Islamist bandwagons

I've seen a lot of commentary, some very good and some less so, about the intra-Islamist politics of the Israel-Lebanon war.   Shibley Telhami thinks that al-Qaeda is threatened by Hezbollah's ascent and is having difficulty translating its rhetorical gains into recruits and Bernard Haykal sees a major al-Qaeda PR failure, while Michael Scheuer sees al-Qaeda masterfully parlaying the crisis into strategic gains.  The two aren't necessarily contradictory -  my "constructivist strategy" approach could easily make sense of al-Qaeda Central (OBL and Zawahiri) struggling to win recruits or execute operations even as the ideas which they are trying to spread take deeper and wider root - which I've already said is how I see things developing, unfortunately.

A lot of people have already pointed out the significance of Sunni support for Hezbollah.  That doesn't surprise me - I've argued from the start that the Sunni-Shia dimension is a red herring, primarily propagated by the pro-American regimes which desperately wanted to prevent the emergence of precisely this kind of mass popular support for Lebanon and for Hezbollah.  From the perspective of the Saudis and Egyptians and others, promoting the Sunni-Shia divide was a form of divide and conquer - I think that they hoped that by framing it around "Sunni vs. Shia" they could prevent the consolidation of the "al-Jazeera" frame of "popular movement vs. the Axis of Israel/America/Arab regimes."  They failed.  The latter frame has overwhelmingly won out, reflected and supported not only by al-Jazeera but by the Muslim Brotherhood, most press commentary, most political parties, and most of the street demonstrations over the last few weeks.  This was perhaps most clear when a Saudi fatwa against the Shia Hezbollah was smacked down hard by a succession of Sunni Islamist figures, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Qaradawi. 

More interesting to me than the Sunni-Shia question, or even the Hezbollah/al-Qaeda question, is the wider dynamics of the Islamist bandwagon.  It's striking how much intra-Islamist politics on this war resemble those in the Danish cartoons crisis, as prominent Islamist figures initially laid low but then - when the trends in public opinion were clear - raced to jump out in front in order to claim that they were leading it.   This is at least partly a function of at least two increasingly crowded and competitive "markets":  the satellite TV market and the Islamist personality market. 

Looking back at the Danish cartoons incident is instructive.  The Arab "mainstream media" did not take the lead at first - instead, outrage was cultivated over the internet and face to face in the mosques.  Then, in January, things suddenly exploded - in part because two major Islamist figures drew attention to them on Arab satellite TV:  Yusuf al-Qaradawi (on al-Jazeera) and Mohammed Fadlallah (a major Shia figure long associated with Hezbollah).  Al-Jazeera covered it heavily, arguably fanning the flames, and was rewarded with a noticable boost in its ratings.   When this exploded into some violent riots, though, mainstream Islamists looked to rein in the violence and assert their "leadership" through calls for boycott and "rational rage."    A group of "moderates" then issued a petition, heavily publicized by the Saudi al-Arabiya, to resolve the crisis.  Egyptian televangelist Amr Khaled jumped into the fray, earning some sharp reprimands from the more traditional political Islamists for his naivete in trying to mediate a compromise solution.  Within a month, seemingly every would-be Islamist figure had weighed in.   Only then did Zawahiri appear with a comment on the cartoons, appearing a bit behind the curve.  Months later, however, bin Laden emerged with a major address which used the cartoons incident brilliantly to frame his overall call for Muslims to wake up to the reality of a clash of civilizations. 

The Danish cartoons episode offers some perspective on what we're seeing right now, even if the dynamics aren't exactly comparable (certainly the stakes are far higher, and the cost in human lives all too real).   As in the earlier case, this time Arab satellite TV was initially divided and somewhat restrained, although al-Jazeera was on the Lebanon crisis from the start - as before, winning itself great market share.  The initial protests were rather small and desultory - perhaps reflecting "outrage fatigue" (this came right after Gaza), perhaps confusion over the mixed messages in the Arab media, perhaps an expectation (widely held) that Israel would quickly win and that protests would be irrelevant.   It's interesting that, just as with the Danish cartoons protests, SMS text messaging played an important role in organizing these pro-Lebanon protests as well. 

About a week in (July 17), Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood weighed in with support for Hezbollah and a denunciation of the Arab regimes.  From that point on, protests gathered steam, as did overt expressions of support for Hezbollah as opposed to simply defense of the Lebanese and condemnation of Israel - pictures of demos in Cairo showed ever-increasing numbers of Hezbollah yellow flags.  But those protests also included the Kefaya movement and other non-MB participants. Islamist voices were part of a wider Arab nationalist discourse for the most part, not dominating the public arena or imposing their idiom on the debate:  condemnation of Israel and support for the Lebanese people could and did transcend ideological lines, with the Islamists one set of voices among many (albeit a pivotal and powerful set of voices).

As it became clear that the war would not end quickly, and as Arab public outrage grew more intense, the Saudis changed their position (and I do think that the media and public opinion had a lot to do with that).  At this point, al-Arabiya and most of the rest of the Arab media switched to emulating al-Jazeera to one degree or another, covering at least the humanitarian crisis in Lebanon rather than minimizing the crisis.   Nasrullah's interview with al-Jazeera had a major impact, coming at just this time - real "must see TV." 

It was only here - around July 27, or more than two weeks after the outbreak of war and after the consensus had largely formed, that we began to see a bandwagon of Islamist TV personalities.  Like during the Danish cartoons, al-Qaeda was behind the curve, with Zawahiri speaking out only on July 27 - after there had been considerable talk on the jihadi boards along the lines of "where is bin Laden"?  But it's important to recognize that many other prominent Islamist figures were similarly late out of the gate.   Qaradawi weighed in around the same time,  in a July 27 interview with the Egyptian daily al-Wafd which deemed Hezbollah's resistance legitimate and firmly rejected Sunni-Shia divisions.   In a July 30 al-Jazeera program he went even farther, describing Hezbollah's resistance as a jihad, and directly distinguishing the "umma of the peoples" from the "umma of the regimes" - an exceptionally blunt articulation of a very common al-Jazeera theme.   Also on July 27, Mohammed Fadlallah praised Hezbollah's resistance in an interview with al-Nahar, calling for a wide Islamic rather than narrowly Shia spirit of resistance, and called on the Lebanese army to "engage in jihad side by side with the resistance in defending the homeland."

And now we're really seeing a cascade.  On July 30, Amr Khaled again went political, supporting Lebanon and denouncing Israel.  Mohamed Tantawi, Shaykh of al-Azhar, declared that those Muslim countries which inclined towards Israel against the resistance were traitors to their faith.  Sudan's Hassan al-Turabi said that Bush is leading the world into a Crusader war against Islam. Ali Sistani called for an immediate ceasefire, with veiled warnings of dire consequences in Iraq if one was not forthcoming.   Dozens of other personalities, large and less large, have followed suit.   

To the extent that the intra-Islamist politics of the Lebanon-Israel war are following the Danish cartoons model, what should we expect?   More bandwagoning, with competitive outbidding among would-be Islamist figures regardless of their 'actual' beliefs.  We may see some canny Islamist figures try to stand out from the crowd by underbidding - this would get their names in the headlines, get them featured on al-Arabiya TV, prove their "moderation" to the West, while  showing themselves to be "effective" to their audiences.  This is risky though:  it was Khaled's strategy in the Danish cartoons crisis, and it didn't work very well, and the stakes right now are far higher.  The underbidding Islamist might find himself shut out of the game for a very long time if he alienates too much of his audience.    But perhaps the most interesting thing to watch here will be whether certain Islamist figures try to emulate Qaradawi and Fahmy Howeidy in the earlier crisis, calling for a focused, "rational rage" channeled into specific and achievable political projects rather than diffuse anger spilling over into violence.  Overall, I'd expect the "center" to move sharply towards the more Islamist and more radical side of the spectrum.  And I would expect bin Laden to weigh in a month or two from now, after the smoke has cleared (if it has cleared...) to present a grand strategic perspective which makes it appear that all of this is going according to plan.

Apologies if this has been somewhat long and rambling.. just trying to sketch this out for myself as much as for readers.  Comments welcome!

Comments

[homais]

I don't have anything huge to add to this - the downside of substantitively agreeing with you. But I do notice one effect of the shift to the popular/resistance frame: its emphasis on unity. Maybe this is an obvious point, but it feels like space for internal dissent and dialogue seriously constrict at times like this. Even those who aren't fond of the resistance, or of symbolic competition over who leads the resistance, are rather hard-pressed to say anything about it. Don't criticize the tactics of the resistance: we cannot handle division in a time of war (sounds eerily familiar, really). Which, from a public diplomacy point of view, is a nightmare.

If doing anything that popularizes the resistance frame - with its emphasis on unity and its ability to make people who, say, otherwise despise Hizballah at least visibly support it - can basically shut down internal dialogue and focus all attention on the actions of the crusader imperialist etc., that puts the Unites States in a place with very limited options for pursuing a reform agenda (assuming this administration is serious about it, which I am not willing to assume at this point).

Anyway, at least normatively, there's something troubling about the effects of the resistance frame, especially insofar as it makes it hard to even criticize the ones doing the resisting on tactical grounds (as happened with Siniora), let alone broader ones

[aardvark]

That's a great point, and an important one - this is very much a populist, mobilizational moment and not a dialogue moment, which is understandable but still upsetting.

[Paul Anderson]

Nice overview. A valuable service to those of us who lack a broader perspective on what is being said in the East.

Best wishes

[Mahmood]

What about the effect of the Israeli land invasion? It is one thing to bomb from the air and quite another to actually invade and capture land, specially since much of this conflict involves competing claims to land. Perhaps the bandwagon got going after Israeli troops crossed the border and invaded Lebanon again. The fact that Hizbollah stood their ground and fought must have contrasted unfavorably with all those Arab states who seemed to simply collaps in the face of Israeli or U.S. invasions.

[Joe M.]

Actually, I think you are missing the bigger picture here. Rather then asking how each Islamist faction or personality is reacting, I think it is more important to emphisize what it is that they are reacting to. There may be some political considerations as to the exact timing of various responses, but do you really think there is much chance that the Egyptian Akhwan, Fadlallah, Qaradawi or Sistani, hell or even Nancy Ajram, Kathem Saher, Mahmoud Darwish or any other person in the Middle East would come out against Hizbullah?

I mean, I think the more proper analogy is the 1979 revolution in Iran. In that revolution, basically every faction and personality came out against the Shah at some point. The actual timing was often political, but the Shah was hated and did need to go, so how could anyone come out in his favor? Even the case of cartoons in Denmark, I think it is safe to say that the people were protesting the West more then they were protesting the specific cartoons (which most people didn't even see).

My point is that I think the points you raise about the "islamist bandwagon" are also a "red herring". rather then discuss which faction jumped on the "bandwagon" at what time, I would have focused on how Islamist are really the only nationalists left in the Middle East. The current leaders have pretty much castrated the other nationalist forces and Islam has become the most legitimate political vehicle for people to voice their dissent. As with the Iranian revolution, all people in the Middle East share the same grievances, but the Islamists have done a better job in building their roots and developing an method to express dissent. Even within Kefaya in Egypt, the big debate is about whether to join forces with the Islamists. The Islamists know they don't need the secular forces, but both sides share the same general grievences (at least, say, the top 5 or so). The seculars talk about being an ant riding on the back of an elephant.

Baheyya pretty much sums in up in her latest post when she says (http://baheyya.blogspot.com):
"there's a key difference between the 1950s and now. Today’s nationalists are far more formidable foes for the hell bent powers. Hamas and Hizballah are immeasurably more significant than Nasser and even Mossadeq. Why? Because unlike Nasser, their legitimacy rests on a firm electoral base and decades of dogged constituency service. As Nasserists are the first to admit, Abdel Nasser did things for the people, not by them. His legitimacy was real, his popularity was palpable, but his undoing was swift."

[Joe M.]

I will just add, this also happened in South America in the 60s, 70s and 80s when "liberation theology" became the most obvious nationalist force. that was, for that matter, a time when there were no "democratic" countries in the region, the USA is putting its nose deep into their business, and thee was a lot of repression.

[Anna in Portland (was Cairo)]

My kids and I (homesick) were listening to "Melody" (the Arab pop station) on the Internet and we heard a Shaaban Abdel Rehim song we had not heard before called "Two soldiers" (etneed asakir) which seems to be about Lebanon as well. To me, it's pretty impressive that pop stars can also get it together fast enough to issue out new songs that are topical about an Israeli offensive a bit more than a week after it starts.

Also just to echo what was being said up thread, I lived in Egypt for the past 8 years and I have heard a lot of grassroots sort of supportive statements regarding AhmediNajad and Hezbollah - without ANY "but then again they are Shia" sort of position taken. I think the Egyptian people (and probably the other peoples of the Middle East) have figured out the Divide and Rule technique a while ago (if they had not, they'd be real idiots, after all).

[Sheerahkahn]

I have a question.

I've been watching the translated versions of the Arab tv's (you know, the ones where they're not blowing sunshine up our butt's), and what I would like to know is how much of the "OMG, WE SO HATE AMERICA! EVERYONE! DEATH TO AMERICA!" is really an expression of their hatred for the US, or is it just boiler plate rant that plays well to the masses?
I'm detecting a disconnect, and I would like to start sorting it out before I make up my mind about what I think should be done.

[Jamal]

Are you talking about MEMRI's TV translations? I can't think of anywhere else that does what you are talking about. For starters, MEMRI is an utterly unrepresentative sample. I'd go fishing for a proper sample before you start trying to figure out the meaning of something a bunch of ex-Israeli spooks decided to claim was an accurate representation. If you want to know what the Arab media is actually saying from someone writing in English who knows and follows the original Arabic, spend some time here digging through Abu Aardvark's archives. That is about the best way to answer your question.

[Anna in Portland (was Cairo)]

Try actually reading the "Arab TV" (as you call it) English language websites. They all have them.

[Abdurahman Warsame]

It's a reasonable analysis of the media trends in Middle East. The masses that support Hezbollah in the Arab world are mainly Sunna because they see Hezbollah as an Arab force rather than Shia.

Anyone who stands against Israel and the US is nowadays seen as a hero regardless. That's most evident here in the gulf where the Shia are seen as threat because of the large iranian population but there is still tremendous support for Hezbollah.

I work for Aljazeera and I'm new to blogging, I hope you could drop by "civilexpression.blogspot.com" and let me know what you think i should improve.