Who Won II: the Islamist dimension

All along I've been writing that the Sunni-Shia dimension of the conflict was a bit of a red herring, promoted by the conservative Arab regimes in an attempt to divide the public and blunt support for Hezbollah.   It didn't work;  Hezbollah and Hassan Nasrallah have received tremendous popular support throughout the Arab world despite the Sunni-Shia issue.  Their open hostility to Hezbollah in the early going only heightened their own unpopularity and fueled the underlying rage against the Arab order which lies at the heart of the "al-Jazeera narrative."   But if I think I got that one right, there is still more going on with the Sunni-Shia dimension, and with wider Islamist politics, worth thinking through. 

First, there's no question that mainstream Sunni Islamists have clearly opted for populism over sectarianism.  The Muslim Brotherhood and a range of mainstream Islamist figures have aggressively supported Hezbollah.  Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the influential Sunni Islamist featured on al-Jazeera, has repeatedly called for support of Hezbollah and denounced anti-Shia attitudes (he has also condemned attacks on the Shia in Iraq, it should be recalled, so it isn't purely opportunistic).   Awadh al-Qurni, a Saudi Islamist often featured on al-Arabiya, responded to concerns about a Shia Cresent by saying that even if that happened it would be in opposition to an American-Israeli  project and thus a lesser danger.  For now, everyone loves Hezbollah, at least for public consumption. 

The fate of a controversial Saudi fatwa declaring that it violated sharia to support Hezbollah because of its Shi'ism is worth attention.  That alleged fatwa sparked a real intra-Islamist political feeding frenzy, with almost every Islamist of note rushing to denounce it.  Then a very interesting roundup on al-Arabiya last week claimed that there had in fact not been such a fatwa against supporting Hezbollah because of its Shi'ism at all.   According to that story, Shaykh Abdullah bin Jabrin claimed that the controversy had been ignited by an "old fatwa that had nothing to do with Hezbollah", and others scrambled to cover their butts, um, I mean scrambled to deny that any fatwa declaring "takfir" on the Shia had ever been issued by anyone, while also declaring their total support for the resistance of the Palestinian and Lebanese people. I interpret all of this as backtracking from a failed rhetorical gambit, just like Bashar's Foreign Minister now claiming to have never said the "half-men" thing which everyone heard him say.  The same al-Arabiya report did note with concern the allegedly growing use of the term "Ruwafidhin" to describe the Shia, a historically and doctrinally loaded term preferred by Sunni Islamists.

The one place where the Sunni-Shia issue seems to be more potent than I had suggested is within the jihadist communities themselves. If their on-line forums are anything to go by, Hezbollah's Shi'ism is an extremely active concern among the jihadis.  I don't want to provide links here, since I've grown leery of that, but I can say that there has been an astonishing amount of heated debate about the Shia issue on the jihadi boards I follow.   A post by Mohammed al-Mas'ari on his al-Tajdeed forum defending Hezbollah as a Muslim movement and decrying sectarian attacks or declarations of takfir against the Shia, has as of today sixty responses (many quite critical) and over 7,000 page views (a lot for this kind of forum).  I have seen dozens and dozens of postings denouncing Hezbollah and the "Rafidhin", warning about the "Shia-ization" of the jihad.   Those are matched by enthusiastic endorsements of resistance, and there's a lot of sharp exchanges back and forth.  But overall I think it's safe to generalize that I've seen more naked anti-Shi'ism here than anyplace else (even the op-ed pages of the Saudi al-Sharq al-Awsat). 

This rift between a mainstream Arab public (which dismisses Sunni-Shia differences in favor of populist mobilization against Israel, America, and their own regimes) and a much more doctrinaire jihadist community fits well within the "Al-Qaeda Media Strategies" argument I put out there a few months ago.  At that time I argued that al-Qaeda Central (OBL and Zawahiri) preferred to use mass media to reach out to the "median Arab" while Zarqawi and the new hard-core jihadis preferred online media aimed at an already mobilized base.    Some of that same dynamic is playing out with regard to Lebanon and Hezbollah.  Zawahiri has tried to appropriate the Lebanese struggle, because that's where the median Arab-Muslim is,  while many within the on-line communities are sticking to their doctrinal guns and denouncing Hezbollah no matter how unpopular that position may be with wider publics. Hey, should we start calling the jihadis the "Islamist Netroots"? 

Whether this hurts al-Qaeda or helps it remains an open question, I would say.   A lot of writers whose views I respect are arguing that Hezbollah's ascent harms bin Laden.  I think that's short sighted, though.   Looking ahead only a bit down the road, Lebanon qua Lebanon will likely fade to the sidelines in most Arab and Muslim public argument (just as many Lebanese fear), and Hezbollah will likely revert back to its natural weight.   It is fundamentally a Lebanese movement, and a Shia one, and those who celebrate it for fighting Israel aren't going to look to it as any kind of wider political model (the same is true of al-Qaeda, for the most part, it should be noted).  I've seen remarkably few signs of Hezbollah actually trying to interject itself into politics elsewhere in the region, especially given the panicked hyperbole about its growing power.    As the storyline moves on, as it will, Hezbollah will likely still be wildly popular and praised for its part in the war, but in more of a passive than an active way - a myth, a memory, rather than a current political player.   And when that happens, what will be left is a more radicalized Arab and Muslim public, angrier with America and Israel, more open to the possibility of violent resistance, and more open to Islamist politics.  In other words, in the medium term al-Qaeda benefits from the war because it furthers its "clash of civilizations" agenda. 

Once again I've no doubt left a lot out... more to follow!

Comments

[Hugo Zoom(JV)]

You say you have grown leery of providing links to these bulletin boards? Why is this so? Do you get unwelcome inflammatory commenters when you do this?

[Aqbawi]

On the topic of Saudi backtracking, I just saw an article in al-Quds al-Arabi saying Saudi Sheikh Saleh al-Luhaidan (head of the Saudi Supreme Judicial Council)has issued a fatwa against the Shia. He says they're loyal to Iran and praises Mubarak for his previous similar statements on this.. He apparently also condemns Hizbullah.

The "Independent Saudi News Agency" (Saudi Information Agency?) was cited for this. Do you have any info on said agency? I can't find a website to check or anything.

http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=2006\08\08-23\z26.htm

[John Burgess]

Marc, for the murderous Sunni attitudes toward the Shi'i, I think you need to look a little farther east. Deobandism is, I think, the most virulent of the "salafist" schools when it comes to Shi'ism.

Aqbawi: The Saudi Information Agency is run by a Saudi opposition group located in/near Washington, DC. I suggest a grain of salt in assessing their materials as their objective is to make the Saudi gov't look as bad as possible. They get a little "creative" at times. They do break some interesting stuff, but it almost seems (to me) that they do it by accident.

[sophia]

" It is fundamentally a Lebanese movement, and a Shia one,"

Are you serious? Hizbollah is an Iranian implant into the Lebanese body politic.