it hit it while i was gone

A couple of weeks ago, I laid out the case that the problem of the future of the Awakenings was coming to a head.  Well, while I was away, the issue seems to have exploded.   McClatchy, the New York Times, the LA Times, and others have run important stories on what seems to be a concerted campaign by the Maliki government to crack down on the Awakenings movement - with what appears to be grudging American acceptance.   

The Awakenings experience demonstrates the limits of American influence over the Iraqi government - months of sustained, intense pressure on Maliki to integrate the Sons of Iraq into the Security Forces has produced remarkably little results, and now Maliki is cracking down on a pillar of Gen. Petraeus's strategy against al-Qaeda.  This should be another nail in the coffin of the popular idea that improving security will lead the Iraqi government to make political accommodations with its rivals.  Quite the opposite - much more on that coming soon, I promise. 

On a related note, Tareq al-Homayed, editor of the Saudi paper al-Sharq al-Awsat, has a widely discussed piece voicing intense displeasure with the 'betrayal' of the Awakening (English version here).  The crackdown could very well put the ice on the recent opening of relations between Arab states and the Iraqi government (which has not, at any rate, yet extended to the Saudis).  I don't think that the Awakenings are as beloved and respected by Arab public opinion as some pretend - they are backed more by governments, the Saudi and Jordanian media, those sorts of sectors - but Homayed's closing lines about the message conveyed will likely resonate more broadly: "Beware of cooperating with the Americans, or you will share the Awakening Councils' fate."

Both reducing America's ability to pressure the Iraqi government to seek political accommodation and creating the perception that the United States betrayed the Awakenings are commonly cited as reasons why the U.S. should not withdraw troops from Iraq.  That both are happening anyway seems to be relevant.

Back to the internal dynamics at play.  Maliki is casting this as another step in the "law and order" campaign, with the refrain of no arms in the hands of militias familiar from earlier campaigns in Basra et al.  Ironically, this framing actually follows what I've advocated for well over a year - establishing effective state sovereignty, which the U.S.-backed Awakenings project undermined.   But I had hoped that this would be done by integrating the Sunni Awakenings into the security forces, not by arresting their leaders and throwing their members back out onto the streets.  This is just one more example of the gap between the formal policy and the implementation which has plagued Iraqi politics - an amnesty law which doesn't seem to let many Sunnis out of jail, a deBaathification reform law which seems to make things harder for its intended beneficiaries, calls for refugee return which do nothing to allow them to successfully return.   

If this is indeed the showdown, and - in the words of the influential ISCI leader Jalal al-Saghir - "the Awakenings have no future in Iraq", then what's going to happen?    It could shape up into a real world test of two competing hypotheses:   'we don't need to accommodate those hoodlums'  (Maliki, Gen. Keane) vs 'they can cause a lot of trouble if not accommodated' (Petraeus and Odierno, among many others).   The first position basically assumes that the Awakenings are the remnants of a spent force, unwilling and unable to go back to the insurgency, which can be easily bought off with jobs or ignored.   The second basically assumes that the Awakenings represented a choice made by the insurgency factions, which could go back to the insurgency if it had to. 

I think that they can go back to the fight, even if they don't really want to. I've never understood the argument that a group which effectively fought the U.S. for years, then voluntarily decided to strike deals with the U.S. to battle a common enemy, can not now switch sides again.   I don't have the faith in biometric data that I hear from U.S. military sources.   

But you can see the Maliki calculation here pretty clearly.  Start from the basic assumption that all other things equal, most of these guys really don't want to go back to the insurgency.  They'd prefer to be integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces, recognized as the power-brokers in the Sunni community, and given de facto control of their local neighborhoods.  But the Maliki government now seems intent on denying them that option.  So what can they do? 

The deals with the U.S. (never yet with the Iraqi government) don't mean that they've given up their guns or forgotten how to fight.   But their extreme fragmentation (some 200 different individual deals with the U.S. military, as Steve Biddle always points out) creates a major collective action problem.  The absence of a unified leadership makes it harder for them both to make and enforce binding deals (pace Jim Fearon), but also to return en masse to the mattresses.  With each local group looking out for itself, Maliki likely believes he can slice and dice them, co-opting some while cracking down on others, counting on their inability to overcome the collective action problem.   Plus, as I was told recently by a senior U.S. military leader, if the Awakenings groups do hit back then Maliki has the excuse he needs to slam down even harder.   

Much of this depends on whether the insurgency factions such as the Islamic Army of Iraq still retain operational control over all these local cells and small groupings - if they do, then they could overcome the collective action problem and initiate a coordinated return to insurgency (though not to any 2005-style alignment with AQI, I don't think - that divorce, from what I've heard from a wide range of sources, is final).   Even if they can't or won't go that route, it doesn't seem like it would take that many individual defectors - even just a few thousand - to seriously ramp up fighting again.

But here's a stumper.  What if that battle is joined, but the "former Awakenings" ("the once and future insurgency?") choose not to turn those guns against their American "friends" but concentrate exclusively on the Iraqi government.  Which side does the U.S. support?  The Awakenings movement which it has built and cultivated, or the Iraqi government which it has built and cultivated?  Could get messy. 

 

Comments

[Zathras]

It has always seemed to me that multiple deals between the American military and local Awakenings not working with one another rather increased the relative power of the central government. The alternative posed by some observers, of the central Shiite-dominated government letting bygones be bygones and letting Sunni Arab insurgents who had fought the government through mass-casualty attacks on Shiites take over effective control of large areas of Iraq, just never seemed very realistic to me -- not because it wasn't a fine idea in the abstract, but rather because it assumed Shiite opinion with respect to former insurgents is more flexible than is probably the case.

Now, I'll admit Maliki is no George Washington. He doesn't seem to me to have advanced very far beyond the views of his major constituency. But I'm not persuaded of the apparent view held by some observers, that he is hostile to integrating the Awakenings primarily because he -- individually, or in common with his close associates -- is just being sectarian and unreasonable. I don't think that's a realistic way to approach Iraqi politics right now.

This is our problem because our army is there and for no other reason. Without the American army in the middle, Maliki probably proceeds with his test of strength against Sunni Arab militias unwilling to submit to his government's authority, and what happens happens. It would be better for Iraq if this did not happen, but the United States can't afford to keep the lid on this kettle forever. I fear we're just kidding ourselves that efforts to mediate between a majority deeply motivated by past grievances and a formerly dominant minority that does not even acknowledge them is a road that leads anywhere.

[Klaus]

Which side does the U.S. support? The Awakenings movement which it has built and cultivated, or the Iraqi government which it has built and cultivated?

Oh come on. What has the US been doing recently, apart from assisting the Iraqi government in dismantling the Sadrist-dominated local councils and inserting its own people? The US is behind the government, with open or closed eyes. That is: imperialists or tools of an autocracy. And the US will be over the horizon for a while still, lending air support to the heroic attempts of the PTBs to consolidate their control of the political process. Provided they can keep the peace among themselves, of course, witness Diyala.

[Alex]

What if that battle is joined, but the "former Awakenings" ("the once and future insurgency?") choose not to turn those guns against their American "friends" but concentrate exclusively on the Iraqi government.

Precisely what the US wants. Good to see you like to repeat US embassy propaganda.

[aardvark]

Alex -

I'm really confused - you think that the U.S. really wants the Awakenings to go to battle with the Iraqi government? Why? Don't quite get it, but curious what you have in mind.

[Alex]

Well, I think the US wants to create a wider split between the Sunnis and the Shi'a, not necessarily to go to war, but for the Sunnis to be angry with Maliki. The reason is obvious. The issue of the SOFA has been absolutely central in US thinking, for good reason (though its importance has been concealed). Any split that can be created which might force Maliki to sign on conditions more favourable to the US is bound to be pursued. In fact, as we now know, Maliki was not playing chicken, as your US diplomat friend thought, but wouldn't have signed on anything less than something like the 2011 final date now proposed (if indeed he is ready to sign on even that). So, in fact such a US manoeuvre wouldn't have worked, but given the mentality of US officials thinking that really Maliki was playing chicken, creating a Sunni-Shia split is a move in the game.

There was also the secondary issue of making the Iraqis look still stupid, divided and fractious, in case anything unpleasant had to be done in order to resolve the problem of the SOFA.

[Klaus]

I am more of the persuasion that the US leadership was and is acting incredibly shortsighted, without any clue as to where this thing is going - much like they went in. So naturally they have put the crushing weight of the US Army behind the factions more amenable to a US presence - they couldn't just leave, that would be admitting defeat - and because the short-term concern was getting shot at, and the detrimental effect on the US Army and the Bush administration's popularity back home this had. I don't think Iraq in any way will play out to the advantage of any American long-term, save producers of military hardware. Not even oil producers.

So they will back the IA against the Awakenings, if only to save face for the Iraqi gov - just like in Basra and Sadr City. The US Army is dedicated to upholding the Potemkin village of Iraqi peace and sovereignty, and they can't have the IA failing.