AMS open letter to resistance

The Association of Muslim Scholars, one of the most influential Sunni organizations in Iraq, has just released an unprecedented open letter to the "resistance".   According to the Al-Haq Agency, this is the first time that the AMS has publicly addressed the resistance as a whole, making it a fairly significant event.   Like the essay by Abd al-Rahman al-Rawashdi posted last week, the AMS argues that the time has come for the resistance to reap the fruits of its successful jihad against the occupation, but warns that if it fails to unify and put forward a political program then others will seize the rewards instead.

After praising the military valor and steadfastness of the insurgency, the AMS poses this sharp question:  jihadist and resistance movements in the Islamic world have had many victories over their enemies, but most of them have failed to achieve their goals after the conflict.  The AMS repeatedly invokes the Afghan experience of a successful jihad which then collapsed into factional warfare when the Soviets left.   The presence of an occupation force helped unite the resistance, writes the AMS, but now is the time to ask:  what comes after the occupiers leave?  Those who fail to think about this question now, warns the AMS, will be surprised with a bitter harvest.   

First, others will try to reap the fruits of the jihad and resistance than its legitmate owners - the occupiers will leave through the door the resistance opened, but it will try to pick successors to be its agents in running the country.   And their first move will be to try and liquidate the supporters of jihad and resistance - a direct warning to those Sunnis currently working with the US to think about their future once they have served their purpose.  Second, the occupation will never stop trying to sow discord (fitna) among the factions of the resistance, as a way of weakening it.   The US has been defeated and wants to leave Iraq, but is only searching for a way to deny the jihad its victory;  factional strife is its exit strategy.   The resistance is on the brink of a great victory, argues the AMS, which only increases the danger of complacency.   

It concludes by pointing out that it has been calling to unify the factions for months, and is pleased with recent moves in that direction.  The occupiers will be forced to deal with it, directly or through intermediaries, because of the simple reality of its power which can't be ignored.  Such a dialogue is acceptable, but only after the US has committed to withdrawal - a consistent theme among the "Islamist nationalist" resistance groups.   The AMS warns against beginning dialogue with the US before it has committed to withdrawing, because any dialogue before then is only aimed at exploiting and creating differences among the resistance in order to weaken it.

Finally, one fascinating point:  the AMS urges coordination with all voices and movements working against the occupation - explicitly including Shia factions which fit that description. The entire document is notably devoid of anti-Shia rhetoric:  all attention focuses on the US.  Even Maliki's government is criticized for being an American  agent, not for being sectarian.  Read that as you will. 

I mention the AMS open letter not only because it's an important political move within the Sunni community, and yet another signal of what the nationalist insurgency groups are trying to do - come together around a political program and form some kind of leadership which can act effectively in a post-American Iraq.   I also mention it because it's important right now to emphasize that these groups are simply not going to sit back and allow the currently America-friendly tribal shaykhs to dominate Sunni politics.  They see what's happening, and they are actively strategizing about how to frustrate the American plan to consolidate an "acceptable", supposedly pro-US leadership in the Sunni areas.   The Sunni turn against al-Qaeda, and the current willingness to work with the US military, depended on a tacit agreement between the major insurgency groups and tribal leaders on the need to defend their turf.  But reading recent insurgency literature makes it painfully clear that these groups remain committed to an American withdrawal (no matter what the Anbar Awakening crowd says) but also that they are deeply suspicious of the intentions and aspirations of those tribal leaders sitting down with Bush.  It's pretty clear who they think is trying to "illegitimately steal the fruits of the resistance's victory".   

The open letter offers a window into what should be a perfectly obvious point:  Sunni resistance groups who don't share the Bush administration's agenda are not passive observers of the emerging American Sunni strategy.  These groups have always been the blind spot in the way surge partisans framed Sunni politics - with the juxtaposition of al-Qaeda and the Awakenings crowding out any consideration of the agency of the insurgency groups themselves.  They still are - the constant use of the term "former insurgents" tends to occlude the fact that these groups still very much exist and have agendas of their own.   

Now Fred Kagan and the administration argue that "moderate" (read "amenable to the Americans") will win out in the intra-Sunni competition, and that the political incentives will now undermine hard-liners.  The lavish financial packages mentioned during Bush's stopover in Anbar are surely meant to sweeten their hand, as are the police and military jobs.  But all of this relies on an astonishing number of rosy assumptions - about economic development, about Sunni preferences and expectations, and about the passivity of hard-liners in the face of it all.  The AMS letter, sharply warning the resistance against complacency as well as factionalism, is clearly meant to ensure against that last one. 

What's much more likely than a consolidation of moderate politics is that the continuing Shia domination of the security forces and the state, the political deadlock in Baghdad, the predictable failure of economic development promises, the nresolved refugee crisis, and the inexorable logic of civil war will strengthen the hand of hard-liners. They are almost certainly going to do what they can to push events in that direction if they feel their influence seriously threatened, and they'll have plenty to work with.   The Sunnis in the police and military in whom the administration is investing such hope will continue to face a sectarian stainless-steel ceiling, and there is very little reason to believe that their loyalties will shift to a national government perceived as sectarian and hostile.  That's even more the case for the "former insurgents" who are not integrated into any national level institutions like the army, who really can't be described as anything other than US-sanctioned militias.  The insurgency groups command a lot of guns, and the loyalty of their people - 1920 Revolution Brigade members cooperating with the US against al-Qaeda remain 1920 Revolution Brigade members, just like Badr Brigades in the Iraqi military remain Badr Brigades.  And then there's the million-plus refugees and displaced persons, with harsh memories of sectarian atrocities, who will not likely be able to return home to an ethnically cleansed Baghdad and will likely be a powerful constituency for hard-liners.  I could go on, but I think that's enough for now...

Comments

[Ben P]

Marc,

All of this is very interesting and it suggests - but does quite answer - an important question I have never seen answered - at least in English language media.

That is: what is the precise relationship of the tribes to the the major insurgent groups (outside of the ISI)? This seems to suggest - and I sense too - that Sunni groups like the Islamic Army of Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigades are not fundamentally "tribal," although they rely on tribal networks extensively. (espeically considering that the AMS is quite heavily linked to the 1920s in particular)

This gets to my sense that things like the Anbar Awakening is much more complicated than is portrayed in the English language media - that there are actually significant differences in end-goal amongst the various participants. That some are quite "mercenary" and are perfectly willing to be coopted by whoever gives them a lot of money/patronage, while other individuals have a much more instrumentalist view of what they are doing. I think the number of "instrumentalists" rises everywhere outside Anbar.

My sense is that people/tribal leaders like Abu Risha in Anbar was never in the insurgency, while other members of the Anbar council deeply mistrust/resent figures like Risha, because they see him as lacking principles and that he is perfectly willing to "sell out," so to speak.

Anyway, I'd like to see what you know/your take is on the question of the relationship between tribes and the mainstream insurgency and the degree to which they are separate phenomenon.

[Solomon2]

The US has been defeated and wants to leave Iraq, but is only searching for a way to deny the jihad its victory; factional strife is its exit strategy. The resistance is on the brink of a great victory, argues the AMS, which only increases the danger of complacency.

Well, well. I just got back from Kagan's event at the American Enterprise Institute. He and his panelists paint quite a different picture. Much to their surprise, the Surge coupled to the Awakening has been so successful that they've cleaned Al-Qaida out everywhere except the upper Tigris valley, and the pursuit of them by American and Iraqi forces continues at this moment. The Sunni insurgency is dying: either they are joining the security forces (some were insurgents as recently as last month!) "or they go down with Al Qaida." The Iranian and Syrian networks supplying them are now under coalition pressure.

Even the Shia militias are feeling the heat and calming down. But as of right now the Sunni insurgency appears to be nearly over, and Sunni-Shia political dialogue has picked up remarkably. Senator/Colonel Graham even went so far as to predict that it will be days, not weeks, before we witness significant Sunni-Shia political progress.

I hope to write this stuff and more at my blog later. Ciao!

[Zathras]

About that "fascinating point" Lynch points to here, the absence of anti-Shia rhetoric from the AMS statement...how are the various Shiite factions likely to interpret it?

Will they take it, as Lynch appears to, as a statement by a leading Sunni Arab group that the battle to end the occupation and prepare a "political program" -- albeit one that is as yet content-free -- takes precedence over sectarian differences? Or will they assume that this is part of a Sunni Arab two-faced two-step to accelerate the American departure so that Sunni Arab dominance can be restored?

Given the record in Iraq, what should we expect?

[Andrew R.]

It seems to me somewhat unlikely that very many Shi'ite groups (even those that oppose the U.S. occupation) would make any common cause with folks saying that the Ba'ath party is the only legitimate government of Iraq.

[Saeed Uri]

Really goo analysis. One question that I might ask the insurgency and leaders of the Sunni political organizations is what is their commitment to democracy like? Does it even exist? Do they believe in the Islamist agenda of a caliphate or are they willing to work in the system that was created by the US? I know that there are constitution problems, and even a need for elections but will they be supported by the insurgents once the US leaves Iraq?

Also in regards to the Sunni Shia relationship, once the US leaves will it be fine and dandy? I would think once the sunni's unite (if they are able too) won't the shia's feel threatened (it is not like hate does not exist between the two). A scenario that I could see happening would be an extension of what is happening today. What I mean is the Iraqi army, which is used to fight "terrorist" today, will also be used to fight "terrorist" tomorrow.
The final sentences of your post I think are the most important to the future of the Middle East and could create a huge problem if Iraq becomes a failed state. The world is not really considering the future of Iraqi refugees, the creation of Israel created .7 million refugees, the destruction of Iraq created millions. How will they affect the future of the Middle East and more importantly that of the "free world" is it not our fault that their lives are what they are today? Will they not be a huge pool so groups like Fatah al Islam and Al Qaeda will be able to recruit from? It will only decrease support of the western idea of a nation state, since it is not working for them, and increase faith in the idealist idea of the return of an Islamic Caliph. I really think that this is a topic that needs to be worked on more than any other problem that a failed Iraq will create. Iran, Syria, Sunni's and Shias might be todays problem that we are "band aiding" but the Iraqi refugees will be a problem that needs to be handled today before it is exploited by people with intentions contrary to our beliefs.

[bb]

According to military pov websites (eg Long War Journal) the US and ISF have just started an offensive against ALQI in the northern areas of Salahaddin, Ninewa, Diyala and Kirkuk involving a combined US/ISF force of 26,000. These are apparently the regions ALQI has retreated to after the Diyala/Baquba offensive and where the most recent major suicide bombings of civilians have been occurring.

Clearly while Bush is president the US will stay on the offensive and will only be forced to withdraw if the democratically elected Iraqi Government asks it to, not by substantive negotiations with the insurgency, although there's sure to be some face saving window dressing.

Consequently the significant negotiations for the Sunni insurgency will surely be between it and the Iraqi govt in which the Sunnis can set a govt demand for a US withdrawal timetable as part of a final deal where the insurgency ceases its attacks on the Shiites, accepts the new post Baath political/demographic realities and makes the most of it?

That nitty gritty reality might explain the absence of anti Shiite rhetoric?

Saaed Uri's point about the Iraqi refugees is interesting but aren't they in the main Sunni professional middleclass with the means to support themselves in Syria or the Sunni arab states? Am happy to be corrected by others more knowledgeable, but unlike more familiar refugee crises eg Kosovo I haven't seen much coverage of poor refugees flooding into UN camps and creating a humanitarian crisis? It rather seems that the Sunnis with the means to do so have been acting common sensibly?

Marc - the insurgency seems to be now taking the Awakening sheikhs as a significant political threat to their leadership of the Sunnis? What's your assessment? And it would be interesting to know how Al Jazeera and the new Arab media is reporting these developments?

[NEWSDESK HELSINKI FINLAND]

Thank you VERY MUCH, Marc Lynch.

We now see we didn't leave the link to our preliminary announcement of this -- we called then the "National Front of Liberation" -- here a week ago in vain.

This is MOST helpful indeed, and certainly the path to keep the eye on.

We'll repost this of course and should you keep going on like this, add you to our most recommended links :)

Our most warmest regards,

NEWSDESK HELSINKI FINLAND Staff

[NEWSDESK HELSINKI FINLAND]

Marc,

Having now had a close look at the AMSI wire, the case certainly looks somewhat different than you put forth in your analysis.

Perhaps you should check out this:

IRAQ: On AMSI Open Letter and the Forming of the Jihad Islamic Front of National Liberation
http://theunitedstatesofmonsters.blogspot.com/2007/09/iraq-on-amsi-open-letter-and-forming-of.html

(Of course anyone interested can take a look at it, certainly bringing forth some points of interest concerning the intentions of the IR)