.  The best-case scenario here might be that the Sadr-Maliki truce evolves into a shared effort to extend the sovereignty of the Iraqi state, with the Sadrists and the government working together to curb extralegal armed activities.  I don't think this was the real purpose of the mission, nor do I agree that this sort of military campaign without a prior political consensus was the right way to do it, nor do I expect it to happen.  But if there's any chance to spin some gold out of the mess than that's where efforts should now be focused. 

Finally, in the American debate to come, the moral hazard question I raised last week will have to be addressed.  Everyone is arguing over whether it is conceivable that Maliki could have acted independently, either politically or logistically.  He and his supporters continue to claim that he did.   American officials continue to largely back him on this, both in my own private conversations and in the reporting (although one report did mention that Petraeus was briefed by Mowaffik al-Rubae in advance).  The main issue seems to have been the timing, not the campaign itself - preparations seemed to be for a June campaign, after the Petraeus/Crocker hearings, with Maliki for whatever reason pushing it forward.  That would have to raise serious questions for Americans to ponder.  Heck, I hope that it's true, and that the Iraqi government has decided that it really is the sovereign power and doesn't need to consult with the American representatives before launching major military offensives. Great!  Because then, why shouldn't that government carry on being sovereign without 150,000 American troops? 

Enough rambling... off to real work. 

(NOTE - added an update, realized it was getting too long, deleted it and moved it up to a new post above.  Apologies if that confused anyone!)

Comments

[hrumpth!]

Hey 'expert', nahrain.com is NOT a Sadrist website: it's been around since at least 1999 and it is owned by Abdel-Karim Daibis, "Abu Hatem", who used to be one of the webmasters of sistani.org in Tehran before moving back to Iraq in 2003. He's not affiliated with anybody in any political sense.

You're probably confusing nahrain.com with nahrainnet.net.

Why do you always set yourself up to be exposed as a poser? Why do you do this to yourself?

You should always check and re-check your Iraq stuff since you're a long way off from stating anything with any certainty.

[aardvark]

Cool - thanks! I've always found the Nahrain news aggregator useful, at any rate.
pssst - your IP address is showing... sigh. Sock-puppetry really is the last refuge of the pathetic.. And I had almost forgotten about you!

[hrumpth!]

Why go though the whole IP detective route when I made it easy for you right there in the e-mail address field?

"And I had almost forgotten about you!"

I hate taking pleasure in watching weaklings squirm, but you're such a phoney.

Now don't go making any more boo-boos, 'cause I'll be watching.

[aardvark]

No detective work... "other comments from this IP address" shows up right there in the comment field on typepad. Trust me, I wouldn't waste my time. Not sure why you don't just use your name, though.

Real contributors, you can come on back in now.

[hrumpth!]

"Dear real contributors, please, please defend me against this big meanie. Say nice things about me. Say that you love me. Love me, dammit, love me!"

Dude, it's so easy to psych you out.

[Cernig]

Marc,

The arguments that the US were intimately involved in planning/executing Maliki's offensive have partly rested on claims that the Iraqi Army can't move without US logistics.

In the case of the 14th, that's not true - they'd been based athwart the main Baghdad/Basra rail link. It's possible that Maliki used the 14th not just because it was recruited in Basra from mainly Badr Brigade sources (the loyalty factor), but because it was the only one he could easily move without US assistance.

Just another possibility to add into the mix.

Regards, Cernig

[Cernig]

And while we're all looking South, there's this.

"At a Pentagon briefing last Wednesday, the commander of the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team in Diyala province, Col. Jon Lehr, told reporters via videoconference that the Sons of Iraq "are not a permanent security solution," although, he added, "they have been an integral part of our strategy."

...as Lehr put it last week, "not all Sons of Iraq are created equally." In Diyala, the local Sons of Iraq groups have split in two. "One is a tribally based," he said. "They tend to be associated with rural areas . . . [and] are there to protect their villages. " The other half, which he described as "the politically based ones," are in Baqubah, the province's main city of about 300,000, which less than a year ago was considered an al-Qaeda-driven battleground.

Baqubah's Sons of Iraq came from the 1920s Revolutionary Brigade, which earlier had been responsible not only for killing American soldiers but also for kidnapping a U.S. Marine. Others are from Hamas in Iraq, a Sunni insurgent faction that had broken away from the 1920s Brigade. And there are also some from mujaheddin made up of former Saddam Hussein loyalists."

That divide isn't getting much attention in op-ed columns - just as the Shiite divide didn't until it exploded in open conflict. Does anyone actually believe that the leaders of the "political" and "tribal" currents of the Awakening will regard having their forces cut to a fifth of their present strength, while the rest become street-sweepers and mechanics, as being in their own interests? Especially given the evidence this last week that Maliki and his allies are quite willing to co-opt State military force to attempt to further theirs? Well, maybe some of the US cheerleading set do - but the rest of us should be looking for yet another explosive fracture at some stage in the future.

Regards, C

[aardvark]

Hey C - the rss feed for your new url doesn't seem to be working, for me anyway. Keep an eye on that when you move!

[bb]

Moqtada's acceptance of a ceasefire is consonant with the mahdis fate every single time they have challenged the government and the Shia establishment since 2004 - resistance or challenge,followed by hasty retreat and (contrite?) ceasefire.

Because Moqtada is Shia, and because he represents a significant political movement, he and the Mahdis are a problem to be managed by the government, not eliminated.

I think there is a lot of misunderstanding about this in the west which always seems to report Iraq through a Sunni/Baath prism (the NYT Basra reporter turns out to be a Baathist officer in Saddam's army!).

Whatever the perceptions as to whether Prime Minister Maliki "lost" or not, the actually reality of the situation will be seen going forward - ie if the Iraqi government forces have a henceforth substantially increased presence in Basra and other cities of the south?

[Cernig]

Marc,

we've pointed the new blog's output at the old feedburner feed.

http://feeds.feedburner.com/Newshog

That should now deliver the new site's content.

Regards, C

[Dan Kervick]

Marc,

Do you have a link to any English full text versions of the new provincial elections law? I have been wondering since this ruckus began if part of the point was to draw the Sadrists into battle against the government so as to establish a legal pretext for disqualifying Sadrist parties or lists in the provincial elections. After all, it doesn't look like there was really any serious effort to crush or rout the Sadrists, or strike a "decisive blow" against them. Wouldn't that be an absurdly grandiose ambition, anyway?

If this is what was going on, it looks like Sadr did not take the bait. This hypothesis would explain why Sadr was seemingly so eager to negotiate a truce and get his followers to stand down and leave the streets. But I don't know if this hypothesis makes sense, because I'm ignorant about the law. What does the provincial election law say about qualifications for entering the elections, and who gets to decide on those qualifications?

[nur al-cubicle]

Found this at L'Orient-Le Jour:

"Analyst Moustafa Alani of the Gulf Research Center in Dubai believes that neither camp can claim victory. Maliki was forced to cut a deal with Sadr, whose militias will retain their weapons. Inter-Shi'ite divisions are intact and Alani predicts new violence in the very near future".

Meanwhile more mortars were lobbed at the Green zone Tuesday morning.

[nur al-cubicle]

Now BBC reports that the Baghdad is out of provision, fuel and without power. This cannot be good for Maliki.

[Wendell]

Thanks for (trying to) clarify what may well be so opaque as to be unclarifiable. Heck of a note when I'm finding myself reading al Jazeera to try to understand the news (not just find out their take). Now, off to watch Mosaic.

[greg]

Maliki's disastrous "offensive" against the Sadrists would mark the beginning of the end of his regime, except it's been the beginning of the end since the beginning, so final nail in the coffin might be more accurate.

The move was a disaster for him on every level I can think of. First, he was the aggressor, turning Sadr, who had been fairly faithfully enforcing a ceasefire among his followers, into a victim. Then, Sadr's forces turned out to be more than a match for the government's, despite their better equipment and US support. Maliki's almost immediate shift from "surrender now" to "we'll pay you to stop" was humiliating, and turning to Iran as a peacebroker showed which foreign power has the real influence within Iraq. The ability of the Mahdi Army to rain mortar shells on the Green Zone pretty much showed insurgents can strike at any time and place of their choosing, despite the surge. Finally, Sadr's offer of a truce when he was in a position of advantage made him appear magnaminous and the one most concerned for the well-being of innocent civilians.

The silver lining to all this, from a US standpoint, is that the "fiery cleric" Sadr (I've come to think that phrase is part of his name) actually seems to be a quite reasonable, practical person who takes the long view of things and can be dealt with. This means that a reasonably orderly and bloodless withdrawal of US troops may be possible. Of course, that means the US must recognize that an independent Iraq must be just that, not a puppet host for the US military and oil companies, and that means it will have to wait for a new administration. But my guess is that Obama, at least, is sensible enough to recognize this.

[Ken]

On the involvement of Americans prior to the move... I found the following exchange betwixt Russert and CIA director Hayden on Sunday's Meet The Press very curious:

MR. RUSSERT: This is an article, Friday's paper: "[Iraqi] Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ... decided to launch the offensive without consulting his U.S. allies, according to administration officials. With little U.S. presence in the south, and British forces in Basra confined to an air base outside the city, one administration official said that, `we can't quite decipher' what is going on. It's a question, he said, of `who's got the best conspiracy' theory about why Maliki decided to act now." The United States was not informed by the Iraqis that we--he was going to do this?

GEN. HAYDEN: I, I don't know what on--what went on on the ground in Baghdad prior to the operation. I do know that this was a decision of the Iraqi government by the prime minister and personally by the prime minister, and that he's relying on Iraqi forces, by and large, to take this action.

MR. RUSSERT: Were you aware of it?

GEN. HAYDEN: I was--in terms of being prebriefed or, or having, you know, the, the normal planning process in which you build up to this days or weeks ahead of time, no. No, I was not.

MR. RUSSERT: You didn't know it was going to happen?

GEN. HAYDEN: No more so than Dave Petraeus or Ambassador Crocker did.

Russert then moved along, and left me yelling at the t.v. screen "SO WHAT DID CROCKER AND PETRAEUS KNOW?!" How any self respecting interviewer could let that dodge go by is beyond me.

But it seems to me that if Maliki really did move without American knowlege that Hayden would be able to act like he was honestly taken by surprise. The word parsing in the above exchange seems like truthiness defined, being technically accurate but very misleading. It's almost as if Hayden knows the truth will out and he doesn't want to have his words come back to haunt him.

[greg]

Well, Ken, let's take his words at face value. That means the head of US "intelligence," with 150,000 US soldiers on the ground and God knows how many of his own CIA agents in Iraq, had no clue that an offensive involving tens of thousands of government troops was about to take place. That makes me feel soooo much better.