cause without law ain't no order, you know what I'm sayin'

The Iraqi Parliament's passage of the budget, amnesty, and provincial laws after much political theater is potentially a rare bit of good news.  But as with the deBaathification reform (which looked so promising on first blush and then not so much when the details emerged), it all depends on the details of the laws, the implementation, and the reception.  Thus far, the reporting in the Western, Arab and Iraqi press has been very light on the details, mostly repeating what Parliament spokesman Khaled al-Attiya said in his press conference.  Given the centrality of the details, it isn't encouraging to hear that "the parliamentary success was clouded because many of the most contentious details were simply postponed, raising the possibility that the accord could again break into rancorous factional disputes in future debates on the same issues." [quote fixed - thanks, Eric]  I'm relieved that the speaker didn't have to exercise his threatened nuclear option - dissolving the Parliament - and that these three crucial laws have finally been passed after so many months of wrangling. That's good news on its merits.  But I'm also reserving judgement on the implications of the laws until we see the details and the fallout. 

I've only been able to get hold of the text of one of the laws so far - the amnesty law.  As with the deBaathification reform, it's hard to tell how extensive the amnesty will turn out to be from the text of the law.  Gven the long list of exceptions detailed in article 2, it all comes down to interpretation and implementation.  If applied generously and in a spirit of reconciliation, it could be quite extensive and build considerable goodwill (even if it also puts a sizable number of insurgency-age young men, fresh from prison, back onto the streets).  If applied rigorously and in a sectarian spirit, a lot of the prisoners who the Sunnis hope to see released might not get out and backlash would set in very quickly.  So as with all these laws, wait and see.   

The most interesting part of the amnesty law is actually Article 6:  "The Iraqi Government shall undertake the necessary measures to transfer those detained in the MNF-I jails to the Iraqi jails in order to implement the provisions of this Law on them."  What this means in practice will be worth following.  Last week I noted that the potential complications posed by this provision:  will the US honor an Iraqi request for prisoners held in US facilities to be transferred and amnestied, given its own military interests, and if not how would the Iraqi government respond?

I'll update if I can, but most likely I won't be able to write anything more for a while because I'm now officially late for a meeting across town, and then I have to rush back to talk at the "Integrating Islam" conference at the Elliott School (hope to see some of you there!).... and then I'm off to the airport for a week in the Gulf.    Have a nice week, everyone! 

Comments

[Eric Martin]

Your quote got truncated in the first paragraph. Should read:

"raising the possibility that the accord could again break into rancorous factional disputes in future debates on the same issues."

You stop off at "raising the possibility"

[nur al-cubicle]

I can't imagine that the US, having invested yet more billions in prison camps for captured insurgents (and people in the wrong place at the wrong time) would release any of these prisoners. Another question is how well does US "reeducation" work, anyway? Any scholarly analysis of such "reeducation"?

[Gregory Gause]

I know that I am in a distinct minority among Iraq watchers, but I was hoping that al-Mashadani was going to push his nuclear button. I would like to see the parliament dissolved and have new elections. The advantages of new elections, in my mind, are: 1) get rid of al-Maliki, 2) break up the UIA into component parts, let them run separately, see how they do. This could then promote cross-sectarian alliances, which are already appearing, in the next parliament; 3) test the political strength of the Awakenings, which, I would assume, would put together some kind of list, and get them formally into the political process. I understand all the objections to the Iraqi electoral system, but it seems to me that new elections -- national, not just provincial -- would be the best way to take advantage of the somewhat improved security situation.

[Badger]

Visser has a brief update today (Thurs Feb 14), indicating among other things it looks as if the cross-sect opposition (to the Maliki/Kurd/Hakim front) may have done quite well(at least on the elections-date issue). Worth reading.

[bb]

It is truly outstanding to see the western and Arab commentariat across the board discussing legislation passed by a democratically elected Arab parliament. Not just a benchmark, but a milestone.

[David Martin]

A book titled "Order Without Law" describes how ranchers in a corner of northern California deal with the usual problems--damaged fences, stray livestock, possible trespass (un-stray livestock) and so on. There's informal rules for everything, many of them different from the legal versions.

[JHM]

I know that I am in a distinct minority among Iraq watchers, but I was hoping that al-Mashadani was going to push his nuclear button. I would like to see the parliament dissolved and have new elections. The advantages of new elections, in my mind, are: (1) ... (2) ... (3) ....

This approximates, distantly, to a sort of private mental benchmark of my own. For a couple of years now I have wondered if I am the only person following developments in the former Iraq from Europe or North America who could tell a pollster without hesitation who or what I'd vote for if I was a subject of the International Zone régime myself. (In two words or less: Muqtadá.)

Though much closer than anybody else, Dr. Gause doesn't come all that close to fitting my bill. The type of "advantages" that he specifies are such as a practicing invasionite or tertiary educationalist would think of from the outside, not the thoughts of a voter in the voting booth. Even "Get rid of al-Maliki!" -- though that one sounds promising, maybe even a bit swiftboatlike -- would turn out to be high and dry and academic, I suspect, if the precise reasons for preferring Anybody But Núrí were spelled out a little. Nevertheless, Dr. Gause does put himself in M. al-Mashhadání's position to some extent, if not actually thinking what he would do if they traded places, then certainly making me wonder.

The point of maximum Gause-Mashhadání divergence is Advantage III, to "test the political strength of the Awakenings, which, I would assume, would put together some kind of list, and get them formally into the political process." No practical pol in any nation or province would ever think like that. If it wasn't clear to M. al-Mashhadání that the Salvific Awakeners would vote in a way that profits himself, partisanly or sectarianly or personally, he'd naturally be happy to leave their electoral strength untested indefinitely. Given the nifty triple bundling of bills, and the other now familiar methods of obfuscating who votes for what at New Baghdád,[1] M. al-Mashhadání's exact calculations cannot be reconstructed. All the same, it seems very safe to say he cannot possibly have thought Dr. Gause's thought, nor even the Gausean kind of thought.

What would Hillary do, for Pete's sake, if presented this afternoon with proposals to enlist scads and scads of unenrolled young or African-American donkeys in order to ascertain their strength, and lead them into the formal process, and make sure that the Homeland political system, and especially the Democratic Party, take due proportional account of their wishes?

Gimme a break. Happy days.

____
[1] There are a number of technical and procedural ingenuities in the doings of the International Zone régime that merit more attention than they have received. On the obfuscation of representation front, for instance, would it have satisfied Mr. Edmund Burke if the electors of Bristol simply could not make out whether he had voted the way they instructed him to, not even if al-Jazeera had been broadcasting live from Westminster?

[Andrew R.]

Two thoughts. The first off is that I've got the horrid feeling that amnesty might begin and end with letting out Sadrists in the spirit in intra-Shi'ite reconciliation and leave everything unaddressed.

Gregory,

I wonder how much of a test of the Awakening/Sons of Iraq/Whatever's strength provincial elections would be, especially since they'd be the folks guarding the polls, transporting ballots, etc.

[acomplia]

Your quote got truncated in the first paragraph. Should read:

"raising the possibility that the accord could again break into rancorous factional disputes in future debates on the same issues."

You stop off at "raising the possibility"

[nur al-cubicle]

AA, could you spring DJ Grooverider while you're visiting the Gulf? Thanks.

[ella]

Any comments on: "Arab information ministers adopt broadcast charter" ??
http://africa.reuters.com/wire/news/usnL12427370.html
Or do your comments deal now exclusively with Iraq and/or US politics?