Senate: make Iraq pay for Sons of Iraq

I was very intrigued to hear that the Senate Armed Forces Committee has unanimously recommended, in addition to a somewhat problematic ban on US financing for reconstruction projects larger than $2 million, that "Iraq also would have to pay to train and equip its security forces and provide the salaries of Sunni-dominated "Sons of Iraq" security groups."   I've been advocating this move for a long time - not to save money, but to force Maliki to integrate the Awakenings into state security force to advance both sectarian political accommodation and the effective sovereignty of the Iraqi state.  Here's an excerpt from what I wrote in March  after noting that Gen. Petraeus had just gone on record declaring the future of the "Sons of Iraq" to be the single thing which most kept him up at night:

So what to do?  Brian Katulis and Ian Moss over the weekend argued that "the United States must signal that it will stop its independent funding of the Sunni militias that are part of the sahwa movement, providing ample time for Iraq's Ministries of Defense and Interior to assume financial responsibility. With the price of oil hovering around $110 a barrel, the Iraqi government does not lack the resources to fund these groups on its own."   Over the last two weeks I had been privately circulating a similar proposal along these lines, though I had suggested sweetening the pot by offering to compensate the Iraqi government for the expense of hiring the Awakening fighters in order to remove any financial incentives. 

The argument basically goes like this.  If the Awakenings are not integrated into the national security forces, then there is little hope for political accommodation or for lasting security and the US is effectively trapped.  Since all other forms of persuasion seem to have failed, it's time to give Maliki an ultimatum:  in two months, payments to the Awakenings will cease.  If Maliki gives in, then there may finally be some hope for political accommodation and for overcoming the strategic problems created by the surge - think of it as cashing in the Awakenings chip before it loses its value.   

The downside is that if Maliki doesn't go along, dragging his feet and ignoring American advice as usual, then things may well get ugly. But all signs suggest that they will get ugly anyway - and better that they get ugly while the US is at the highest troop levels it will ever have.  If Maliki won't do this now, when US troop levels are high and security is relatively better, with the shadow of a new President who likely will not continue to offer an open-ended commitment, then he never will... and everyone should know this.  The upside is that if it works, then the next President - whoever it is - will be dealing with a more competent and more effectively sovereign Iraqi state in which the weight of Sunni arms is more vested rather than with an uneasy, violent standoff between heavily armed and mistrustful militias seperated only by American troops.

The argument for this has only gotten stronger over the last two months, as the Maliki government has suddenly found it possible to find jobs for significant numbers of members of Shia tribes and presumed Shia militia members in its battle against the Sadrists. Good move by the Senate Armed Forces Committee - now let's see if the recommendation can be leveraged into some real progress on that front.

Comments

[fnord]

Eh, whats the fall back position, if the Maliki government screws it up and refuses to play along? A return to the old levels of violence? Is there a contigency plan somewhere, or is this another example of the US breaking their word? "Come to our side, we will give you money"... "Ooops, we were just kidding, now you are unemployed again."?

[Zathras]

OK, first of all, it's the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The amendment in question was attached to the annual Department of Defense authorization bill, a piece of legislation separate from the appropriations bill providing funding for operations in Iraq (technically, this is an emergency supplemental. Five years into this war, President Bush still has not seen his way clear to request war funding through the normal appropriations process, and Congress has never insisted on paying for the war in this way).

It is possible for the DoD authorization to be attached (as an amendment) to the supplemental, though this is a highly unusual procedure for such a major piece of legislation. Otherwise, though, it would be difficult for Congress to impose this prohibition via the authorization -- at least, to make the prohibition effective before the last months of this year at the earliest.

The American command in Iraq, of course, does not need to wait for Congress to prohibit the use of funds for the SoI groups, and there are good reasons why it should not. However, the reservations I expressed in response to Lynch's post last March seem as relevant to me now as they did then.