Dr Hani Siba'i is a London-based Egyptian expert on radical Islamist movements, once affiliated with Islamic Jihad, and a very influential commentator within the jihadist world. He was interviewed after the Algeria and Morocco bombings on a number of Arab media outlets, including LBC and al-Arabiya, and had some interesting insights into the question I posed last week about whether those bombings should be interpreted as a return to the insurgencies of the 1990s or a new state in an evolving al-Qaeda organization. I don't endorse or reject any of his interpretations, but thought that readers might find this "inside view" interesting.
Siba'i downplayed the size of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, except in Algeria where it had already been relatively strong: in Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya, he argues, jihadist organizations are small and beleaguered. For Algeria's GPSC, a long-standing jihadist organization, the decision to change its name and pledge allegiance to al-Qaeda was a carefully considered one. Its leaders knew very well the costs that would be paid for affiliating with al-Qaeda, and so must have felt that those costs were worth the price. What did it gain? Attractiveness to a new generation of potential radicals, which admired al-Qaeda but had little sympathy for a group primarily identified with the domestic horrors of the 1990s. Once it changed its name, it needed to prove its value and its capabilities - and hence these attacks.
The weakness of al-Qaeda in Morocco, on the other hand, is demonstrated by the individual and ineffective nature of its efforts to prove itself. In Siba'i's view, the lesson of the Moroccan campaign is that slapping an al-Qaeda label on the efforts couldn't overcome the real absence of a substantial organization or capabilities. Only one "salafi-jihadist" organization really exists in Morocco, he claims, and it really isn't very big or effective. As for Libya, Siba'i claims that no jihadist organization exists any more, since the arrest of several leaders in 2004. He claims that its leaders, currently in Libyan prisoners, are currently "rethinking" their ideology, as did the leaders of the Gamaa Islamiya and Islamic Jihad in Egyptian prisons.
Finally, how did these new al-Qaeda in the Maghreb leaders decide on their strategy or coordinate with al-Qaeda Central, if they could not use telephones or make direct face to face contact? Siba'i says that the internet has become the new reference for fatwas, coordination, and inspiration. The internet, he says, has allowed for ideological and strategic unification despite the barriers of geography, distance, and counter-terrorism operations. What is happening today, argues Siba'i, is the dissemination of ideas without direct contact with the owners of those ideas, with individuals then taking it upon themselves to put those ideas into action. One of the implications of this is that groups such as AQM - or any other local organization - may be acting on the basis of their understanding of the al-Qaeda strategy, rather than on direct instruction (think of the Madrid bombings, for instance)... an interpretation, by the way, which would suit Siba'i fine since he's a prominent figure on the internet forums where al-Qaeda strategy is interpreted.
The bottom line for Siba'i: the suicide bombings in Algeria and Morocco did not represent a new model of armed jihad in those countries. They were done by pre-existing organizations rebranding themselves with an al-Qaeda label which they believed would be attractive to potential recruits, and attempting to prove themselves to al-Qaeda Central. The Algerian bombings succeeded because of the strength of the pre-existing organization and the Moroccan bombings failed because of the weakness of the pre-existing organization. What's new is this rebranding and the calculations that went in to it, and the role of the internet in unifying ideologies. And so, for what it's worth, that's the publicly expressed view of an "insider".
Seems like a good read.
Posted by: The Lounsbury | April 16, 2007 at 05:10 PM