What Osama Wants

I've got a lot of respect for Peter Bergen, but I think that his NYT op-ed today gets the question of how al-Qaeda views an American withdrawal from Iraq wrong.   I don't have time for an extended critique today, but very quickly I'll just refer back to my earlier long post on this question.   Bergen argues that al-Qaeda primarily wants to find a swathe of territory on which to constitute a jihadist state, and that Sunni Iraq would be the ideal location for this jihadist state.  But this overlooks a couple of key points. 

First, al-Qaeda's wider political strategey benefits enormously from having American troops in Iraq.  It gives meaning and purpose to the jihad there, and a steady stream of the images  they need to glorify themselves and win recruits.   Killing Shia might thrill the hard-core jihadists base, but repels the vast majority of Arab Muslims.   Without Americans to fight against, the al-Qaeda campaign in Iraq loses both its political justification and its main political payoff. 

 

Second, the idea that al-Qaeda wants to establish a physical base - in Iraq or elsewhere - is probably wrong, even if Zawahiri or others have said otherwise in the past.  One of the lessons of Afghanistan has to be that a physical base is vulnerable in ways which a dispersed network is not.  What do you think is going to happen if al-Qaeda puts together an Emirate in the Iraqi desert and starts gathering in the kinds of people and institutions which used to be in Afghanistan?  American bombers will flatten it in about 20 minutes, obviously.  And al-Qaeda's leaders know that.   While declaring an Emirate in Iraq might be a symbolically important move, actually establishing a new physical base from which its leaders can organize and train and rule is just not going to happen.

Finally, Bergen assumes that an American withdrawal would make the success of such a mini-caliphate more likely.  Does it?   Remember that somebody in the name of al-Qaeda already declared an Iraqi Islamic State in the Sunni areas, without waiting for the Americans to leave.   More importantly, such a jihadi mini-state would face fierce resistance from both the Shia majority and from many Iraqi Sunnis who have no desire to live under or be ruled by jihadis.  I would expect that in a post-American Iraq, Iraq's Shia (with or without overt Iranian help) would fight fiercely against any jihadi Emirate in the Sunni areas - without having to worry about America's wider strategic aims (such as avoiding civil war or honoring the concerns of other regional actors).   And it wouldn't only be the Shia.  The current American attempts to split the Baathist parts of the Sunni insurgency from the al-Qaeda parts reflect the very real conflicts between them over what a post-American Sunni part of Iraq should look like - and this would only be exacerbated if that future appeared more likely to arrive, and the vast majority of Iraqi Sunnis who don't support al-Qaeda are faced with the prospect of their coming to power.  In short, local Iraqi conditions - far more than American military forces - will prevent al-Qaeda from achieving any form of power in Iraq.

In short, I think Bergen is off-base on how an American withdrawal from Iraq would play into al-Qaeda's strategy.   He might be right that the al-Qaeda propagandists would portray it as a great victory of America - but this should point to an aggressive American public diplomacy campaign to deny them that narrative, not to staying in an untenable position just because we're afraid of what they might say about us.   Making foreign policy decisions based on reputation concerns went out with the domino theory, or should have anyway. 

And with that, it's back to other, non-blogging, work.   

Comments

[Craig]

Without Americans to fight against, the al-Qaeda campaign in Iraq loses both its political justification and its main political payoff.

But, you're assuming Osama's main goal is to attack Americans in Iraq. I don't agree. I think he wants to attack Americans in America. And not troops, either. He wants to murder innocent Americans, when they least expect it... for maximum shock value. What makes you think Osama gives a damn about an Islamic state? His organization has succeeded in the past by being stateless.

In the early 1970s, Yasser Arafat started the civil war in Lebanon, to create a FAILED state from which to attack Israel.

In 1983, Hezbollah drove the peacekeepers out of Lebanon with two massive suicide bombings, to make sure that Lebanon remained a failed state, so that they could continue to operate free of any state constraints. Which they did, their terrorism both inside and outside of Lebanon continued. Argentinian prosecutors indicted Rafsanjani just yesterday for Hezbollah's murder of over 200 people in Lebanon in the early 1990s.

Hezbollah started a war with Israel a few months ago, to keep Lebanon a failed state.

After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Osama (Al Qaeda) helped the Taliban seize control, so that he could keep Afghanistan a failed state. Incidentally, I think that is EXACTLY what Osama would like to do in Iraq. Drive the US out and then assist one of the factions to drive Iraq all the way back to the stone age. Just like he did in Afghanistan.

Anyway... terrorists have used a model of a FAILED state as a base of operations for 30 years. Why do you think they want to do things differently, now?

[Craig]

Sorry about saying it was you arguing Al Qaeda wanted an Islamic state, that was the author you quoted. I disagree with both of you :)

Osama needs both the ideological victory of driving the US out of Iraq and he needs the free reign of an Iraq that is in a state of chaos. That's my opinion. That's the only way Al Qaeda emerges with anything like a victory, in Iraq. Any other type of US failure in Iraq is a victory for Iran, and a loss for Al Qaeda.

[Jay]

Craig, you haven't addressed the political aims of Al Qaeda that the Aardvark is commenting on. Regardless of whether Osama would rather strike Americans in Baghdad or New York, Al Qaeda is playing for an audience. The fact seems to be that they retain little support, even among Sunni Arabs in Iraq. They require US presence to justify much of their position there. Aardvark outlined why it would be difficult for them to gain a free hand in Sunni areas in a post pull out situation, thus why they're less dangerous to us there in an international terrorism context. It follows that a goal of attacking us here rather than there isn't furthered by an American retreat. Furthermore, the Taliban had pretty considerable control over Afghanistan and its many factions, in fact, establishing law and order initially made them popular. Hezbollah enjoys a lot of support in Lebanon, including a demographic constituency (Shia). These situations both differ from what a failed state in Sunni Iraq may look like if you take Aardvark's anlysis to heart. It will be more difficult for Al Qaeda to push their 'Clash of Civilizations' rallying cry in the Mid East if the focus is on fighting btw factions in Iraq.

[Craig]

Jay,

The fact seems to be that they retain little support, even among Sunni Arabs in Iraq. They require US presence to justify much of their position there.

I don't agree. You just said they don't have much backing in the arab world... yet, they are in Iraq right now and have been all along. What makes you think they'd have to go, if the US did?

And there is nothing Al Qaeda could do that would garner them more support and credibilty than drive the US from Iraq. The US is much hated in the ME.

[No Preference]

Craig, "al Qaeda" is not our opponent in Iraq. Even the US military considers foreign Islamists to be a small part of the insurgency.

[Schwa-Schwa]

He might be right that the al-Qaeda propagandists would portray it as a great victory of America - but this should point to an aggressive American public diplomacy campaign to deny them that narrative, not to staying in an untenable position just because we're afraid of what they might say about us.

Er, Marc, considering your prior complaints about the quality of US public diplomacy, are you sure that's a good idea?