Foreign Affairs Arab Reform

**** WORLD EXCLUSIVE!  MUST CREDIT THE AARDVARK ****

UPDATE: here's the link, as promised - go read the whole thing!

Okay, maybe not that big a deal, but I always wanted to do that Wonkette thing.

Anyway, I got hold of a pre-publication copy of an interesting piece in the next Foreign Affairs on Arab reform by Steven Cook (link to the full-text should be available on-line some time tomorrow, I hear):  "The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform."   

Cook argues that promoting Arab reform is an urgent security need, but that Bush's policies to date have been minimal and ineffective.  Nothing surprising there.   Cook then argues that "one principle should guide U.S. leaders:  punitive policies have proven, time and again, to be of limited value or even counter-productive.  Washington needs, instead, to adopt an incentive-based approach, one that will lead Arab countries to fundamentally revise their institutions." 

This means abandoning both "reliance on civil society" and "pressure for economic reform", neither of which offers a viable route to real reform in his estimation (Amy Hawthorne had some similar thoughts on the civil society question last year).  From this perspective, both the Middle East Partnership Initiative and the USAID development approaches are misguided;  they might provide some nice returns on their own merits, but won't contribute to serious reform.   Cook also correctly notes the simple problem that America's "dismal image in the Arab world" means that "many local activists refuse to work with Americans" - and, I would, those tend to be the most able, most popular, most independent local activists. 

So what will work?  Focusing on the "flawed institutions" which are the real obstacle to reform: 

"Contrary to conventional wisdom, Arab states boast such institutions in spades; the problem is not with their number but with their nature.  In the Arab world, these institutions are designed to ensure the authoritarian character of the regimes.  Rather than guarantee rights or give citizens a voice, Arab political institutions tend to restrict political participation, limit individual freedom, and vest overwhelming power in the executive branch." 

Cook may be arguing with a bit of a straw man here - who disagrees that Arab political institutions stink?  But his broader point is an important one:  as long as those authoritarian institutions are setting the rules of the political game, then even progressive-looking developments such as local elections will have little real impact. 

So how does Cook suggest getting at these institutions?  Basically by the US offering more aid and mebership in valuable international organizations in exchange for specific, measurable institutional changes promoting pluralism, the rule of law, power sharing, property rights, and free markets.   As he points out, American aid has generally not been tied to such specific changes, with aid to countries like Jordan and Egypt far more conditional on their cooperation on grand strategy and high politics than on internal reform.   

Unfortunately, the specific ideas Cook offers don't seem like they'll have the punch needed to really make a decisive difference.  As he admits, the US doesn't have anything to offer like the EU membership which has driven Turkish internal change.   It is unclear why Arab regimes would accept anything which looked like a poison pill or a trojan horse. Egypt may like to get another $700 million from the US, but does it need that $700 million so badly that it would make fundamental internal changes to get it?  And why would Egyptian leaders place any stock in such a conditional offer, when their long experience tells them that Americans care far more about how Egypt treats Israel than it does about how it treats its internal opposition? 

I also think Cook goes a bit awry by lumping together political and economic reforms.  Most Egyptians, or other Arab regimes, would have little problem with the economic changes suggested, but would balk at anything which challenges their internal rule.  By lumping them together, this avoids priortizing what we should really care about.  Should free speech and the right to political assembly and public opposition be given greater or lesser weight than, say, privatization of state monopolies or protection of property rights?  Arguments could be made either way, but Cook doesn't really break it down.

Finally, I fear that Cook falls into the same trap as have others who have emphasized economic incentives: assuming that such indirect, incentive based approaches would be well-received by the Arab public.  Au contraire:  few images are more potent than that of the Arab ruler as prostitute, exchanging services to Washington for American cash. 

Anyway, it should be a valuable contribution to the Arab reform debate, and you should check it out when it comes on line.   While I'm thinking about it, Ray Takeyh has an interesting piece in the National Interest, too, which I don't have time to discuss but you might want to read.  Takeyh seems to be working the same turf as Cook, though, suggesting a trend:

If Washington is serious about democratization in the Middle East, as opposed to liberalization, it has to change strategies....A viable democratization strategy would employ the considerable economic leverage that the United States and Europe possess to pressure these states toward viable reforms. Preferential trade agreements, foreign assistance and access to U.S. markets should be contingent on the level of progress that regimes make toward democracy. The U.S. experience vis-a-vis Latin America, especially Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s, and that of the EU towards its eastern periphery make it clear that when political reform is linked to economic benefits, regimes can be induced to introduce changes that lay the basis for a democratic transformation. The West should link aid to reforms designed to reduce state controls over both political life and the economy.

 

Comments

[praktike]

Good scoop. I'll blog about this later ... btw, you might want to read this WSJ editorial: http://tinyurl.com/4y4eu

Let me know if you're not a subscriber, and I'll shoot you an email.

[the aardvark]

Not a subscriber - send me the text, or tell me what it's about!

[Issandr El Amrani]

please post or email it on if you get it!

[Peter]

One of the problems an approach like Tayekh, or any effort at Arab reform had led by the United States, is that Arab public opinion is overwhelmingly hostile to American attempts to promote internal reform or democratization. In the context of America's policies in Iraq and Israel/Palestine and overall military dominance vis-a-vis the Arab world, many of Arabs see democracy promotion as an unacceptable interference in their internal affairs, or, even worse,as a new form of imperialism.

I'm not defending this attitude, but it does exist. Without support from the Arab public, any American attempt to pressure Arab leaders to make reforms will have a very limited impact.

[Dung Beetle]

Dear Abu,

This may sound simplistic, but why exactly do experts like Mr. Cook always argue that Arab political and economic reform is an urgent matter for US security interests? After the Oklahoma bombing, I don't remember anyone calling for urgent economic and social reform in all of the filler states of America. I agree that after 9/11, the US needs to fight Al Qaeda and other extremist organizations. But does that require reforming the politics and economy of the entire region? Wouldn't it be more efficient just to increase funding for domestic security, spying and counter-terrorism? Moreover, wouldn't it be less costly and more effective to reduce anti-American sentiments by reducing all overt aid and intervention (incentive based or punitive or whatever) in the region rather than trying a new style of intervention? Isn't the real source of anti-Americanism due to US intervention in the region in the first place? Why do regional experts always advocate "big picture" solutions to relatively managable security threats?

In terms of the economy, the entire Middle East/North Africa region is hardly a drop in the bucket in terms of total US trade (especially if we exclude oil - which the US seems to be able to obtain without too much trouble). Why is it so urgent from an American national security perspective for this insignificant region to reform economically?

Of course any good hearted human being would like all other people to be free and prosperous, but I don't see why is it in the US national security interest to carry this out unilaterally. Is the importance of the Middle East being overblown by area experts? Just wondering...

Yours humbly,
Dung Beetle

[Jonathan Dresner]

Dung Beetle: if you didn't hear plenty of fulminating about our extremists and the danger they pose and their relation to our broader culture it's because the "liberal mainstream media" kept... oh, wait, it was liberals talking about those things, wasn't it?

[praktike]

Dung Beetle, you may have heard something about an attack on September 11th ... something about WMDs, and so forth. We can't keep the lid on this region forever.

[Dung Beetle]

Dear Praktike,

Of course I have heard of September 11th (and I mentioned it in my post if you read carefully), I just think that the most efficient solution to terrorism is 1) increasing domestic security; 2) ending overt meddling in the region; and 3) investing in covert counter-terrorism.

As for Weapons of Mass Destruction -- I have heard of this too. I don't think the US found any lying around in Iraq, did they?

Even if the region has WMD (and the ability to deliver those weapons onto US soil) why is that an urgent threat to US security interests? A limited WMD stockpile (vis-a-vis a massive American WMD stockpile) is useful for deterrence not compellance. If you think that authoritarian regimes can't be trusted with even a limited deterrence capability, I would assume you support attempting to disarm China or Pakistan as well... I think the reality is that the discourse about WMD becomes a bit hysterical when people talk about Arab regimes.

Perhaps you believe that authoritarian states in the region will give their WMDs to terrorist groups to do their bidding. I never accepted the idea that a dictator like Saddam would have lent such weapons to terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda. Did you? The risk of detection and massive retaliation is just too great to believe in such silly scenarios.

Loose nukes and dirty bombs are a serious problem, but these problems can be dealt with without comprehensive political and economic reform in the Middle East/North Africa. In fact if the US stops meddling in the region, will it not eliminate one of the major reasons for terrorist's targeting the US?

In any case, if there are still loose nukes out there, it is likely that they come from post-political and economic reform Russia. Perhaps policy wonks with grand reform schemes should be careful about what they wish for ...

I am just arguing for a more sane and cost effective foreign policy that reduces intervention in the region while efficiently targeting the specific source of the threat to US national security.

Sincerely,
Dung Beetle

[praktike]

Ah, I get you now. I agree that the terrorist threat should be put into its proper context, and that the unilateral reform of the ME is neither likely to succeed nor be cost-effective. I thought you were saying something else. As far as gov'ts giving WMDs to terrorists, well, I think that deterrence tends to work. Iran, for instance, has never given its chemical weapons to Hizb'allah as far as I can tell. I think we're on the same page in many respects, but I submit that the U.S. does need to recast its relationships with autocratic Arab regimes like Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

[David Holiday]

Briefly, on the Takeyh reference to Mexico. "Preferential trade agreements, foreign assistance and access to U.S. markets" were definitely not made contingent to democratic progress in Mexico by the U.S. government, before, during or after NAFTA. The argument, in fact, was the reverse -- that economic reforms and free trade would favorably impact democratization, but it was a only matter of faith that this would happen.

Ironically, political pluralism got a huge boost in 1988 when a faction of the PRI that rejected austerity policies pushed by the US broke away, and formed the PRD. So in a sense, but not the sense that Takeyh argues, I suppose economic reforms DID lead to political reforms.

[Leila Abu-Saba]

Sometime in the late 1980s the NY Times printed a piece on Islamist organizing in Cairo's slums. The government had essentially given up on providing basic services like sewage, schools and hospitals. The Islamists (I forget the name of the party or group- i'm no poli scientist) had stepped in and were winning hearts and minds with free medical care, free schools and so forth.

At the time I thought - we give Egypt billions of dollars a year. What are we getting for our money? At least when the Soviets were helping Egypt, they built (ugly) housing and schools, and that (environmentally disastrous) dam.

After September 11, I believe the question is even more to the point. Now the muscle for 9/11 was said to be Saudi but Atta and Aiyman Az-Zawaihiri, the planners, were Egyptians, scarred by the anti-Islamist torture and imprisonment of the 80s. Whoever their Egyptian supporters may be, I am certain that the sha'abi ones (the poor, the so-called "street") are influenced by the government's indifference to their pressing problems. The fundamentalist groups are in there doing something for them.

Again, we're giving Mubarak all this money - is he using it to improve the condition of Egypt's populace? Why can't Egypt take care of basic business, and why did they let the Islamists do it for them? The question was obvious when I was an exchange student in 1983, and it's still obvious.

We're giving them guns, is the answer. Our government doesn't give a s**t if the mass of Egyptians fester in oozing sores and die slowly of malnutrition. But of course it does affect us - we're mostly just too dense to see it in the USA.