CIF: Insurgents against al-Qaeda

I've got a new piece up at the Guardian's Comment is Free, which lays out my thinking on recent developments between al-Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq and the Sunni insurgency.   Here's how it starts:

Optimism about developments in the Sunni quarters of Iraq has become surprisingly common these days. From American military officials to surge-architect Frederick Kagan's wife, there seems to be an emerging consensus that Anbar province has "turned the corner" thanks to tribes and other insurgents turning on al-Qaida. While things are indeed happening in Iraqi Sunni politics, they are not necessarily what meets the eye. In the world of conservative pundits and American military officials, the tide has supposedly been turning against the Sunni insurgency nearly constantly over the last four years. Oddly, it continues to rage.

While there is little reason to take upbeat assessments at face value, several important developments last week suggest that there may be some meat this timeto long-rumoured divisions between al-Qaida in Iraq and the rest of the Sunni Islamist insurgency. But those developments have more to do with al-Qaida's possibly premature bid for hegemony over the Islamic insurgency than with America's "surge." If they come to fruition, it may actually make the anti-American insurgency stronger. The bright side is that a shift against al-Qaida could work in America's favour should it decide to withdraw from Iraq. The less bright side is that such a shift would probably make for a more effective, popular, and legitimate insurgency should the US forces remain.

After reviewing the developments, which will be familiar to Abu Aardvark readers, I wrap it up like this:

But what if al-Qaida in Iraq has indeed gone too far? What if its heavy-handed attempts to impose its hegemony over the insurgency have triggered a real backlash?

The insurgency factions publicly turning against al-Qaida in Iraq express no interest in reining in their war against the occupation. Indeed, their main complaints are that the Islamic State of Iraq's attempts to dominate the insurgency have proven internally divisive and are weakening the insurgency. They also complain about the ISI's globalist discourse, calling for jihad everywhere rather than focusing on the Iraqi jihad. The new Council of Ulema immediately authorised the battle against the American military and the Iraqi government, while the Islamic Army's communique addresses Osama bin Laden approvingly, asking him to intervene with his Iraqi representatives to correct their course. In short, the factions breaking with al-Qaida are doing so in the name of fighting a better jihad - not in the name of packing it in.

There is a silver lining here, but only if the United States gets serious about withdrawing from Iraq. The factions complaining about al-Qaida emphasise the Iraqi front, and deny any intent of turning Iraq into a base for a wider jihad. While these statements seem primarily aimed at reassuring their Arab neighbours, they also rebut one of the Bush administration's most frequently invoked reasons for staying in Iraq - the "phantom menace" that al-Qaida would establish a mini-Emirate in the Sunni areas which would become a new Afghan-style base for the jihad. What is more, while the Islamic Army of Iraq stoutly denies having negotiated with the Americans (despite pervasive rumours to the contrary), it refuses to rule talks out as long as an American withdrawal is the topic of discussion. It has been clear for over a year that at least some of the insurgency factions (unlike al-Qaida in Iraq) are ready to talk about a political settlement, if it involves the US leaving and the interests of the Sunni community being protected from Shi'ite domination.

Ultimately, how this emerging divide turns out depends on how strong the Islamic State of Iraq really is in the face of these increasingly vocal rivals, a question about which the available evidence is unfortunately fragmentary and contradictory. While most people would be delighted to see al-Qaida lose ground in Iraq, it's important to recognise these developments for what they are rather than what we wish they were. This insurgent turn against al-Qaida could smooth the way towards an American withdrawal, if the Iraqi government could find a path towards the elusive political reconciliation which American commanders admit is necessary. But if neither Sunni-Shia reconciliation nor an American withdrawal are in the offing then it could well result in a more united and effective insurgency.

Read the rest at Comment is Free.  I'll admit up front much of the analysis turns on an unresolved empirical question:  is al-Qaeda/Islamic State of Iraq power in fact rising or not?  Unfortunately, the available evidence on this is so scattered and contradictory that at this point I'm only comfortable posing the questions rather than offering any definitive answers. I also wasn't able to link these Sunni Islamist developments back up to developments on the Shi'ite side in such a short piece.   Finally, after I wrote it I came along an important analysis of the IAI/ISI spat just posted on one of the major forums which worries intensely that the internal divisions could cripple the jihad rather than strengthen it, and that insurgencies tend to struggle when internal infighting gets too intense - a point made by one of the commenters on an earlier post.   Again, much depends on the *real* balance of power between the ISI and its opponents - which we may soon discover. Overall, at any rate, I think that the CIF piece nicely summarizes the last week's blogging and captures something important going on right now which isn't getting a lot of press... or when it is being noticed, is being misread.  Comment away - here, not there!

** update:  note that I managed to get a few editorial changes made, in case you saw the earlier version.

Comments

[Craig]

Why would you think anything happening in Al-Anbar was related to a US troops surge, anyway? Not only is there no troop surge in Al-Anbar, but troops (US Marines) have been redeployed from Al-Anbar into Baghdad in the last 6 months. Which, if anything, offers evidence that the situation in Al-Anbar is calmer than it was in the past.

You seem to be setting up a straw man just so that you can debunk it.