TAP: Sunni World

Here's the piece for the American Prospect.   There was one copy-editing change made which I hadn't approved (because of a fire alarm in my office building) which I'm still hoping to get corrected - it's not central to the argument but makes for a rough transition (Fixed - thanks!) Here's how it starts:

During his visit to Iraq last week, President Bush carved out an hour to sit down with Shaykh Abd al-Sattar Abu Risha, the controversial head of the Anbar Salvation Council who had become a symbol of America's Anbar strategy. The pictures from that photo-op were likely the Shaykh's death warrant: Abu Risha was assassinated today, even as Bush prepared to use the Anbar strategy's "success" to justify our continued involvement in Iraq.

David Petraeus was quick to blame al-Qaeda for the stunning murder, a leap to judgment emblematic of all which is wrong with America's current views of the Sunnis of Iraq. In reality there are a plethora of likely suspects, reflecting the reality of an intensely factionalized and divided community which little resembles the picture offered by the administration's defenders. Leaders of other tribes deeply resented Abu Risha's prominence. Leaders of the major insurgency factions had for weeks been warning against allowing people such as Abu Risha to illegitimately reap the fruits of their jihad against the occupation. The brazen murder of America's closest Sunni ally in Iraq was as predictable as it was shocking, and carries a powerful message to both Iraqis and Americans about the real prospects for the long-term success of the American project.

And later,

General Petraeus worked creatively and effectively to encourage this trend, and soldiers and diplomats on the ground seem to be aware of the complexities of the new "cooperative" mission. The same can't be said for surge cheerleaders in the United States. Much of the conventional wisdom about the Sunni areas now seems to come from the impressions formed by politicians and journalists on stage-managed visits to Iraq, or by carefully crafted press interviews with "former insurgents" hand-picked by American military handlers. But we don't need such a mediated view. Leaders of the major Iraqi Sunni groups actually speak quite often and quite candidly to their own people: in open letters, in official statements posted on internet forums, in the Arab and Iraqi press, and in statements released on al-Jazeera and other satellite television stations. What they say in such statements, in Arabic, when addressing their own constituencies, might be considered a more reliable guide to their strategy and thinking. So what are the major Iraqi Sunni leaders saying?

Go read it to find out.
   

Comments

[Curt]

Thanks for the insightful analysis, as always. I hope your take makes the rounds so that we can get beyond the facile governmental and media versions of these same events.

Meanwhile, it is time you jumped from 50 Cent and Kanye, and went over to M.I.A.

[Eric Martin]

Well done.

[Andrew R.]

Marc,

From your assessment of the situation, how accurate do you think the beliefs of the Ba'ath party and its associates that they can retake all of Iraq in short order are? Is it the same sort of wishful thinking that causes them to believe that Iraqi Sunnis are 60% of the population, or do they still have the muscle to do so?

[Zathras]

Future conflict between Sunni Arab and Shia is probably inevitable at some point, and while regrettable in human terms is not really our problem. How concerned ought we to be about Sunni Arab tribes seeking unity among themselves by picking a fight with the less numerous Kurds in the north?

[Moloch-Agonistes]

While the cocktail of ignorance and bloodlessness has a certain tangy appeal, i'd suggest that future conflict between "Sunni Arab" and Shi'a (Arab) may kind of be "our problem" given the close proximity of heavily armed sponsors in e.g. Saudi Arabia and Iran who are already now engaging in proxy warfare. Meanwhile, when Mosul and Kirkuk go up in flames as a side effect of our invasion, you can bet the "Sunni Arabs" at the gates will be primarily after the oil fields beneath them, not "unity." (Of course, unity is often a side effect of oil fields, so maybe I'm being slightly uncharitable.)

[Non-Arab Arab]

Anyone else notice that Bush started tearing up in his speech last night when he mentioned Abu Risha's killing?

[JJackson]

Marc

I would like to pick-up on Zathras's comment re the Kurds. While an enormous amount is being written about the Sunni / Shia dynamic and I think I have a reasonable handle on the players within these blocks I am far less clear on how the Kurds fit into the picture and how you think they might fare in a post occupation scenario. Should you wish to write on this subject I, for one, would be most grateful or if you have a recent article on this topic please could you provide a link.

[Adrian]

Non-Arab Arab - the death of Abu Risha was probably the first person Bush had personally met who's been a casualty in Iraq.

[Zathras]

Well, here we go: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/14/AR2007091400469.html?hpid=topnews

I suppose this is just emblematic of the press coverage of all which [sic] is wrong with American views of the Sunnis of Iraq. Or, it could be that the al Qaeda franchise is just trying to steal the fruits of the victorious Sunni Arab jihad. Might there be another interpretation?

[aardvark]

I'd say a little of both! Seriously, of course al-Qaeda was going to claim responsibility for the murder whether they did it or not (claiming responsibility for such things is a key part of their propaganda strategy), and those with an interest in blaming al-Qaeda were going to leap on that claim of responsibility whether it's true or not (most obviously, tribal rivals like Ali Hatem are happy to have the finger pointed elsewhere, and it fits the American storyline). Doesn't mean much of anything.

In the Iraqi realm, "official" circles have embraced the al-Qaeda claim because it's convenient, while elsewhere it's being treated as a whodunnit. Conspiracy theories are blooming at an impressive rate: Ali Hatem was actually meeting with Nuri al-Maliki when he heard the news of the death! the hit had to have an inside person to get Abu Risha into the right place at the right time! And so on... I don't know who killed Abu Risha, and neither does anyone else right now, AQ claims of responsibility aside.

[Zathras]

All quite possible. Even American commanders in Iraq, blaming al Qaeda in the hope of holding open a door for Sunni Arabs and Shiites in the Baghdad government not to kill each other while saving everyone's face, may have hidden motives.

An academic's desire, after firmly and at length declaring his belief in one theory explaining Abu Risha's murder, not to have to acknowledge he might have gotten it completely wrong? You might as well not try to hide that one. It's pretty obvious.

[Moloch-Agonistes]

About that which one cannot speak, thereof one ought probably simmer down and avoid snide comments about academia.

[bb]

The claim is yet another example of ALQI setting the agenda for the resistence. They have now followed it up with suicide bombing of Sunni civilians in Ramadi and an announced program of killing all the Sunni sheikhs who collaborate with the Americans in the awakening.The rest of the resistance seems to have fallen back into line with ALQI.

I think AA was pretty spot on in his analysis when he said:

"There is absolutely nothing in current Sunni discourse to suggest that any sort of "bottom up reconciliation" with the Shia is taking place or that the tactical cooperation with American forces against al-Qaeda is producing any kind of meaningful integration into the Iraqi state. Far more common is the need to prepare for future conflict with the Shia and, increasingly, the Kurds (see Kirkuk and Mosul). Resentment over the sectarian 'cleansing' of Baghdad runs exceptionally high, and few Sunnis seem prepared to accept any political settlement which does not include their return to Baghdad -- something that the Shia militias (which continue to dominate the Iraqi Police) seem rather unlikely to accept".

What is often forgotten in the fog of rhetoric about the occupation is that the Sunni resistence groups are also fighting for the restoration of Sunni rule in Iraq.

The emergence of the Sunni reconciliatory awakening movement was a huge threat to the the resistance's achievement of its end goals.

As AA has often revealed: the resistence leadership is beholden to its own rank and file. When there was a breakdown between AlQI and the other resistence groups it was the latter who was forced to give way under pressure from its own supporters?

There is absolutely nothing in current Sunni discourse to suggest that any sort of "bottom up reconciliation" with the Shia is taking place or that the tactical cooperation with American forces against al-Qaeda is producing any kind of meaningful integration into the Iraqi state. Far more common is the need to prepare for future conflict with the Shia and, increasingly, the Kurds (see Kirkuk and Mosul). Resentment over the sectarian 'cleansing' of Baghdad runs exceptionally high, and few Sunnis seem prepared to accept any political settlement which does not include their return to Baghdad -- something that the Shia militias (which continue to dominate the Iraqi Police) seem rather unlikely to accept.