Qaradawi's dangerous ideas

Yusuf al Qaradawi, again. Not the petition which denounces  him as a 'theologian of terror', for having allegedly authorized the killing of civilians and encouraging terrorism.  I've said my piece about this many times before - follow the links from here for why I don't think that it is true that Qaradawi authorized the killing of American civilians in Iraq.  (*) 

What's more interesting than rehashing that old ground is to look at some new controversies surrounding Qaradawi.  As you may know, Abu Musab al Zaraqawi recently released a statement over the internet attacking "the ulema of the air and the sultans of the televisions", who he (Zarqawi) felt had "abandoned the mujahidin" and "surrendered them to their enemies."   While most press commentary considered Iraqi clerics to be the target of the diatribes, the Palestinian writer Munir Shafiq wrote in al Hayat on Monday (December 6) that Qaradawi was obviously Zarqawi's main target.  Qaradawi's condemnations of the beheadings and hostage taking, broadcast regularly on al Jazeera and widely disseminated in the Islamic world, evidently had had some impact on Zarqawi's standing and strategy, prompting this unusual and bitter open attack.  It's rather ironic that even as Qaradawi faces an escalating campaign for his alleged aid and abettance of terrorism, the real terrorists themselves are furiously attacking him for the opposite reason.  For Zarqawi, Qaradawi and other moderate ulema "weaken the forces of extremism in Islam" (Shafiq's words) by rejecting their right to carry out atrocities or to pass judgement on other Muslims.

Zarqawi's fury with Qaradawi has received little attention because it doesn't fit the current storyline - the whole "theologian of terror" thing - but it does suggest an important development in the real battles taking place in Arab and Muslim public opinion.  Qaradawi is dangerous to the likes of Zarqawi, because he is vastly influential, he adamantly rejects his radical, violent, exclusivist vision of Islam and he instead offers a moderate, democratic, but genuinely Islamist alternative. 

For example, on Sunday night, on the al Jazeera talk show Sharia and Life, Qaradawi returned to one of his favorite themes, one sure to strike fear into the hearts of his critics on both sides:  "A Civil Democratic Islam" (the title of a recent RAND report).  So what did Qaradawi tell an audience of somewhere between 10-20 million Arab viewers?  "There is no political Islam and non-political Islam, there is no democratic Islam and non-democratic Islam, there is only true Islam as we understand it which must be based on shura (consultation) and respect for human rights and respect for freedoms and dialogue with others and tolerance of the other and equity [insaf] for women and equity [insaf]  for the weaker classes and the establishment of social justice." 

Qaradawi questions the use of the term "civil" in the context of Western discussions of "civil society" because, he argues, the popular sectors of society should be free to organize themselves along the values and identities in which they believe.  Islam is a religion of life, he argues, one which gives meaning to all aspects of the Muslim's life, and can not therefore be excluded arbitrarily from the realm of politics.  If the people believe in religion, and organize themselves outside the state along those lines, on what grounds can their beliefs or organizations be summarily excluded from the bounds of legitimate "civil society"?   It is not a bad idea to consider the post-election debates here in the US about religion and politics before taking on Qaradawi's question.

Qaradawi carefully distinguishes between the Muslim and the Islamist.   Non-Islamist Muslims - those who push for secularism, for example - are Muslims (no takfiri extremism here).   Islamists are those Muslism who are part of a political movement aimed at reshaping society along Islamist lines, just as nationalist or Marxist or liberal movements seek to reshape society along their preferred lines.   And as such, they have a clear political agenda, but one which Qaradawi thinks must be advanced through peaceful social action and participation in genuinely democratic institutions (he is scathingly critical of currently existing Arab sham democracies, with their 99% Presidential election wins).

Qaradawi takes the RAND report to task for neglecting what he considers to be the most important trend within Islamism:  "the trend of reform and renewal, a centrist Islamist [wasatiya] trend.. which unites the norms of sharia with the changes of the era... one which unites received truths with rational truths."   He claims that this trend, whose lineage he traces to Mohammed Abduh and Rashid Ridda, has a mass popular base and is indeed the most popular of the trends (which may be wishful thinking, but that's what Qaradawi said).   Qaradawi asks why the West does not want to acknowledge the reality of a mass-based Islamist centrist reformist movement commited to democracy, and instead wants to focus on other, less important or influential (by his account) trends such as the traditionalists who reject modernity or the extremists.   And, speaking for this trend, Qaradawi "calls for a stand against sectarianism and against extremism and against stagnation, and I call for an opening and for dialogue."

In the battle of ideas, then, Qaradawi represents a powerful obstacle to radicals like bin Laden and Zarqawi.  Qaradawi's arguments for a democratic, centrist Islamism are particularly important because they aren't being made in books which few people read, or in international conferences addressed to presumably sympathetic Western ears, but instead on al Jazeera where they reach tens of millions of the most politically aware and active sectors of the Arab public.  While I can understand why American liberals might be leery of his socially conservative views, and many more Americans might be deeply disgusted by his positions on Palestinian suicide bombings, I think that people often deeply underestimate the role that such figures can and do play in the wider battle of ideas in the Arab and Muslim world. For better or for worse, in my humble opinion, in the real balance of forces within Arab public opinion today, one Qaradawi arguing for democracy is worth infinitely more than the well-intentioned but non-influential writings of outspokenly pro-American liberals.  Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya just matter more than Elaph and Al Hurra, regardless of whose ideas you prefer.   

(*)  and at any rate since being accused of having done so he has issued a series of strong statements explaining that he does not, as in, for example, this September 26 statement which says, among other things:

"it is forbidden to kidnap any human being in any situation other than open warfare, when the person kidnapped becomes a prisoner of war who must not be killed";  "In the case of war, it is not permissible to kidnap innocent or enemy civilians who must not be made target of any act of war";  and "we say that a captive can only be killed in exceptional circumstances, by an order of the head of the Muslim state made on the basis of a court sentence. The groups operating within the armed resistance to the occupation of Iraq or elsewhere do not have the right to exercise the power of the head of a Muslim state. Moreover, killing captives is bound to have adverse effects on the resistance to the occupation, and give the cause of the Iraqi people and their struggle a bad image. We, therefore, denounce the killing of the Nepalese and other captives who did not take part in the fighting. If it were true that they provided service to the occupation forces, such service does not justify their killing."

Comments

[praktike]

Interestingly, the US Army War College is thinking about these kinds of issues as well. Here's a report about Islamic laws of warfare done by a scholar at UCLA:

http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/islamic.pdf

[lewy14]

“While I can understand why American liberals might be leery of his socially conservative views,”

Yep.

“and many more Americans might be deeply disgusted by his positions on Palestinian suicide bombings,”

Yep. Again.

“I think that people often deeply underestimate the role that such figures can and do play in the wider battle of ideas in the Arab and Muslim world.”

Quite possibly so. I’m informed by Qaradawi’s disavowal of the whole hostage murder thing and will concede that at the very least it is not fair to refer to this issue without referencing the disavowal. Further, I’m also informed by this comment:

“If the people believe in religion, and organize themselves outside the state along those lines, on what grounds can their beliefs or organizations be summarily excluded from the bounds of legitimate "civil society"?”

I’ll concede that Christian religious conservatives appear to advance much the same argument. I’m not one of them, but I support American style separation of Church and State (no Establishment) and not French style enforced secularity in the public sphere. Freedom must entail the freedom to wear ones’ faith, on one’s sleeve if one likes.

I still think there’s a case to be made that Qaradawi is a religious hate monger, and his “socially conservative views” alone suffice to earn him that distinction. Note that were he a conservative Christian theologian, this would hardly be controversial, they get called that and worse every day (and in at least some cases, rightly so).

But I’m interested in the idea that Qaradawi could be this, and yet also be a foil against Bin Laden, Zarqawi, et al. That’s an interesting idea and one I’ll have to think about. I distrust him and his motives, and I’m not alone in this, but in some respects this may not matter. In any case, know that should I further criticize Qaradawi (and I fully expect to), know that I acknowledged this much.

[the aardvark]

Lewy14-
Couldn't ask for more than that. I've said many times myself something similar - I don't actually particularly like Qaradawi's views, nor trust his intentions; but I think it's important to present those views honestly, see where they fit in the wider spectrum of Muslim opinion, and engage with them fairly in both the positives and negatives. If, having done that, you still conclude that on balance Qaradawi and others like him should still be denounced and opposed, then at least we're arguing about the same thing - and can reasonably disagree.