CSS Arab Public Opinion

The Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan has just released a major study of Arab public opinion (find a PDF in English here - it isn't actually available in Arabic at all, although al Jazeera and a few newspapers have reported on it already).   The CSS collaborated with local research centers in five Arab countries (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and the Palestinian territories), and surveyed 1200 people in each national sample, along with 500 university students and 120 business people and 120 media workers in an elite sample. 

Among the headline findings:  "there are critical distinctions within Arab public perceptions of the West, based largely on status, age, and education."  Hostility to the United States is significantly greater than hostility to other "Western" countries - almost everyone prefers France.   Here are the "not positive at all" attitudes towards the United States:  Jordan 58%, Syria 75%, Palestine 70%, Egypt 63%;  "highly positive" is less than 5% in every country except Lebanon -which was a major outlier in the study, with almost 80% expressing some degree of positive feelings towards the US.

In contrast to speculation among some pundits that youth, many of whom love Western culture and want American education, will push against an entrenched anti-American older generation, the survey finds that youth and university students are particularly angry with the West:  "negative sentiments are particularly strong among youth... who disapprove of US policies, are skeptical of American intentions in the region, and are most likely to reject strengthened bilateral ties," particularly alarming "given the demographic trends in the region, whereby 50% of the population is less than 25 years of age."

The survey found that these attitudes tend to be based on a "a fairly thin knowledge" of the West, with less than half the respondents believing that they "have a good understanding of culture and society" in the West.    The survey found that Arabs do perceive significant differences between their societies and Western societies, but that these cultural disparities do not seem to be at the core of the current anger with the United States.  The survey found "little evidence that Arabs perceive the West as a Crusader force, intent on destroying the Islamic world in a battle over religious beliefs."   Even more than that, "most Arabs consider religious fanaticism to be a problem in their societies.. and nearly two thirds of respondents believe religious fanaticism is a problem in both Western and Arab societies."  Finally, almost all countries saw "the Zionist lobby" rated as the most influential foreign policy maker in the United States - with the surprising exception of Egypt, who chose President Bush 34% - 29%.  But since Egyptians almost unanimously despise Bush, this isn't necessarily reassuring.

A key problem is perceived hypocrisy:  "while they note that Western societies profess many positive values, they often feel that actual Western policies do not reflect these values."   Asked whether "the US supports the practice of democracy", Lebanese were the most likely to agree (just over 40%), with Jordanians surprisingly agreeable (just under 40%), around 20% of Palestinians and Egyptians, and less than 10% of Syrians.  But the fact that 40% is a surprisingly high finding should be pretty alarming in and of itself for American democracy promoters. 

On the "al Jazeera effect" hypothesis, the survey found "no clear cut statistical evidence to support the contention that high levels of viewership of Arab satellite TV bears any relation to negative perceptions of US foreign policy."

Finally, the survey found extremely widespread opposition to American foreign policy, along with evidence that Arabs would like to have closer relations with the West... but only if the United States changes its foreign policy.   American handling of the Arab-Israeli conflict was viewed positively by 5% of Jordanians, 1% of Syrians, 5% of Lebanese, 1% of Palestinians, and 2% of Egyptians.  On Iraq, roughly 80% of Jordanians, Syrians, and Palestinians, 75% of Egyptians, and 55% of Lebanese felt that the use of force was not justified at all.   More than two thirds overall believe that the US occupation will not produce a democracy. 

The survey asked some interesting questions which I haven't often seen publicly reported before.  They asked Muslim respondents whether they believed that ijtihad (interpretation) remains open - a key indicator of one's attitude towards a more moderate or radical approach to religion:  only 3% in Lebanon, 6% in Palestine, 5% in Egypt, 5% in Jordan, and 8% in Syria said that ijtihad was closed.   Almost all Muslims surveyed thought that Sharia should be *a* source of legislation, with almost two thirds in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine saying that sharia should be the *only* source of legislation.  This suggests broad-based support for a moderate Islamism, with sharia viewed as mandatory but open to interpretation - essentially the position advocated by Yusuf al Qaradawi.   One final point of note:  the survey found no significant correlation between support for sharia and anti-Western attitudes. In Jordan and Egypt, however, there was some correlation between preferring a less central role for sharia and having more positive views of the US. 

There's a wealth of information in the survey, including a range of findings on what the respondents view as terrorism which were published in advance of the survey as a whole (I wrote about them here);  the Syrian sample, understandably enough, seems to be the shakiest, the least detailed, and the one in which I would have the least confidence.   

Comments

[praktike]

Thanks for summarizing this.

This was the most interesting part to me:
"The survey asked some interesting questions which I haven't often seen publicly reported before. They asked Muslim respondents whether they believed that ijtihad (interpretation) remains open - a key indicator of one's attitude towards a more moderate or radical approach to religion: only 3% in Lebanon, 6% in Palestine, 5% in Egypt, 5% in Jordan, and 8% in Syria said that ijtihad was closed. Almost all Muslims surveyed thought that Sharia should be *a* source of legislation, with almost two thirds in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine saying that sharia should be the *only* source of legislation. This suggests broad-based support for a moderate Islamism, with sharia viewed as mandatory but open to interpretation - essentially the position advocated by Yusuf al Qaradawi. One final point of note: the survey found no significant correlation between support for sharia and anti-Western attitudes. In Jordan and Egypt, however, there was some correlation between preferring a less central role for sharia and having more positive views of the US."

So what you're saying is that there is majority support for sharia but perhaps with a more modern interpretation thereof? I wonder how, if you drilled down on specific issues (e.g. women's rights), this would play out. What do you think most people want to reinterpret?

[the aardvark]

I wish they had asked more specific questions on exactly that line - as I read the report, they were using ijtihad as a proxy for general attitudes towards religious orthodoxy vs pluralism. (orthodoxy isn't exactly the right word here, but I have to run out and stir my pasta sauce in about 30 seconds so it will have to do...)

[praktike]

taqlid?

[the aardvark]

Actually, one of the most interesting juxtapositions in the survey is that significant percentages of the people surveyed BOTH want sharia to be the source of legislation AND consider religious fanaticism to be a major problem in their societies.

In other words, no matter what certain prolific commentators on Islam say, these Muslims do not themselves consider it "fanatical" to want to see an ijtihad-centric, pluralistic Islam occupying a central place in their political system. And they clearly distinguish - in their own minds, regardless of whether or not these certain commentators consider this impossible - between this moderate Islamist position and a radical Islamist position.

Praktike, you mentioned in a comment on another post that As'ad describes Qaradawi as an Islamic fundamentalist. Well, As'ad is clearly and obviously right: Qaradawi describes himself as an Islamist, and his entire career has been devoted to promoting Islamism. But it's the former, moderate and ijtihad-based, version that he promotes, not the radical salafi/Wahhabi version that bin Laden promotes.

People have every right of course to oppose both forms of Islamism. But it seems to me just a major strategic and intellectual error to conflate the two when their own adherents and advocates do not.

[praktike]

Sigh. I guess I have to get around to the Baker book now, huh? Been collecting dust on my shelf for a while now.

The other day I loaded up an OnPoint segment with Fawaz Gerges and Khaled Abou el-Fadl as panelists ... I found them very interesting and el-Fadl in particular. His conception of shari'a as a kind of moral underpinning for a democratic Islam, his argument that Muslims need to embrace public reason rather than reverting to dogmatism strikes me as a very progressive approach.

Natch, I googled them, and sure enough -- stealth Islamist! and enemy of the state! -- right on cue.

Sad.

Still, Qaradawi is far to the right of those guys, and I guess you know a lot about him ... but he still creeps me out.

[the aardvark]

Qaradawi *is* far to the right of guys like Abou el Fadl - which puts him a lot closer to the mainstream of Arab public opinion than someone like Abou el Fadl. It's not an accident that Qaradawi lives in Qatar and spends most of his time on al Jazeera and preaching to mass audiences, while Khaled lives in California and spends most of his time writing highly intellectual books. Different audiences, different projects.

Anyway, I've never said that Qaradawi shouldn't creep you out... just that you (and everyone else) should place him accurately within the political and ideological spectrum and deal with him for what he is: equating him with bin Laden confuses more than it enlightens, and would make it harder for those who want to fight against Qaradawi-ism (as it were) to actually do so.

[Peter]

A very interesting study. My one problem with it: it states that "approximately 50% of Lebanese are Christian". This is a very inflated number: all of the other studies on Lebanon I've seen estimate that Christians comprise between 20% to 30% of the population. Given that Lebanese Christians tend to be much more pro-American than their Muslim counterparts (although, of course, neither Christians nor Muslims are a monolithic community), the inflated sample may explain why Lebanon is such an outlier.