Reflections on Egypt

I'm just wrapping up an intense week in Cairo, where I've interviewed about two dozen people including Egyptian and Arab journalists, political writers, activists, Muslim Brotherhood leaders, American diplomats (along with chats with some wonderful and well-informed friends - thanks to all of you, especially for the Stella and caffeine and phone numbers, but I won't embarrass you by naming names).  While a lot of those conversations aren't really bloggable, I did want to throw out some impressions from the trip.

First, I'm far from the first to note that the Kefaya movement seems to have  run out of steam.   While George Ishaq, the movement's coordinator, tried to be optimistic and described the current period as a time for reflection and mapping out a new strategy, few other people shared that optimism.  While their views vary on what Kefaya accomplished, they all seem to agree that it has lost relevance to the Egyptian political scene - whether because of internal conflicts, or a lack of a clear positive agenda, or failure to reach out past an intellectual elite, or whatever.   (I was supposed to go to a demonstration today to see if they could get their mojo back, but an interview ran over and I missed it).  Personally, I think that they accomplished a lot by helping to open up the space for criticism of Mubarak, and broke some important psychological barriers against protest.  And maybe that's all that could have reasonably been expected.  Perhaps one way to present this would be to compare them to al-Qaeda (even if they would hate this comparison):  a relatively small group of people who used dramatic public actions to spread a set of ideas, which still exists but is relatively unimportant now in and of itself - because those ideas and modes of action have now taken on a life of their own.  Hence the judges, and the labor strikes, and the proliferation of a dizzying array of critical reporting of scandals and vigorous political debate in the independent media.   

Second, everyone here seems keenly aware that the United States has backed off of democracy promotion.  When Condi Rice came through the country without meeting any civil society leaders or mentioning democracy at all, really, it capped off an already widespread perception that the US no longer cares to promote democracy in Egypt:  "the government knows it, the people know it, and the activists know it," as one person put it to me, and everybody is adjusting their behavior accordingly.  People are rather passively watching the charade of Constitutional 'reforms' which seem to entrench rather than alleviate authoritarian structures and 'emergency' laws.  What with the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and the rough treatment for protestors over the last year, along with the absence of any clear political goal right now, I just get a sense of political frustration and fatigue - not from everybody, some people still seem energetic and determined, but that's the overall sense I got.  It's kind of ironic - many Egyptian activists might not have had much confidence in American democracy rhetoric when it was out there a few years ago, but now that it has vanished they can feel its absence. 

Third, even if democracy and reform are on the outs, at least there's a lively political press now, and some good political talk shows on the Dream channel and Orbit.  Scanning the news-stands now is pretty exciting - hard-hitting reports on corruptio and political scandals, open debates over Mubarak's failings and what to do about the Muslim Brotherhood. The official media like al-Ahram, from what I'm told, is hemmoraghing readers and influence, losing them to the new independent press.   A lot of people credit al-Jazeera for inspiring and making possible this profusion of independent media -  now the domestic media are creating some really interesting domestic political space, even if it rests on shaky legal and institutional foundations.   Still, it's definitely the kind of domestic media growth which warms my Habermasian heart.  You can really see the lines of political influence for new media here.  The independent press, like al-Masri al-Youm and al-Dustour, routinely cites blogs for its stories about police abuse and the like.  Half a dozen different people showed me police abuse videos on their mobile phones, and a lot of people described a TV program which featured one of the abuse victims featured in a video which initially appeared on a blog and got picked up by the press.   

Fourth, the government's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood is exceptionally intense, with unprecedented pressure on individual members (or suspected members).  Not just people going to jail, but businesses closed and merchandise seized, students prevented from sitting exams, and other escalating repression.  There's  a huge amount of anti-MB material flooding the press, including in the leading independent paper al-Masri al-Youm.  I also heard some pretty intense anti-MB talk from some people from whom I wouldn't have expected it. The  "al-Azhar militia" story, which purported to show Muslim Brotherhood members doing military exercises, seems to have been a real political fiasco for the Brotherhood.  While MB sympathizers angrily dispute the story and deny the existence of any such militia - and the MB itself issued a statement denouncing it - it seems to have resonated with public opinion and scared a lot of people.  Oh, one other thing about the MB:   this week, al-Masri al-Youm broke a story about the Muslim Brotherhood planning to form a political party. Some people saw it as an escalation against the government (as a salvo against the draft controversial constitutional amendment banning parties based on religion), some as a retreat in the face of pressure (demonstrating moderation and willingness to work within the system), and most doubt that it will ever really happen.  I'm not sure what I think about it yet, but it's an interesting debate.

Fifth, anti-Shia stuff is really spreading rapidly, and seems to have the Egyptian government's approval (at a minimum).   Sensational-looking books about the Shia are all over the bookstands, along with stories in the tabloids and scare-mongering editorials.  Even in al-Masri al-Yom, op-eds in recent days have (for instance) attacked Bush's plan for Iraq because it would empower the Shia, who would abolish all forms of Arab identity and seek to unify with Iran.  The tabloids are worse, and even Egyptian TV has been hosting some pretty nasty anti-Shia rhetoric.  Fahmy Howeydi, a (if not the) leading Egyptian public intellectual, told me that because of Iran's role in Iraq he no longer felt able to publicly defend Iran or the Shia the way that he often has in the past.  Why all this anti-Shia discourse now?  One popular theory is that the Egyptian government, backed by the US, wants to prepare the ground for confrontation with Iran. By this theory, the government is stoking hatred of the Shia as a pre-emptive move to shape the political space in such a way as to make it hard for Iran to appeal to Egyptian (and Arab) public opinion in the event of a war - and to prevent a repeat of anything like the outpouring of popular support for Hassan Nasrullah last summer.  One problem with this theory is that mobilizing anti-Shia anger against Iran simultaneously complicates attempts by the government to support American goals of strengthening a Shia government in Iraq - an irony of which at least some officials seem painfully aware.  Another school of thought points to the Iraq war, and especially the Saddam execution video, as fueling anger against the Shia, independently of anything the government is doing. Whatever the case, I've seen a lot more anti-Shia discourse than I expected or have ever seen before, and it alarms me.

Sixth, the niqab.  As soon as I got here, I was pretty surprised to see so many women wearing niqab - the full face covering - rather than the normal hijab.   Egyptians I asked about it attributed it to everything from the Muslim Brotherhood, to the TV lite-Islamist Amr Khaled, to Gulf influence, to a 'fashion arms race' in which the proliferation of expensive hijab-wear has forced women who want to appear 'really' pious into the niqab.  Whatever the case, the niqab has been an issue in the press too - with the Minister of Awqaf stirring controversy by refusing to let women waring it to act as counselers.   Everyone I talked to  was angered by Farouq Hosni's clumsy denunciations of the hijab and the ensuring political frenzy (terms like 'a circus' and 'an embarrassment' were common) - though many were quick to point out that NDP figures took the lead in that local StupidStorm (although many Muslim Brothers couldn't help themselves either).   

Last thing - one of the main bookstores in central Cairo is prominently featuring posters for an instant book declaring that "Saddam was not executed" - it was all an American hoax.  The guy who hanged was actually one of Saddam's doubles -  the author compares a bunch of pictures of Saddam in power with pictures from the trial and execution, and declares that they are obviously not the same man.  It's a nutty book in every sense of the word... I don't know how many people (besides me) have bought it, but I saw the poster in a few places.

I feel like I should offer some kind of personal travelogue instead of these analytical notes... you know, hard life on the mean streets of Zamalek, my struggles on the Misr Gedida tram, that sort of thing.  Nah.  But here's one anecdote- I ran into Arab League Secretary General Amr Musa.  Literally - not in a car, but I bumped into him outside the Arab League.  He didn't seem to recognize me even though I've interviewed him before (no suprise there) and seems a lot older than the last time I saw him.  I had to resist breaking into a Shaboula "Bahibak ya Amr Musa" rap, because he didn't seem to be in much of a joking mood - can't think why. 

Anyway, that's it - now all of my Egypt-based readers should feel free to chime in on any of these points....

Comments

[Zach]

I was in Cairo during the summer of 2005 at the height of the Egyptian election section. Regarding anti-Shia sentiment, I found a substantial reservoir existed at that time, which tended to come to the surface pretty quickly when the subject of Iraq came up. I spoke to a number of people who, frustrated and somewhat perplexed by the US' actions in Iraq, had decided that the US had developed a pro-Shia, anti-Sunni bias. While this idea is obviously pretty strange as political analysis, it tends to lead me to believe that the current sentiment comes substnatial from the public themselves. If the government has exerted efforts to stoke such conflicts, it probably didn't have to try very hard. But then again, I only spent a couple of months in Cairo. I'd be interested to hear what someone with more experience thought about this matter.

[Yohan]

Does anyone know how much anti-Shia sentiment existed in Egypt before the Iraq War?

[Chris]

I am happy to see this lengthy account. The anti-Shia movement, noted in today's CSM in Saudi Arabia, is very discouraging. It may lay the cultural framework for a long conflict.

[NonArab-Arab]

http://nonarab-arab.blogspot.com/2007/01/on-anti-shia-prejudices.html

[Blake Hounshell]

Ironically, Egypt is deep down a Shiite country in many ways ... lots of traditions carried over from the Fatimids.

[Craig]

Second, everyone here seems keenly aware that the United States has backed off of democracy promotion.

Sixth, the niqab. As soon as I got here, I was pretty surprised to see so many women wearing niqab - the full face covering - rather than the normal hijab.

The one does a pretty good job of explaining the other, in my opinion. There are worse things than dictatorship.

[SP]

About the anti-Shia thing, the Shia's 'flavour of the month' status for standing up to the Americans and Israelis in Lebanon hasn't disappeared altogether, you still see the Nasrallah poster from one of the newspapers last summer pasted up in various small shops, but someone told me the other day about a shopkeeper reporting that he had taken down his Nasrallah poster after Saddam's hanging.

I think most people would agree that pro- or anti-Shia sentiment has generally been more political than theological for Egyptians - lots of Brothers were inspired by the Iranian Revolution, Nasrallah became a huge hero last year, and even the latest anti-Shia upsurge seems to be more about what the Shia in Iraq are doing than deep-seated prejudice toward Shia in general (though the sense of otherness/bit of prejudice that does exist certainly helps). But I haven't been following the Shia-bashing in the press recently, so for all I know it's descended into theological bickering too.

[rashad]

Regarding the "Saddam wasn't killed book," one of my Egyptian coworkers at the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt had seen some tv coverage of the book, and as is her wont, mostly believed it. I bet five dollars this meme will be all over the middle east within a few months.

[Helena Cobban]

I agree with what Blake and SP said about pre-2003 anti-Shiism in Egypt. Viz., that the popular culture does still have a lot of Fatimid influence in it and that attitudes towards "the Shia" of most Sunni Egyptians (like those of many other Sunni Arabs) always seemed much more political than theological. I guess the exception to that, at the Arab level, would be the Wahhabis.

Anyway, I'll be in Cairo for most of February so I can probe this a bit more there, myself.

Huge thanks, Marc, for the update here!

[Adam]

If you want really, really good laugh about the corner the NDP has painted itself into with the proposed constitutional amendment regarding political parties based on religion, go read Sandmonkey:

http://www.sandmonkey.org/2007/01/19/our-political-circus/

This is the original story on al-Arabiya to which he links:
http://www.alarabiya.net/Articles/2007/01/18/30871.htm

Absolutely hilarious.

[jonst]

Marc,

Any general comments about the situation in Lebanon? From the Egyptian perspective that is. And how might the anti Shia dynamic impact the situation in Lebanon if the govt appears to be falling?

[Maha]

My impression so far is that the majority of Muslim Egyptians are terribly ignorant (as are most Sunnis) of Shia theology or ritual and unlike the average Lebanese or Iraqi have had precious little contact with ordinary Shia unless they've spent time in the Gulf. Ignorance of this kind is fertile ground for prograganda of any kind. Nasrallah's appeal runs deep, though, as he demonstrated a meaure of integrity and leadership that the Arab masses are simply not used to. Like Sadat before him, he exposed other Arab leaders, but in rather a different way. His silence on Iraq may be guided by considerations of realpolitik but it may eventually hurt him.

[Nur al-Cubicle]

Have you seen this, Fantastic Aardvark?

http://www.adherents.com/lit/comics/comic_collage.html

[Alaa]

it seems most analysts are underestimating or totally missing the influence of the Salafi movement in today's sunni world (they're huge in Egypt).

the shia have been an obsession for the salafi's for ages, even before the recent war in Lebanon, most salafi sheikhs took an anti hezbolla stand they publicly say shia are more dangerous than the zionists or the americans.