Al-Qaeda after bin Laden

I've noticed a number of pieces in the Arab press over the last few days speculating about the future of al-Qaeda after bin Laden.  Mostly it's in response to the latest round of tapes, from Zawahiri and Zarqawi, as well as the long absence of bin Laden.   I don't actually read as much into bin Laden's media absence as do some - sure, he might be dead, but just as plausible is that he believes that his appearances should be reserved for high profile interventions and there's no point in wasting him on a run of the mill denunciation of the Muslim Brotherhood participating in Egyptian elections.

Whether he's dead or not, though, he will be someday and people are struggling to discern what that would mean for al-Qaeda.  Most of the analyses are casting it in terms of either Zawahiri or Zarqawi emerging as the new center of power.  Some think that al-Qaeda would pretty much disappear as an organization, even though the various jihadist groups that make it up would continue as they are.   

Among the more interesting of these recent pieces, Jamil al-Nimri, in Jordan's al-Ghad, points out that "it is apparent to anyone who saw the tape that he [Zawahiri] lacks the charism of bin Laden and his credibility and the power of conviction".   Zawahiri might have been effective behind the scenes, but his elevation to the primary face of al-Qaeda would (in Nimri's assessment) cripple that organization.  Zarqawi would likely then become the 'home address' of al-Qaeda.  Nimri notes Zarqawi's growing willingness to engage directly with public criticisms of his actions - after the Amman bombings, and now in his most recent tape - and suggests that this means that Zarqawi is aware of the possibility of his 'elevation' and is trying to play more of a public role ala bin Laden.

Meanwhile, Yusuf al-Dini in al-Sharq al-Awsat pits Zawahiri against the Muslim Brotherhood.   He sees Zawahiri's detailed intervention in Egyptian politics as a new thing for al-Qaeda - and as evidence that al-Qaeda is growing concerned that the prospects of peaceful change might be blunting the appeal of al-Qaeda's violent strategy.   Rather than focusing on the Zarqawi challenge, he directs attention to the potentially renewed vigor of domestically-oriented political Islam, the declining fortunes of which in the 1990s (according to such authors as Kepel, Roy, Gerges, and many others) contributed to al-Qaeda's rise. 

There's lots more out there that I don't have time to write any more about, but it just caught my eye that there so many Arab writers now are speculating about a world after bin Laden.