Arab reflections on the fifth anniverary of 9/11

Everyone is writing up their reflections on the fifth anniversary of 9/11.  I doubt I have all that much to add to the wealth of commentary out there, so instead I thought I would just look at some of the main themes in the glut of similar commentary in the Arab media.  In this post, I'm going to focus on the Arab press.  Next chance I get, I want to look at how the fifth anniversary of 9/11 has been discussed on al-Jazeera. 

I'm struck by the level of consensus over how bad things are five years after 9/11.  I looked at more than a dozen newspapers from eight Arab countries (along with the three London-based pan-Arab dailies), whose columnists generally range from extreme anti-Americans to partisan pro-Americans.   I could find only a handful of columnists arguing that the war on terror has made things better for the United States, its ideas, or its allies (they mainly vary on whether they see all this as a good or a bad thing).  Whether writing in opposition to America or in support of it, Arab columnists seem pretty unanimously to see Islamist extremism on the rise, democracy in retreat, and American influence in tatters.   They almost universally blame Bush for making things worse than they had to be, and particularly identify the invasion of Iraq as the key mistake, the point where things all went wrong.  That all might be self-serving and hypocritcal, insightful and brilliantly observed, or whatever.  But it is what's being written and said, for the most part. 

The narrative of an initial consensus in support of the war on terror turning sour over the invasion of Iraq is widespread (though this is more tendentious in the Arab case than in the American or European case - there was a lot more Arab opposition to the Afghan war than this narrative allows).   Some typical examples:  Hassan Nafaa, in al-Hayat, wonders how the war on terror turned into a war on Arabs and Muslims.   Since al-Qaeda is a secret terror organization, not a state, the US could have mustered great support for bringing the criminals to justice, but instead chose war against the state of Afghanistan and, worse, against Iraq.   As Bush's "war on terror" evolved into  a war to subjugate the Arab and Muslim world to American diktat, resistance to the US inevitably grew.  Yasir Za'atra, writing in Qatar's al-Sharq, tells a similar story:  the world understood war against the Taliban after they refused to surrender bin Laden, but not Iraq.  Now America's project in Iraq has failed, its claims to spread democracy have fallen by the wayside (to the delight of its corrupt allied regimes), and Lebanon's victory over Israel has given Arabs hope about the possibility of resistance.  For Mahmoud Mubarak, in al-Hayat, this is not an accident: dominating the world is America's raison d'etre, and 9/11 was nothing but an excuse to invade our countries and assault us at all levels. Abdullah Iskandir, in al-Hayat, argues that the war on terror after 9/11 enjoyed international consensus but the invasion of Iraq on dishonest premises destroyed that consensus.   Hossam Haydar, also in al-Hayat, similarly bemoans the extension of the war into Iraq, and - invoking the specter of American intervention in Syria, Lebanon, and Iran - asks "who will save us from Bush?" 

It is hard to find much dissent from the view that the war on terror has been an utter failure.  Fahmy Howeidy, for instance, wrote last week that five years of Bush's war on terror have been an unmitigated failure.   Pointing to the growing radicalization of the British Muslim community, and to the revelations of a bombing plot in Germany allegedly in response to the Danish cartoons,  Howeydi argues that this represents a growing global trend of increased sympathy with al-Qaeda's arguments.  The war on terror hasn't just failed, he argues, but has actually contributed to expanding the depth and reach of terrorism - strengthening its appeal and increasing its base of recruits. 

Abd al-Bari Atwan agrees, claiming that Bush's policies have created greater danger and uncertainty and chaos in the Arab world with little positive to show for all the pain.  The real goals of Bush's war on terror, Atwan argues, are to serve Israel, to support corrupt dictators, and to return direct Western imperialism in the region... goals which will inevitably fail.  In another column, Atwan dismisses Bush's claim that the war on terror has made the world safer:  the truth, he argues, is the opposite entirely.  Al-Qaeda has won the first five years since 9/11 since its goal was to draw the United States into military interventions in the region, giving the jihadists the opportunity to attack Americans directly and begin to bleed America's wealth and will.   America has failed to benefit from any of these wars, he writes, and indeed has suffered great losses for little gain.   Iraq has been a training ground for a new generation of terrorists, who will no doubt soon disperse throughout the West and the Arab world seeking new venues for the jihad.  And the spread of "Islamophobia" in the West serves al-Qaeda's agenda of pushing the world towards a polarized conflict between Islam and the West and forcing Muslims into the radical camp. 

Even the usually pro-American Abd al-Rahman al-Rashed raises red flags.  He is distressed at the success of al-Qaeda, and dozens of other like-minded groups, in propagating their ideas.  He complains bitterly at the failure of Arab societies to learn from their mistakes, and warns that whatever happens with al-Qaeda the organization the ground is being prepared for more and larger acts of terrorism in the future.   The disease of extremism, he writes, can not be solved with democracy or through dealing with Palestine - it needs to be confronted head-on, and that isn't happening.   Ayman Safadi, editor of the liberal Jordanian daily al-Ghad, argues that after five years the world is less safe due to Bush's mistakes.  Batir Wardum, another Jordanian liberal, offers a rather depressing top 20 list of facts about the world five years after 9/11.  Orib Rentawi, in Jordan's al-Dustour, writes that after five years of campaigning for Arab-Muslim hearts and minds, the United States and its allies have won only more hatred and contempt.

Kuwaiti liberal Ahmed Bishara does make a more positive case:  five years after 9/11, at least the public voices of extremism and the roots of the problem are being openly confronted.  He also sees progress of sorts - women voting in Kuwait, the Wahhabi establishment in Saudi Arabia under fire, Egyptians protesting in the streets, the Iraqi Shia liberated.  Ahmed Jarallah, in Kuwait's al-Siyasa, argues that at least there is a global consensus against terrorism now, with all states recognizing the threat it poses, if only the United States could adjust its policies to work with that consensus rather than taking counter-productive, unilateral actions.  Mishari Zaydi ridicules the deluge of al-Qaeda videos, mocking them as empty talk from an organization which has done nothing of significance in five years.   Salah al-Qullab, former director of al-Arabiya, writes in Jordan's al-Rai that at least Arabs are less prone now to believe conspiracy theories about 9/11 - if Israel were behind it, then bin Laden must have been working with Israel - though this may be a mixed blessing, if al-Qaeda actually wants credit for it (as their new anniversary video makes clear that they do).

And then, there's the jihadis.  They don't have access to the mainstream Arab press, for the most part, so their attitudes will have to await another post.  But it's worth noting here that al-Qaeda's fifth anniversary greatest hits video has received a lot of attention.  In an al-Jazeera program discussing that tape, most of the guests agreed that the video demonstrated some unsettling things about al-Qaeda:  the simple fact that al-Sahab had access to so much previously unreleased footage from Afghanistan shows that their archives remain safe and that al-Qaeda as an organization may be less dispersed than we assume;  and that al-Qaeda chose to release this footage five years after 9/11 rather than right away suggests a seriously long-term way of thinking.   Just glancing through the forums, and very impressionistically, you don't see a lot of dejected voices - the writers on these forums generally seem more optimistic, focused, and energized than even a year ago.

It shouldn't be surprising that an Arab public still reeling from the war in Lebanon, to say nothing of the ongoing issues in Iraq and the snuffing out of the so-called Arab spring, is pessimistic about the state of the world five years after 9/11.  And it shouldn't be surprising that most Arabs continue to pour scorn on Bush and his approach to the war on terror.   And finally, you always have to be careful about drawing inferences from newspaper columnists to "public opinion" (or, god forbid, "reality"!) - what I'm describing here may say more about the state of the Arab press than the state of the Arab world.  Still, the near-unanimity of opinion is itself an important indicator.  And a depressing one. 

Comments

[Katie]

I've got a question about Atwan's assessment of Al-Qaeda's goals: "to draw the United States into military interventions in the region, giving the jihadists the opportunity to attack Americans directly and begin to bleed America's wealth and will."

Is there any sort of widespread agreement that this is indeed the goal that's primary among the various goals they had back in 2001?

Are any of those sources in English or French? What kinds of people in what kinds of organizations say, "Yeah, that's pretty much what they were after?"

[Schwa-Schwa]

I don't know how reliable this is, but it's pretty interesting... what bothers me is that they seem to be playing us (ie the West) like marionettes.

The Master Plan, Lawrence Wright
http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/060911fa_fact3

Of particular interest is Al-Qaeda's 20 year plan:

Al Qaeda’s twenty-year plan began on September 11th, with a stage that [Jordanian journalist Fouad] Hussein calls “The Awakening.” The ideologues within Al Qaeda believed that “the Islamic nation was in a state of hibernation,” because of repeated catastrophes inflicted upon Muslims by the West. By striking America—“the head of the serpent”—Al Qaeda caused the United States to “lose consciousness and act chaotically against those who attacked it. This entitled the party that hit the serpent to lead the Islamic nation.” This first stage, says Hussein, ended in 2003, when American troops entered Baghdad.

The second, “Eye-Opening” stage will last until the end of 2006, Hussein writes. Iraq will become the recruiting ground for young men eager to attack America. In this phase, he argues, perhaps wishfully, Al Qaeda will move from being an organization to “a mushrooming invincible and popular trend.” The electronic jihad on the Internet will propagate Al Qaeda’s ideas, and Muslims will be pressed to donate funds to make up for the seizure of terrorist assets by the West. The third stage, “Arising and Standing Up,” will last from 2007 to 2010. Al Qaeda’s focus will be on Syria and Turkey, but it will also begin to directly confront Israel, in order to gain more credibility among the Muslim population.

In the fourth stage, lasting until 2013, Al Qaeda will bring about the demise of Arab governments. “The creeping loss of the regimes’ power will lead to a steady growth in strength within Al Qaeda,” Hussein predicts. Meanwhile, attacks against the Middle East petroleum industry will continue, and America’s power will deteriorate through the constant expansion of the circle of confrontation. “By then, Al Qaeda will have completed its electronic capabilities, and it will be time to use them to launch electronic attacks to undermine the U.S. economy.” Islamists will promote the idea of using gold as the international medium of exchange, leading to the collapse of the dollar.

Then an Islamic caliphate can be declared, inaugurating the fifth stage of Al Qaeda’s grand plan, which will last until 2016. “At this stage, the Western fist in the Arab region will loosen, and Israel will not be able to carry out preëmptive or precautionary strikes,” Hussein writes. “The international balance will change.” Al Qaeda and the Islamist movement will attract powerful new economic allies, such as China, and Europe will fall into disunity.

The sixth phase will be a period of “total confrontation.” The now established caliphate will form an Islamic Army and will instigate a worldwide fight between the “believers” and the “non-believers.” Hussein proclaims, “The world will realize the meaning of real terrorism.” By 2020, “definitive victory” will have been achieved. Victory, according to the Al Qaeda ideologues, means that “falsehood will come to an end. . . . The Islamic state will lead the human race once again to the shore of safety and the oasis of happiness.”

[Katie]

Here are the two things that I'd most like to say to anyone who subscribes to that line of reasoning:

1) Why gold? It's a limited resource. Extraction of it is very harmful to the environment, and if you significantly increase demand for it, then you'll be poisioning our earth quite a bit despite how many poisons you'd save the earth from by setting Western consumption back a bit.

2) Again, why a material that has to be acquired in dangerous conditions? Who's going to go get the gold? Why do you feel that it's okay for mine owners and rulers to make people hurt, suffer, get terrible chemicals in and on their bodies, work long hours for little pay, etc. just because it's at the command of your economic system rather than the status quo economic system?

Other than that, I don't have any strong arguments with the plan as a whole. I feel like I can tell someone what I know is a bad effect, but that I can't tell someone whether or not his/her idea of who should rule the world is...........good for humans as a species. I might not like it, but I haven't thought about the subject enough to have an idea as to whether or not it'd work.

I mean, look at Orson Scott Card's "shadow" novel series. He chronicles exactly how peaceful actions to take over populations can lead to more suffering later on and how violent actions to take over population can lead to less suffering later on. He also shows that it's nearly impossible to predict the next "later on" just by seeing what happens in the "now" and first "later on," since all the influential & brilliant people of that "later on" generation will have their own ideas about what's going on.

With that in mind, how could I jump to say, "That's a bad idea!" except on those two points?

But I definitely want to look some Al-Quaeda person in the eyes and ask him to revise his plan around those two objections I have before he struggles for it.