Not that anyone is paying attention to Iraq right now, but the second round of the Foreign Affairs roundtable on what to do in Iraq has now been posted (including an interesting response by Stephen Biddle, author of the original Foreign Affairs essay, and Larry Diamond). I would have liked there to have been more opportunity for back and forth among the participants rather than just two rounds like this, but I don't make the rules! I take some heat from several respondents for not offering my own proposal... guess I shouldn't have left that to round 2, huh?
Here's my contribution, for the record:
What is most striking to me about the first round of posts is the degree of consensus on two points: Biddle's description of Iraq as a severe and deteriorating communal conflict, and the limited resources the United States can bring to bear on the situation. This strikes me as progress: at least we can argue about how to solve the problems at hand rather than debate what they are. In my second post, I'd like to comment on three major points: ethnic polarization, al Qaeda's role in Iraq, and the question of U.S. withdrawal.
First, polarization. Here the lessons of history and political science are not kind. De-communalization is difficult and rare, and it is foolish to expect any easy escape from a spiral of conflict fueled by intense anger and legitimate fears. How could Iraqis today, any more than Bosnian Muslims or Croats or Serbs, easily forget the crimes against their families and the destruction of communities? These psychological dynamics are reinforced by every aspect of the political system, and enshrined in the Iraqi constitution. Iyad Allawi's failure in the January elections put paid to fantasies of the emergence of a unifying nationalist figure. Even worse, Iraqis today receive their information from ethnically affiliated media. Ethnic identification in Iraq is there to stay, and the United States really shouldn't waste its scarce and declining resources trying to change that now.
Still, the primacy of ethnic identities by itself does not guarantee perpetual conflict. Survey research shows wide areas of agreement among Iraqis on many core issues such as democracy, the role of religion, and national sovereignty (that is, the need for Americans to leave eventually). Prime Minister Maliki's recent initiatives seem aimed at finding some common ground on that basis. But intensely committed minorities willing to use violence to inflame the situation-whether hard-line Sunni nationalists or jihadists or Shiite death squads-make achieving any of these ambitions difficult. Contra Hitchens, these spoilers simply cannot be stopped through a greater military presence or dramatic events such as Zarqawi's killing. Spoilers can be stopped only when their violence starts failing to produce the desired results. When it became clear that Zarqawi's beheading videos were generating a backlash, for instance, his propaganda unit stopped making them. The United States thus needs to focus on shifting the terms of the Iraqi political debate, taking away the strong cards in the hands of the spoilers and providing the right incentives to the political leadership to reach a consensus. Moving toward a dramatically reduced American presence would help on both counts.
Second, Washington needs to better understand where Iraq fits in to al Qaeda's strategy. The bogeyman of al Qaeda seizing power and establishing a new caliphate in Baghdad can be safely ignored: the Iraqi Shiites will never allow a Sunni movement this kind of power. Even most Iraqi Sunnis would stand against the establishment of an Islamist state, as would every Arab regime (including Saudi Arabia). A failed Iraqi state might allow some pockets of jihadist-controlled territory to emerge, but a jihadist Iraqi state more generally is simply not in the cards.
Iraq is important for al Qaeda because the conflict there helps polarize the Islamic world and hasten a true "clash of civilizations." Americans fighting in Iraq do not hurt al Qaeda; they help it, because such fighting fuels the master narrative of an American "crusade" against a besieged Islam and provides images and stories for use in propaganda. Both Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden have said that the killing of Shiites does al Qaeda no good, only the killing of Americans. An Iraq without a major American presence would thus be of little value to al Qaeda's grand strategy, and its jihadists would more likely follow the American deployments out of the country than seize Baghdad.
Which brings me to the question of withdrawal. I've long been skeptical about the calls for it, for two main reasons: First, it seemed irresponsible to walk away from the mess the United States has made, repeating on a larger scale the elder Bush's abandonment of Iraqi Shiites and Kurds to Saddam's tender mercies. And second, announcing plans for withdrawal seemed likely to create dangerous incentives for all political actors to game the schedule. But those reasons now pale in comparison to the problems posed by not withdrawing. It seems the height of strategic irresponsibility to remain in a place where there is not only no realistic plan for victory, but also every indication that the American presence is making things worse.
At this point, focusing solely on coming up with a strategy for "victory" does not make sense, because no such strategy is out there. The United States does not need to defeat insurgents or jihadists in hand-to-hand combat to prove its mettle, and indeed, the more it tries to impose its will in Iraq now the worse the results are likely to be. Washington's credibility is so low, its presence so inflammatory, that virtually any initiative under an American brand name will generate resistance. For these reasons, therefore, I have regretfully come to the conclusion that-although much would depend on the terms, context, and execution of it-a gradual U.S. withdrawal seems like the least bad option still available.
Glad to see people are coming around. It was obvious the US lost Iraq the day the looting began. I waited about a year to see if Rummy would learn anything. He didn't so I declared defeat. The other reason why Iraq cannot be won is that there is no way to bribe the Arab Sunnis. They don't have oil, and not enough population to be a power in a "unity" government. Rice finger-shaking and admonishing just isn't enough. [This is where I might disagree with the analysis. Why wouldn't al Qaeda set up training camps in the Sunni triangle and spread global havoc from there?]
As for the future, an Army major I know, who's in the Iraq planning thicket (as opposed to the fighting thicket) puts it this way: cut and run or stay and die. There is no solution for Iraq.
As for US morals, there aren't any. This is SOP. Read Overthrow by Stephen Kinzer for the sad history.
Fine and dandy. We now agree. Unfortunately W doesn't. He won't leave because doing so cements defeat. He'll never do it. He's much more likely to escalate--call it doubling up in gambling, I think.
Posted by: eCAHNomics | July 17, 2006 at 07:57 PM
The other reason why Iraq cannot be won is that there is no way to bribe the Arab Sunnis. They don't have oil...
On the contrary, the lack of oil in the Sunni regions makes the Sunni imminently bribable. The Sunni can make nice with the Shi'ites and Kurds and get a share of the oil money, or they can continue indiscriminate slaughter and get an impoverished unrecognized rump state in Al Anbar.
Why wouldn't they go with the former and a Bosnia-esque solution?
Posted by: Andrew Reeves | July 17, 2006 at 09:42 PM
I'm inclined to agree with Andrew. I'm not sure that there's any non-catastrophic solution for Iraq, but it seems to me that the only prospect of a solution would be in ethnic and sectarian cantonment, with the US swallowing its pride and accepting that plenty of people it doesn't like will be empowered by the outcome, including Iran and Sunni jihadists. I can't imagine an Iraq emerging that in any way resembles the stated American goal of constructing a positive example for the rest of the region, but at least petty sectarian tyrannies are likely to stay petty.
Posted by: Scott Martens | July 18, 2006 at 07:52 AM
Weakness invites aggression.
Leaving Iraq? Go ahead, but this is not about Iraq – it’s about the world as we know it.
And here is why: The soon nuclear Iran, Syria, Hizbollah and Hamas link could not be more visible these days – and if anyone has not noticed, they are on the move and they will soon radically be changing the power balance in the Middle East far away from western influence.
Why now? Because the US is bleeding in Iraq and US arrogance to UN, EU and other potential partners make international support for US missions in Iraq hard for W to get. And a bleeding US, won’t be able to stop Iran’s nuclear (nor North Korea’s) ambition, nor to support a peaceful solution for the Israel/Palestine issue. Just because of this – the Iran sponsored offensive is coming just now. The map of the Middle East will be drawn by Iran and followers/ supporters/associates and western influence in the Middle East will probably vanish together with the state of Israel. That’s my scenario and I don’t like the consequences of it.
What to do? Risking to take the “assume a can-opener” approach – a collective US, EU and NATO offensive (probably 500.000 to 800.000 troops on the ground) to seal the borders of Iraq to stop supply of new insurgents and supply. Establish security, law and order in the major cities. Engage in a massive nation building effort with a Marshall plan to give ordinary people their lives back. This is in my perspective a 20 -40 year effort and will be a burden all of us in the western world have to carry collectively. We took it – we own it. We broke it – we’ll fix it.
Sorry for the strange english - It's not my mother tounge...
Posted by: Dag Landewall | July 18, 2006 at 09:45 AM
While I support a withdrawal, I would add a proviso -- the US will withdraw its troops, say in six months, unless the Iraqi Parliament votes to ask it to stay. The advantages of this approach from a US political standpoint seem obvious. For Iraq, if the Parliament does not ask us to stay, it can at least get some credit for our withdrawal.
Posted by: Alan | July 18, 2006 at 02:13 PM