Who won?

Who won the Israel-Lebanon war?  The general sense of the Arab public discussion of Lebanon won't surprise most people:   most agree that Hezbollah won, that Israel suffered a serious setback, that the Lebanese people are the greatest losers, that the gap between Arab regimes and their peoples has grown even wider, and that America fared very poorly.    So not really that different from American debates, really - although Arab writers are far more likely to emphasize American losses from the conflict.    There are a few things going on beneath those headlines worth highlighting, though. 

First, for all the shouting in the streets, a lot of the press commentary and talk show discussions has been far more cautious, and worried that military victory might be squandered through diplomacy.  In today's al-Hayat, Arfan Nizam al-Din offers a preliminary reading of the war's winners and losers, which begins not with a rousing declaration of victory but a long list of conditionals which will ultimately decide the outcome:  how quickly and forcefully Resolution 1701 is enforced, the sincerity of the various parties to the agreement, whether Israel refrains from ceasefire violations, whether the Lebanese army can really do anything, whether there are moves to dealing with the real roots of the regional conflict.   Only then does he move to an accounting:  the Lebanese people and state the greatest losers, the Lebanese government a major loser for being unable to protect its people or its borders - though it could redeem itself by seizing the chance to build on a moment of national unity, Hezbollah a big winner despite its losses, the Palestinian people losers because their issue has become relatively marginalized, Israel and especially Olmert losers for failing to achieve their objectives.  Similarly, Ragheda Dergham argues that the war clearly hasn't ended yet and all premature declarations of victory should be discounted (she is also one of the few to declare Hezbollah as much a loser as Israel, since - in her view - it weakened its claims to independence from Syria and Iran, while showing Lebanese that it would sacrifice their lives and land to its political goals).

The deep contempt for Arab regimes in much of the Arab public discourse colors their views of the future.  As the war comes to an end and violence gives way to diplomacy, a lot of Arab writers and pundits are worrying that the feckless and corrupt Arab regimes will negotiate away everything Hezbollah won on the ground - giving Israel a political victory it could not achieve by force of arms.
Wa'il Abd al-Fattah, in Lebanon's al-Akhbar, for instance, denounces the culture of fear and impotence which continues to govern Arab politics despite all the talk of "the spirit of Beirut."  Saad Eddin Ibrahim argues, in a piece describing the new Middle East as angry, democratic, and Islamist, that more than ever before Arabs and Muslim popular anger focused on the triumverate of Israel, America, and the Arab regimes seen as accomplices to the violence (he attributes this to the fact that for the first time, hundreds of millions of Arabs and Muslims directly witnessed Israel's assault on an Arab-Muslim state on satellite television, night in and night out - obviously an argument I'm happy to see, but which puzzles me since the same was true from 2000-2002, from the Palestinian al-Aqsa Intifada through the Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank).

The pervasive disgust with the Arab order and with Arab regimes, by the way, is one reason why Bashar al-Asad's speech denouncing the Cedar Revolution and the pro-American Arab regimes went over so poorly. Few of the enthusiasts for Hezbollah saw Syria helping, and whatever the nature of Syrian-Hezbollah relations the former gets no credit in the court of Arab public opinion for the successes of the latter.  (Although one wonders if the furious response by defenders of various Arab regimes suggests that the part about Arab leaders being "half men" actually went over pretty well, striking a nerve perhaps?)

Many writers for the Saudi al-Sharq al-Awsat have been scathingly critical of Hezbollah all along, and now their analysis tends to fall along the lines of "let's see what they do with their victory" (Yusuf al-Dini, for example, expects Hezbollah's "adventurism" to give way to "pomposity" in victory which will alienate their new supporters).   Liberals and regime supporters alike are frantically trying to minimize the significance of Hezbollah's victory by emphasizing its local roots and distinctively Lebanese dynamics.  Jamil al-Nimri (in Jordan's al-Ghad), for instance, stresses that Hezbollah's experience can not be replicated elsewhere or its lessons more widely applied. 

The divide between Lebanese and non-Lebanese Arab commentators is especially notable.    From the start, a lot of Lebanese complained that the Arab media was just appropriating their suffering for the larger Arab cause -  as in al-Jazeera's immensely influential "Sixth War" frame. - and would just move on once the Lebanese resistance to Israel was no longer useful to that storyline.  That divide has only sharpened since war's end:  non-Lebanese commentators primarily writing about the war's impact on the Islamic movement, on Israel's power, or on the fortunes of various Arab governments;  and Lebanese commentators writing about those things, but also about what is to become of Lebanon's politics.   Arab and Muslim pundits applaud Hezbollah as a new champion against Israel, but Lebanese worry about its influence at home. Hazem Saghiye, for instance, writes about how the weakness of the Lebanese state is ultimately the source of its problems, and that Israel's brutal war had made it much more difficult for Lebanon to regain the "stateness" it had only so recently rescued from Syria.  Walid Shaqir (also in al-Hayat) worries that a struggle between PM Seniora and Syria's Bashar al-Asad is coming, in which the latter will attempt to use the aftermath of the war to overturn the Cedar Revolution and restore Syrian domination of Lebanon (a fear which Asad's speech denouncing the Cedar Revolutionaries as Israeli agents will not likely assuage).    

In short, this anxious public debate about the future suggests that the Arab public is less consumed by triumphalism than unsure what to do with such an unusual turn of events. The doubts about the ability or interest of Arab regimes to capitalize on Hezbollah's victory, and the potential divide between Lebanese and Arab priorities, are crucial undercurrents in current Arab discourse.  There are others, of course, and I'll try to explore some of them over the course of the week. 

Comments

[NonArab-Arab]

Setting aside internal Lebanese debate, the references you give seem to miss a big part of the debate. Where's the other (I think representing the current majority) side of the coin: Al-Quds Al-Arabi, Jazeera, Ikhwan-related publications, etc? I know you follow this stuff too so I can only presume you got busy and are commenting on what you were able to read. Would be very interested to see you add the rest to your comments.

[issandr]

Ya Abu Aardvark,

while reading your fine commentary above a thought struck me: can we hold the London-based pan-Arab media (as-Sharq al-Awsat, al-Hayat, al-Quds al-Arabi and now perhaps Elaph) representative of the Arab debate, or even the Arab intelligentsia debate, on the Lebanon war? While I've noticed some of the restraints in discussing of this war in the Egyptian press, I think there is a wider range of opinions in Cairo -- from gung-ho cheerleading for Nasrallah (e.g. the celebration and free Nasrallah poster seen in last week's liberal ad-Dostour) to much more skeptical interpretations in most of the state press to warnings against Hizbullah in the cravenly pro-Gamal Mubarak daily Rose al-Youssef. There's also been a big debate about Egypt's position through the war, notably on whether the Camp David accords should be reconsidered, what Egypt could have done different, its diminishing regional stature, etc.

And then of course there's the debate as framed by the TV channels, which is probably most important of all. I'm not sure about most Arab countries, but newspaper readership in Egypt (and I think I can safely say the rest of North Africa) are low, while the quality of much of the press leaves a lot to be desired. On the other hand, al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya offer compelling viewing and live debates (where, sure enough, heated discussions often replace reasoned debate). Can we talk of multiple, overlapping Arab debates -- some qawmi (i.e. pan-Arab), some local, and much of it vocal but actually having little impact?

Also, in magazines here there's been some awareness of the complexity of the whole issue: one headline I saw read "The Lebanon war: Assad, Nasrallah, Olmert, Bush all declare themselves victorious." Political scientist Hassan Nafaa recently wrote that he was saddened by seeing Egypt split between those who saw Hizbullah as defeated and those who exagerated its accomplishments. Other editorials are emphasizing that this is no time for celebration and the first priority should be helping the Lebanese and thwarting off further Israeli hostile acts. And while the leftist press is triumphalist about Hizbullah (hoping to embolden the opposition by making Mubarak's Egypt look bad), there is a lot of caution in much of the other press. There is little doubt that the Arab public sphere, to use your book's expression, is behind the Lebanese, but the attitude to Hizbullah is more nuanced than first appears.

[praktike]

Yeah, I'm going to have to go with Issandr on this one. I think how we define the "Arab public" is crucial here. I think elite Arab political commentators and the -- for lack of a better term -- Arab street will differ. The latter is more likely to respond emotionally by seeing this thing as a loss for Israel, a triumph for Hassan Nasrallah, and a tragedy for Lebanon. As both you and Issandr point out, the elite will be more nuanced and probing, and there will be gaps between the state press and the pan-Arab, independent, and/or opposition papers.

Interesting point, btw, on whether Syria gets credit for this. Based on the Ibn Khaldun poll (which admittedly has some problems), no Arab leaders made the top ten in terms of popularity while Ahmadinejad was #2 right after Hassan Nasrallah. That suggest that Iran's reaping the PR benefits of this, and that Bashar isn't.

[the aardvark]

Hi folks, all three of you are right - more posts are coming, just ran out of time to add the stuff you're asking about!

[hummbumm]

As we call Assad in lebanon, the lion of damascus and the rabbit of the golan. Assad will never get credit because hanging over his rhetoric is the fact that the golan border is oh so quiet!
So my two cents, Iran looks like a winner, Hizbullah unclear, short term popularity boost across the arab world maybe, but in lebanon, some of their comments about retribution have been met with fear. This only solidifies them as a Shiite party in lebanon, not a national party but non shiites and even some shiites are not at all fans of Hizbullah. That old truism popping up ( we see it here in the states with our internet hawks), the farther away from the battlefield people are, the more hawkish! Thus Egyptians looking up to Hizbullah, but if bombs were raining on Cairo, they would be a little more circumspect. Lebanon a sure loser that is the only certainty, though there is always hope. This time have to give credit to elite. I mean what was Egypt meant to do, declare war and get trounced for no doubt they would. Let us remember the destruction lebanon suffered, something that a state has to take into account whereas Hizbullah can ignore in its "victory tally"

[aardvark]

"rabbit of the Golan" - cracks me up every time!

[Jim S]

I really doubt the Arab street really cares about the people of Lebanon. Much as Bush cannot comprehend why the Iraqi people in their suffering aren't falling to their knees in gratitude to the U.S. for their liberation from Saddam they probably don't understand why some Lebanese (I have no idea if they are a majority or minority.) aren't happy to be martyrs to the greater Arab cause of harming Israel to whatever degree possible, preferably to destruction.

[praktike]

"rabbit" doesn't have to be pejorative. in egyptian amiyya, it could be "a million egyptian pounds," mish kida walla eh?

[hummbumm]

Asad el sham wa arnab el golan. In any case Bashar will not get any points from his link to Hizbullah. Yes Arab street does not care about lebanon, but i think word will seep out slowly that this victory is not all that victorious for the lebanese, and not the type of victory anyone would like for his own country. It is very much a majority who are not happy to be martyrs in the greater arab cause in lebanon. There is a strong feeling of lebanon is not going to bleed again for other Arabs to feel good about themselves, and especially for Iranian interests. that is the viewpoint of any non shiite and some shiites. Within the shiite community feelings are much more complex, given all the other things that Hizbullah provides in terms of social services, and pride in their accomplishments; in other words look how brave our guys are, and how can I not support this cause when my neighbor or cousin or brother just died for it. Kind of like a support our troops feeling. But I still think many want to live in peace, and any more adventurism from Hizbullah would not go over well. We shall see.

[mhanna]

It also seems to me that the populist support for Hizballah in the Arab World has pointed to a melding and strenghtening of the remnants of Arab nationalism with the new form of political Islam, meaning actual political parties. Of course, by the remnants of Arab nationalism I do not imply some sort of nascent political movement for unification, but a potent solidarity that is more and more expressing itself in the language of political Islam. If I had to guess, the biggest result of all this will be the further popularity of Islamist parties domestically within the Arab countries. In the end this will be a boon to the MB in Egypt.