Aardvark Day at the Washington Post

It's Aardvark Day at the Washington Post, I'm happy to say.  First, the op-ed page features an essay by our guest for the last week, Brian Katulis (along with Lawrence Korb and John Podesta).  The piece lays out their argument about strategic drift:  "Bush claims that his strategy is having some success, but toward what end?"   More from Katulis expected soon. 

Second, I was happy to be included in the excellent article by Tom Ricks on the front page of the Washington Post today.  It is somewhat reassuring (though not surprising to me) that while we have obvious disagreements about the political implications of developments in the Sunni areas, many of the military officials Ricks interviewed share my basic assessment of the political situation:

Senior military commanders here now portray the intransigence of Iraq's Shiite-dominated government as the key threat facing the U.S. effort in Iraq, rather than al-Qaeda terrorists, Sunni insurgents or Iranian-backed militias.

In more than a dozen interviews, U.S. military officials expressed growing concern over the Iraqi government's failure to capitalize on sharp declines in attacks against U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians. A window of opportunity has opened for the government to reach out to its former foes, said Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the commander of day-to-day U.S. military operations in Iraq, but "it's unclear how long that window is going to be open."

The lack of political progress calls into question the core rationale behind the troop buildup President Bush announced in January, which was premised on the notion that improved security would create space for Iraqis to arrive at new power-sharing arrangements. And what if there is no such breakthrough by next summer? "If that doesn't happen," Odierno said, "we're going to have to review our strategy."

....

Indeed, all the U.S. military officials interviewed said their most pressing concern is that Sunnis will sour if the Iraqi government doesn't begin to reciprocate their peace overtures. "The Sunnis have shown great patience," said Campbell. "You don't want the Sunnis that are working with you . . . to go back to the dark side."

The Army officer who requested anonymity said that if the Iraqi government doesn't reach out, then for former Sunni insurgents "it's game on -- they're back to attacking again."

The year-long progress in fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq could carry a downside. Maj. Mark Brady, who works on reconciliation issues, noted that a Sunni leader told him: "As soon as we finish with al-Qaeda, we start with the Shiite extremists." Talk like that is sharply discouraged, Brady noted as he walked across the dusty ground of Camp Liberty, on the western fringes of Baghdad.

I'm really glad to see these officers recognizing the core of the problem here, and trying to grapple with it, and going public with their frustrations. 

One comment:  The officers interviewed in the story are agonizing over whether provincial elections would help bridge the political gap.  I understand the hope that this could break the impasse, but  I'm skeptical for three reasons. 

First, it's important to recognize the intense Sunni-Sunni political struggles unfolding, as I wrote about in some detail the other day, and think about how elections could be a trigger for bringing those undercurrents to the surface. 

Second, as I mentioned the other day most Sunnis seem more preoccupied with the national level than the local - the new elections that they want are to the national Parliament.  They are also intensely suspicious of anything which smells like partition, and promoting provincial over national elections could well trigger an intensely hostile reaction.

Finally, and most importantly, provincial elections sidestep the really important question:  the relationship between these local militias and the central state.  Without institutionalized control over the means of violence and a meaningful political bargain at the center, I just do not see any way to prevent a spiral into sectarian warfare.  And thus, as Ricks quotes my argument, the current strategy is accelerating Iraq's descent into a warlord state even if violence is temporarily down.   

So what I take away from this very good article is some encouragement that the military officers recognize the problem (as I've often heard in private), along with continuing frustration that they aren't grappling with the ways in which their own efforts - no matter how pragmatic, clever, and productive in the short-term - are making the problem worse. 

UPDATE:  just wanted to add one thing, because on further reflection I didn't quite capture what I wanted to say. I do think that these officers are grappling with the problem I identify - but they don't see any way out of it, which isn't quite the same thing.

Comments

[peter hofmann]

One proposal: try to analsye iraq in social terms.

[Saeed Uri]

I really enjoyed the roundtable at Carnegie. Personally I think your comments on the topic were the most interesting. Of course from reading your blog nothing was ground breaking but hearing the views of the other guest also kept it interesting.
Walking out I was wondering, since the other speakers were having a hard time explaining "why now" about the release of the platform, and thinking that all things in the Middle East connect some way or another, could the experience (or whatever you want to call it)of Hamas in Gaza be a reason for its release? Or what about the AKP in Turkey? Even the criticism that comes from Al Qaeda about the different national organizations, did that have any affect?
There is probably no way of figuring this out, but could regional (and religious) influences be a cause for the release of the platform? After all Egypt is THE Arab country and its future will have a huge impact on the whole region (just like Nasser did).

[anna missed]

...[ And thus, as Ricks quotes my argument, the current strategy is accelerating Iraq's descent into a warlord state even if violence is temporarily down. ]...

I can't think of any other (rational) reason for this strategy other than 1) it will (and does) reduce violence, 2) which makes the current "surge" appear to be "working", and 3) requires the occupation to continue, because dependency on U.S. forces has expanded beyond the Shiite government and now includes the former Sunni insurgency.

But as usual and keeping within precident, the long term logic and potential remains grounded in a wish and a dream.

[John]

It amazes me, having spent 3 and a half years in the Middle East, two of which during wartime, how as we call them, armchair critics and armchair generals think they know what they are talking about. From their high enclosed glass bubble, vicariously passing judgment. If your such an expert on the Middle East you would know that the first form of government is the tribe. Using these mostly honorable men to restore law and order is common sense. It is nothing like the warlord state of Somalia. What would you rather have more people dying and a lack of law and order just to further your political agenda. You got your 15 go now!

[bb]

The arguments in this post for putting off the provincial elections are much more persuasive than in the earlier one. And with the Sunnis sidelining the Association of Muslim Scholars and the reopening of the St John of God church in Baghdad it seems Al Qaeda is really on the run and increasingly being revealed as having been the main engine of the insurgency and instigator of the sectarian bloodletting? This would suggest that the refugees in the neighbouring states will start returning to Iraq in very large numbers.

In this context, once AlQI is completely driven out, national elections could serve as the circuit breaker for national reconciliation and be followed by the provincial elections once the sharing of revenue has been formalised?