So, what was going on in that OBL tape?

I've been absolutely fascinated watching the unfolding debate in the jihadist forums and various Arab media about what happened with al-Jazeera and bin Laden's Iraq address. 

Some things that I've been reading about the episode are just wrong.  This is not the first time that al-Jazeera has angered al-Qaeda.   The jihadist forums routinely lambast al-Jazeera, along with the other Arab media outlets, for not acting as the propaganda outlets that they'd like.  They've been frustrated for years with al-Jazeera's presentation of the tapes, cutting them up and airing only the newsworthy bits, with commentary and analysis from often unsympathetic guests.  That's one of the many reasons that they came to rely on the internet distribution method, so that they wouldn't be at al-Jazeera's mercy.  Still, it's clear that this one is something special - they are genuinely outraged, beyond the norm.   

It's pretty clear that, at least in the eyes of his followers and online interpreters, bin Laden did not mean what most people thought he meant in the address.  He was not addressing al-Qaeda in Iraq or the Islamic State of Iraq, or focusing on their errors.  He was not calling for reconciliation or admitting defeat (although skeptics would respond that of course this is what his partisans would say).   He was offering advice to the "mujahideen" in Iraq, but that is not being seen as anything new, as he has offered advice to the mujahideen around the world many times.  The main charge being leveled against al-Jazeera, in fact, is that its presentation of the tape was fundamentally misleading because it made it seem like he was talking about al-Qaeda's mistakes and misfortunes when the full tape makes quite clear that he wasn't - he was offering advice and praise to all mujahideen, which to these interpreters was the whole point.  There's also a lot of anger out there that the people who made their instant analyses based on the al-Jazeera version haven't come forward and changed their public views.   Ah, media criticism and bashing pundits- the common glue which binds together internet activists across cultures and political divides.  [UPDATE - I thought of a good American analogy for this last night. It's as if Bush gave a speech bashing Congress, and then CNN had only run clips suggesting that he had attacked Republicans, driving an entire news cycle dominated by "Bush attacks Republicans" - and then nobody changed their story after the whole tape aired elsewhere.]

So what was bin Laden up to?  That's where things get murkier.  There are a number of competing interpretations floating around the forums, some confused and some furious and some compelling.  The most interesting interpretation I've yet seen comes from Dr Akram Hijazi, who is one of the more prolific and from what I can tell most influential of the jihadi analysts on these influental forums (his essay is easily found on any of the forums;  ask me for a link over email if you want one). 

Hijazi's reading of bin Laden's speech won't offer much support for either side of the current American political debate.  He argues that bin Laden was speaking not as a political strategist but as a "salafi jihadist" (the divide between Muslim Brotherhood style political Islam and salafi jihadism is a particular theme of Hijazi's developed over countless essays).   Hijazi argues that the salafi-jihadist organizations are religious first, not political organizations with a religious focus, and that such organizations do not change their doctrines for political ends.  He notes bitingly that non-salafi-jihadists, even those sympathetic to al-Qaeda, always misinterpret bin Laden's speeches because they read him through their own political, strategic lenses (a sin of which I suppose I'm equally guilty).    

To Hijazi, this is a major mistake.   Bin Laden and the salafi-jihadists are first and foremost concerned with religion;  if they admit mistakes, the mistakes are deviations from religious precepts rather than strategic or tactical.  His major charges against the Iraqi mujahideen are that they are accepting judgements by bad ulema, or by hypocrites (munaqafin) who pretend to be good Muslims but who are really looking to spread fitna (internal conflict).   His call for unity is a call for unity of honest organizations (jama'at sadiqa) - which for Hijazi is one of the major theoretical innovations and points of the speech.   What bin Laden demands of the Iraqi fighters is religious sincerity and honesty, not any particular political strategy, and unity must begin from this religious foundation.     Hijazi notes that nowhere in bin Laden's speech do words appear such as independence or liberation or negotiation or elections or political participation or nation (watan).  That, to Hijazi, is the real clue to what bin Laden is talking about.   The mistakes in Iraq are deviations from sharia - which could mean an overeager imposition of hadud penalties without the oversight of a sincere and qualified judge, could mean fanaticism (ta'assub) in placing one's group over the umma, or could mean bestowing illegitimate recognition on polytheistic political institutions (like democracy).   Of course, the doctrinal and strategic likely run together - groups like the Islamic Army, which are forming the Political Council, would fall on the same side of the divide as would Tareq al-Hashemi since they talk about participating in the political process once the Americans leave.

This is just one interpretation of bin Laden's speech, but it comes from an influential insider voice.  Frankly, I'm not sure what to do with it, and since it doesn't really fit any political agenda over here it will probably be ignored.  But it seems like something interesting that people might like to hear about.       

Comments

[ebw]

I'd like a copy and I've suddenly got an itch to read sermons from Calvin and the Geneva pastors that set off the first War of Religion in France.

[jr786]

I think Hijazi's point is that a correctly oriented Muslim society, i.e. one that is firmly rooted in sharia, will naturally result in a correctly oriented Muslim politics. In other words, the politics of such a society will necessarily be correct and just and thus cannot be determined minus the existence of a true Islamic state.
In this sense, politics is the expression of religion and culture.The more religious the state, the more culturally Islamic it would be, a tautology actually. Is politics would follow.

[Zathras]

The similarities between the distinction this Hijazi fellow makes and those that used to be drawn between doctrinal Communists and those who were using Communist doctrine to pursue "political" ends (e.g. ends involving non-Communist concepts like national interests) are obvious.

That doesn't make the two identical, but it isn't hard to see how easily doctrinal and tactical concerns overlap, and how likely it is that people preoccupied with the one can speak with thorough conviction in discussing the other. No Communist regime would have lasted as long as so many of them did if all the doctrinal arguments that erupted within the ideological elites had always been conducted in a spirit of complete insincerity.

Of course, those Communists who thought only in terms of correct doctrine tended to make themselves irrelevant over time. If Hijazi is correct, this would explain what has appeared to be bin Laden's reduced relevance in the world of Islamist terrorism. But I don't know if he is correct, and given bin Laden's record I'm not sure how one would tell.

[Abu Ghayib]

You can access all of Hijazi's stuff at his blog:

http://drakramhijazi.maktoobblog.com/

[alle]

Unrelated, but "Ali Sadraddin Bayanouni, the head of Syria's Muslim Brotherhood, has declared that the MB's embrace of democracy means that it will accept a woman or Christian becoming president of Syria if they are elected to the position."

Oy, what will the Brothers in Egypt think?

[Yohan]

I don't know why as-Sahab doesn't take a more active role in managing its image in the Arab-language MSM. I get why they've turned to the internet in response MSM outlets like al-Jazeera not being pliable enough, but as this incident shows you can't just ignore al-Jazeera and expect its influence over you to go away. It will still cover your sayings and doings so why not seek to manage that rather than abandoning all influence you have over your image in the medium that is most consumed by your target audience?

AIPAC(for example) does a lot of direct mail and other Information Operations outside the MSM, but it also recognizes the need to engage the media in order to steer coverage or at least frame issues in a more useful way. Why doesn't as-Sahab send out clear, concise press releases rather than letting al-Jazeera cut up at will the rambling and opaque speeches that as-Sahab seems to love? Are there insurmountable barriers for as-Sahab or some other al-Qaida organization against sending members to talk shows or against submitting Op-Eds in non-Saudi Arab language newspapers? I guess what I'm asking is, are there structural obstacles to further engagement in the MSM or is it a matter of will?

Of course al-Qaida's core beliefs will be repellent to a majority of Arabic speakers, but this sort of bungling of its Information Operations will turn off many of those who would otherwise be attracted to the organization. If nothing else, they would be better able to ensure that their message isn't altered.