Iraq: some quick hits

Taking a break from the great Iraq debate, here are a few quick hits on stories out of Iraq I'm following:

• The influential Sunni organization the Association of Muslim Scholars has accused a militia of the Sunni waqf of invading its Baghdad office and shutting it down.  If true, this is extremely provocative.  The AMS may be out of step with the current official political discourse (Hareth al-Dhari provoked a firestorm by reaching out to al-Qaeda in Iraq a few weeks ago), but it remains extremely influential in the Sunni community.  Keep an eye on this.
• Sam Dagher has a nice profile of Tareq al-Hashemi in the Christian Science Monitor.  Note the issues Hashemi raises:  first and foremost, Sunni prisoners (some 26,000 Sunnis have reportedly been rounded up as part of the new security plan according to this article;  other sources talk about 60,000) - it's a huge issue for Sunnis, these mass arrests which are rarely mentioned in the accounts of the new American COIN strategy. One wonders how these prisoners feel about bottom-up reconciliation and about their political views and willingness to take up arms when/if they get out.  Hashemi also talks about  Maliki's obstinance and circumventing of the constitution;  the death sentences against Sultan Hashem and Hussein Rashid Mohammed (over the Anfal genocide), which Hashemi describes as burning any chance of enticing other ex-military officers back into the political game;  and the continuing climate of sectarian fear and mistrust. In a different interview given to al-Malaf Press, Hashemi sounded more optimistic about the security aspects but warned that Sunnis needed to see rapid economic gains or they would lose faith in the process.
  
• Al-Jazeera is headlining a report that Maliki has decided to reach out to Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in hopes of securing their assistance on internal security and the repatriation of refugees. I'm really not sure what this 'opening' is supposed to entail.   This might be a hopeful sign, or it might be another attempt by Maliki to do an end run around the Sunni political leadership - if Sunni leaders from Hashemi to Dhari to the insurgency factions depend on Saudi support and Jordanian safe harbors, then this might be a way to put pressure on them... or to meet one of their demands.   We'll see.  Kind of makes you wonder what he's been doing to this point..  At any rate, the report is sourced to a Dawa leader who doesn't want to be identified, so it might not amount to anything at all.
• Late update:  just want to be sure to draw attention to Jon Lee Anderson in the New Yorker, who offers this gem: "Zaidan said that Anbar’s Sunni tribes no longer had any need to exact blood vengeance on U.S. forces. “We’ve already taken our revenge,” he said. “We’re the ones who’ve made them crawl on their stomachs, and now we’re the ones to pick them up.” He added, “Once Anbar is settled, we must take control of Baghdad, and we will.” There would have to be a lot more fighting before the capital was taken back from the Shiites, he said. “The Anbaris will take charge of the purge. What the whole world failed to do in Anbar, we have done overnight. Baghdad will be a lot easier.”  That's the Sunni discourse I'm used to hearing.   
  

Finally, I've been closely following an escalating series of very interesting online polemics between supporters of the new Political Council of the Iraqi Resistance and salafi-jihadists associated with the Islamic State of Iraq (al-Qaeda).  Salafi-jihadists such as Akram Hijazi have been going after the Islamic Army, Hamas Iraq, and the various "nationalist-jihadist" factions for their political pragmatism - and have also been touting AQI's impending rebound, for what that's worth.  Nationalist-jihadists have been hitting back, defending their strategy and blaming AQI for the "fitna" in the Sunni ranks.  Each has been interpreting the recent bin Laden message to its own advantage.  One of the more interesting responses posted on a forum affiliated with Hamas-Iraq argues that the PCIR (including H-I) sees its political moves as part of the 'path of jihad' because the American decision to withdraw from Iraq has become only a question of timing. It is this imminent American withdrawal which justifies the political moves in this account, not the American alignment with the Sunni tribes.  The salafi-jihadists, the author complains, see fighting the Muslim Brotherhood and nationalist factions as more important than fighting the Americans - an argument with some merit, which hits them where it hurts.  He also accuses al-Qaeda and the salafi-jihadists of provoking internecine warfare, which ignores the reality of the Iranian threat and the Safavid invasion of Iraq and the risks of partition. Alarmingly, the problem with al-Qaeda here is that it isn't sufficiently anti-Shia!   That doesn't bode well for the future... What's more interesting here than the recitation of fairly familiar themes is what appears to be the growing self-confidence of these nationalist-jihadist factions in the online debates - this is purely impressionistic at this point, but they seem to be pushing back harder and more confidently than in the past.  Something to follow, not to draw any conclusions from at this point...

That's all for now. 

Comments

[Moloch-Agonistes]

"The PRIC"? Shades of Nixon and CREEP. Assuming this is a "majlis siyasi" of some sort the Arabic initials might be more appropriate for little ears.

[aardvark]

Again! That's the second time I've made that typo...

[James]

Wow. That American Prospect article in your del.icio.us seems very on the money vis a vis what I keep hearing out of Iraq, and what my in-progress undergrad degree in medieval history has taught me. Please point folks to that in a post soon!