CTC: Militant Ideology Atlas

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has just released a massive report entitled the Militant Ideology Atlas.   The report offers a massive database of figures who play a role in the jihadist intellectual universe, summaries of a large number of important texts which circulate in that intellectual universe, and an intriguing citation analysis used to determine the influence and centrality of various figures.  I've got great respect for the CTC and the work they do, which strikes me as non-partisan and highly professional - they've assembled a dedicated group of researchers who are doing high quality work which deserves wider attention, even where I disagree with specific conclusions and recommendations.

The primary contribution made by the Militant Ideology Atlas is its summaries of more than 75 jihadist books and articles found in the online library at the Tawhed site  (which I recently discovered can only be accessed via a proxy server from North American addresses;  I wonder why?).   While I haven't had the time to scrutinize any of the summaries, on the face of it this looks like an extremely useful resource.   Among the main findings of the citation analysis:  Sayid Qutb is the most frequently cited modern Islamist theorist; the imprisoned Jordanian Abu Mohamed al-Maqdessi (owner of the Tahwed site) is the most influential living jihadist author;  Saudis and Jordanians dominate the key nodes of the jihadist debates, in contrast to traditional Egyptian dominance;  and several largely unknown writers (such as Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Yusuf al-'Uyayri and Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi) are surprisingly central to the debates.   

The citation analysis is clever and potentially useful, though I have some doubts about it.  As the authors acknowledge, relying on the Tawhed site introduces potential bias which must be taken into account before generalizing the findings.   Also, the raw numbers of citations is quite low -  the largest number of citations (to Sayid Qutb) is only 10, with quite a few people clustered around 4-6 (including, amusingly, George W. Bush with 4).   That suggests some caution in drawing wide-ranging conclusions from the data, even if the connections identified through the analysis can be suggestive of lines for further research. 

One major quibble with the presentation of the findings:  the report argues that Ayman al-Zawahiri, "often portrayed by Western media as the main brain in the Jihadi Movement, is totally insignificant in the Jihadi intellectual universe."   That wouldn't be totally surprising, since political leaders aren't necessarily intellectual forces.  But the data presented in the Report actually does not support the argument.   While Zawahiri does not seem to score highly in the citation index, he does quite well when measured by "most popular texts read online" (pp 8-9 of the full report).  Zawahiri authored four of the twenty most popular texts (#8, 14, 16, and 20) - which is more impressive considering that the texts ranked 3, 4, 7 and 9 are technical guides to internet security and the texts ranked 11, 13, and 15 are medieval texts which are not even discussed in the report's database. When limited to relevant texts, Ayman Zawahiri authored four of the top 13 most popular texts, with adjusted ranks of 5, 8, 9, and 13.  No other author has four pieces in the top 20.  So I'm not impressed with the Report's conclusions about Zawahiri's relative insignificance in the jihadi intellectual universe.

Anyway, even if the findings shouldn't be pushed too far, anyone interested in the jihadist scene will want to explore this report.

Comments

[Abu Sinan]

I find it very interesting that George Bush is cited more than anyone, even the Prophet Mohammed.

[JR786]

Two things caught my attention. On page 6 the authors state that Salafism "is ideologically akin to the medieval Puritan movement in England and the United States". Whatever other merit it may have as an analogy, locating Puritanism in the Middle Ages is a bit of poor scholarship at best.

More troubling is the following:

Finally, a word about 'moderate' Muslims. The measure of moderation depends on what type of standard you use. If by 'moderate' one means the renouncement of violence in the achievement of political goals, then the majority of Salafis are moderate. But if by 'moderate' one means the acceptance of secularism, capitalism, democracy, gender equality and a committment to religous pluralism, then the Salafis would be extremists on all counts. (11)

W-llahi, then i'm an extremist on at least one count - capitalism (total, unwavering, Gatesian acceptance?). The normative presentation of these categories of moderation forces me to conclude that I don't even know one perfectly moderate Muslim, nor can I positively assert that any exists. Furthermore, while the authors rightly point out that Jihadists don't allow for any deviation in thought, they don't seem to either. Similarly, they seem to have declared that the Bush Administration is extremist as well since it has embraced violence and war as the means for advancing political goals.

In the tradition of the Prophet, West Point has spoken to its target audience according to the level of its understanding and confirmed to them what they already knew - there are no moderate Muslims.

[the aardvark]

JR - while I was underwhelmed by the report's recommendations, I actually didn't read that part the way you did. I took it more as a call for definitional precision - what do we, and should we, mean when we talk about "moderation." I didn't read this as their endorsement of the broader definition, which would make it impossible to draw useful distinctions within the small jihadist subgroup they were studying. And note that the report was quite careful to place the jihadists as a small subset of the much wider Islamist and Muslim communities - not at all equating those circles.

[Tiffany Campbell]

I have just finished reading the Executive Summary of the "Atlas" and I have to admit I am quite dismayed. To give an overarching and basically useless statement like" Since Western governments lack credibilty in the Muslim world, they should pursue these efforts indirectly," seems almost insulting at the worst and useless at best. And what does "pursuing efforts indirectly" do for our credibilty?

"Convince Jihadi intellectuals who are truly influential to renounce certain tactics"? When this happens, like after the tragedy in Amman, it is a spontaneous incident. And I can't imagine what kind of 'indirect methods' it would take to convince Al-Qadahwari to risk his credibilty (power base) to renounce certain Jihadi tactics.

I would not dare to ask if an average Iraqi, after living in a war torn country for 4 years, with life a life filled with tragedy and uncertainty, if he would want something like the Talaban for a government, Because, just as it happened in Afghanistan, I am sure the answer would be, "if it would stop the fighting and lend some stability, yes".

"The Jihadi Message is so weak and unappealing that they have to use violence to persaude people." Not to overgeneralize cultural attributes, but the use of force, power and violence as persuasion is something that has historical resonance in most Arab cultures, especially Iraq. The use of violence to defend one's honor is expected. This statement, to me, seems extremely culturally unaware.

Last but not least: "Qutbism" just doesn't have a good ring to it.