The full bin Laden tape on Iraq

Just a very few comments about the full version of the bin Laden tape on Iraq, since that's all I have time for before running off to teach.  With the whole context in place, the tape is much less negative about Iraq than has been presented.  It is also, to my surprise, far less forthcoming to the "nationalist" factions than suggested by the al-Jazeera version. I had anticipated that bin Laden would be trying to find a path to reconciliation, in order to make sure that al-Qaeda would be represented in the emerging political face of the Iraqi resistance.  The recent comments by Hareth al-Dhari had seemed to offer such a path back in.  But bin Laden didn't really pursue that path.  Instead, his speech concentrated on placing Iraq in the context of global jihad, and presented a fairly uncompromising vision in which the burden was on the nationalist factions to repent their deviations.  In the full tape, bin Laden did seem to be pushing for reconciliation among the factions and denouncing factional conflict - but his concept of reconciliation was very much on his own terms. 

I would point out just four very quick things:

• the Islamic State of Iraq isn't mentioned at all, not directly or indirectly.  All references are to the mujahideen in general, and there is a lot of talk about the importance of avoiding factionalism or placing loyalty to a leader or group over loyalty to the umma.    While this could be an implicit critique of the ISI, that's only an inference since he does not tip his hand one way or the other.  One much-trafficked discussion on the forums right now focuses on exactly this question - and nobody is really sure why he didn't mention the ISI.   If they don't know, I don't think we should be all that confident that we do. 
  
• judging by the discussion in the forums, one of the key themes here is being understood as the escalating conflict between al-Qaeda style jihadism and the Muslim Brotherhood - both within Iraq and in the wider Islamic world.  Bin Laden specifically criticizes those who have chosen to participate in elections or the Iraqi government (such as Tareq al-Hashemi's MB-linked Iraqi Islamic Party) and describes participation in a "polytheistic" government or cooperation with American-backed security forces as "obvious apostacy."   That should be something for MB-skeptics to think about. 
• While there is certainly some self-criticism going on, as in the earlier al-Jazeera version, the context suggests that the tape is more of an invitation for "true mujahideen" to come back to the jihad, with no questions asked, than an admission of defeat.  He goes on at length about how all men make mistakes, and only God can judge them.   While this is likely in part an appeal for the transgressions of the Islamic State of Iraq to be forgiven, or at least submitted to the arbitration of "honest" judges, it is also an appeal for the ISI to forgive those fighters who have collaborated with the US and Iraqi security forces. 
• finally, purely at the aesthetic level, this is bin Laden's strongest performance in a long time.  While the first half of the tape is somewhat formulaic, during the second half of the tape he finds his rhythm, his voice deepens, and his rhetoric becomes both sharper and more poetic.  In comparison to the last video, which didn't seem to have a clear intended audience or a clear message, this tape (especially in the second half) felt like vintage bin Laden.   I don't know how significant this really is politically, but it's worth noting that his performance was strong and confident, not hesitant or defeated. 

Hopefully I'll have time to put these points together into something more coherent, but now I have to go teach a few classes.  The missing links blog has more discussion of this here, and here on Abd al-Bari Atwan's interpretation (see:  Hareth al-Dhari above).

UPDATE:  Abd al-Rahman al-Jabouri, the spokesman for the Political Council for the Iraqi Resistance, "welcomed bin Laden's call to unite the ranks of the resistance and to not give cover to the plans of the American occupation to frustrate the jihad in Iraq."  Bin Laden's tape, he said, offered a perfect opportunity for all parties, without exception, to set aside the mistakes of the past and begin working together towards the future.  Jabouri repeated the phrase "without exception" several times and specifically invited al-Qaeda in Iraq back into the fold - on the condition that they first resolve several outstanding issues between them and the other factions.  One resistance faction after another is releasing statements to the forums welcoming bin Laden's message, while urging al-Qaeda in Iraq to not miss this chance.  When Hareth al-Dhari said on al-Jazeera in early October that al-Qaeda in Iraq was not beyond the pale, it led some - including Juan Cole - to declare him increasingly irrelevant in Iraqi politics and "no longer a national figure".  But it seems distinctly possible to me (and to Abd al-Bari Atwan) that bin Laden's tape comes in response to Dhari's intervention, and that the Political Council of the Iraqi Resistance is interested in moving beyond the conflict with al-Qaeda to refocus on the occupation (and, largely unsaid, the Shia).  Whether that will lead to anything (positive or negative) remains very much to be seen.

Comments

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It's interesting that both you and Badger, on listening to the full tape, revised your initial interpretations that Bin Laden was being reconciliatory? This gelling with the denunciation of Al Jazeera on AlQ's own website.

And yet the resistance factions are choosing to believe the Al Jazeera version. What is really going? Are people just wanting to hear what they want to hear? Or are al Dhari, al-Basri Atwan, Al Jazeera and the the non AlQ groups "spinning" in an orchestrated attempt to seduce the AlQI rank and file from the leadership? It would be interesting to know if Al Jazeera has "cut and pasted" previous Al Qaeda tapes?