The insurgency's strategy in September

What with the Crocker/Petraeus report and Maliki's rapidly crumbling position, everyone involved in the Iraq issue is gaming the coming month, calculating the angles and trying to position themselves for whatever changes may be forthcoming.  Iyad Allawi, of course, is making his bid for power by seeking American backing.   Jalal Talabani's emergency summit produced a political coalition based upon the Maliki 4 - a sectarian four party bloc (the two Kurdish parties, SIIC and Dawa) which prefers to call itself "moderate" (it isn't) or "the majority" (it isn't).    A few days ago, the Maliki 4 managed to get Tareq al-Hashimi of the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Tawafuq Bloc to sign on to an agreement which promised movement on some key issues, including Sunni prisoners and an end to deBaathification.   

This agreement was likely produced for the sole purpose of giving Ryan Crocker something to bring back to Congress (and is what I expected weeks ago).  But it doesn't actually solve anything:  Hashemi has made very clear that he has no intention of rejoining Maliki's government, the agreements exist only on paper at this point, and nothing has been done about the deeply sectarian nature of what passes for the Iraqi state. 

It's important for Hashemi, though, because he and the other national Sunni politicians are desperate for something, anything to show for their decision to work with Maliki and the American (and Iranian) backed political process.   Hashemi and the Tawafuq Bloc are struggling to maintain their own influence within the Sunni community on two fronts - against the tribal shaykhs of the various Awakenings, who at last count are not planning to offer up replacements for the Tawafuq Bloc in Maliki's government (but the story changes twice a day), and against the insurgency groups who are trying to form their own political front.   Their rather forlorn hope is that they can get the Americans to deliver enough to maintain their standing, since they know perfectly well that left to their own devices the Shia-Kurd Maliki 4 bloc would offer nothing.

What about the insurgency?  For months now, insurgency groups have been trying to formulate some kind of public political front, but seem to be consistently frustrated by internal struggles and the fragmented nature of the insurgency itself (among the latest developments, we've got the 1920 Revolution Brigade denouncing anyone using its name while cooperating with the Americans while accusing Hamas Iraq of being the real collaborators, and the Islamic Army of Iraq indicating that it's striking a truce with al-Qaeda in Iraq).    It's in that context that I wanted to draw attention to an essay published today under the title "September and a political project for the mujahideen" on the al-Haq Agency, one of the major internet outlets for the Sunni insurgency, by Abd al-Rahman al-Ruwashdi. 

Ruwashdi complains about politicians stepping forward to claim the fruits of the insurgency's victory without having made its sacrifices or paid its costs.  It is therefore time, he argues, for the real insurgency groups to come together and form a viable political front.  While there have already been some efforts to form a political front, he notes, the expected changes in September mean that there's no time to lose.  He quotes Hareth al-Dhari, who argued that the principled rejection of participating in the political process under occupation does not mean that groups can not organize to prepare to fill the political vaccuum.   He warns the Sunnis that not preparing for the period after the American withdrawal would mean making the same mistake as the Americans, who failed in Iraq because they did not plan for the period after the war. 

He therefore calls for a political front of all active jihadist factions in the Iraqi arena, a single unified front which can work for common objectives and coordinate to act effectively.  This front should issue a political program rooted in sharia but sensitive to the diverse fabric of Iraqi society.  More controversially, he calls for coordination with all movements and actors resisting the occupation - which could be read either as a call to cooperate with al-Qaeda or as a call to cooperate with the Mahdi Army.   He calls for more active efforts to secure Arab and Islamic support.  Finally, he calls on the politically influential leaders of the insurgency to step forward and reveal themselves, to prevent others from exploiting their victory and claiming to speak for the Sunni community.   We are confident, he writes, that those who defeated the American project can also build a viable political alternative.

This isn't completely new, of course, but it's another significant example of how insurgency strategists and leaders are trying to plan for a post-American political future.     At the same time, the essay is revealing of the complete lack of a concrete political agenda:  there are calls to unify, coordinate, step forward... but nothing on what exactly it is that this new political front should demand.  We can make some guesses. They begin from a deep belief that they are the ones who defeated the United States (and they do believe that they are winning), and that they are a majority in Iraq (a few weeks ago I think I wrote about a statement by the head of the Islamic Army of Iraq which claimed that Sunnis made up 60% of Iraq's population).   They also believe that the current Iraqi state and government are thoroughly controlled by Iran, and that the Shia are determined to ethnically cleanse them from (at least) Baghdad.   I would guess that a serious insurgency political program would demand not just an end to ethnic cleansing but the return to the status quo ante - i.e. all the Sunni refugees and internally displaced persons returning to their homes (just try to imagine the security implications of such a restoration, under conditions of deep mutual distrust, recent history of reciprocal mass killing, and a heavily armed population) .  It would probably also demand more than just a seat at a Shia-dominated table - the idea popular with surge-enthusiasts that getting more Sunnis jobs with the police will give them a stake in what they see as a Shia-dominated system badly misreads their worldview.    Do you see why the benchmarks so popular in American discussions of Iraq - even if they were being met -  are so irrelevant to the real issues in play?

Comments

[bb]

The inability of the Sunni resistance leadership to internalise they represent not just a minority of arab Iraq but a small and growing smaller minority is surely impeding their ability/opportunity to create a viable, influential, strong power base in the provinces where the Sunnis do hold a large majority or substantial presence. AlQI recognised this long ago when it declared the ISI. It seems the shiekhs of the Awakening understand it too.

What this essay surely indicates is that Sunni resistance leaders are hopelessly divided/factionalised in their political aims? But on the other hand so are the Shiites, who are now fighting each other for control of southern Iraq in a "post withdrawal" context.

The absence of even a semblance of unity within either side in arab Iraq, let alone together as a common front to force the US out means the prospects of withdrawal are virtually nil? Ditto the fall of the Maliki govt.

[Non-Arab Arab]

BB: The prospects for the American withdrawal are virtually nil only if you presume that withdrawal requires an Iraqi state functioning to Washington's satisfaction. I would argue that given that is an essentially impossible goal, in the end the only criteria will be when Washington recognizes the utter futility of their presence and comes up with a temporary face-saving formula to cover their rears for the retreat.

[bb]

But what does "functioning to Washington's satisfaction" mean? In the present situation this would be a government that is not demanding the US withdraw? While the Shiite establishment is facing challenges to its power from the Sadrists - and to a lesser extent the insurgency - the government is not going to be asking the US to leave, surely? I suggest that a "satisfactory" government is one that will accept a significant US presence for the foreseeable future?

On your second point re "temporary face-saving" formulas, this sounds like the Vietnam analogy. However from my observation the situation is markedly different. It's hard to see any circumstances under which US regional and strategic interests would be served by leaving Iraq to become a vassal state of a nuclear armed Iran to threaten the Sunni arab neighbours? South East Asia was not the world's main supplier of oil in 1975.

In terms of US domestic politics, the American public by and large reveres its military and will support as long as it is perceived to be on the offensive and not bogged down in a seemingly fruitless exercise as it was in Vietnam and in Iraq between 03-07 Also there is no draft reaching into every American home.

[annie]

bb, I think the American public by and large perceives our military to be bogged down in a seemingly fruitless exercise as it was in Vietnam and in Iraq between 03-07. In terms of US domestic politics, as far as our politicians are concerned it really doesn't matter what the public thinks.

[Crisol]

I leave you a video on non violence. I hop you enjoy.
Big Hug, Roberto
Contact: [email protected]
http://video.google.fr/videoplay?docid=6753184449967918648&hl=fr+

[Nur al-Cubicle]

But what does "functioning to Washington's satisfaction" mean?

It means impossible: An autocrat at the helm, the militias disarmed, Iran declared a threat, Kurds renouncing their claim to Kirkuk, no place for ethnicity and religion in politics, normal relations with Israel, 5 permanent big US military bases, al-Sadr imprisoned, and a host of other imaginary realities.

BTW, Kurdistan is actually two proto-states: Talabani-controlled Sulaymaniyah and Barzani-controlled Erbil.

[JHM]

Let's review the bidding, please!

Dr. PolSci diagnoses his patients -- accurately enough, I'd say -- as suffering from certain remarkably gaudy hallucinations and self-serving delusions like

(1) "They begin from a deep belief that they are the ones who defeated the United States (and they do believe that they are winning)"

and

(2) "[T]hey are a majority in Iraq (a few weeks ago I think I wrote about a statement by the head of the Islamic Army of Iraq which claimed that Sunnis made up 60% of Iraq's population)."

After such a diagnosis, what possible therapy? What conceivable "serious insurgency political program"?

These mental patients seem to be in their own way thorough KarlRoveans, they can always just make up their own Imperial Reality to suit themselves as they march ever onwards to Total Triumph.

Still, it was asked for some program to be suggested, so how about they first convince everybody else in the former Iraq (1) that they REALLY ARE sixty percent and not the beggarly twenty percent they have been widely reported to look more like, and (2) that they REALLY HAVE repelled the militant GOP invasion machine, and repelled it single-handed?

If the mental patients in question can pull that much off, taking over the asylum altogether ought to be a cinch.

But if not, not.

[dammit]

i don't care about all of the internal / external ramifications / nuances - i just wanna see the Oil Stealing Occupation casualty count go back up !!! has been declining for 4 months now !! what is up with the Iraqis ?? why aren't they blowing up / gunning down the Oil Stealing Occupiers ???

[NEWSDESK HELSINKI FINLAND]

Our eds feel they're able to tell what's gonna take place in September very soon so if interested in the issue, do check our site next weekend and look for an ANALYSIS article by us in the address:

http://theunitedstatesofmonsters.blogspot.com

(It will take a day or couple to finish the piece, do the final checkings and ask for authorization to post it, but it should be there in some days...)

NEWSDESK HELSINKI FINLAND

[Patrick]

Marc~

Your coverage of these things is the best, but I have a question to ask: is there a danger of becoming so focused on the trees that we lose sight of the forest?

So far, you've shown that you are capable of keeping sight of the fact that this is a failed occupation and a disaster for all parties. But by focusing so intently on the factional fighting of various Sunni and Shi'a players, aren't you just giving legs to the belief that there is a non-violent solution to the present conflict? Again, I don't want to accuse you of such a belief, but your research and analysis will enable (I know I know) many who want to stay the course by giving them something to latch onto.

I hope I'm not sounding too anti-intellectual, I'm admittedly playing something of the devil's advocate. But your analysis can't but help remind me of stories I heard about Pentagon officials during the Vietnam War. They became so engrossed in the nuances of South Vietnamese politics, they lost sight of the fact that they were fighting for a lost cause. Also, most of them didn't know a word of Vietnamese; they relied on area experts to provide more raw data, and manipulated said data to their own ends.

[ummabdulla]

"a few weeks ago I think I wrote about a statement by the head of the Islamic Army of Iraq which claimed that Sunnis made up 60% of Iraq's population"

But that's not new, is it? Haven't Iraqi Sunnis (and Sunnis in neighboring countries) been saying that all along?

[NEWSDESK HELSINKI FINLAND]

Here's the piece we promised earlier:

ANALYSIS: "This will be last year of the occupation in Iraq" September 2007 review, definition and analyse of the Iraqi Resistance today

[Question]

Prof. Lynch,

I hope you don't take this the wrong way, but can you run down your qualifications as to why you consider yourself an authority on Iraq? How many academic papers have you written about Iraq? How many books? How many times have you travelled to Iraq? Do you claim to have original sources in the Iraqi government? In the Iraqi insurgency? What specific periods of Iraqi history have you taught during your academic career?

You give a very subjective (at times, stinging) opinion on Iraq that clearly reflects your politics, and I appreciate your input even though I don't agree with all your positions, but I have a right to wonder how substantiated these opinions are.

[NEWSDESK HELSINKI FINLAND]

@ Question:

If unhappy to Prof Lynch's coverage, why don't you check out our "September report" linked above?

We quote only Iraqi Resistance sources, before that defining the resistance quite clearly.

Furthermore, we claim indirect contact to the resistance in the sense that they do check our posting above and should there be any mistakes done by us, we'll correct them with public condemnation of our possible errors.

[Question]

Newsdesk Helsinki Finland,

You have an interesting take on things but clearly you are in the far fringe. I am personally disgusted but you do have a right to your opinions. But I wonder if you can answer this question: What percentage of Iraqis would agree with your qualification of these insurgents as "resistance"? 80%? 60%? 40%? 20%? 5%? 2%? 0.5%?

Does the opinion of Iraqis even matter to you, all the way up in Finland? Or are you only interested in hating what you call the "United States of Monsters"-America?

[Question]

Newsdesk Helsinki Finland,

You have an interesting take on things but clearly you are in the far fringe. I am personally disgusted but you do have a right to your opinions. But I wonder if you can answer this question: What percentage of Iraqis would agree with your qualification of these insurgents as "resistance"? 80%? 60%? 40%? 20%? 5%? 2%? 0.5%?

Does the opinion of Iraqis even matter to you, all the way up in Finland? Or are you only interested in hating what you call the "United States of Monsters"-America?

[aardvark]

Dear Question,

I could point to a book and half a dozen articles about Iraq, multiple courses taught in both comparative and IR which have mentioned Iraq, the dozens of Arabic newspapers and forums that I link to and translate every day, various American government and Arab/Iraqi sources, and so on - but why? Presumably you are able to make up your own mind - read the analysis, consider the sources, check them if you can, and make up your own mind.

[Steve]

http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/250.php?nid=&id=&pnt=250&lb=brme

[Question]

Dear Prof. Lynch,

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the book in question concerns Al-Jazeera's coverage of Iraq, not Iraq itself? Is that right?

Furthermore, it seems from what you described as your body of work that you are not an issues-specific expert on Iraq but rather you cover Iraq as part of other fields of expertise that touch upon Iraq.

Did I also get this from your response, that you haven't travelled to Iraq, ever?

Sometimes your judgements on certain Iraq issues seem a bit too harsh and would require plenty of confidence and authority on the subject to carry water. By understanding the depth of your knowledge on Iraq I can better "make up my own mind" as to the accuracy of some of your judgements.

[NEWSDESK HELSINKI FINLAND]

"What percentage of Iraqis would agree with your qualification of these insurgents as "resistance"? 80%? 60%? 40%? 20%? 5%? 2%? 0.5%?"
- A neat per cent. Haven't seen any poll on this issue. Last year some 90% of Sunnis accepted them. The Sunnis being most targeted we side mostly with them, but also with Kurds and Shias as you can see from our coverage just recently (we were among the first to repost on Cholera epidemy threatening Kurds and just today we posted three pieces concerning the Shias).

"Does the opinion of Iraqis even matter to you, all the way up in Finland?"
- It jolly well does. We work with the Iraqis in issues such as these. We're not kidding with serious matters such as these.

"Or are you only interested in hating what you call the "United States of Monsters"-America?"
- At the time we took the name pissed off about the U.S. nuking people indiscriminately, gathering whoever does such things is a monster. Therefore the name. Rather than hating the Americans we've decided to put up a fight against their current admins, which are quite separate issues.

The DU is of great concern to all sections of Iraqis, not the least to the Shias, as you can see e.g. from following this link to the "fearure" articles page of Voices of Iraq:

http://66.111.34.180/look/english/section.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=2&NrSection=4

As it is, nearly every article there has taken some 60 readers, except one, namely this one:

Depleted uranium threatens thousands of lives in Basra, government turns blind eye –researcher

In a less than a week it has had nearly 6,000 reads (some 5,300).

The NDHF policy follows the international law and so sides with the resistance not only because its legal position, but because we've understood that this is the only way to make end of the horrors the Iraqis suffer at the moment: the occupier must go, just as is the opinion of the Iraqi people. We side with that, nothing less, nothing more: What comes to this you may read again the stats from year ago posted by steve above.

Kindly yours,

NDHF eds.

[CIS]

I wonder how many of those insurgent groups in Anbar who temporarily sided with America out of necessity are now getting sick and tired of being portrayed as America's submissive sidekicks in Bush's propaganda.

[DCChatter]

Given the discussion above, check out:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U623_GTYX-8

It is a trailer for a new documentary on the Insurgency - recently completed by two DC journalists after spending a year in Baghdad.

[Brian H]

NDF;
you bring strongly to mind an old Scots adage, which you might heed:
"Fools and bairns [children] shud nae see unfinished werk."

[NEWSDESK HELSINKI FINLAND]

@ DCChatter (Brian H):

Here in Finland we say:

"Kyl yks naine kymmene kättä voitta."

Translation to that:

"One woman wins ten hands anytime."

Why not try that?