Dr Fadl's Review of Jihad

Over the last two weeks, the Arab and Islamist media have been discussing the serialized publication of "Rationalizing Jihadist Action in Egypt and the World," better known as the Review Document, by Dr Fadl (Sayid Imam Sharif), in the Egyptian newspaper al-Masry al-Youm and the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Jarida (all nine parts can be found on Islam Online, and much relevant commentary is collected in Khalil el-Anani's Islamists Today; one English discussion can be found here, and Anani's own discussion here).   In this long-gestating document, Dr Fadl is reinterpreting the meaning of jihad in ways which explicitly forbid declarations of takfir (under most circumstances) and the killing of non-Muslims in Muslim countries or members of other Muslim sects (i.e. the Shia). 

Dr Fadl, now and then (courtesy of Islam Online)

Dr Fadl was one of the chief ideologues of the Islamic Jihad group (Ayman al-Zawahiri's organization) and a guiding force behind both the bloody 1990s Islamist insurgency in Egypt and the evolution of al-Qaeda's doctrine.  In 1997, the Gamaa Islamiya declared a controversial ceasefire, and over the last ten years several of its leading thinkers have been involved in various private and public initiatives aimed at rethinking their doctrines.   The document's source, therefore, matters as much as does it contents.   The review etains the "jihad-centric" view of Islam characteristic of salafi-jihadist doctrine, while demanding that jihad be understood within a more rigorous understanding of sharia and jurisprudence, and specifically refutes a range of interpretations of jihad which have justified attacks on state employees and government officials, civilians, tourists, Shia, and non-Muslims in Muslim countries or in their own countries.   On the proliferation of proclamations of takfir, the review declares that this should be a legal (sharia) judgement, not a political  or intellectual accusation - as with jihad, seeking to establish rules to govern it rather than to reject it.  There's much more there, which I don't have time to get into right now, but I think those are the highlights to date - and the main points to be picked up by the public debate thus far.

How significant is all this?  Much depends on how much influence Dr Fadl still has, and whether the review is received as sincere or as opportunism.  The popular radical Islamist figure Hani Siba'i, for instance, denounced Dr Fadl as irrelevant to today's jihadism and lacking any real influence, and dismissed the document as an unprincipled surrender under regime torture and repression. Gamaa leader Najih Ibrahim, on the other hand, welcomed the review and stressed its importance and sincerity.   Kamal Habib sees the review as an entirely appropriate reinterpretation in light of 25 years of experience, emphasizing that doctrines should always be open to review and reflection and ijtihad (interpretation).  The prominent Islamist lawyer Montasir al-Zayat sees it as entirely sincere and as a major ideological development.  Egyptian analyst Diya Rashwan sees it as an historic turning point in the history of jihadist thought and a major blow to the foundations of al-Qaeda's thought and discourse.  The debate has really just been joined - it will be interesting to see if the interpretations cross any predictable lines.

I've never been quite sure how seriously to take the various review initiatives by the leaders of the Gamaa and Islamic Jihad. Frankly, I remain somewhat skeptical and incline more towards the opportunistic interpretation.    For me, the decisive point is that it is in fact generating quite a stir in Islamist and Arab circles, if not so much in the West.  I can see the potential for the document to have some impact within jihadist circles, particularly at a time when we're seeing an intense ideological (as well as military) battle in Iraq between adherents of different "jihadist" worldviews.  Dr Fadl's intervention might well have more impact because it enters into an open, hotly contested arena in which the "salafi-jihadists" aligned with al-Qaeda in Iraq are being challenged by an array of more pragmatic, politically-oriented but still self-consciously "jihadist" factions both in Iraq and spreading through the Islamist milieu.  On the other hand,  Amr Shoubiki, a prolific Egyptian analyst of Islamist movements, doesn't think it will have much effect in Iraq.   At any rate, it will be very interesting to see the extent to which this breaks out of the Egyptian context and sparks these wider debates.  As one early indicator, for what it's worth, the thread about the Review Document on one of the leading Iraq-focused forums is already within its top 65 most-read posts and has generated a lengthy comment thread.   

That's all I have time for today.  For now, I  just wanted to highlight a fascinating developing Islamist debate to which it's worth paying attention even if its eventual impact is difficult to predict.

UPDATE:  Khalil el-Anani writes:

[even] if Al-Qaeda leaders Osama Bin Laden, or Ayman Al-Zawahri, attempted to revise their ideology, not much would change.  On the contrary, new Al-Qaeda leaders would emerge, adopting the same vision and message of their godfathers. They would always find evidence to support their righteousness claiming that those who recanted either strayed from the right path or were coerced.
It would be extremely naive to expect such revisions to have a substantial effect on Al-Qaeda cells and their followers with whom they merely maintain a spiritual relationship.
The ideological and spiritual relationship between Al-Shareef and the post-9/11 Afghanistan and Iraq Jihadi generation seems very weak. This is not only due to the lack direct interaction between the two, but also because the old Sheikhs have been supplanted with new ones who have monopolized the theories influencing new Al-Qaeda members.

Good points there, and in the rest of the article.  One point which I would add is that new media has driven an incredible proliferation of ideologues and ideas, decentralizing authority and making it much more difficult for any would-be leader to monopolize or control discourse.  Jihadists in Iraq and beyond might have a look at Dr Fadl's document, and might even debate it, but I agree that few are likely to fundamentally change their views because of it.  He's just one among many, and he's really kind of old school compared to the current state of jihadist intellectual play.

 

Comments

[Chuck]

Call in and check out our interview tonight at 8PM EST with Dr. Paul L. Williams, author of The Day of Islam at thirdrailradio.com

[arabist]

I think it's also worth mentioning (from my cursory reading) that the document remains highly intolerant (towards non-Muslims including people of the book) and full of ambiguity about the use of violence, notably advocating strategies of deception and dissimulation when faced with a powerful enemy. In other words, it is racist intolerant tripe, even if it implements changes the egyptian government wanted, i.e. advocating non-violence even against an unjust "sultan". There is some worry here in Egypt that the regime is considering playing with fire and promoting some of these Salafist types against the Ikhwan, although I think the more responsible people in the Egyptian establishmet will not follow that path, which previously led to Sadat's assassination.

[aardvark]

Issandr - good points both - to me, one of the most bizarre things has been that the regime has simultaneously cracked down on the MB while cozying up to the "reformed" Gamaa and Islamic Jihad figures.

[jr786]

This comment is priceless:

notably advocating strategies of deception and dissimulation when faced with a powerful enemy. In other words, it is racist intolerant tripe.

The correct strategy for Muslims facing Israeli or American tanks is to be flattened like gentleman, not be troublesome brown people who refuse to denounce violence when confronting its most able practitioners. He did get the racist tripe part right, however; he spewed it.

[alle]

to me, one of the most bizarre things has been that the regime has simultaneously cracked down on the MB while cozying up to the "reformed" Gamaa and Islamic Jihad figures.

Not so bizarre at all. It makes fine sense from their point of view. The MB poses a real threat on the political level, and seem way to big to swallow up, plus, they can be attacked with impunity since all important allies (US, Arabs) agree that they should be cut down to size. The ex-Jihadists, on the other hand, pose no political threat whatsoever, so it is completely affordable to deal with them to help diminish the terrorist nuisance posed by people on that fringe -- and if it turns out youngsters will ignore them, at least the older generation has been safely defanged. Win/win, in the short to middle term. Remove ethics and principles from the equation and look at their self-interest, then tell me you wouldn't do the same if you wanted the continuation of Mubarakist cleptocracy.

[anon]

What i think this paper by Dr. Fadl is indicative of is not so much the debate within Islam, but the sense of the threat posed by the USA and other imperialist forces. It seems to me that splits between different Islamic factions are all varying degrees of attempts to deal with the American threat. So different factions of Islamists are taking different lines in order to find a balance between addressing the challenge of the Americans v. being able to gain popular acceptance.

In this respect, I tend to agree with Lynch in that this particular paper is opportunistic, but not necessarily personally so.