Payola and public diplomacy

I've argued that the greatest victims of the Pentagon's amateurish propaganda payola scheme have been those voices in the Arab media that actually want to advance pro-American arguments, who now face an even greater level of suspicion and skepticism.   Turns out someone else agrees with me, and when you hear who it is you'll realize that this may be one of the only times you ever hear that phrase:  Ken Tomlinson, of  Broadcasting Board of Governors and Corporation for Public Broadcasting fame (thanks, AH). 

According to Broadcasting and Cable (subscription only), Tomlinson was deeply concerned:

Telling B&C he agreed with the criticism that such payments undercut U.S. efforts to help Iraq build a free press, he also said that, "as a news professional, can you imagine anything lower than a newsperson who takes bribes? Talk about building a free and honest press."

Tomlinson said that debates "involving people who also don't agree with us on freedom and rights are vital to what we are doing at Alhurra....

When Alhurra was launched, Tomlinson said, "Our competitive edge in the Middle East is our very dedication to truth, and free and open debate. And we will stand out like a beacon of light in a media market dominated by sensationalism and distortion."

Leaving aside all disagreements about al-Hurra itself, or Tomlinson's sincerity or accuracy in his claims about it, I'm glad to see Tomlinson taking this position. 

I think that the payola only affects al-Hurra indirectly.  Since al-Hurra is formally and openly an American government broadcasting outlet, it obviously isn't directly tarred by a scandal involving secret payments and placing of ghost-written stories in the Iraqi and Arab media.  If al-Hurra directly broadcast scripts written in the Pentagon, so what?   Firewall or no firewall, it's pretty much what viewers expect. 

But in the bigger picture it does affect al-Hurra, and all American public diplomacy, because it goes so directly to the question of the sincerity of American commitment to free and open media, and American credibility in its advocacy of democracy.  The problem is not that the United States is trying to persuade foreign audiences of American views - if that were illegitimate, then you'd have to kiss the entire public diplomacy enterprise goodbye.   It's the subterfuge, which is like a cancer at the heart of the public diplomacy endeavor... once it is inevitably exposed, it metastasizes and consumes even the healthy cells.

I've seen a number of articles over the last few days coming forth to defend the program, comparing it to early Cold War programs or justifying it as a necessary part of a total war against al-Qaeda.  Some of those pieces are thoughtful and well-argued.  But I think they are wrong.   Compared to the early Cold War, today it is almost impossible to keep something like this a secret.  The time-frame for exposure is incredibly compressed, and once exposed the information circulates back to the targetted region virtually immediately.    In other words, it isn't just a normative claim for the superiority of transparency and media freedom - it's based on the new strategic reality created by today's information environment.  Any policy which does not take into account the inevitability of early public exposure is by definition a flawed policy.  That applies to extraordinary renditions, torture, domestic spying, and Iraqi payola schemes alike.  This should be a key concept for all policy making today, and a key way in which public diplomacy should be integrated into the policy process. 

I think that building a free, open, critical media in the Middle East really is one of the most vital steps towards positive change in the region:  meaningful democracy is inconceivable without it, as is virtually every other aspect of economic, cultural or political reform.    Undermining that to score a few cheap points in a propaganda war is incredibly short-sighted, self-defeating behavior. 

Comments

[Jamal]

I'd like to say I think this comment of yours is one of the best elucidations of a policy-making principle I've heard in a long time:

"Any policy which does not take into account the inevitability of early public exposure is by definition a flawed policy. That applies to extraordinary renditions, torture, domestic spying, and Iraqi payola schemes alike. This should be a key concept for all policy making today, and a key way in which public diplomacy should be integrated into the policy process."

However, in the context of this administration (or any administration?) I kind of have to wonder if the thinking even if implemented wouldn't be more along the lines of "if/when it is revealed, how do we contain the damage and destroy the leaker" more than "how do we craft a policy which people will by in large agree with and accept if/when revealed". Bush's very public reaction to the recent domestic spying reactions unfortunately would be one of many such signs that this is how this administration behaves. Forget the Iraq-Vietnam comparisons, the Nixon-Bush ones are now growing too.

[John Burgess]

Not to minimize the issue, but I think what happened here is that the Franklin group got hired to improve the public information climate. Not having had any particular experience in that role, Franklin looked around to see what that climate was.

What they found was that Arab media is filled with "for-pay" or "for-service" articles, dutifully written by journalists who supplemented their income or lifestyles by being republishers of press releases; "helping out" the business of family, friends, or the powerful; doing favors in anticipation of favors returned.

This being the status quo--with few exceptions--Franklin say, "Hey, when in Rome...."

That this was antithetical to good journalism never even crossed their minds. They were task oriented, not oriented toward greater journalistic principles.

[Aunt Deb]

Well, that's certainly one way to look at it, John Burgess. But it raises the question of why turn this into a bottom-line product-producing private contract operation in the first place. I would have to contend that this administration thinks 'news' is simply a battleground of competing opinions and that almost all opinion holders are swayable, either directly through payola or indirectly through the products of those receiving payola. Works a treat for them, after all.

[collounsbury]

Lincoln Group previously Iraq-Ex.

Frankly having seen these guys in op in situ, I would say this was less about an understanding of the Arab media enviro and more about scrambling and short cuts in an enviro which they barely understood.

Rather like the rest of CPA-Iraq ops I saw. Amateur hour. The whole American game was gross amateur hour because the chuckle heads in DoD did not feel like learning and did not know the value of the same.

Well, what's a few billions pissed away, eh?