Mishari Al-Zaydi has the third part of a five part series on Jordan in today's al-Sharq al-Awsat, focusing on the position of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. The first half of the essay deals with the Jordanian MB's position towards the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; it's fascinating, but only of historical interest, so I won't talk about it here. The second half of the essay explores the evolution of the MB's relationship with the Hashemite monarchy, especially since Abdullah II replaced his father Hussein as king. The key question is whether that close relationship has changed since Abdullah took power, or since 9/11, and what future there might be for the Ikhwan-Hashemite alliance.
What has changed? Himam Said, a MB hawk, says that "we have not changed since our founding in 1945... it is upon those who deal with us to take us as we are, and we have not changed our positions, and we have not changed our slogans. The change is in those around us." Said is exaggerating the continuity of the MB's own positions, but he's not wrong that the real change occurring elsewhere: in the changed attitudes of the regime, and in the rising presence of a non-Ikhwan radical salafism.
With regard to the Palace, and Abdullah's replacing of his late father, Musa al-Mayatah, leader of a leftist party, points out: "the new King did not have a special meeting with any leaders of the MB. Yes there were exceptions such as his meeting with Majid al-Thunaybat, leader of the Ikhwan, but that came in the context of his meetings with notables from Kerak, not in his capacity as head of the Ikhwan. The late King Hussein used to meet with them continuously." Later in the article Mayatah suggests that the Ikhwan wants to position itself as a bulwark against the radical salafi jihadists, but that its relations with the throne aren't what they used to be. Since 9/11, he says, the concern with Islamism which dominates the world also shapes the ideas of the Palace. The Ikhwan can't be as useful against the religious right as it was against the Left (its traditional role in support of the regime)... and indeed the regime sees the Left more as an ally now than as a threat.
Deputy Parliamentary spokesman Ali Abu Sakr says that the failure to meet with MB leaders suggests a failure on the part of the King (not something you're likely to hear him say to a Jordanian paper!): "I think that the the experience of the current King is not equal to that of the late King. It was the Ikhwan which saved the regime in its moments of instability, yes the Ikhwan had its own interests in this alliance, but it was an ally to the regime." Abu Sakr adds this rather inflammatory comment: "I think that it is the Jordanian state which wants to inflame fitna [chaos, disorder, conflict]" and warns that weakening the Ikhwan is the most likely course of action to create violence and conflict in the kingdom. And he warns that the Jordanian people want the regime to demonstrate an Islamic vision, which an effective presence for the Ikhwan provides. He concludes: "the regime can not do without the Ikhwan, and the Ikhwan can not do without the regime.. the regime wants to advance a successful program for political coexistence with the Islamists, and the Islamists want to preserve the regime."
Mamduh al-Abaddi, deputy speaker of the Parliament (identified by Zaydi as a leading secularist activist, which I'm not sure is exactly right), expresses doubts that the relationship between the Ikhwan and the regime have been broken. Zaydi, summing up, seems to agree with the analysts who see the relationship with the Ikhwan as "in the freezer" but "not dead."
Marwan Muasher, reform czar and chair of the National Agenda, says that the conditions of domestic political life have indeed changed, which is only natural. He wants to increase the prospects for other political forces - even if this means creating them from scratch, as in the King's proposals to create Sadat-style left/center/right parties.
This leads to the big question of how powerful the Ikhwan actually is. Mayatah claims that its strength is exaggerated, but its hard to disagree with the Ikhwan's self-assessment that it is the only organized political force in the country. Zaydi points to the over-riding significance of the electoral law: the much-derided "one vote" electoral law limits the Islamists presence in Parliament, but also carries a lot of seriously negative baggage. Changing the law to make it more genuinely representative of public opinion would certainly increase the Islamists Parliamentary strength... but nobody knows by exactly how much. Zaydi, quoting the Jordanian nationalist writer Nahid Hattar, points out that Jordanians of Palestinian origin are also politically under-represented, and a changed election law which strengthened them (especially the more liberal, well-off Amman Palestinian-origin citizens) might balance out the Islamist gains.
Finally, Zaydi points to internal disagreements among the Ikhwan: between radical and moderate political voices, between those who want a more social and religious emphasis and those who want a more formally political agenda, between conservatives who yearn for the old close relationship with the regime and those who prefer a more radical vision. In this regard, it's worth noting that al-Ghad reported today that the preparations for Shura Council elections began unusually early this year - suggesting that these questions are being intensely debated.
And that's your Jordanian politics fix for the week.
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