ICG: the Sadrists and the Surge

In several recent discussions of Iraq, I've expressed my ongoing perplexity over the Sadrist movement.  Compared to most of the other actors in the Iraqi game, its discourse and behavior always strikes me as opaque.   So I'm particularly interested in yet another first-rate report by the International Crisis Group:  "Iraq's Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge."  Here's the conclusion:

The ceasefire largely has held and, together with bolstered U.S. and Iraqi military presence in Baghdad, helps account for a dramatic drop in violence. But the respite, although welcome, is both slightly misleading and exceedingly frail. Muqtada’s decision likely reflected a pragmatic calculation: that a halt in hostilities would help restore his credibility and allow him to reorganise his forces and wait out the U.S. presence. Their retreat notwithstanding, the Sadrists remain deeply entrenched and extremely powerful in a number of regions. Fleeing military pressure in Baghdad, Mahdi Army fighters redeployed to the south, thereby setting up the potential for an escalation of the class-based confrontation with the U.S.-backed ISCI.

Among Sadrist rank and file, impatience with the ceasefire is high and growing. They equate it with a loss of power and resources, believe the U.S. and ISCI are conspiring to weaken the movement and eagerly await Muqtada’s permission to resume the fight. The Sadrist leadership has resisted the pressure, but this may not last. Critics accuse Muqtada of passivity or worse, and he soon may conclude that the costs of his current strategy outweigh its benefits. In early February 2008, senior Sadrist officials called upon their leader not to prolong the ceasefire, due to expire later in the month.

The U.S. response – to continue attacking and arresting Sadrist militants, including some who are not militia members; arm a Shiite tribal counterforce in the south to roll back Sadrist territorial gains; and throw its lot in with Muqtada’s nemesis, ISCI – is understandable but short-sighted. The Sadrist movement, its present difficulties aside, remains a deeply entrenched, popular mass movement of young, poor and disenfranchised Shiites. It still controls key areas of the capital, as well as several southern cities; even now, its principal strongholds are virtually unassailable. Despite intensified U.S. military operations and stepped up Iraqi involvement, it is fanciful to expect the Mahdi Army’s defeat. Instead, heightened pressure is likely to trigger both fierce Sadrist resistance in Baghdad and an escalating intra-Shiite civil war in the south.

Muqtada’s motivations aside, his decision opens the possibility of a more genuine and lasting transformation of the Sadrist movement. In the months following his announcement, he sought to rid it of its most unruly members, rebuild a more disciplined and focused militia and restore his own respectability, while promoting core demands – notably, protecting the nation’s sovereignty by opposing the occupation – through legitimate parliamentary means. The challenge is to seize the current opportunity, seek to transform Muqtada’s tactical adjustment into a longer-term strategic shift and encourage the Sadrists’ evolution toward a strictly non-violent political actor.

Read the rest.  I'll only say that after reading this subtle, complicated, and well-researched account of the Sadrist movements calculations and strategies I'm even more perplexed than before. 

Comments

[Andrew R.]

I wonder if the answer to the question is as simple as that Sadr might be a genuine patriot who is also something of a thug. I mean, the JAM cease-fire was pretty much a unilateral thing that happened under his initiative, and ISTR there are hotly-denied rumors* that elements of the JAM have been working with MNF-I to weed out the more overtly Iranian elements of the militia.

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*There are times when I really wish I read Arabic.

[Eric Martin]

Thanks for linking to this Prof. I jumped on your delicious link earlier this morning.

[Derfel64]

The report was interesting but it failed to add something radically new. Perhaps what was most shocking is that the Mahdi Army militants themselves are eager to scrap the ceasefire and there have been demonstrations insulting Sadr inside Sadr City.

If eventually the Mahdi Army comes back to arms as seems to be happening, it would have been a blunder of historic proportions by the US and Iraqi government.

[LT Nixon]

Interesting insight. Thanks for sharing. Things seem to change in Iraq pretty fast and it's pretty hard to stay on top of everything.

[Tommy Moore]

The Independent's Patrick Cockburn has a book on Muqtada Sadr that could be interesting coming out in a few months.