While I've been gone: Iraq

In the weeks I've been away, a lot has happened on the Iraq front with regard to the evolving politics of the Sunni insurgency - all of which, as it has unfolded, fits comfortably within the general sketch of the Iraqi scene I developed last month.  It has become increasingly clear the extent to which the US funded, armed, and guided the alleged Anbar Awakening.  It was obvious from the beginning that whatever the real irritation they felt with al-Qaeda, the Anbar Salvation Council was a racket, created and paid for by US forces to provide local cover, rather than representing real Sunni political developments.  Today's Washington Post suggests that it already seems to be on the brink of collapse, while the US military increasingly recognizes that the real muscle in Sunni politics remains with the insurgency factions.  And so, those groups are now reportedly tentatively getting armed by the US and are working at least tacitly with the US against al-Qaeda.  American military officials seem to understand the complex motivations of those insurgency groups far better than they did even quite recently, and are at least trying to work with them.  The problem remains, of course, that those groups want the US to commit to getting out, and remain intimately and organically embedded in Sunni communities which remain deeply hostile to the US presence whatever their temporary acceptance of its usefulness. The street battles between the Islamic Army of Iraq and al-Qaeda in Iraq last week, followed by their public truce, leaves the extent of this alignment of convenience very much in question though.  It's good news for the US only to the extent that there's a political outreach to these insurgency factions - otherwise, once they've eliminated their local enemies, we'll just be looking at a more unified, more effective, and better armed insurgency.  And there are few indications as yet that any progress is being made on the political end - or that the Maliki government has any interest whatsoever in seeing any.    Anyway, as I ease back in to blogging this week, I hope to flesh out these developments a bit and bring out what is and isn't likely in the near future.

Comments

[Gregory Gause]

I doubt that there is any connection between this raft of articles (finally discovering the story that the Aardvark had been following for months) about the Sunni insurgent groups, al-Qaeda and the US and the recent series of comments from al-Maliki and Talabani a few other Iraqi government officials warning about a "coup" aimed at the current Iraqi government. However, it is interesting to note that, just as this activity heats up on the Sunni side, the Iraqi government expresses real worries about efforts, encouraged by neighboring Arab states, to put together an alternative coalition to displace al-Maliki. One wonders if that disparate coalition can ever come together (Sadrists and Fadila, al-Tawaffuq, Saleh Mutlak, Iyad Allawi). But it does indicate that there is plenty of stuff going on behind the scenes in Iraq right now, and not just among the insurgent groups.

[bb]

Evan Kohlmann seems to see this "truce" as a win for AlQ. The truce statement didn't seem to mention the issues of targeted attacks on the Shiites, or the AlQ's program for global jihad. So if Ansar al-Sunnah and the IAI have now formally thrown in their lot with AlQ and have accepted attacks on the Shiites and global jihad what are the implications for the Iraqi nationalism issue? And will it mire the US even more?

[Ellen Knickmeyer]

Hello,
I'm Ellen Knickmeyer, the Washington Post's Cairo bureau chief. Trying to get hold of you and can't find a current email. Would you mind contacting me on the email above? And deleting this posting?
Best,
Ellen.